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Abstract
This thesis investigates how far the political theory of Gramsci's Prison Notebooks
(1929-35) had its immediate origins in the crisis going on in Germany at the time he
wrote them. The crisis was a matter of burning interest to all European communists
for whom the whole future of the revolutionary project started in 1917 depended on
what happened in Germany. The thesis reconstructs the historical context of the
Prison Notebooks year by year and identifies a series of notes - the 'German'
notes - in which Gramsci theorises about questions suggested by current events in
Germany. A few of these notes are in a concrete state and their German content is
readily identified but many were written in general terms which must be decoded
before their 'practical origins' in the German events become apparent. The method
of decoding Gramsci's notes is to contextualise them.
The order of chapters is chronological and each has three levels: (i) an account of
Gramsci's personal drama - his moral struggle in the context of his deteriorating
conditions of health - based largely on the Prison Letters. These letters are the
outstanding human document of the European resistance to fascism, including
resistance to German fascism at the hour of its victory; (ii) a reconstruction of
Gramsci's knowledge of the German events based on a systematic reading of the
political periodicals and newspapers he received on subscription in prison. These
provided Gramsci with continuous news and comment on German affairs, the full
extent of which has not been investigated (Appendix 2); (iii) a critical commentary
on the 'German' notes following the chronological order established by Professor
V. Gerratana in the critical edition of the Quaderni del Carcere (1975). The
technical difficulties of determining the precise dates of the notes are sometimes
considerable and have been a matter of scholarly dispute. Where the dates of the
'German' notes discussed in this thesis present particular problems, they are dealt
with separately (Appendix 1).
The conclusion draws together the conceptual threads running through the
German notes and summarises the main features of Gramsci's interpretation. His
theory of the rise of Hitler differs from those of other marxists inside and outside the
Comintern for two reasons: firstly, his assimilation of concepts of non-marxist origin
such as Weber's concept of the charismatic leader and Sorel's concept of the
historical bloc; secondly, his rethinking from its Hegelian origins of marxism itself,
which enables him to conceptualise aspects of the German crisis neglected by
other marxists, notably the historic crisis of the traditional intellectuals, the counter-
revolutionary effects of civil society, and the role of the bureaucratic caste.
In Gramsci's interpretation, Hitler comes to power in the context of a criSis of
hegemony marked by the breakdown of the 'ruling ideas'.The traditional
intellectuals, the Prussian nobles, are unable to provide leadership in politics or
culture. Despite the catastrophic nature of the economic crisis after 1929, it does
not develop into a revolutionary situation because of the resistance presented by
the superstructures of civil society (private armies, newspaper concentrations, and
other elements), a complex network of 'trenches' which make up the ideological
front of the dominant class. The crisis is solved by the transformation of traditional
into charismatic authority through the sudden appearance of a "man of destiny".
The charisma of Hitler depends on reinventing tradition, a process most visible in
the 'symbiotic' dependence of the parties and ideologies of the German Right. The
element of race, a subordinate element in traditional nationalist ideology, now
becomes the nucleus of a new utopia - the 'Third Reich', Gramsci regards the Third
Reich not as a revolution (which it claimed to be) but as a dynamic restoration
founded on the traditional solidarity of the dominant agrarian-industrial bloc.
Despite this, his final word on the 'monstrous' phenomenon of Hitlerism, written in
1935 in response to the first laws of the racial State, unmistakably registered the
shock of the new.
Preface
This thesis has taken longer to research, think out, and write than I ever imagined.
My interest in Gramsci began in 1968 as a research student at York under the
inspiration of a magical Welsh teacher, the late Gwyn A. Williams, who had written
about Gramsci in the Journal of the History of Ideas in 1958 when few people
outside Italy had heard of him. At the time I was interested in other questions,
particularly in Gramsci's relation to his 'master' Croce and how this influenced his
reading of Marx. However, the discovery of Gramsci's notebooks and letters in the
original Italian stimulated a sort of brainstorm which rendered me completely unfit
to write anything useful about him. It was not until much later during a term in
Cambridge in 1992, in calmer times and 'other worlds', that I began writing an
entirely different thesis about Gramsci's response to the German crisis of 1929-33.
My research on his periodicals, mostly conducted in the national libraries in
London and Rome, was well advanced by this time and I had a clear idea of the
structure and content of the work, but I still found it difficult to grasp how exactly his
dialectic worked and I was still far from clear whether his German notes added up
to an 'interpretation'. Then circumstances diverted me into doing an MA in which I
pursued an interest in modern German historiography and wrote a short thesis on
explanations of the Holocaust. This was not entirely unrelated to my work on
Gramsci's 'German' notes, but the fact remains that what I fondly imagined would
take eight weeks in Cambridge took nearer eight years: contrary to the academic
spirit of the times, it was a job for a tortoise not a hare. Given the moral and
intellectual quality of the man, however, I never doubted that it was worth the time
and effort.
The Question
Throughout this time the original question remained the same. What did Gramsci
say in the Prison Notebooks (1929-35) about the contemporary crisis in Germany
which saw the rise of Hitler and the Third Reich and, with them, the defeat of
Europe's strongest communist party? At first sight the notes appeared to contain
little about these crucial events, but this was strange in view of the fact that for
European communists Germany was "the key to the international situation". The
policy of the Comintern was 'modelled' on the German situation and in Comintern
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circles the future of the revolutionary project started in Russia in 1917 depended
crucially on what happened in Germany. I started reading some of the 20-25
periodicals Gramsci received on subscription in prison to find out what he knew
about the German events. This soon disposed of the myth that he knew little about
what was going on: on the contrary, the periodicals provided him with a continuous
flow of news and comment about events in Germany from a variety of ideological
perspectives and on a regular basis (see Appendix 2). The question now became
a puzzle. If he knew so much, why did he seem to write so little?
The obvious answer was the prison censorship which, I assumed, scrutinised every
page he wrote. Gramsci was not allowed to read works of "political agitation", so I
inferred that he was not allowed towrite about such matters either. However, there
is no evidence that the prison authorities attempted to regulate what he could write.
The assumption that Gramsci's elliptical mode of expression in the notebooks was
due to the repressive effects of the censorship on his writing does not stand up to
scrutiny. There is no evidence that the prison authorities read, let alone censored
the notebooks although the prison governor was at liberty to do so at any time.
True, the notebooks were stamped on every page by the prison censor and signed
by the prison governor, but this was before not after Gramsci wrote anything in
them and not a word of the notebooks (unlike the letters) was ever cancelled by the
censor.' This fact did not exclude the possibility of Gramsci exercising a prudential
self-censorship, of course, especially on the few occasions when he writes about
the politics of his own side. Nevertheless this discovery complicated the puzzle still
further. Perhaps Gramsci's disguise was due more to intrinsic than extrinsic factors,
perhaps it was explained by his method of thinking rather than by the regime he
worked under.
Decoding the Notes
The puzzle was pieced together note by note until, in time, the theoretical 'mirror
image' of the German crisis in Gramsci's notes unfolded. As I got to know what he
knew about the German events, week by week, month by month, I began to read
his notes differently, in the first place chronologically, and to compare what he
1 The notebooks were stamped and signed on coming into the prison, not after Gramsci wrote in
them. The procedure is described in a letter to Tatiana on 23 February 1931 (LC" p.398). This
explains why we often find the prison stamp on blank pages (see Professor Gerratana's 'Description
of the Notebooks'. aClv pps 2369-2441)
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knew with what he wrote at anyone time. It was not until a later stage, after passing
through a phase of fanatic pedantry about the dates of the notes and when I had a
better understanding of how his dialectic worked in particular notes, that I realised
that Gramsci's theory resulted from an "elliptical comparison" similar to that used by
Machiavelli in The Prince.
The habit has been formed of considering Machiavelli too much as the man of politics in general, the
'scientist of politics', relevant in every period. Machiavelli should be considered more as a necessary
expression of his time, and as closely tied to the conditions and exigencies of his time ....... He is
influenced by the examples of France and Spain, states which have achieved a strong territorial
unity; he makes an "elliptical comparison" (to use Croce's expression) and deduces the rules for a
strong State in general and a strong Italian State in particular 2
Perhaps it is time to change our habit of thinking about Gramsci too and to deliver
The Modern Prince from the political scientists who have so far monopolised it into
the hands of historians. For even though he was isolated in a remote prison in Bari
Gramsci remained, like Machiavelli, closely tied to the conditions and exigencies of
his time, including those of the watershed years 1929-33. Contrary to what is
commonly assumed, Gramsci's notes were not only, or even mainly, based on the
political experience prior to his arrest in 1926. His thinking was influenced, for
example, by events in Germany in the years 1929-35 although the "elliptical
comparison" took in the experience of other countries as well, notably Britain. It is
therefore a question of seeing how far his general rules of polities, written with Italy
specially in mind, "approximate" to German (and British) politics in those years. By
comparing the text with the context, I found that they corresponded time and again
and that the text bore the "imprint" of the context. The scholarly controls
safeguarding against reading "into" the notes what was not really there were the
dates and sources of the notes, but the text matched the context too often to be a
figment of the imagination.
The puzzle can be understood better when it is approached from the practical
instead of the theoretical side. When Gramsci called marxism "the philosophy of
praxis" he meant theory is practical in its origin and intention. It therefore becomes
a question of discovering the "practical origins" of his theory in the current
struggles. To take a typical example: the electoral successes of Hitler's party in the
summer of 1930 (as reported in the periodicals) coincided with Gramsci's first
attempt to analyse the phenomenon of charismatic leadership in modern politics
2 First draft §1.1 0, QCI p.8-9 lsecond draft §13.13, QCIII p.1S72. For the convention used in referring
to the prison notes, see 'Dates of the Notes' below).
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(§2.75i). The past example of Mussolini is discussed but the timing of this note
indicates that its practical origin was the appearance of a new charismatic leader in
Germany comparable to Mussolini. It was the reports from Germany which put the
question of charismatic leadership on Gramsci's agenda and gave his theory its
currency or attualita. But there is no mention of Hitler in this note: the effect of the
"elliptical comparison" was to hide the immediate practical origin of his theorising
behind a "mask of generalisation" (Perry Anderson), which typically presents
itself to us in the sybilline phrase: "In the modern world, the so-called 'charisma' of
which Michels speaks " etc. By contextualising this note, however, we discover
in Gramsci's theory the abstract imprint of German politics in the summer of 1930
as the charismatic Hitler began his meteoric rise. Thus, when Gramsci writes that
the appearance of the charismatic man "coincides with a primitive phase in the
development of mass parties", the mass expansion of Hitler's party in 1929-30
currently testified to what he meant.
The puzzle does not end there, however, for there is a further layer to Gramsci's
disguise. The mask of generalisation is the mask of Janus: it faces left and right at
once. This had to do with his conception of the scientific or objective validity of
theory. If theory had its origin in the practical struggles of the day and was meant to
solve the problems these presented, Croce would say that it must be an "error",
since it must be tainted with the partisan "passion" which animated these struggles.
According to this doctrine the political theory of a communist like Gramsci could
have no claim to scientific or "objective" validity. Gramsci's answer to this doctrine
of the 'paesional' origin of error was to conceive the political struggle dialectically
and to formulate rules of politics which were objectively valid for opposite sides.
This was
the double interpretation of Machiavelli: by the tyrannical men of State who want to preserve and
strengthen their domination and by the liberal tendencies who want to change the forms of
government. This second tendency is expressed in Foscolo's verses [about Machiavelli] ·who, even
as he strengthens the sceptre of rulers, plucks away the laurel leaves and reveals to their peoples·
etc. Croce writes that this demonstrates the objective validity of Machiavelli's positions, which is
absolutely right (giustiSSimo )3
By critical analysis of the politics of the Right, Gramsci formulated rules of politics
which were useful for the Left. Objectivity depended on identifying elements of
politics in the current situation which were com mon to both sides. The charismatic
3 First draft §4.04, QCI p. 425.
vleader, for example, was an element of the politics of the Right, but in the past it had
also been an element of the politics of the Left. The 'charismatic' Mussolini
celebrated in the writings of Michels, for example, began his career on the Left
before passing over to the Right and the sorcerer of fascism was deeply indebted to
the knowledge gained from his apprenticeship in the "class struggle". Conversely,
'bureaucratic centralism' in parties and States was an element of the politics of the
Left to which Trotsky drew attention in his polemics of 1923-24, but in the cabinet
formed by Papen in the summer of 1932 Gramsci found that this phenomenon was
also a feature of the politics of the Right. In his reflections on these and other
elements of politics, Gramsci synthesises the experience of Left and Right in the
quest for objectivity. This explains the constant sensation of "ambiguity" in his
generalisations which the most percipient readers of the prison notes have noticed.
Direct and Indirect Sources
The sources used by Gramsci in compiling the prison notes are catalogued in the
fourth volume of Professor Gerratana's critical edition of the Quaderni, the
awesome 1000-page "critical apparatus". Scholars who have applied themselves
to the huge mass of discrete detail it contains will perhaps know it as the "infernal
apparatus". Nevertheless, it is important to note its limitations. For understandable
reasons, the critical apparatus for the most part gives details only of the direct
sources, ie, the articles and books directly cited by Gramsci in the notes. But these
are not an exhaustive record of his reading, nor do they give the full picture of his
background knowledge of events. Gramsci followed domestic and foreign affairs in
the years 1929-35 closely, but the direct sources do not give much idea of the
continuous flow of information at his disposal. Yet his whole dialectic depended on
this. The key principle of his marxist historicism was defined as follows:
If it is necessary in the perennial flow of events to fix concepts without which reality cannot begrasped,
it is also necessary, and indeed indispensable, to keep firmly in mind that reality in movement and the
concept of that reality, although logically distinguishable, must be conceived historically as an
inseparable unity 4
Gramsci's thinking "adheres" closely to the reality of the time. It proceeds not from
concept to concept but from reality to concept.. Its connecting threads lie outside
the notes themselves in the movement of reality, and the notes are a series of
4 §10.II.01, QCII p.1241.
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snapshots of this movement taken at different times.
To return to the question of sources: when, for example, Gramsci refers at the end
of 1931 to the crisis of parties which "has happened especially in Germany with the
expansion of Hitlerism" (§7.77), he does not directly cite a source for this, but the
comment implied that he had followed the development of the German situation at
least since the breakthrough of Hitlerism in the elections of September 1930. To
find out where this knowledge came from and to try to reconstruct it, we must look to
Gramsci's indirect sources - the news contained in sources not cited in the notes.
A reconstruction of Gramsci's knowledge of German affairs from indirect sources
will at best be an "approximation": at worst there is the danger to which Gramsci
wittily refers in a letter to Tatiana: "From a tiny bone Cuvier could reconstruct a
megatherium or a mastodon, but it can happen that with a piece of mouse's tail
you end up reconstructing a sea-serpenf'. The German notes examined in this
thesis are like the tiny bones of a mastodon; the fact that we have a collection of
such bones not just a single artefact should ensure that our reconstruction of
Gramsci's background knowledge resembles more or less accurately the original
creature.
Primary and Secondary Sources
The German background has been reconstructed from the primary sources -
Gramsci's periodicals and newspapers. However, knowledge of the secondary
sources has inevitably coloured my reading of the primary sources and influenced
what I have selected from them in constructing a narrative of the German events.
The historiography of Nazi Germany is "a moment of modern culture" as Gramsci
would say, and has profoundly shaped our moral and intellectual consciousness.
Several aspects of interest to Gramsci have since been the subject of research by
historians: given the depth and intensity of the work on this period, it would be very
surprising if they were not. Where this is the case, I have referred to relevant
secondary works in the footnotes and a select bibliography of such works is
provided at the end. Occasionally it seemed appropriate to discuss the secondary
literature in the text itself by way of bringing a critical perspective to bear on some
of Gramsci's inquiries. Where I have crossed the "shadow line" from primary to
secondary sources, I have tried to make this clear. Gramsci was very conscious of
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the "non-definitive" status of his inquiries on the intellectuals which were to be
confirmed or falsified by further research. He had no hesitation in saying that further
research might show the very opposite of what he was saying was true. It is entirely
in Gramsci's spirit of open-minded inquiry, therefore, to examine his ideas in the
light of later findings whenever possible.
Organisation and Presentation
The attempt to reconstruct the historical-political context of the prison notes poses a
number of technical problems of organisation and presentation. To deal with these,
the following conventions have been adopted: (i) The 'German' notes are
presented as far as possible in chronological order in the third section of each
chapter. Some adjustments have been made - usually by grouping notes - to
enhance thematic coherence and readability. To follow the threads of Gramsci's
thinking it is sometimes necessary to dilute strict chronological purism with a dose
of common sense. In each case the 'target' note is quoted in bold type to denote its
place in the chronology. To understand the place of the target note in the process
of Gramsci's thinking, however, it is sometimes necessary to refer to notes written at
an earlier or, more rarely, at a later stage. Since the latter are quoted out of
chronological order, they are presented in plain type. Where this kind of internal
contextualisation is needed, it is usually indicated by the rubric "past and present".
(ii) the German background of the notes based on material from Gramsci's
periodicals is reconstructed separately in the second section of each chapter. To
present the sources and notes together would have been unmanageable and the
notes would have been submerged by the sources. To remind the reader of the
relation of certain notes to their context, however, it is sometimes necessary to
quote material from the periodical sources in the third section of the chapter. This
is particularly the case in the dramatiC early months of 1933 when Gramsci's writing
was more than usually "close" cognitively and temporally to his sources. Where
source material is quoted in this section, it is always presented in plain type to
denote a clear distinction between what Gramsci was reading (ie, by someone
else) and what he was writing at the time.
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The Dates of the Notes
Although the dates of Gramsci's notes, especially the first drafts, are vitally
important in this thesis, I do not intend to enter into the rather unproductive dispute
about them.5 It is fair to say about the technical problems of dating the notes what
Gramsci once said about the finer points of philology: "They are the sort of
problems about which Heine wrote: 'they are so boring that I fell asleep, but such
was the boredom that it woke me up again"'. Suffice to say, I have generally
accepted the authority of Professor Gerratana in this matter and followed the
parameters positively (as distinct from conjecturally) established by him in the
critical apparatus.6 Where I have narrowed down the dates more precisely, the
evidence or arguments for doing so are given in Appendix 1. Occasionally I have
traced notes to periodical sources not given in the critical edition: the details are
given in the footnotes.
The numbering of the notes follows that of the 4-volume critical edition: the symbol
§ is followed by the number of the notebook, then the number of the note. The
volume and page number of the critical edition (QCI-IV) are then given to indicate
where it can be found. To avoid misunderstanding it should be noted that the
numerical order of the notes in the critical edition does not necessarily denote their
chronological order. Because Gramsci usually wrote in several notebooks at a
time, and because he sometimes started blank notebooks from the centre pages, it
often happens that notes with higher numbers were written before those with lower
numbers: for example, §3.34 was written before §2.75; §8.171 was written before
§8.55, etc.
All translations of Gramsci's sources and notes are mine. Wherever I am indebted
to other translations, even if do not 'agree' with them, this is duly acknowledged.
Wherever I have translated part of a note or letter (either for the sake of economy
or focus) which has been translated in its entirety elsewhere, references to
translations of the whole passage are provided.
*
5 The dispute starts from Gianni Francioni: L 'officina gramsciana. lpotesi sulla struttura del 'Quademi
de/Careere' (Bibliopolis, Napoli, 1984).
6 See the acidly incisive comment in Valentino Gerratana:Gramsci. Problemi di metoda (Editori Riuniti,
Roma, 1997) p.147.
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1Introduction
We know that Gramsci wrote an analysis of the postwar crisis in France before
1929 which he called Notes on French National Life. 1 However, he also produced
an analysis of the succeeding crisis in Germany after 1929 which could then be
compared and contrasted with the French model. These 'German' notes have
passed entirely unnoticed in spite of the wealth of critical writing on the notebooks.
They are scattered across some 30 notebooks and were never put together into a
single coherent whole. What kind of analysis do they contain and why has it gone
unnoticed?
It was not a history of the German events in the usual sense. His notes on the
German crisis were written as it was happening not after it was over. He did not
.have the hindsight of a historian for whom knowledge of the outcome of events (ie,
what exactly needs to be explained) organises the whole conception of them,
determining the key elements to select, describe, and analyse. Gramsci's position
was more like Trotsky's who also attempted to analyse the German crisis as it
unfolded and whose articles on Germany are a classic Marxist analysis of "history
in the making".2 But there are significant differences between them. Trotsky's angle
of vision was clearer than Gramsci's and he wrote directly about the German
events in an attempt to influence their outcome. As a prisoner of Fascism Gramsci
could neither influence the course of events nor even write directly about them, at
least not very freely. Being powerless to change the world, he wanted to write
something for eternity but this did not mean that he turned his back on current
events. He wanted to write a modern version of The Prince in which history,
especially "history in the making", would be studied in order to extract general
rules of politics. Some of the most interesting of these notes, usually written under
the heading 'Machiavelli' , had their "practical origin" in the German events, but
their origins are disguised by what one critic referred to as Gramsci's "mask of
generalisation".3 The main reason why Gramsci came to adopt this mask was
1 They were included in the Notebook13 on Machiavelli as §13.37. Notes on French National Life,
QCIII p. 1635-1650. The first drafts of these notes were written very early, by the end of 1929 or start
of 1930. A translation of these first drafts can be found in Antonio Gramsci: Prison Notebooks,
Volume1 (hereafter PN1), edited and introduced by Joseph A. Buttigieg (Columbia University Press,
1992).
2 Leon Trotsky. The Struggle against Fascism in Germany (Penguin, 1971). Note the list of
newspapers and journals available to Trotsky on p.498-499.
3 Perry Anderson: 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci'. New Left Review, No.l00, November 1976-
January 1977, p.20.
2intrinsic not extrinsic: it was not because of the scrutiny of the prison censor as is
usually assumed (although this was not immaterial) but because of his idea of
what thinking about politics "scientifically" meant. However, by reconstructing what
Gramsci knew about events in Germany, mostly from the periodicals he regularly
received in prison, it is possible to penetrate the mask and see the "practical
origins" of his generalisations. It is important to trace the German origins of
Gramsci's theory for it can be argued that no attempt to write a modern Machiavelli
would be complete which did not grapple with the big questions of history and
politics posed by the rise of Hitler and the advent of the Third Reich.
A 'Crisis of Hegemony'
Viewed in their totality, we might say that the originality of Gramsci's notes is to
interpret the German crisis of 1929-33 as a "crisis of hegemony", which would thus
be their organising concept. However, it is important to remember that the concept
of hegemony which is now synonymous with Gramsci's name was far from being
fully-formed when he started writing in 1929. In its one-dimensional meaning the
crisis of hegemony simply meant the breakdown of parliamentary government, ie,
of the 'normal' form of governing with the consent of the governed. In the first drafts
of his notes on France Gramsci had already worked out a model of the general
phenomenon of "crisis of hegemony" in this sense before the end of 1929.4
However, the most interesting dimensions of the concept of hegemony, which have
to do with the structures of civil society and the function of the intellectuals, were
still embryonic at this early stage. We must first sketch the origin of these concepts
in Gramsci's thinking and the way in which he related them to the 'parliamentary'
crisis of hegemony. This will indicate how he attempted to organise his first
observations on the crisis in Germany which were written at the turn of 1929-30
before Hitler appeared to be significant. Gramsci started by synthesising the
elements of French and German experience of the time, much as the young Marx
did in giving birth to the new conception in the years before 1848.
4 §1.4B. The reverse Jacobinism of Charles Mau"as. QCI p.58-64. Starting from the elements of
French political history Gramsci moves to a description of the general phenomenon of hegemony and
its breakdown in the postwar period, before returning again to "The crisis in France" (p.58-60).
(Translation in PN1 p.155-161).
3The Conceptual Starting-Points
(i) Civil Society
Gramsci tells us directly in the notes that his concept of civil society comes from
Hegel.
16.24. Encyclopaedic Ideas.Clvll Society .It Is necessary to distinguish between civil
society as It Is understood by Hegel and In the sense In which It Is often used In these
notes (ie, In the sense of the political and cultural hegemony of a social group over the
entire society, as the ethical content of the State) from the sense in which It Is used by
the Catholics for whom civil society means, Instead, political society or the State, In
contrast to family society and the Church... 5
The reference was to Hegel's Philosophy of Right where "civil society" features as
one of the moments of the "ethical life", lying between the preceding moment of the
family and the succeeding moment of the State. We notice that Gramsci gives no
hint of the original "speculative" form in which Hegel expressed his philosophical
thought. He assimilates the concrete substance of Hegel's concept, discarding its
speculative form: this substance was "the political and cultural hegemony of a
social group over the entire society".
Gramsci learned how to separate the content from the form of Hegel's philosophy
by studying the original process of thought by which the young Marx "transformed"
Hegelianism. According to a famous metaphor of Marx, Hegel stood history on its
head and it was necessary to put it back on its feet. Marx started this process of
"transforming" Hegel from a critique of his political philosophy, the Philosophy of
Right, which was also Gramsci's starting-point in the prison notes. A key moment in
the process according to Gramsci's reading of it was the moment of synthesis of
German philosophy and French politics which the young Marx expressed in a
number of early texts with which he was familiar.6 By alleging that the concepts of
German philosophy could be "translated" into the language of French politics or ( to
put it another way) that German theory was equivalent to French practice, the
young Marx stripped the German ideology of its mystery and brought it down to
5 §S.24, OCII p.703. My italics.
6 Gramsci recalls this moment in §1.44, at an early stage of the notebooks: "(cf. Marx's analysis in The
Holy Family according to which the phraseology of the Jacobins perfectly corresponded to the
formulas of classical German philosophy, which is recognised today as being much more concrete and
which has been the origin of modem historicism)" QCI p.51.
Gramsci's reading of the 'Young Hegelian' Marx predates the prison notebooks. By way of illustration
(not reconstruction) note the use he makes of TheHoly Family in the article CriticslCriticism 0112
January 1918, where Bruno Bauer typifies the habit of "getting concepts and reality mixed up·. Scritti
Giovanili I p. 153-155. This suggests that he had grasped the principle of "transformation" of idealist
philosophy early on.
4earth. Impressed by the creative possibilities opened up by this principle of
"translation", Gramsci starts the notes by attempting a 'Franco-German' synthesis
of his own which was designed to bring Marxist theory up to date with political
reality as it had developed since 1848. This brought the concept of civil society into
a pivotal position in the field of play of his own theory. Gramsci's synthesis can be
traced in two notes written together around the end of 1929.
11.47. Hegel's doctrine ot a.soc/atloll Hegel's doctrine of the parties and the
asaoclatlona as the 'private' network of the State. This derived hl.torlcally from the
political experiences ot the French Revolution and was Intended to give constitutionalism
a more concrete character. Government with the consent of the governed, but thla was
organised consent not the generic and vague consent expressed In the moment of
electlona. The State has and demands consent but also 'educates' It by means of the
political and syndical assoclatlona which are, however, private organlams, left to the
private Initiative of the ruling clasa. Thua, In a certain aense Hegel already went beyond
pure constitutionalism and theorised the parliamentary State with Its regime of parties. 7
11.48. [Notea on French National Ufe]. The development of Jacoblnlsm [In Ita content]
was formally perfected In the parliamentary regime whereby the urban class, during the
period when 'private' energies In society were most abundant, achieved Its hegemony over
the whole population /n the Hegelian lorm 01 government with permanently organ/sed
consent (In which the organising la left to private Initiative and therefore has a moral or
ethical character since the consent In one way or another la voluntary).8
The equivalence between German philosophy and French politics, Hegelian
political theory and Jacobin democracy, was based on the perception that both
contained in embryo the same "element of politics", ie, the modern parliamentary
State with its regime of parties. We notice that the term civil society is not used,
probably because Gramsci was mainly trying in this note to situate theoretically his
concept of the political party , but theconcept of civil society is clearly there in "the
private network of the State". This private network is the same thing as Hegel's
"ethical State" since consent given freely is ethical in character. But the scope of
civil society in Europe by 1929-30 had developed far beyond the associations
mentioned by Hegel and "consent" was now more permanently entrenched.
We may debate how far this Franco-German synthesis "solicited the texts"
but this is not at issue here. The key point to hold on to is the 'French' prinCiple of
transformation, ie, of bringing German theory down to earth. To do this it was
necessary to break off from theory altogether and to study the concrete political
reality it was meant to describe. Thus Gramsci began by studying the concrete
7 QCI p. 56-57. My italics. (translated in PN1 p.153-154).
8 QCI p.SS. My italics. (Translated in PN1 p. 155).
5elements of German civil society. In fact, he shows more interest in these early
notes in the symptoms of hegemonic crisis in civil society than in the arena of
parliament and the political parties. This may have been for prudential as well as
scientific reasons since writing directly about German politics, about matters of
immediate "political agitation", was potentially sensitive as far as the prison
authority was concerned.9 There were two elements of civil society in Germany
which particularly interested Gramsci in 1929-30: the para-military associations or
"shock troops" of the German Right (§1.133-134)10 and the ownership and
readership of German newspapers (§2.26)11. As different kinds of "private
association", the study of these elements enlarged and refined the concept of civil
society itself. Moreover, insofar as both the elements played a key role in
attempting to change "the equilibrium of force and consent", they gave concrete
substance to Gramsci's "crisis of hegemony".
(ii) The Intellectuals
Gramsci tells us directly in the notes that the concept of the "intellectuals" also
comes from Hegel but it is harder to tell how since, unlike "civil society", the
"intellectuals" do not appear in Hegel under that name. Moreover, in the note in
which Gramsci tells us this Hegel's "intellectuals" meant something quite specific.
§8.187.lntellectuals. The position assigned by Hegel to the Intellectuals should be
accurately studied. It has had enormous Importance not only In the conception of political
science but In the whole conception of cultural and spiritual life. With Hegel thinking In
terms 0' the 'castes' or the 'estates' begins to give way to thinking In terms of the 'State',
whose 'aristocracy' are preCisely the Intellectuals. The 'patrimonial' conception of the
State (which Is the mode of thinking In terms of 'castes') Is the conception which Hegel
Immediately had to destroy (scornful and sarcastic polemics against von Hailer). It Is
Impossible to understand anything (historically) about modern Idealism and Its social
roots without this 'validation' of the Intellectuals by Hegel.12
9 Italian and German fascism had already begun to draw closer together by this time. For example, the
Nazi party congress at Nuremburg in1929 welcomed the Italian representative with loud applause
and shouts of "Viva l'Italia Fascista". Hitler told the congress that "any possible enemy of France must
be considered a probable ally of Germany" and therefore called for the promotion of closer friendship
with Italy. See the reports of the congress in RSE, 13,20 August 1929, p.1818-1819 and p.1866-
1867, discussed in chapter 1 below.
10 §1.133. MilitaryandPoliticalArt, QCI p.120-122. (Translated in PN1 p. 217-218 and in Selections
from the Prison Notebooks (hereafter SPN), edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey
Nowell Smith (Lawrence and Wishart, 1971) p. 231-233, starting from "The relationship which existed
in 1917-18 ..... ).
11§2.26. The German Newspapers , QCI p.182-183. (Translated in PN1 p.274-27S).
12 §8.187, ocu p.1054.
6On this evidence Gramsci's "intellectuals" come from the same text of Hegel which
gave him "civil society". The polemic against von Haller is found at the start of the
section on 'The State' in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, immediately after the section
on 'Civil Society'.13 This textual reference again brings to mind the young Marx's
"transformation" of Hegel. We know that Gramsci was actively engaged in "the
study of Marx's Hegelianism" at an early stage of the notebookst- and probably
knew that he started from the Philosophy of Right. Even without the text of Marx's
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, however, Gramsci seems to have studied
the same paragraphs on 'The State' to which Marx first applied his 'transformative'
criticism. These included the paragraphs on the civil service, Hegel's "universal
class". The context of this note suggests that Gramsci was no more inclined than
Marx to accept Hegel's description of the civil service as the "universal class" and
that he had a firm grasp of the difference between concept and reality.
In the context of 1932 when Gramsci wrote this note, Hegel's "intellectuals"
referred specifically to the civil service, the State bureaucracy, since this was linked
to his perception of its pivotal role in German politics in 1932. The patrimonial
conception of the State with its outmoded way of thinking in terms of "caste"
described the mentality of the civil and military bureaucracy which effectively ruled
Germany after the breakdown of parliamentary government in 1930. This way of
thinking was characteristic of Germany's "traditional intellectuals", the Prussian
Junkers, who resembled "a priestly-military caste". Gramsci suggests that the
particular tradition they were heirs to was Haller's philosophy of the State not
Hegel's. Hegel's "aristocracy" was an aristocracy of talent not of birth. The civil
service was "a career open to the talents", that is, open to the brightest and best of
"the middle class" {Hegel's term}. This is what Gramsci meant by the "social roots"
of modern idealism. Haller's State, on the other hand, was the patrimony of the
Prussian aristocracy, exclusively reserved for those of
13 The polemic against von Haller is in the Addition to §258 of the Philosophy of Right. See Elements
of the Philosophy of Right, translated by H.B.Nisbet and edited by Allen W.Wood (Cambridge
University press, 1991) p.278-281.
14 See §1.152. Marx and Hegel. "In the study of the Hegelianism of Marx, it is necessary to
remember • etc, QCI p.134-135. The specific reference to Hegel's Philosophy of Right in the
letter to Tatiana on 19 May 1930 (LCI p. 331) indicates that Gramsci was reading it at the time this note
was written, ie, shortly after 20 May 1930 (for the date of §1.152, see Professor Gerratana's
observations In aclV P.2373). Gramsci was reading it in the Italian translation by F.Messineo
published by Laterza in 1913: see 'Ubri e opuscoli di autori conosciuti', QCIV p.3055.
7noble birth.15 Gramsci perceived that this was how President Hindenburg and his
circle regarded the German State in 1932: it was their State.
However, Hegel's conception of the "intellectuals" embraced not only political
science but "the whole of cultural and spiritual life". In other words, Gramsci's
transformation of Hegel's idealism went beyond the State in the strictly political
sense. To understand the scope of his transformation, we must go back to its
starting-point.
What did Marx mean by saying that Hegel stood history on its head and that it was
necessary to put it back on its feet? Gramsci's answer was to transform Hegel's
Idea into "the ideas of men", and thence into "the intellectuals".16 However, he did
not simply see the intellectuals as they saw themselves. Gramsci explains that the
intellectuals tend to see themselves as an independent category who represent
"the uninterrupted continuity of history", who represent, in other words, the
"tradition" which survives historical changes. This subjective conception on the part
of the "traditional" intellectuals as he calls them, corresponded to "the uninterrupted
continuity of history" represented by Hegel's Idea, which also led a shadowy life of
its own outside of history. Gramsci understood that the transformation of Hegel's
Idea into the intellectuals was not complete unless they are seen as part of the
"system of forces" prevailing in civil society - unless they are seen, that is, in a
"sociological" perspective. This was not without difficulty since Marx's sociology
was almost universally interpreted in positivist terms and the positivist "mechanics"
of the system of forces left little or no room for the "active principle" represented by
the intellectuals. Nevertheless, it was only by showing the position of the
intellectuals in the social structure and their role in the social system that Hegel's
Idea could be brought fully "down to earth".
15 For an account of von Haller's philosophy of the State, see Robert M.Berdahl: The Po/iticsof the
Prussian Nobility. The Development of a Conservative Ideology 1770-1848 (Princeton University
Press, 1988) p.232-246.
161n his early writings on Marxism, Croce was extremely interested in the problem of Marx's
transfonnation of Hegel but never satisfactorily solved it. He argued that "Hegel's Idea (and Marx knew
this.perfectly well) is not the same as the ideas of men; and to turn the Hegelian philosophy of history
upside down cannot give us the statement that ideas arise as reflections of material conditions. The
inverted form would logically be this: history is not a process of the Idea, or of some transcendent
r~t~nal reality, but a system of forces .... : . Gramsci solved the problem by situating "the ideas of men"
within "the system of rorces'. See Benedetto Croce: MateriaJismo storico ed Economia Mancista
(Laterza, 1961) p.5
8The scope of the activity of Gramsci's "intellectuals" corresponds to the forms in
which Hegel's Idea manifests itself in history. In Hegel's philosophy of history the
Idea or Spirit (Geist ) comes down to earth in history, where it differentiates and
manifests itself in various peoples as their National Spirit (Volksgeist ). Hegel calls
this national spirit "the principle of a people", ie, the principle which unifies a
people and holds it together. But what form does this unity take? The usual
interpretation of Hegel is strictly political, ie, that the principle of a people is
embodied in its political organisation, the State, but Gramsci was also interested in
the other interpretation according to which the principle of a people is embodied in
its culture. It has even been argued that the meaning of 'State' in Hegel has
nothing to do with political organisation at all and refers exlusively to culture17 , but
since by culture Hegel means not only the "art, religion, science" etc of a people but
also (especially in The Philosophy of Right) its "institutions, laws, morals" etc, it
seems clear that the cultural and political forms of the Volksgeist cannot be neatly
separated. This interrelation corresponds to the complex configuration we find in
Gramsci's notes between the cultural and political forms of intellectual activity.
The prison notes start from the premiss that the cultural and political forms of
the Volksgeist correspond "concretely" to the activity of the intellectuals in the
spheres of civil society and the State. The so-called Volksgeist is a sort of
complex paradigm of a nation's tradition which is invented and formed by the
intellectuals through their cultural and political activity. According to Hegel the
subjective reality of the Volksgeist in the political sense is the sentiment of
"patriotism".18 No one would deny the reality of this sentiment but relatively little
attention is paid to how it becomes a reality. The patriotic spirit is formed, in the first
instance, through the schools system where the State takes direct responsibility as
the educator of this particular form of "consent". However, the deeper roots of the
Volksgeist lie in civil society, the realm of the "ethical State", because consent is
ethical when it is given voluntarily out of moral and intellectual conviction and when
it is given permanence in a great variety of cultural forms, of which the political
parties are one. When the intellectuals or "leaders" of civil society and the leaders
of the State promote the same Volksgeist, the same complex of ruling ideas, we
17 For example by Leon J.Goldstein: 'The Meaning of 'State' in Hegel's Philosophy of History " The
Philosophical Quarterly, XII, 1962, p.60-72.
18 On Hegel's concept of patriotism as a political disposition see §267 -269 of Philosophy of Right
cit., p.288-289.
9can say that a state of normal equilibrium exists since the people give their consent
to their leaders by freely accepting the "official" national paradigm. But what
happens when the official national paradigm breaks down?
Gramsci's notes on Germany start from this point. He read an article about
contemporary German writers and summarised its contents in §3.03, significantly
entitled German Intellectuals. 19This literature told him something about the crisis
of the national spirit in Germany. In his summary he referred to this as a crisis of
"the prinCiple of authority" in Germany which meant something similar to Hegel's
"principle of a people". For he tells us that in one writer, typically,
the principle of authorlty ...ls attacked In all Its forms: religious dogma, monarchical
power, official teaching, the military State, the marriage bond, paternal prestige, and
above all the Justice which protects all these transitory Institutions and marely coerces,
constrains, arbitrarily deforms public life and human nature. Man Is unhappy and bad as
long as he Is shackled by the law, by custom, and by traditional Ideas, 20
The violent crisis of the national spirit reflected in these German writers
corresponded to the crisis in the parliamentary arena at this time where the
Nationalist party began splitting Up.21 This was due to the tactics of its new leader,
Alfred Hugenburg, who joined with Hitler and the "racists" in the autumn of 1929 in
absolute opposition to the republican system. In other words, the 'official'
Volksgeist in both its cultural and political forms was disintegrating and the old
ruling class, the "traditional intellectuals", were losing the consent of the people.
Such was Gramsci's first perception of the crisis of hegemony in Germany.
The Guiding Threads
Although the 'German' notes do not add up to a fully integrated interpretation of the
German crisis written with the benefit of hindsight, nevertheless it is possible to
identify a number of guiding-threads running through them so that we can at least
speak of recurring lines of inquiry. There are two main threads which we may call
the political and the historical and which correspond in his thinking to the two
1913.03, QCI p.286-288, This note is related to what Gramsci says about the influence of Freudianism
in Germany in his letter to Julia of 29 December 1929, "This has given birth to a new form of intellectual
disorder which is very interesting", To Julia, Lei p,302.
2O'b'dI I .,p.287,
21The splitting of the German National People's Party (the 'Nationalists'), the first of several in the
course of 1929-30, was reported in Rassegna settimanaJe della stampa esters ,17 December 1929.
which Gramsci received regularly throughout the period of the notebooks.
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'moments' of Germany's development, past and present .To simplify a complex and
subtle pattern of thought, we may say that most of the German notes are particular
elaborations of one or other of these main threads.
(i) The Political Thread
The political thread is defined by the crisis of the political parties and of the whole
parliamentary regime in Germany. This was a general phenomenon of the postwar
period although its significance differed from country to country. This phenomenon
is first described in §1.48, one of the first drafts of the notes on France. Written at
the end of 1929, it marks the start of the political thread.
The 'normal' exercise of hegemony on the now classic ground of parliamentary government
I. characterised by a combination of force and con.ent In equilibrium, without force
outweighing consent too much. Indaac:l,force appear. to be .upported by the con.ent of
the majority a. expres.ed through the so-called organ. of public opinion (which are
therefore artificially multiplied In certain .Ituatlon.) .
In the po.t-war period the apparatus of hegemony dl.lntegrate. and hegemony become.
Incr... lngly difficult to exercl.e. The phenomenon I. described by varlou. names and
from various .tandpolnt., the commone.t being "crisis of the principle of authority",
"dissolution of the parliamentary regime" . Naturally enough the main .ymptoms of this
phenomenon, In the arena of parliament and government, are the only on.. ever described
and the.e are explained In term. of the failure of the parliamentary 'principle', of the
democratic 'principle' etc, but not the failure of the 'principle' of authority (this failure I.
proclaimed by other.). On the practical level, the crlsl. Is reflected In the Increasing
difficulty of forming governments and the Increa.lng In.tabillty of government.
themaelvea. Ita Immediate origin II.. In the multiplication of parliamentary partie. and In
the (permanent) Internal cri ... of every party (le, every party experlenc .. what
parliament as a whole experiences: difficulty In governlng).22
The instability of parliamentary regimes is the most obvious symptom of the
postwar crisis of hegemony, ie, the breakdown of "the equilibrium of force and
consent" which had become the 'normal' basis of political leadership in Europe
since 1848. The first line of enquiry is therefore Gramsci's observations on the
crisis of political parties in Germany. The results of the German elections held
almost continuously at one level or another between 1929-33 provided him with
much factual data on the parties and with evidence of the changing (or
unchanging) state of "equilibrium" (see §9.62, for example).23 There are a number
22 QCI p. 58-59. The periodical source of this note was the report of the protracted ministerial crisis in
France following the fall of BrIand's ministry in October 1929, in Virginia Gayda: 'Variazioni su una tema
francese. II Parlarnento contra 10Stato',Gerarohis, November 1929.
23§9.62. Machiavelli. [The theorem of fixed proportions] where Gramsci usesthe example of
"elections for the President of the Republic, for the Diets of the Lander, for the Reichstag. for the
communal councils and so on right down to the factory councils·. QCII p.1132-1133. Second draft
translated in SPN p. 191-192.
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of strands in this political thread which are conceptually significant .
The comparative perspective. Since the breakdown of hegemony was a general
phenomenon, the political crisis in Germany was seen in comparative perspective
which is not usually the case even among historians who have since written so
much about it. The main terms of comparison were Italy where the parliamentary
regime was slowly strangulated and finally given the coup de grace in 1926 and
Britain where the crisis was resolved by 'normal' parliamentary means in 1931.
Thus, the election of the National Government in Britain in October 1931 was a
significant moment in his thinking about the crisis of political parties in Germany
(§4.69 and §7.77).24
The focus on the right-wing parties. For scientific as well as prudential reasons the
focus of Gramsci's enquiry was on the parties of the Right not the Left, except
insofar as the "overall" relation of forces was taken into account. In particular,
Gramsci says very little in the notes about the German Communist Party. In view of
his position as a prisoner of a Fascist regime it is not difficult to see why, although
his prudence was a more complicated affair than this since he disagreed with the
policy of his own side. In any case, the most significant feature of the crisis of
political parties after 1929 was the appearance of the charismatic leader. This is a
key strand in the political thread, especially as the "charismatic" precedent set by
Mussolini in Italy provided the basis for a comparative analysis. Gramsci starts to
elaborate this strand in the summer of 1930 (§2.75(i) )25 , and after the
'breakthrough' of Hitler in the elections of September that year he returns to it at
different stages of the crisis (§2.75 (ii), §6.97, §4.69)26 . The notes on Caesarism
(§9.133/136)27, for example, written at the turn of 1932-33, are part of the same
strand as those on the charismatic leader since the phenomenon of Caesarism
arose on account of the same fundamental difficulties of "equilibrium".
24 §4.69. On the Parties, QCI p.513, and §7.n. The Intellectuals. The Political Parties, QCII p.910.
These are the first drafts of §14.23. Observations on Some Aspects of the Structure of Political
Parties in periods of Organic Crisis, QCIII p.1602 (Translated in SPN p.210)
25§2.75. R.Michels etc, QCI p.23Q-239. (Translated in PN1 p. 318-326). Despite the change of
handwriting, it has not been noted that this note was written in two halves, the first in the summer of
1930 the second in the late summer of 1931. For the method of dating, see text of thesis.
26 §2.75. The second half of 1931 starts from: "The charismatic leader can belong to any kind of
party, whether authoritarian or anti-authoritarian ....": §S.97. Past and Present. Great Ambition and
Petty Ambitions, 0011 p.n1- n2 (note the reference to ·what Michels has called the 'charismatic'
leader ..."); §4.69. On the Parties, QCI p.513.
27 §9.133 & §9.136. Machiavelli. Caesarism, QCII p.1194-1195 and 1197-1198. (Second draft
translated in SPN p. 219-223).
12
The crisis of tradition. The observations on the charismatic leader, interesting
though they are, are not perhaps the most original aspect of his perspective on the
German crisis, however. The clue to this lies in Gramsci's historicism which is more
intuitive and concrete than other varieties, including Croce's. As far as the political
parties in Germany are concerned, Gramsci applied his intuition particularly to the
crisis of the Nationalist party which, as "a monarchist party in a republican regime"
(§1.18, §2.75)28 , was particularly interesting because it stood for a tradition which
was opposed "in principle" to the very political system in which it now had to
operate. The crlsls of monarchism was one element of the much wider "crisis of
authority" to which Gramsci often refers (§1.48, §3.03, §3.34, §4.22)29 . The point
was that those on the Right who stood for this principle and attacked the republican
regime for its lack of "authority", could not offer a realistic alternative Since their own
principle was in crisis. Perhaps the most original dimension of the crisis of
hegemony as Gramsci perceived it lay in this crisis of tradition in Germany and the
Nationalist party provided a concrete focus at the level of the parties for this wider
and longer perspective. At the start of 1933 Gramsci wrote about the
"symbiosis of parties" of the German Right (§14.03).3O This concept accurately
described their tactical partnership during the cnsts of 1929-33 but, more import-
antly, it also defined in a certain way the relation between the coming of Hitler and
the crisis of the German "tradition". The symbiosis was a historical as well as
political concept, defining a relation between past and present, old and new.
The political role of the bureaucracy. The weakening of the political parties
is directly related by Gramsci to the strengthening of the political role of the civil and
military bureaucracy (§4.69)31 whose centre of power was the circle around
President Hindenburg. The crisis therefore temporarily reproduced a state of affa1rs
'similar' to that analysed by Max Weber in a famous critique of the government of
imperial Germany written shortly before its overthrow in November 1918. Gramsci
initially cited Weber's analysis for the purpose of comparison with the working of
28 §1.18. Maurrss' Error. Notes on the French Monarchist Party, CCI p.14-15 (Translated in PN1
p.108-109). It is important to note that Gramsci's French notes start from "the monarchist party in a
republican regime- since this element of politics formed the basis of comparison with Hugenburg's
German monarchist party (ie, the Nationalists). The comparison 'Maurras-Hugenburg' is made explicit
in the second draft in CCIII p. 1646. This type of party is also discussed in §2.75 (i) I QCI p. 235.
29 §1.48 cit.; §3.03. German Intellectuals, QCI p.286-288; §3.34. Past and Present ,QCI p.311-312
(translated in SPN p. 275-276); §4.22. Croce and Marx. The Va/ueofthe Ideologies QCI p.442.
30 §14.03. Machiavelli. Centre. oou p.1656-1657.
31§4.69 On the Parties, cit.
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government in Liberal Italy (§3.119)32 but Weber's account of the rule of the high
bureaucracy - the "State-Bonapartist party" as Gramsci calls it - also served to
define and focus for Gramsci a specific element of Germany's tradition (§12.01)33.
Structure-superstructure: the 'resistance' of civil society. Was the crisis of
hegemony purely a phenomenon of the superstructures? What relation did it have
to the crisis of the structure in Germany after 1929? It is important to ask this
question in view of Gramsci's reputation as "the theorist of the superstructures". As
far as the pOlitical thread is concerned, the answer lies in Gramsci's "anti-
economism" and his classic justification of it in §7.10.Structure-superstructure
which was, in fact, an explanation of the German election results of September
1930.34
Although anti-economism is a seminal theme in Gramsci's Marxism, the structure-
superstructure relation remains the central problematic. Gramsci began writing the
notes at virtually the same time as the Wall Street Crash and his many notes on the
relation "structure-superstructure" must be read in the context of the world capitalist
crisis as it developed after October 1929. His basic thesis is that economic crises,
including "catastrophic" ones, do not automatically have pouncat and ideological
effects, especially not revolutionary ones. The "potential" of such crises must be
transformed by the political parties before we can speak of their political and
ideological "effects" and this depends on a complex set of cultural and political
preconditions which have nothing directly to do with economic processes. The
most important of these relate to the superstructures of civil society which. as we
know, Gramsci compared to "the trench systems of modern warfare": they are "very
resistant to catastrophic 'irruptions' of the immediate economic elemenf.35 This
was based on observation of the crisis in Germany and was confirmed, as he saw
32 §3.119. Past and Present. Agitation and Propaganda, QCI p.388. Gramsci refers to the Italian
translation of Weber's Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order. Towards a
political critique of officialdom and the party system published by Laterza in 1919. He added that "the
translation is very imperfect and imprecise", suggesting that he knew it well. A recent translation is in
Weber's Political Writings, edited by Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs, Cambridge University Press,
1994, pp's130-271.
33 §12.01. The Inteliectuals ...QCIII, p.1527 (Translated in SPN p.19 note), where Gramsci refers to
Weber's work again in the context of describing the Prussian nobility, the "traditional intellectuals" in
Germany.
34§7.1 O. Structure and Superstructure, QCII p.858-860, written in December 1930 in the form of a
critique of Rosa Luxemburg.(Second draft translated in SPN p.233-235, starting from: "On the
subject of parallels ..." ). For the precise context and "double" meaning of this note, see text of theSiS.
35§7.10 cit. p. 860.
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it, by the results of the Reichstag election of September 1930. From Gramsci's
standpoint this was a victory not for the "attacking" forces led by the Communists
(as the Comintern claimed) but for the "defending" forces now regrouping behind
the Nazis. This was not to deny that Germany showed all the cultural and political
symptoms of a crisis of hegemony (or "crisis of authority", in German language), but
the election results showed that the dominant class had plenty of reserve strength
and was far from finished in spite of the terrifying force of the capitalist crisis. The
crisis had the effect of spurring the ruling class into restoring its hegemony before
the revolutionary class could fully exploit its breakdown.
Gramsci's anti-economistic position put him at odds with the Comintern which had
switched to an "offensive" tactic in 1929-30 in response to the capitalist crisis. This
placed him in the "impossible" position (§3.32)36 of being a prisoner of Fascism
whilst disagreeing with the official policy of Communism. Not surprisingly he
discloses very little about his political position in the notes. There were two
exceptional moments, however, when he defined his position in relation to the
Comintern. The two notes were written in response to events in Germany, always
regarded in Comintern thinking as the main arena of the European class struggle:
the first was written in the light of the results of the Reichstag election of September
1930 (§7.1 0), the second after the Reichstag election campaign of February-March
1933 in which the German Communist Party was destroyed (§14.68).37
The question of 'parasitism'. The question of Gramsci's political position (or
positions) cannot be discussed in further detail at this point as it is not relevant to
the crisis of hegemony. However, when his disagreement first became known to his
comrades in prison in a series of conversations in November-December 1930, they
felt that he had underestimated the severity of the world economic crisis and asked
36 §3.32 .: Rendre la vie impossible-, CC1 p.310. This note must have been written shortly after the
visit from his brother Gennaro on 16 June 1930 informing him on behalf of the leadership in exile of
the PCI of the change in the party's tactical line. Gennaro's testimony that Gramsci thought the new
tactic was a mistake is confirmed by the following note §.3.33. Some CaUSBsof Error, CCI p.310-311.
37 §7.1 O.Structure and Superstructure cit.; §14.68. Machiavelli, CCIII, p.1728-1730., the only one
of Gramsci's notes to refer to Stalin (Giuseppe Bessarione) (Translated in SPN p. 240-241). Written in
the first half of 1933, the timing of this note is partly indicated by the following §14.70. Machiavelli.
When it can be said that a party is formed and cannot be destroyed by normal methods. CCIII p.1732-
1735.
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him to prepare a study of it.38 Although he gathered material on the economic
crisis during 1931, he never produced the study asked of him. This was for reasons
of method as well as opportunity since the study of the economic crisis could result
all too easily in making deterministic or "predictive" assumptions in forcasting
political outcomes.
A structural phase can only be studied and analysed after it has completed its entire
process of development not during the process Itself. The only method In this case Is to
proceed by hypotheses and by making It perfectly clear that they are only hypotheses. 39
However, the financial panic in Europe during the summer of 1931 inspired the first
of an interesting sequence of notes inquiring into the causes of the economic
crisis (§6.123, §9.61, §15.05).40 A main strand in his thinking regarded it as a
"crisis of saving" caused not by the high wages paid to the workers but by the quota
of national income consumed by "parasitic" classes with no essential function in
production. The older a country's history, the more significant these parasitic
classes left over by the country's "tradition" were (§1.61).41 But to see how Gramsci
thought this hypothesis might apply (or not apply) to Germany, we must turn to the
historical thread in his thinking.
(ii) The Historical Thread
If Gramsci's "crisis of hegemony" meant no more than the breakdown of
parliamentary government in Germany there would be nothing very original about
it apart from the use of a novel terminology. But, as we see, when he interweaves
the political and historical threads of his thinking the scope of the criSis of
hegemony starts to become apparent. For it is clear that Gramsci's hegemony
refers to the State as a cultural not just a political form. This was a product of
38According to Athos Usa's report of the conversations of November-Oecember1930, Gramsci's
analysis "took no account of the interdependence of the Italian economy and other capitalist countries
or of the consequences inherent in the sharpening of the world economic crisis· . In fact, Gramsci fully
appreciated the gravity of the 1929 crisis - which he called "a catastrophic 'eruption' 01 the economic
elemenr) - but at the end of 1930 he did not foresee its duration and scope. He thought it might be
another ·sudden eruption" like the German inflation of 1923.Usa wrote his report in 1933 when the
scope and duration of the 1929 Crisis had become apparent.
39 §7.24. Structure and Superstructure, OCII p.S72. My italics.
40 §6.123. Past and Present. Observations on the Crisis of '29-30-?, OCII p.792-793; §9.S1. Past
and Present. England and Germany, QCII p.1131-1132; §15.05. Past and Present. The Crisis, QCIII
p.1755-1759. The first was written in 1931, in the context of the financial crisis; the second in1932, in
relation to the peaking of the unemployement figures; the third in early1933, in relation to the new
political conjuncture.
41§1.S1. Americianism, QCI p.70.
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Germany's past.
The historical thread in Gramsci's notes is defined by the function in German
history of the Prussian nobility, the Junkers. The start of this thread can be found in
§1.44, also written near the end of 1929, where he analyses "the political
leadership of a class before and after it comes to power". In the course of this
analysis we find a comparative sketch of how "the process by which the
bourgeoisie takes power in France, Germany, Italy (and England) differs". This
thumb-nail sketch gives us the first reference in the notes to the concept of the
nobility as "the bourgeoisie's intellectuals".
The phenomenon Is the most complete, the most rich In political elements, In France. The
German phenomenon Is similar In some respects to the Italian, In other respects to the
English. In Germany 1848 fall8 because the bourgeoisie Is not very concentrated (the
Jacobln-type slogan In Germany In 1848 Is provided by Marx's formula of 'permanent
revolution') and because the Issue Is mixed up with the national question. The wa... of
1884, 1866, and 1870 solve the national question and result In an Intermediate type of
solution to the class question: the bourgeoisie gets control of economic-Industrial affair.
but the old feudal classes remain as the ruling stratum (ceto governltlvo) with a great
many caste prlvllegea In the army, the state administration, and on the land. But for all
their enduring Importance and despite keeping all these prlvllegea, at least these old
classes In Germany do have a function: they are the bourgeoisie's "Intellectuals" with a
particular temperament of their own Inherited from their class origin and from the
tradltlon .
The correct explanation why the Junkers and Kalserlsm stsyed In power In Germany In
spite of the larg.scale capitalist development Is Indicated by Antonio labriola: the cl •••
relationship created by the development of Industry persuades the bourgeoiSie, as soon
as the limit of bourgeois hegemony has been reached and the circumstance. of the
progressive classea have been transformed, not to fight to the deeth against the old world
but to leave part of Its facade standing as a disguise for Its own domination. 42
Gramsci elaborates this thread in his notes on the Intellectuals. The first draft of
these was §4.49, written at the time the Reichstag election of 1930; the second was
§12.01written around the time of the presidential elections of 1932. A further trace
of this thread can be found shortly after Hitler came to power in 1933 (§ 15.18).43
Although the notes on the Intellectuals are regrettably short, for Gramsci the
investigation of this question was the most exciting enterprise of the notebooks.
There is abundant testimony in the letters to its special importance to him and of his
personal struggle to order his thoughts and discipline his imagination on this
42 §1.44. Political leadership of a class before and after becoming the government, QCI p.53.
(Translated in PNI p.150).
43 §4.49. The Intellectuals, aCI p.480-481; §12.01. The Intellectuals , aCIII p.1526-1527;
§15.18. Past and Present, QCIII p.1n5-1776.
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question.44 His frustration at being unable to undertake the necessary scholarly
research, his "excessive methodological scuples", his constant reservations and
misgivings about the results of his thinking - all this suggests that the question of
the intellectuals was Gramsci's 'big idea' and there is no doubt that the final
expression of his thoughts fell far short of the subject'S potential as he conceived it.
Since there are (with one possible exception45 ) no significant conceptual changes
between the first and second drafts, we quote the relevant passage on the
"traditional intellectuals" from the second draft of 1932. He begins by comparing
their function to that of the English landowning class.
The latter, long after losing Its economic supremacy, preserves Its political-Intellectual
supremacy and Is assimilated by the new group In power as 'traditional Intellectuals' and
as leadership stratum . The old landowning aristocracy joins up with the Industrialists by a
kind of suture which Is precisely what joins together the traditional Intellectuals and the
new dominant classes In other countries.
The English phenomenon also appears In Germany where, however, It Is complicated by
other historical and traditional elements. Germany, like Italy, was the seat of an
Institution and an Ideology of a universalistic, supra-national character (the Holy Roman
Empire of the German Nation). It supplied a certain number of personnel to the medieval
cosmopolis which Impoverished Its own Internal energies and aroused struggles which
distracted from the problems of national organisation and perpetuated the territorial
disunity of the Middle Ages. The development of Industry took place within a semi-feudal
framework which lasted until November 1918 and the Junkers maintained a polltlcal-
Intellectual supremacy far greater than that of the corresponding English group. They
were the traditional Intellectuals of the German Industrialists but with special privileges
and a vigorous awareness of being an Independent social group based on the fact that
they kept a significant measure of economic power on the land, which was more
'productive' than In England. The Prussian Junkers resemble a priestly-military caste with
a virtual monopoly of directive-organisational functions in political society, but at the
same time possessing an economic base of their own and not having to depend
exclusively on the liberality of the dominant economic group. Moreover, unlike the English
landed nobility, the Junkers constituted the officer corps ot a large standing army which
gave them solid organisational cadres favouring the preservation of their esprit de corps
and their political monopoly.
(In Max Weber's book Parliament and Government In the New Order In Germany can be
found many elements showing how the political monopoly of the nobles Impeded the
elaboration of an extensive and experienced bourgeois political personnel and was at the
root of the continual parliamentary crises and of the fragmentation of the liberal and
democratic parties. Hence the Importance of the Catholic Centre and of Social Democracy
which managed during the Imperial period to build up to a significant degree a
44 Thus, in the first plan of study set out in the letter to Tatiana on 19 March 1927, he writes: "The
subject is full of possibilities (argomento suggestivo in sommo grado ) although, of course, I could only
~ketch the broad outlines as there is no chance of my consulting the immense mass of material which
IS necessary", Le I, p.56. And he was referring only to the Italian intellectuals .
45 In the first draft the big landowners (/atifondisti Junker) are described as being -allied with the
petty-bourgeosie" but this is dropped in the second draft. Since the description appears to be
historically accurate in view of the Junkers' leadership of the Farmers League, the omission of this
important detail in the second draft is puzzling. It could be that Gramsci thought that history needed to
be reconsidered in the light of current politics, especially the success of Hitler's party which may have
suggested to him that the "subaltern class", the petty-bourgeoisie, had now become an independent
political movment.
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parliamentary and directive stratum of Its own).46
This brilliant synopsis sets out an entire agenda for historical research as Gramsci
was probably aware. Unfortunately this agenda cannot be explored further here47 ,
but some comment on the question of German "peculiarities" is merited in the light
of Gramsci's comparative perspective and some clarification of the term
"intellectuals" is needed in view of its unlikely application to the Junkers.
The comparative perspective. As we see, from the start of the notes Gramsci's
perspective on modern German history is defined by the ruling function of the big
Prussian nobility (/atifondisti Junker), and their conception of themselves as the
carriers of the German "tradition". Gramsci seems to take the same route which
German historians will later call the Sonderweg although it is worth remembering
that he was writing in 1932 without knowing that it led to the Third Reich. Moreover,
we should not lose sight of the main features of his route map. In the first place his
perspective on Germany's bourgeois revolution is comparative - "sim ilar in some
respects to the Italian, in other respects to the English" - so the route is far from
being entirely "peculiar": the only peculiarity seems to be to describe the nobility as
"intellectuals". Again, his perspective presupposed the large-scale development of
industry and the fundamental dominance of the bourgeoisie. This meant that the
bourgeoisie were the 'hegemoniC' class of civil society in Germany for his very
concept of 'bourgeois revolution' implied that the bourgeoisie, through a multitude
of private initiatives, organised its own leadership of civil society. The most
important regional variation in the pattern of civil society was east of the Elbe,
although it might be argued that bourgeois social relations predominated even
here if we accept Weber's definition of the Junkers as mostly "a rural middle class
with a feudal stamp"48 . Even if we narrow our definition of the Junkers to the
nobles in the strict sense, ie, the old aristocratic families still in possesslon of
hereditary latifundia , it would not be entirely accurate to describe them as a "pre-
capitalisf' class since the big estates could be regarded as a capitalist form of
production, albeit with a peculiar set of social relations. The problem is that
histories of the bourgeois revolution in Germany have paid very little attention since
Max Weber's pioneering investigations in the 1890s to the social or "historical
46§12.01. The Inteliectuals .....aCIll p.1526-1527. (Translated in SPN p.18-19).
47 See works on the 'traditional intellectuals' listed in the bibliography.
48 Weber's description, made in the context of comparing them with the English landowning class, is
inGeneral Economic HiStory (London, 1927), p. 110, a translation of Weber's Wirtschaftgesichte
(1923), a series of lectures delivered at Munich in 1919-20 just before his death.
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bloc" east of the Elbe.
The Junkers as " traditional intellectuals II .What exactly did Gramsci mean by
calling them "intellectuals"? On the face of it this description looks distinctly
unpromising since the prestige of the Junkers was scarcely based on their
intellectual cultivation, but Gramsci is obviously not using the term in this
conventional bourgeois sense. A passing comment in a later note (§7.43) nicely
makes the point. Gramsci refers to the most famous but least typical of the Prussian
Junkers - Bismarck. In a polemical comment on a piece by BoriS Souvarine
(,Liefscitz') he says that
Llefscltz thinks of the political man more as the great Intellectual In the literary sense
than as the great politician. But who was the greater Intellectual: Bismarck or Barres?
Who actually "realised" greater changes In the world of culture? Llefscltz doesn't
understand such questions at all..... 49
The nature of leading the State was quintessentially practical but to fail to
recognise the intellectual capacity demanded by political leadership was stupid.
We may well question whether or not the "bureaucrats" who succeeded him
brought to the function of leadership the specifically political capacity so
prodigiously displayed by Bismarck, especially as the victorious wars of German
unification proved that the nobility's "genius" - which would thus become the
"national" genius - lay in the field of military art and science. This question was
posed by Weber in 1917 when Germany was losing the war and when there was a
good prospect that the Junkers' monopoly of the ruling function would come to an
end. But leaving aside this important question for the time being (not to mention the
question of whether the Junkers of Pomerania read French novels), we are still left
with Gramsci'S apparently implausible description of them as "intellectuals".
In general terms Gramsci's "intellectuals" are defined by their social function.
He differentiates between "productive" and "intellectual" functions in line with the
pivotal distinction between structure-superstructure (the extent to which the
Prussian Junkers as a social group combined both functions is thus central to any
historical-political analysis of them). The concept of the intellectuals could thus be
aSSimilated to historical materialism even though it could not be found in the classic
statements by Marx, Engels, and Labriola, at least not in anything like this form.50
49§7.43. Reformation and Renaissance, QCII p.891-892.
50 Notwithstanding Gramsci's references to Engels' Utopian and Scientific Socialism and to Antonio
Labriola's writings on The Materialist Conception of History, as if to 'legitimise' his insertion of the
concept of the intellectuals into the historical materialist 'tradition'. §1.44, QCI p.53-S4.
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However, there is obviously more to the concept of the "traditional intellectuals"
than this purely functional difference.
As we suggested, Gramsci's intellectuals are a "transformed" version of Hegel's
Volksgeist or "national spirit", a distinctive cultural-political form (ie, 'State') created
and shaped not by the Geist but by the "intellectuals". In this sense the peculiar
priestly-military spirit of the Junkers is regarded by Gramsci as significant as far as
their leadership of the State is concerned, particularly after the fall of Bismarck. This
spirit was personified more by Moltke (and by Hindenburg between 1929-33) than
by Bismarck. Gramsci made a note of precisely this point when he was reading
Em iI Ludwig's biography of the Kaiser:
It should be remembered that Bismarck, following In the footsteps of Clau.ewltz,
maintained the superiority of the political over the military moment, wher... William II
(according to Ludwig's account) was furious with a newspaper which reported Bismarck'.
opinion: thus the Germans brilliantly won almost an the battl .. , but lost the war. 51
If we study the language of his successive notes on the nobility we see that the
whole tendency is to differentiate the peculiar spirit of this "priestly-military caste"
(echoes of Weber?) from the spirit of the bourgeoisie, whose "intellectuals" they
were. The configuration of Gramsci's concept of hegemony seems to raise the
question how far the spirit of this ruling caste permeated the whole of civil SOCiety
in Germany, which is precisely what the classic definition of "militarism" seems to
mean52, but it is more plausible (especially in the context of the Kaiser's Germany)
to follow Hegel's suggestion that the national spirit in the strictly political (ie, not
cultural ) sense is the sentiment of "patriotism". This was not only more superficial
but also more artificial, and could be manufactured more readily than the national
spirit in a deeper cultural sense. The "patriotic" pressure groups of Wilhelmine
Germany can thus be understood theoretically without implying that they
represented the German "national spirif.
For if the bourgeoisie were the hegemonic class of civil society, the nobility
remained the leaders of the State. We know from Max Weber that recruitment of the
sons of the bourgeoisie to high office in the civil and military bureaucracy
depended on ritual forms of initiation to the caste, such as possession of PrUSSian
reserve officer status and membership of an exclusive student fraternity at
51 §19.28. Political-Military Leadership ofthe Italian National Movement, OCIII p.20S2. First draft
§1.117, QCI p.111.
52By Alfred Vagts in A History of MilitariSITI.See the introduction to Karl Liebknecht: Militarism and
Anti-Militarism, translated and introduced by Grahame Lock (Cambridge Rivers Press, 1973) p.xxiv.
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university.53 The spirit of these "traditional intellectuals" consisted essentially in
their claim to represent the "uninterrupted continuity" of German history - ie, the
German "tradition" - even though the reality was that this continuity had been
"interrupted" by the bourgeois revolution. Their ownership of productive land gave
them "a vigorous awareness of being an independent social group" even though
the bourgeois revolution had effectively turned them into "the bourgeoisie's
intellectuals", changing their main function from a 'productive' to a 'governing' one.
It seemed that their aristocratic claim to exclusive ownership of the nation's tradition
and to be the country's "natural" rulers was strengthened not weakened by
historical change.
The main question now must be what bearing did this historical perspective have
on the crisis of hegemony between 1929-33? What was the relation between past
and present? As we said, Gramsci's historicism works intuitively rather than
'systematically'. The immediacy of his intuitions means that what appears valid at
one point of the crisis may not appear valid later on: this applied particularly to
estimating the political weight and life-expectancy of the "traditional intellectuals".
However, this does not affect the underlying consistency of his interpretation.
The crisis of the German ideology. When Gramsci uses the expression "crisis of
authority" he refers specifically to the crisis of hegemony as it affected the German
Right for whom authority meant "tradition", ie, the fundamental source of legitimacy
in conservative ideology (§3.34).54 As we said, in the early stages he was more
interested in the ideological forms of the crisiS in Germany even though the
multiple splits in the Nationalist party in 1929-30 provided plenty of evidence of the
crlsls at the corresponding parliamentary level. For example, he was particularly
intrigued by the influence of Freudian analysis on German writers for whom "the
revolt of the sons against the fathers" was a typical theme of the time as historians
have since shown (§3.03).55 According to Gramsci these writers had invented a
new type of "noble savage" similar to that of French literature of the eighteenth
~ See Weber's comments on the student fraternities in Suffrage and Democracy in Germany (1917)
In Political Writings op.cit. p.115-117. See also Eckart Kehr: 'The Genesis of the Royal Prussian
Reserve Officer' in Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy. edited and introduced by
Gordon A.Craig (University of California, 1977), p.97-108.
~ §.3.34. Past and Present, QCI p.311, where the ·crisis of authority" means that the ·traditional
Ideologies· have lost their hold on the masses.
55 §3.03. German Intellectuals, QCI p.286-288. On this particular theme see first of all, Peter Gay:
Weimar Culture (Penguin, 1974), chapters 5 &6, and more generally Walter Lacquer: Weimar.A
Cultural History 1918-1933 (New York, 1974).
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century56 although whether the new hero stood for a 'restoration' or a 'revolution'
of some kind was far from clear. The revolt of the sons against the fathers was
closely connected with the several notes on the "youth question" (§1.127, §3.34,
§14.58, §15.66)57 where he describes an unusual "crisis of generations" in which
the "old" abdicate their responsibility for educating the "young" and adopt an
attitude of "apres moi te deluge". The outcome of this was unforseeable in 1930
when the crisis as Gramsci saw it was still at a stage when "the old is dying and the
new cannot be born".58 However, the Reichstag election of September that year
marked a further stage in the "decomposition of parliamentarism" in Germany and
the birth of Hitlerism clearly indicated how the crisis of authority might be resolved
(§4.22).59
The elements of civil society. The study of literary movements was one way of
examining the crisis of hegemony in Germany but Gramsci knew perfectly well that
he could not rely on analysis of ideology alone: he therefore turned his attention to
studying the "material structure" of German ideology where he found that the
traditional forms were still deeply "entrenched". In the field of private organisations,
ie, civil society, the traditional forces took the initiative in organising and defending
their "fronf' in two particular ways: the first took the form of private military
organisations which proliferated in post-war Germany (§ 1.48, §1.133/134)60 and
were particularly active in 1929-30; the second was in the area of private
newspaper ownership which had a key role to play in the whole organisation of the
56 Letter to Giulia. 29 December 1929. LC I. p.302.
57§1.127. The Youth Question, QCI p.115-116; §3.34. Past and Present. QCI p.311; §14.58. Past
and Present. QCIII p.1717-1718; §15.66. Past and Present. QCIII p.1829-1830. On the relation
between classes and generations. see the interesting account in Robert Wohl: The Generation of
1914 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1980) p. 80-84. -This comparison of generations to classes helps to
explain the function and appeal of the generational concept in Weimar Germany - and in postwar
France and other European countries as well" ..
58 §3.34. QCI p.311.
59 §4.22. Croce and Marx. The Value of the Ideologies. QCI p.442. This was written at the time of the
Reichstag election of September 1930 and ~he current phenomena of the decomposition of
parliamentartsrn" refers to this. See also the second draft of1932 which amplifies the point: "The way
in which this decomposition is presented in order to hide the reactionary tendencies of certain social
groups is extremely interesting". §10.41. QCII p.1322-1323. Gramsci means the way in which the
National Socialists used "revolutionary" phraseology to hide their reactionary tendenCies.
60 The "question of the shock troops (arditi )" is first mentioned in §1.48. QCI p.60. as a point of
contrast between the crisis in France and ·other countries" (ie. Italy. Germany). and then followed up
in §1.133 and 1.134. QCI p. 120-123.
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"ideological front" of the traditional classes {§2.26, §3.49}.61 The function of the
para-military organisations and the right-wing press was precisely to change the
equilibrium of force and consent which was the fundamental reason for the
crisis.
From time to time Gramsci studied other elements of German civil society: he took a
special interest in the organisation of Catholic Action in Germany (§S.22, §5.59,
§8.129 etc}62 , for example, where the memory of Bismarck's Kulturkampf
continued to define the relation between past and present. After the political parties
were swept away in June1933 Gramsci turned his attention to the most important
element of civil society in Germany, the Catholic Church, which signed a Concordat
with Nazi Germany the same month. Rosenburg's "struggle for the Weltanshauung"
launched in 1934 meant that the Catholic Church had more reason than ever to
fear another Kulturkampf (§16.11, §20.04}.63
The ruling caste. The historical and political threads also intersected in Gramsci's
mind when it came to the role of the bureaucratic elite, both civil and military,
whose centre of power was the Head of State, Field Marshall Hindenburg and his
Circle. Gramsci's description in §12.01 of the Junkers as resembling "a priestly-
military caste" was explored in a number of collateral notes also written in 1932
(§8.S5, §8.81, §9.68}.64 This was because the ascendancy of this elite and its
special "caste" character were particularly apparent to Gramsci in 1932 when the
presidential contest between Hindenburg and Hitler tended to expose its inner
workings to the light of day. However, this particular element of the German
ideology - "the corporate-military spirit" - was not confined to the ruling caste: it also
permeated the private para-military organisations of the Right including
"delinquent associations" (§8.B1)65 like Hitler's Storm Troops. The controversy
61 §2.26. The German Newspapers, QCI p.182-183, which is linked to the concept of the
"ideological front" in §3.49. Questions of culture. Ideological material, QCI p.332-333.
62 §5.22. Catholic Action in Germany, QCI p.55S-557; §5.59. Catholic Action in Germany, QCI p.592;
§8. 129. Catholic Action, QCII p.t 019. (Translated in Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks,
translated and edited by Derek Boothman, Lawrence and Wishart, 1995 (hereafter FSPN), p.107-
110.
63§16.11. Relations between Church and State, QCIII p.1865-1874 (Translated in FSPN, p.SO-70) ;
§20.04. Integral CatholiCs, Jesuits, Modernists, QCIII, p.2088-2103, especially p.2094 (Translated in
FSPN, p.76 passim).
64 §8.55.Encyclopaedic Ideas. Seff-Government and Bureaucracy, OCII p.974-975;
§8.81.Encyclopaedic Ideas. The Spirit of Solidarity, QCII p.986-987; §9.68. Machiavelli. Organic and
Democratic Centralism, QCII p.1138-1140 (especially the paragraph on "bureaucratic centralism").
65 The expression is used in §8.81 cit.
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stirred by the presidential ban on the Storm Troops in April 1932 was exploited by
Hitler precisely to strengthen the esprit de corps of his troops.
The change of ideological elements . Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of his
historicist analysis of the past and present of the German Right is the "change of
elements" from the old to the new form of the German ideology. Gramsci's account
of this process in the notes is hard to excavate but it seems to start from his
observations on "the importance of utopias and of confused, rationalistic
ideologies" in the early stages of movements trying to form a collective will
(§8.195)66 . This can be putatively related to the parallel discussion in the prison
letters at this time on anti-semitism which, as Gramsci appreciated, had become the
key element of the new combination. 67 A further instalment of this change of
elements from the old to the new form of the German ideology is his account of
"partial and total conceptions of the world" (§15.06)68 written shortly after Hitler
and the National Coalition came to power in 1933. Gramsci predicts that the new
form of the German ideology will become total once it sheds its "symbiotic" features,
ie, its dependence on the old form.
Another very interesting strand in this type of analysis is constituted by his
investigation of the "feudal origins" of racist thought (§7.51, §14.39, §17.43)69
which he traced back to French historiography of the Restoration. He started from
"the element of racial struggle (I'elemento di latta di razza ) grafted on to the class
struggle in France by Thierry" and asked "what importance it had, in France, in
determining the nationalistic colouration of the movements of the subaltern
classes?" (§7.51). As always the line of enquiry starts from an element of French
history, "the richest in political elements", but the discussion of Thierry and (after
1848) Gobineau is entirely to do with current German politiCS, especially when we
remember the way in which Gramsci's 'Franco-German' turn of mind worked.
66 §8.195. The proposition 'that society does not pose problems for itseff unless the material
preconditions for their solution already exist', QCII p.1 057-1058. (Second draft translated in SPN
p.194-195)
67 The very tense correspondence with Tatiana on this question, into which Piero Sratfa was drawn
started on 13 September 1931 (LCII p.464) and ended on 21 March 1932 (LeI! p.550-551). For a 1~1!
account, see text.
68 §15.06. Machiavelli. Global and Partial Conceptions of the World and Practical Approaches, QCIII
p.1759-1761 (Translated in SPN p.157-158).
69 §7.51. History of the Subaltern Classes, QCII p.897; § 14.39. Popular Uterature. Manzoni and 'the
Humble', QCIII p.1696 (Translated in Antonio Gramsci Selections from Cultural Writings, edited by
David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith,Lawrence and Wishart, 1985, p.294); §17.43. Problems of
Culture. Racism, Gobineau and the historical Origins of the philosophy of praxiS, QCIII p.1943-1944.
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Moreover, the analysis of the feudal origins of racism was meant to suggest how, in
view of the "feudal" stamp given to the national tradition by the eastern aristocracy,
the element of racism had the potential to dominate the German ideology
completely. With the advent of the 'Racial State', of course, this is precisely what it
did. But it follows from Gramsci's analysis of its origins that in the dialectic of
"revolution-restoration", this State was a form of "restoration".
The dialectic of revolution-restoration . This dialectic and the related concept of
"passive revolution" is first mentioned by Gramsci in the context of his studies of the
Risorgimento (§8.25)70 but he also applies it to his analysis of German politics. The
starting-point for this is the notes on Caesarism (§9.133/136)11 written in the winter
of 1932-33 during the transition from Schleicher to Hitler, where he recommends
the dialectic as an analytical tool for breaking down the schematic difference
between progressive and reactionary forms of Caesarism. When the new Caesar
came to power at the end of January 1933, the composition of the coalition
government suggested that the element of 'restoration' predominated over that of
'revolution' and Gramsci's notes of the time reflect this way of seeing it (§14.03).72
Moreover, his reflections of early 1933 on the strength of agrarian parties
(§14.53)73 and on the relations between agrarians and industrialists (§15.06)74
must be seen in terms of his perspective on the "traditional" function of the nobility
as the "intellectuals" of the industrialists. The reason why this 'intellectual' function
of the landed nobility seemed to persist for so long was ultimately related to their
'productive' function, ie, "to the fact that in rural areas all the elements involved in
agricultural production continue to form a bloc, which is often under the leadership
of the most reactionary of these elements". 75 If the German notes of 1933 seem to
underestimate the element of 'revolution' compared to that of 'restoration'; that is, if
they attribute too much political weight to "the force of tradition", this was ultimately
because Gramsci knew that the "historical bloc" east of the Elbe had survived the
70 §8.25. Risorgimento, QCII p.957.
71 §9.133/136. Caesarism, QCII p.1194-119511197 -1198. For the precise dating of these notes,
during the chancellorship of Schleicher, see text.
72 §14.03. Machiavelli. Centre, QCIII p.1656-1657. Written in early 1933 just after Hitler came to
power, Gramsci asks whether in the new coalition government Hitler's party would merely serve the
Interests of "the 'historical' party of Hugenburg-Papen", who are "the extremists·.
73§14.53. Machiavelli. The Strength of Agrarian Parties, QCIII p.1712.
74§15.02. Machiavelli. The question whether the big industrialists have a permanent political party of
their own, QCIII p.1750-1751.
75 §14.53 cit.
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crisis, no thanks to Schleicher's "agrarian Bolshevism". Indeed, the question of the
survival of this "historical bloc" was fundamental to the whole "crisis of hegemony"
in Germany.
Structure-superstructure: Amercanism in Germany. Although the crisis of
hegemony was mainly a superstructural phenomenon, relating to the cultural-
political form of the State, we have seen that Gramsci did not entirely neglect its
structural aspects. As far as the historical thread is concerned, we must look to what
little he says about the history of the structure in Germany. The most interesting
insight into his perspective can be found in his many notes on Amercanism, which
are related to what some historians have called "the crisis of modernity" in
Germany and even to what others have called "the politics of cultural
despair" .76
Gramsci's analYSis of the reaction of "traditional" Europe to Americanism is
particularly interesting in relation to Germany where the introduction of
Americanism in the 1920s went furthest. The European "tradition" is defined as
consisting of numerous classes with no essential function in the world of
production, ie, "absolutely paraSitic classes". The older a country's history, the more
numerous these "residues of idle people" left over by the past. Before Americanism
could be introduced there must be a "rationalisation of the population" whereby
these "pensioners of economic history" ceased to exist.
Gramsci seemed to think that this brutal process of "rationalisation" was now
happening in Germany. In one of his early notes (§3.11)n he noted with interest
Pirandello's remark in an interview given in April 1929 (ie, pre-Wall Street Crash)
that Berlin was more open to Americanism than Paris, because "the very structure
of the city offers no resistance". At first Gramsci took Pirandello's "structure"
seriously, to mean social-economic structure, and offered the following explanation
of Berlin's reception of Americanism:
In Berlin the middle cl..... were .Iready ruined by the w.r .nd the Inflation .nd Garman
Indu.try w.e more highly developedth.n the French. By contr•• t the French middle
cl..... did not .utter (occa.lonal) cri... like the GermanInflation nor an organic crlala,
much more r.pld than norm.l, .rlalng from the Introduction and (.udden) diffusion of a new
method of production
76 Notably Oetlev J-K Peukert in The Weimar Republic. The Crisis of Classical Modemity (Penguin,
1993), especially chapter 9 'Americanism versus Kulturkritik' p.178-190. Peukert refers to Fritz Stern's
conception of "the politics of cultural despair".
n §3.11. Americanism, QCI p. 296-297.
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Gramsci was obviously referring to the "rationalisation" movement in German
industry in the 1920s, which was the 'structural' aspect of Americanism. But this is
interpreted as an "organic crisis" which, following on the war and inflation of
1923, contributes further to the trauma and ruin of the middle classes. Thus
beneath the glamorous surface "what is called Americanism today is to a very large
extent a phenomenon of social panic, dissolution, and despair of the old strata who
are destined to be crushed by the new order .... ". 78 Thus Gramsci saw
Americanism as an affair of dying classes "left over by the European tradition" who,
faced with the inexorable process of modernisation, had given up all "resistance"
and sunk into despair. When he updated these notes in 1934, in the light of the
Third Reich, his perspective changed. The reference to the rationalisation
movement of the late 1920s gave way to simply "the organic crisis of 1929". This
only strengthened his perspective on the ruin (if not despair) of the Berlin middle
classes, but Pirandello's suggestion of April 1929 that the structure of the city
seemed to offer no "resistance" to Amercanism looked decidedly different in the
context of Nazi Germany. Thus Gramsci added in parenthesis: "(Today [ie, 1934]
Pirandello could no longer say the same thing, so it must be understood that he
meant the Berlin of the night clubs)". 79 At the risk of "soliciting" the texts, from these
few indications we can say that the cultural and political reaction of "traditional"
Germany to Amercanism was part of Gramsci's wider "crisis of hegemony" which
came to a head after 1929.
78 §3.11 cit., p.296.
79 §22.1S. American and European Civilisation, QCIII p.2178-2180. (Translated in SPN p.316-318).
Chapter 1
October 1929-September 1930
From the Death of Stresemann and the Wall Street Crash to the Nazi 'Breakthough'
The Letters
"I am becoming a real fakir. ..:'
In the autumn of 1929 Gramsci got to work in earnest on the Prison Notebooks. His
health was stable and contact with his family was good: in November he was
visited by his brother Carlo, in December by his sister-in-law Tatiana. Although he
faced a prison sentence of over 20 years, his morale was initially high and he did
not feel entirely powerless. Exploiting the few legal rights accorded him by the
penal statute, he had obtained permission to write in his cell and to be sent books
and periodicals. His confident state of mind at this juncture is captured in the
sermonising tone of his advice to Carlo who had recently lost his job and now
found himself, like his older brother Gennaro, unemployed. Gramsci warned him to
avoid sinking into "those vulgar and banal states of mind called pessimism and
optimism". This was timely advice in view of the feeling of insecurity engendered by
the 'Great Crash' on Wall Street a few weeks earlier.
What you say about Nannaro In your letter Is Interesting but surprising. The two of you
have been through the war. Nannaro's war experience was quite exceptional; as a miner
working underground he could hear through the wall dividing his own tunnel from the
Austrian one the enemy beaverlng away to lay explosives which would blow up his tunnel
and send him sky-high. It seems to me that a man cannot put up with these conditions for
years and go through th.s. psychological experiences without developing the greatest
degree of stoical serenity, without becoming profoundly convinced that man's moral
fortitUde Is completely rooted In hlms.If, In his own energy, his own willpower, In the Iron
logic of the ends he seta himself and the means he deploys to achieve them. Such a man
will never again fall Into despair, or Into those vulgar and banal stat .. of mind we call
peaslmlsm and optimism.
My mind synthesises these two sentiments and supersedes them: I am a pessimist of the
Intellect and an optimist of the will. In every circumstance I think of the worst POIsible
scenario and then mobilise all my reserves of willpower to defeat the obstacle ahead of
me. I never entertain lIIuslonl or luffer from delusions. Above all, my strength hal always
been an Infinite patience, not patience which Is passlv. or Inert but animated by a spirit of
peraeverance.
I don't doubt that there 18 a very serious moral crlsl. today, but there hay. been even
more serious one. In the pa.t and there I. a difference between now and then ..•..[six lines
cancelled by the censor] ...•..SO I'm Inclined to be a bit Indulgent towards Nannaro and I'd
ask you to be the same. I've seen for my.elf that he can be strong and It I. only when he
Is on hi. own that he los .. his head and geta downhearted. Perhapa I'll write to him next
tlme2
1 "Iam becoming a real fakir. I'll soon be able to swallow swords and walk barefoot on razor-blades
courtesy of Gillette". To Tatiana, 4 November 1929, Lei p.287.
2To Carlo, 19 December 1929,LC I p. 297-299.
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The lines cancelled by the censor in the context of lithe very serious moral crisis
today" apparently referred to the Wall Street Crash in October 1929.3 Gramsci had
certainly read about the Crash in his reviews 4 but, if this indication is correct, there
is no suggestion that he immediately saw the Crash as a historical turning-point.
His dialectic tended to diminish the proportions of the present by viewing it in the
perspective of the past, but the shock-waves released by the Crash, particularly in
Germany, would soon correct this perspective. Twelve months later in November
1930 Gramsci admitted that the Wall Street Crash had been a bad day for vulgar
optimists. Tatiana asked him if he was familiar with Ford's writings against the Jews
- a timely enquiry in view of the latest success of the Nazi Party in the German
elections. Gramsci replied that he had not read them and added:
Who know. how much greatar Ford'. hatred [Ie, of the Jewl] II now that the two cri... on
the New York .tock exchangehave put 8 brake on the making of automobiles. All the
optlmllm of hll Indu.trlal vision has been destroyed at one blow and It will be hard to
recover It. 5
This was certainly true of Germany where, of all the countries of Europe, the Fordist
mania of the 1920s had gone furthest.
His older brother's experience of underground warfare was no doubt seen by
Gramsci as a metaphor for his own political resistance to Fascism from his prison
cell. His disdain for such "vulgar states of mind as optimism and pessimism" brings
to mind Piero Gobetti's perception that in Gramsci "suffering has taken on such an
intimately aristocratic character that it can deride all the self-indulgences of
bourgeois morality" 6 .The attitude of stoical serenity which he proudly professed to
Carlo would be thoroughly tested in the years ahead as his physical health
disintegrated and the worst possible political scenario became a reality in
Germany.
Already this attitude of mind proved fragile in a number of areas. In November 1929
Tatiana had taken it upon her herself, without consulting him, to press Gramsci's
lawyer to seek a revision of his sentence. Although he recognised her good
intentions, her initiative made him angry beyond measure and he warned her in
3 See Lettere daJ Careere, a cura di Sergio Caprioglio e Elsa Fubini (Einaudi, 1968) p.311 note.
4 See, for example, RSE 12 November 1929, under the rubric on the United States: 'La crisi borsistica
di Wall Street' p.2552-1553 and 'Lacrisi borsistica. Le ripercussioni in Europa' p.2574-2576.
5 To Tatiana, 4 November 1930, LCI p. 361-362
6 Profile of Gramsci originally appearing in La Rivoluzione Uberale, 22 April 1924. It is translated in
Gramsci's Prison Letters, translated and introduced by Hamish Hamilton (1988) p.25-28.
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severe terms never to do anything again, least of all with legal implications, without
his consent. It is not difficult to see where his anger came from given his belief that
"man's moral fortitude is completely rooted in himself, in his own energy, in his own
willpower" etc, for Tatiana's action threatened what little autonomy was left to him to
control his own fate. Even when he was most in earnest, however, his capacity for
self-parody never entirely deserted him. Aware of how hard he was being on her,
he did not forget to send himself up: "I am becoming a real fakir. I'll soon be able to
swallow swords and walk barefooted on Gillette razor-blades?'.
The other circumstance to test his stoicism was the lack of news from his wife Julia
who lived in Moscow with their two little boys, Delio and Giuliano. Although he
learned that she was suffering from a depressive illness, he suspected that her
silence was also due to political intervention. The prison censorship made it
impossible to discuss this supposition openly in the letters, but Gramsci felt that he
had been unofficially 'condemned' by his own side and seems to have attributed
Julia's silence partly to this possibility. The possibility that the "invisible tribunal" in
Moscow as he called it e had also condemned him was not implausible in view of
the negative reaction there to his famous letter criticising the leadership of the
Russian Communist Party in October 1926 shortly before his arrest. Even when he
learned more about Julia's illness, which would explain the irregularity and
vagueness of her letters, he continued to be haunted by the impression that her
letters to him were little more than a "bureaucratic exercise" (una pratica
burocratica )9 . The difficulty was that under the circumstances Gramsci could not
openly discuss his suspicions about how he was regarded politically by the
Russian leadership and whether this had anything to do with Julia's silence.
I could have anticipated the blow. of enemle. I wa. fighting against, I couldn't have
anticipated blows descendingon me from other quarter., from where I le.st expectedthem
(metaphorical blow., you understand, but even the penal code dlstlngulshe. between
crimes of commission and oml.slon, Ie, omissions are also blameworthy,and may
constitute blow.) the thing I. very, very complicated and difficult to explain fully
(.Iso becau.e of the question of the non-metaphoricalwail.). To be honest, I'm not very
sentimental and I'm not tormented by sentimental questions. Not that I'm In.en.ltlv, (I
don't want to appear cynical or shallow); It's rather the case that even sentimental
7To Tatiana, 4 November 1929, cit.
e On the -invisible tribunal" see §3.32. 'Rendre la vie impossible' quoted below.
9 To Tatiana, 27 February 1933, Lell p.S89. -I am convinced to this day that in my relations with Julca
there exists a certain equivocation, a false bottom, an ambiguity that prevents us from seeing clearly
and being completely frank; my impression is that I am set aside, that I represent so to speak "a
bureaucratic dossier" to be annotated and nothing more" (Translated in LP2, p.27S).
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matters In my experience are combined with other elements (Ideological, philosophical,
political etc) with the result that I really couldn't say where sentiment ends and one of
these other elements begins, I probably couldn't even say which one of all these elements
Is the key because they are all combined In an Indivisible whole and In a Single
experience. Perhaps this Is a strength; perhaps It Is also a weakness since It leads me to
analyse others In the same terms and thus perhaps to misjudge them. But I won't go on
because I am writing a dissertation and It appears that It Is better to write nothing than
to write dlssertatlons.lO
The feeling of being condemned by his own side was intensified by the unexpected
visit of his older brother Gennaro on 16 June 1930. Gennaro had been sent by
Togliatti to inform Gramsci of the latest change in the political line of the Comintern
and the disciplinary measures taken against those who disagreed with it. We know
from Gennaro's testimony that Gramsci disagreed with the new tactic. Although
doubt has been cast on his testimony, corroboration can be found where no one
has thought to look, ie, in the prison notes themselves. For the change in the
Comintern's tactic was the "practical origin" of §3.33.Some Causes of Error which
must have been written not long after he got the news.11 Gramsci now found
himself in the 'impossible' position of being held captive by his enemies and, at the
same time, in disagreement with his friends. He expressed his situation in the
preceding note, §3.32. 'Rendre la vie impossible', a quotation from a biography of
Goya he was reading at the time.
There are two ways of killing: one Is frankly designated by the verb to kill, the other
usually remain. Implicit as In the delicate euphemism 'to make life Impossible'. Thl' mode
of a.sa •• lnatlon, which Is slow and obscure, embraces a whole crowd of Invisible
accomplices. It Is an auto-da-fe with no tumbril and no flames, perpetrated by an
Inquilition with no Judge and no •• nt.nc •••. .'. Eugenio O'Ors Lit. of Goy., Galllm.rd
p.41. EII.where he calli It a 'diffused Inquisition' .12
In addition to the atmosphere of "diffused inquisition", there were more palpable
factors which contributed to making his life impossible. The heat of the summer
months at Turi and the noise of the prison guards at night took their toll on his
health. In August he was plagued by chronic insomnia and headaches, which were
doubtless aggravated by his heavy smoking. In September his stoicism was further
tested as his teeth began to fall out. Nevertheless, his sense of humour had not
deserted him. He made a fresh attempt to get a "dialogue" going with Julia and
found just the right touch of humour to engage her.
10To Tatlana, 19 May 1930. LCI p. 332-333.
11 See Chapter 2 below, section headed Past and Present.
12 QCI p.310. Gramscl compares his situation to a prisoner of the Spanish Inquisition in the above
letter to Tatianaof 19 May.
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I'm reminded of a Scandinavian folk tale. Three Norse giants live as far away from each
other as great mountains. After thousands of years of silence the first giant shouts to the
other two: 'I hear the lowing of a herd of cattle'. Three hundred years later the second
giant declares: 'I've heard the lowing too'. After another three hundred years have passed
the third giant gets his word In: 'If you go on making a row like this, I'm leaving' 13
" ...this business of the reviews ..."
In spite of being in prison Gramsci was not cut off from news of current political
affairs. He had many 'windows' on the outside world: some were opened from time
to time while others were closed, some let in a better quality of light than others,
again some afforded a broad angle of vision, others only a partial view of events.
These 'windows' were his periodicals. Their vital importance to him is clear from a
letter to Tatiana at the start of 1932 when the subscriptions were up for renewal.
You know how Important this business of the reviews Is to me. Just lately there have been
further restrictions on what I'm allowed to read. I'm always afraid of 80me kind of muddle
resulting In the 108Sof what stili remains available to me, which would only Impoverl.h my
life even more.14
As Gramsci indicates, the possibility of subscribing to periodicals depended in the
first instance on his legal rights under the penal regulation which changed at
various stages of his imprisonment. Until 1931 his position was governed by the old
Zanardelli criminal code of 1891,which was then replaced by a new criminal code
drawn up by Alfredo Rocco, the Fascist Minister of Justice. What was his legal
position in this first phase of 1929-31? When Gramsci was on remand at San
Vittore prison in Milan, before his trial by the Special Tribunal in May-June 1928,
he was allowed to read newspapers and to subscribe to periodicals. He read six
newspapers a day and organised his whole day around this.15 He also received
regularly on subscription a number of periodicals. After sentence by the Special
Tribunal and transfer to Turi di Bari, his legal position changed. Under the old
prison regulation convicted prisoners were not allowed to read newspapers. For
the next three years Gramsci had no newspapers and, with the exception of one or
two notes entered later, the first six notebooks were written without them. However,
the old regulation said nothing about periodicals and so Gramsci began building
13To Giulia, 6 October 1930, LCI p.358.
14To Tatiana, 25 January 1932, LCII p.528: "Sai che questo affare deUe riviste mi sta multo a euore"
15 -I get five newspapers during the day: Carriere, Stampa, Pop% d'/ta/is, Giomaled'/talia, and
seao ....1 also buy certain reviews and /I So/e, the economic-financial paper of Milan", letters to
Tatiana, 19 February and 4 April1927, Lei pp's 46-47 and 65.
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up his subscriptions.16 At their peak in 1931 he was receiving about 25 periodicals
on subscription including six foreign-language reviews.17 In this first phase he
relied entirely on these to follow the thread of political and economic events. When
Gramsci lost his newspapers (all six of them I) he did not suddenly lose his appetite
for news.
16Many of Gramscl's subscriptions were taken out before the Turi di Bari period and simply continued
after his transfer there in June 1928. They included the most important periodicals as far as political
and economic news was concerned [dates in brackets are the earliest dates he is known to be
receiving the review], le,Rassegna settimanaie della stamps estera (1927), Nuova Antologia (1927),
ClVlltaCsttol1ca (1928), Gerarchia (1928), CriticaFascista (1928),LaRiformaSocia/e (1928). Other
subscriptions did not continue Into the Turi di Bari period: for example, Rivistad'lta/ia (1927). New
subscriptions taken out in 1929-30 included La Nuova Ita/ia (1930, the successor to Leonardo which
folded in 1929). See the dates of the periodicals listed in the material sent to his relatives in Notebook
2, QCIV p.2377-2379; the 'Indice dei periodici citati nei Quademi', QCIV p.3143-3160; and the
letters to Tatlana before the Turi period (for example, letters of 9 January and 19 March 1928, Lei
pp's150,173).
17The full list Is set out In the second petition to Mussolini in October 1931, OCIV p.2391, although
this Included two periodicals he was not receiving at the time (Educazione Fascista and, in all
probability, Politics )
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The Periodicals
The 'Transformation of Nationalist Psychology' ,1929-30
On 3 October 1929 Gustav Stresemann, Germany's foreign minister, died. He was
the leader of the small right-wing German People's Party, the successor to the
National Liberals of the imperial era. As chancellor and then foreign minister he
had steered the German republic out of the inflation crisis of 1923 and through the
years of 'stabilisation' which followed. He had just returned from the Hague where
he had negotiated new terms for the payment of German reparations, the Young
Plan, in return for a French pledge to evacuate the Rhineland in June 1930. The
agreement was consistent with his foreign policy which aimed to pursue German
national goals whilst 'fulfilling' the terms of the Versailles Treaty. Stresemann was
preparing to do battle in the Reichstag to secure ratification of the Young Plan
when he died unexpectedly of a stroke.
Gramsci learned about the death of Stresemann at the time from his periodicals
where it was extensively reported1 , but it was not until later on in the notebooks
that we find any reference to it being a turning-point. In a brief note written in early
1931 in Notebook 5 we find the following observation:
§5.118. Streaemann. Francesco Tommaslnl'. article 'II penslero e opera dl Gustavo
Stresamann' In Nuova Antologla 16 November 1929 Is Interesting 'or the study of post-
war Germany and for the change In the psychology of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois
natlonallstS.2
When we scrutinise Tommasini's article, however, we find nothing about the
psychological change mentioned here. So what did Gramsci mean? Writing in
early 1931, he was describing what had happened not before but after
Stresemann's death. For in the twelve months since then "the psychology of the
bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalists" in Germany did indeed go through a
rapid 'molecular' change. The political 'catharsis' of this process was the
unexpected breakthrough of Hitler and the National Socialists in the elections of
September 1930. Looking back at developments in Germany since October 1929,
Gramsci saw this change in nationalist psychology as the defining feature of the
period after Stresemann's death. As always, Gramsci's historicist mode of thinking
connected the past to the present.
1 RSE 8 ,15, 29 October, 5 November 1929; also CC (Cose Straniere) 19 October 1929
2QCI p.638.
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The Political Conjuncture in October 1929
The first reports of Stresemann's death in Gramsci's periodicals were accompanied
by general talk of "the crisis of the European democracies" - a favourite theme of
Fascist propaganda. In answer to the question whether such a crisis really existed,
a sympathetic French observer noted that the "dictatorships" were too varied in
nature to be classified in the same way except that they all had one thing in
common: "Their origin is the incapacity of the parliamentary regime, its proclaimed
and established impotence to overcome exceptional difficulties".3The ministerial
crisis in France soon after seemed to confirm this.4 On 22 October Aristide Briand's
ministry lost a vote of confidence in the Chamber and resigned. There followed a
prolonged bout of bargaining for ministerial posts in which France was without a
government for eighteen days until a new ministry headed by Andre Tardieu was
formed on 9 November. Briand returned to office as foreign minister. His inclusion
did not prevent the new ministry from winning a vote of confidence in the same
Chamber which had voted him out eighteen days earlier. The leading fascist
periodical, Gerarchia, did not miss the chance to score a general ideological point
by announcing that this latest French 'farce' merely showed that parliamentary
government itself had lost all raison d'etre , not only in France but also Germany:
The latest French ministerial crisis has been resolved after 18days, but this certainly does not mean
that the deepening crisis of the parliamentary system which caused it has also been resolved. There
could perhaps be no better example than this latest episode in France of the irreversible decadence
of parliamentary custom which now stands in sharper contradiction than ever before to the principles
on which it was originally founded and which ought to sustain it... .....
The main feature of the decadence of the parliamentary system is this: the splitting of parties, the
speed with which they are formed and adopt positions, the constantly uncertain situations this
creates; coalition governments based on compromises which are designed to guarantee their survival
in parliament rather than to protect national interests. Any vision of general interests disappears,
programmes are emptied of any content, personalities become more important than collective actions
and needs.
In France and Germany (where after only 10years the parliamentary regime is already on its last legs)
there are numerous parties which at every new political conjuncture spilt up into a right-wing, left-wing,
and centre The variety of parties is shown not only by their twelve different names Every
party in France and Germany is defined more clearly by its leader's name than by its political
title ....There are always dissident factions which alter the calculations and make the outcome of every
parliamentary vote uncertain. 5
3 See under the rubric 'Problemi generali', the report on 'La crisi delle democrazie Europee', in RSE,
8 October 1929.
4 As discussed under the rubric 'Cronache del mese' by Virginio Gayda: 'Variazioni su una tema
francese. Parlamento contro 10 Stato', GER November 1929.
5lbid.
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There was a realistic core in these observations about the parliamentary system
which Gramsci disentangled from the the fascist 'spin' given them by Gerarchia.
According to §1.48 the difficulty of forming governments was one of the main
'practical' symptoms of the general disintegration of hegemony, ie, of government
by consent. Nevertheless, Gramsci regarded this latest ministerial crisis in France
as a routine affair in which the survival of the French republic was not at stake.
Despite the general instability of parliamentary government in the post-war years,
his argument in §1.48 was that bourgeois hegemony in France had great "reserve
strength". But could the same be said of Germany?
The Monarchist Party in a Republican Regime
In fact, Gramsci also found evidence in Germany of the general disintegration of
hegemony, only the practical 'difficulty' was manifested at this time not in the
forming of governments (the collapse of the Weimar Coalition in early 1930 would
soon provide evidence enough of this) but in the governing of parties. More to the
point, Gramsci observed that the anti-democratic parties were having as much
'difficulty' as the democratic ones. This was the internal crisis of the main anti-
republican party, the Nationalists, now 'governed' by Alfred Hugenburg, The party's
defeat in the Reichstag election of May 1928 resulted in the election of the
chairman as new leader of the party, Hugenburg now rejected "parliamentary"
tactics altogether and led the Nationalists into "absolute" opposition to the
Republic, but what kind of alternative did they represent? The leading organ of
Italian FaSCism, Gerarchia, was sufficiently impressed by the "extra-parliamentary"
forces of the German Nationalists to call them ''fascists'', but not without
considerable reservation. Commenting in August 1929 on a recent rally of the
Stahlhelm, the para-military association of the Nationalists, it noted:
In fact, you only have to look at the names of the leaders of this movement, who are all officers of the
Wilhelmine period, to realise that they do not represent - as in Italy - the popular mass consecrated by
the sacrifice of war but a military caste which has misgoverned Germany for centuries, leading to the
disaster of Vers8Ules. and which now seeks to regain the political ground and the economic
supremacy it has lost by means of nationalist propaganda which completely masks its own self·
interest You have only to see the names at the top of the lists of those demanding a revision of
the constitution: they are all former ruling princes, even including one 01the Kaiser's sonsl So-called
German fascism. therefore. is working in a void: its organisation is good but it has no leaders.1f it found
itself tomorrow at the head of a movement, it would end up for lack of ideas by recalling Wilhelm 11.6
6 Alberto Spaini. op.cit.
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Although "the so-called German fascists" were well-organised, therefore, Gerarchia
thought they had no leaders and no ideas - no "intellectuals", in fact. What did
Gramsci think about this?
To trace Gramsci's thinking about Germany in the notes we must follow what he
writes about France. The starting-point of his political theory was the history of
France since this was "the richest in political elements", but the theoretical point of
these political elements (elementi di politica ) was that they were not exclusive to
France. Gramsci starts his notes on political parties from a critique of the Action
Francaise led by Charles Maurras but the "element of politics" in this case, ie, "the
monarchist party in a republican regime", could also be found in Germany.7 The
study of this type of party was particularly instructive because it had to operate in
practice within a constitutional framework, a form of State, to which it was
fundamentally opposed in principle . The absolute programme of Hugenburg, like
Maurras' in France, was a monarchist restoration (another 'element of politics'
drawn from French history), but the consequence of this ideology with its roots in
the past or in "tradition" was that the party increasingly lost touch with reality and its
programme became increasingly impractical. In attacking the republic from a
monarchist standpoint, Hugenburg presented to Gramsci the same "comical"
spectacle as Maurras, ie, of being "a demogogue who doesn't know how to be
one".8
Hugenburg was apparently aware, however, of his deficiencies in demagogy.
The new political conjuncture marked by Stresemann's death coincided with his
tactical alliance with the leader of the "fascists" or "racists", Hitler, in order to
campaign against the Young Plan which Stresemann had negotiated just before
his death.9 The violent plebiscitary campaign which ensued led democratic
7 §1.18. The Error of Maurras. Notes on the French monarchist party , QCI p. 14-15. The element of
politics Is defined as: "The monarchist party in a republican regime, like the republican party in a
monarchist regime and the nationalist party in a regime of national subjection ..... "etc. Gramsci thought
that the 'German' counterpart of Maurras was Hugenburg not (as historians later suggested) Hitler.
See for example Ernst Nolte's Three Faces of Fascism (1965) which dealt particularly with ideology,
the author being more intoxicated than asphyxiated.
8 §1.48. The Reverse Jaooblnlsmof Charles Maurras, QCI p.59. "The thing becomes comical when
the demagogue doesn't know how to be one, Ie, when he operates in practice as though he really
thinks that the habit is the monk, that the cap is the brain. Machiavelli and Stenterello".
9 The nationalist campaign against the Young Plan was reported in RSE, 8, 29 October, 5,12
November 1929 (result of the plebiscite). Note the equivocation from one foreign report to another on
how to distinguish Hitler's party from the other elements of the extreme Right. The Temps of 19
November described the Nazis as ·ultra-reactionary" and "ultra-revolutionary" in the same report (RSE,
26 November 1929)
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observers to speculate on whether or not the nationalists were preparing an
imminent coup d'etat .. The Berliner Tageblatt , for example, warned of "possible
coup d'etats and putsches against the leftist governmenf' but judged that such
attempts would be useless since "by now the parliamentary idea is too deeply
rooted in the German people". Writing about the newly formed Hugenburg-Hitler
front and the anti-Young Plan campaign, the editor of the Vossische Zeitung,
Ludwig Bernhard, lamented the fact that the State prosecuted the communists
whilst allowing the nationalists free play and questioned whether it had any
"authority" left. 10 During the agitation there was a bomb attack on the Reichstag
building, yet "the right-wing newspapers have not uttered a single word of
condemnation of these attacks". But what alternative to the Republic did the Right
offer? A coup d'etat in 1929 was likely, for lack of a realistic alternative, to end in
the same kind of abject failure at the decisive moment as demonstrated by the
Action Francaise in 1925. Why should the German monarchists in 1929 be any
more successful than the French monarchists had been in 1925?
The violent agitation against the Young Plan was too much for the 'respectable'
elements in Hugenburg's party and precipitated, after the party congress in
November, the first of a series of splits. Reporting the party congress on 23
November, The Times commented:
Mr.Hugenburg would find himself in a better position in his own political camp if it were not for the
alliance he has made, for the purposes of his campaign against the Young Plan, with the National
Socialists [the party of Hitler: editor's note] who are not socialists but those extreme nationalists who
are more appropriately described as 'fascists'. There is no doubt that without their help he would not
have obtained the minimum of votes necessary to go ahead with the referendum and Germany would
then have been saved all the discontent and bitterness which had to be stirred up by Mr.Hugenburg
in order to persuade more than half of his voters to vote against the Young Plan. But the enthusiastic
allies of Mr. Hugenburg have complained contemptuously of the Nationalists' lack of zeal. They have
done something even worse: they are supplanting the Nationalists. In the recent elections at both
state and municipal levels the 'fascists' have captured seats at the expense of Nationalist candidates.
This cannot have given much comfort to the leader of the party or to the more moderate elements
among his followers.11
10 RSE, 8 October 1929, p.2264 and, for the following reference, p.226S.
11 Report from the Times in RSE, 3 December 1929, p.2714. Note the editor felt it necessary to
explain who the National Socialists were. On the subsequent split in the parliamentary group of the
Nationalist Party , see the lengthy reports in the foreign press of the Reichstag debate on the anti-
Young Plan motion in RSE, 17 December 1929.
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The splitting of the Nationalist party was the main parliamentary symptom of the
disintegration of hegemony in Germany at the end of 1929. The sources show that
it formed part of Gramsci's field of knowledge even though it is not directly tracable
in the notes themselves. Gramsci's description of the general breakdown of
hegemony in §1.48 was based in fact on a synthesis of French and German
politics in the closing months of 1929. However, the notes indicate that he was
more interested at this time in the cultural than in the political symptoms of the
crisis of hegemony in Germany. For Gramsci found symptoms of the crisis of the
German ideology outside the arena of parliamentary politics altogether.
The Wall Street Crash
Nor did the Wall Street Crash on 29 October leave any discernible imprint in the
notebooks at this time. Apart from a conjectural reference to it in the letter to Carlo
on 19 December 12 , Gramsci did not comment directly on the Crash until a year
later, after the election of September 1930, when its effects at the level of the
political superstructures in Germany had become apparent (§7.10). His silence
should not be taken to mean ignorance, however, since the Crash was prominently
reported in his periodicals and undoubtedly formed part of his general field of
knowledge.13 The possible impact of the Crash, which occurred in the middle of the
ministerial crisis in France, may have coloured his evaluation of this crisis in §1.48.
For although this was a routine episode in the postwar politics of France, "reflecting
more than anything else a normal displacement of the masses (not due to
economiC crisis)" 14, he suggested that it might be the harbinger of "big struggles to
come".
12editor's note in Le p.311. I presume this conjecture was based on the date of this letter since
the prison censor would hardly leave legible the six lines he had cancelled.
13 See In particular, under the rubric for the United States: 'La Crisi Borsistica Le Ripercussionl in
Europa', RSE 12 November 1929, p.2SS2, and 24-31 December 1929, p.2574; Siro Fusi:
'Osservazioni sulla crisi di Wall Street', GER December 1929; Alfonso de Pietri- Tonelli: 'Wall Street'
NA 1 December 1929 (Gramscl mentions this article later in §2.127: ·comments in very general te"';'s
on the crisis of the American stock-market at the end of 1929: necessary to look at it again to stUdy
American financial organisation", QCI p.268).
14QCI p.61
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The Intellectual and Moral Climate
In §1.48 Gramsci hinted that the breakdown of hegemony in post-war Europe was
a more complex phenomenon than simply the general instability of parliamentary
regimes. In the case of the German republic the breakdown was perceptible in the
country's cultural as well as political life, although he preferred to describe this
'intellectual and moral' aspect by another name: ie, as a "crisis of authority" . The
change of nomenclature was not simply a matter of looking at the crisis of
hegemony from a different angle: as we will see, it also implied an alternative
ideological standpoint from that of the fascist organ Gerarchia . Where the latter
argued that the crisis was due to the functional failure ofelection , Gramsci argued
that its roots lay in the functional failure of tradition. It was the cultural aspect of the
German crisis - the symptoms of 'intellectual and moral' instability - which most
interested him in the autumn of 1929.
How did Gramsci learn about this aspect of the German crisis and what particular
themes interested him? More often than not, attempts by fascist writers to describe
the cultural climate of Germany at this time tended to generate more fog than light
15; they merely filled the atmosphere with what Gramsci would later call
"asphyxiating gases". However, Gramsci was not entirely dependent on his fascist
periodicals. He also subscribed until the end of 1931 to a number of foreign-
language periodicals including two French literary reviews, Gide's Nouvelle Revue
Francaise and Les Nouvelles Litteraires . In an issue of the latter for 19
October 1929 he came across an article by Andre Levinson on themes in
contemporary German writing. He made a summary of it at the start of Notebook
3.16 Gramsci was struck by Levinson's observations about the influence of
Freudian ideas on contemporary German writing, particularly the theme of rebellion
of the sons against the fathers, against paternal authority. He mentioned this in a
letter to Julia at the end of the year in which he discussed his philosophy of
education and how it should be applied to the 'formation' of their son Delio. His
perspective evidently differed from the 'Rousseauist' approach of his wife:
15 See for example J.Evola: 'Aspetti del movimento culturaIe della Germania contemporanea', NA, 1
January 1930.
16 Andre Levinson: 'Jacob Wassermann et Ie proces de laJustice', in Les Nouvelles Utteraires, 19
October 1929 (see ociv p.2575)
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This mode of conceiving education as the unwinding of a pre-existing thread had its
Importance In the days when It was propounded In opposition to the Jesuit school - that Is,
when It negated a philosophy which was stili more harmful - but today It has In turn been
superseded. To refuse to 'form' the child merely means allowing him to pick up the motifs
of life chaotically from his general environment and letting his personality develop In a
haphazard way.
It's strange and Interesting that Freud's psychoanalysis Is now creating, especially In
Germany (as far as I can gather from the reviews I have read), tendencies similar to those
which existed In France In the eighteenth century; It Is well on the way towards forming a
new type of 'good savage', corrupted by society - that Is, by history. The result of this Is
a new kind of Intellectual disorder which Is really exceedingly Interestlng.17
The fictional heroes of these German writers were all expressions of the myth of the
"good savage". All were engaged in a struggle against authority in one form or
another, paternal authority being the main one. In §3.03 Gramsci was particularly
struck by the apologetic treatment by these writers of the Freudian theme of
parricide in which the savage action of the son in killing the father or the father-
figure was justified by "a monstrous moral postulate", as he called it. This was the
first, but not the last time that Gramsci used the term "monstrous" to describe what
was going on in the intellectual and moral life of Germany at this time.
But what does this cultural aspect have to do with the crisis of authority in the
political arena? If authority is understood to mean not merely the material power to
coerce but the legitimate right to rule, then this authority derived either from election
or from tradition, ie, the right to rule claimed by the nation's traditional or 'natural'
rulers. Later in Notebook 2 Gramsci considered the third derivation of authority (as
Weber defined it), ie, charismatic authority, but this was in the summer of 1930
atter the profile of Hitler in his periodicals had risen much higher. In the
meantime, the question in his mind in the autumn of 1929 was this: what if authority
cannot be obtained by either of these two means, election or tradition? It seemed to
Gramsci that such was the case with Germany's 'natural' rulers, the nObility, who
are given the somewhat unlikely description in §1.44 of Germany's traditional
intellectuals. Unable or unwilling under the Republic to obtain the right to rule by
election, neither could they rely any more on the legitimacy conferred by tradition. It
was this aspect of the crisis of authority in Germany, ie, the breakdown of the
nation's tradition and of its legitimising function, which particularly interested him.
The theme of rebellion of the sons against the fathers in contemporary German
writing was seen by Gramsci as an ideological expression of this crisis of the
national tradition.
17Lei p.301-302 ( I have used the translation in HH p.105).
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The Question of the Shock Troops
A marked feature of the political scene in Germany in 1929 was intensified activity
by the para-military organisations of the Right. A big rally of the Nationalist
Stahlhelm at Magdeburg in March calling for the "removal of the disastrous
influence of Parliament on the public life of the nation" was followed by a similarly
'impressive' parade of Storm Troops at the Nazi Party congress at Nuremberg in
August.18 In the autumn the two parties combined forces for the plebiscitary
campaign against the Young Plan causing widespread speculation in the press
that a coup d'etat was being prepared by the extreme Right, timed to coincide with
the plebiscite in November . On a daily basis these nationalist para-m ilitaries were
used for the purpose of political offense, violently disrupting the political activities of
the Left as in the municipal election in Berlin. By this time street-fighting between
left and Right had become a routine feature of the German political scene,
particularly on Sundays, the workers' day of rest.
For spirits are not the only things over-excited in Germany these days: so are the armed bands. Steel
Helmets and Reichsbanner, Gommunist,Hitlerite. and nationalist armed bands dedicate themselves
every Sunday to the dangerous sport of civil war. It is a difficult sport to investigate because the police
and the army are too few in number compared with the private squads fully organised on military
Iines.18
Such were "the current struggles" referred to in Gramsci's discussion of the military
and pOlitical use of 'shock troops' (arditi) in §1.133.Military and Political Art,
written in the opening months of 1930. The practical question which these German
struggles immediately suggested to him was the use of shock troops by both sides:
should the Left imitate the tactics of the Right as they appeared to be doing in
Germany? The most important aspect of this note, however, is his analysis of the
function of these private armies in the wider context of the breakdown of
hegemony, which was maintained precisely by the private initiatives of the ruling
class. The inability of the old ruling class to obtain consent (as shown by the
electoral disintegration of the Nationalists under the leadership of Hugenburg) was
commensurate with the increasing use of force - or 'political-military pressure' as
Gramsci describes it - by their extra-parliamentary forces. If the old ruling class
could not obtain consent, it could still prevent its enemy from obtaining it. But how
18 The Stahlhelm rally at Magdeburg was reported in Alberto Spaini: 'lilabirinto tedesco', GER August
1929.The Nazi Party Congress at Nuremberg was extensively reported in RSE 13, 20 August 1929.
19 Alberto Spaini, cit.
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would the resulting deadlock be resolved?
Gramsci perceived that crucial to the task of 'reorganising the State' under modern
conditions was the problem of legality , to which public opinion was particularly
sensitive. To be sure, Hugenburg was far from indifferent to public opinion: as the
controller of Germany's biggest press group - the Hugenburgpress - he had all the
resources necessary to "manufacture" it. However, the possibility of a right-wing
coup d'etat could be ruled out unless it could be made to appear legal.
Hugenburg's hopes of reorganising the State centred on the ambivalent position of
President Hindenburg, the symbol of the 'legal' State but also, as Field Marshal,
the personification of the German 'tradition'. The passage from democracy to
dictatorship might be legally accomplished by invoking Article 48 of the republican
constitution which gave the president the power to suspend parliamentary
government "when the political situation impeded the regular and continuous
functioning of Parliament". The extra-parliamentary agitation of the extreme Right
might well help to create such a situation.
Now the main supporter of Article 48 (or at least his enemies accuse him of being) is Mr.Hugenburg.
The left-wing press has denounced sensational plots going on between him and certain important
leaders of the Reichswehr who are known to be close to Field Marshal Hindenburg and to have
influence with him. The only sensational aspect of the question, however, is that Hugenburg has not
so far bothered to deny these rumours ..... Is it feasible that the men around Hindenburg would lend
themselves to such a dangerous manoeuvre?20
The suspicions of the left-wing press appeared more plausible in the light of the
fact that President Hindenburg was also honorary president of the Nationalist
Stahlhelm which openly demanded the reorganisation of the State itself. The
embodiment of the 'legal' State, however, must avoid being openly associated
with their illegal activities.21
Underground Warfare
Gramsci's observation of the para-military activity of the German Nationalists also
surfaced in the discussion of "underground" warfare in §1.134. Political Struggle
and Military Warfare. Here the question of legality was seen from a different angle,
2Olbld.
21 See the reports In RSE, 15,29 October 1929, on the acrimonious dispute between President
Hlndenburg and the Social Democratic government 01 Prussia which ordered the dissolution of the
Stahlhelm In the Rhineland on account of Its illegal 'frontier defence' preparations. The President of
the Republic thus found himself protecting an anti-republican or.ganisation found to be engaged in
Illegal activity.
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ie, from the standpoint of the relation between Germany's internal politics and her
external relations with France, a recurring theme in Gramsci's 'German' notes. The
regime imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty put the Nationalists in the
position of being what Gramsci calls "a nationalist party in a regime of national
- -. - - - - -
subjection". Since an open breach of legality might entail French intervention,
resistance to this regime must be kept "private".
The Stahl helm was not in itself an illegal organisation but its activites frequently
were. They included the secret storage of weapons and military training of civilians
in contravention of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty. These
activities were carried out in close collaboration with the Reichswehr under the
guise of 'frontier defence'. In the eastern provinces of Prussia near the frontier with
. Poland these illegal activites were hard to monitor, especially as they were carried
out with the connivance of the local Junker estate owners. However, it was
Stahlhelm activities on the western frontier, in the demilitarised zones of the
Rhineland, which caused most alarm in Germany and France at the end of
1929.
In negotiating Germany's agreement to the Young Plan Stresemann had obtained
from Briand a French pledge to evacuate the Rhineland by June 1930, five years
ahead of schedule. In anticipation of the French withdrawal the Stahlhelm stepped
up its illegal preparations for frontier defence in the demilitarised zones. This
provocative activity was an affront to French nationalist opinion and threatened to
wreck Stresemann's diplomatic success by giving the French an excuse to change
their mind. It also made the question of 'sanctions' the French priority when the
Hague conference reopened in January 1930, for there was every prospect of
German non-compliance with Versailles if a nationalist coup d'etat brought the
likes of Hugenburg to power.22
Apart from their effect on French opinion the Stahlhelm's activities were perceived
as an internal threat by the SOCialist government of Prussia, which kept them under
constant vigilance. The threat hinged precisely on the Reichswehr's collUSion in
these activities. As long as it collaborated with anti-republican organisations like
22 See the reports on Franco-German tension over the Rhineland evacuation in RSE 12,19,26
November and 3,10,24-31 December 1929, including the interview with Defence Minister General
Groener in answer to accusations in the French Chamber about German rearmament. On the issue of
possible sanctions against Germany at the Hague Conference, see RSE 21,28 January 1930.
Later.notesc:onfirmGramscl's Interest in the close interplay between the 'internal' politics of the
German Nationalist Right and 'external' French reactions to it.
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the Stahlhelm and relied upon them for its recruits, the threat of a right-wing coup
d'etat remalned These were the circumstances which led the Prussian
government to order the dissolution of the Stahlhelm in the Rhineland-Westphalia
in October 1929. This decision stirred the President out of his passivity. As the
Stahlhelm's honorary presldent, Hindenburg now intervened personally on its
behalf and an acrimonious dispute followed with the Prussian authorities who
refused to lift the ban at the President's behest.23 Thus the President of the
Republic took the side of an anti-republican organisation banned for its illegal
activity. The whole episode revealed the official hypocrisy of the State which was
the nub of Gramsci's analysis of the political use of shock troops in §1.133 and
§1.134.
As it happened, it was only when the French finally evacuated the Rhineland in
June 1930 that the suspected illegal military organisation came out into the open.
President Hindenburg used the occasion of the celebrations accompanying this
event to extort from the Socialist government in Prussia the lifting of the ban on the
Stahlhelm in Rhineland-Westphalia. This allowed the Stahlhelm to hold a rally in
Coblenz, in the French occupied zone, which was calculated to cause maximum
provocation to the French.24
The Campaign of the Hugenburg Press
The unexpected death of Stresemann in October 1929 removed the principal
restraint on the forces of German nationalism, which now began a radical
realignment. Alfred Hugenburg, the leader of the Nationalists, now joined with his
junior partner Hitler in the self-styled 'National Opposition', which attempted to
seize the pOlitical initiative by means of an all-out propaganda campaign against
the Young Plan.25
23 See the reports on the dissolution of the Stahlhelm in RSE 15,29 October 1929.
24See the extensive reports on French evacuation of the Rhineland in RSE 3,10,24 June 1930 and
on German celebrations including Hindenburg's triumphal tour in RSE 8, 15, 22, 31 July and 5 August
1930.
25 The right-wing referendum campaign against the Young Plan was continously reported in RSE
from 8 October to 12 November 1929, the latter issue carrying the result. See also CC (Cose
Straniere) 7 December 1929.
46
The instrument of this campaign was Hugenburg's powerful and extensive media
machine which he had built up since the war years for strategic pOlitical purposes.
26 By 1929 this included a publishing house (Scherl), a string of national and
provincial newspapers, a syndicated news agency (the Telegraph Union), a news
service (Wipro) which supplied ready-made moulds with articles of interest to local
newspapers, an advertising company (Ala), and Germany's largest film-producing
company, Universum Film AG (Uta). The key to Hugenberg's power lay in the
ability to control and manipulate the provincial press, especially under conditions
of economic insecurity. This was done indirectly through Hugenberg's so-called
'newspaper banks', which supplied capital to provincial newspapers in trouble and
offered newsprint at reduced rates.
SUChW8S the extent of Hugenberg's news machine by 1929 that he had no need
to artificially 'multiply' the organs of public opinion (to use Gramsci's expression)
but only to 'orchestrate' them. The man chosen to do this was the leading luminary
of the volkisch, anti-semitic Right - Adolf Hitler. The press campaign against the
Young Plan has not been analysed with the detailed attention it deserves in spite
of its cardinal importance in transforming Hitler's political fortunes in the course of
1929-30.27 For it was largely thanks to the sustained national coverage given to
him by Hugenburg's 'opinion factory' that the initiative in German politics passed
not to Hugenburg, but to his junior partner Hitler who now appeared to many
'smail-town' Germans as the charismatic 'coming man' of German politics. The
national 'breakthrough' of Hitler and the National Socialists in the Reichstag
elections in September 1930 owed much to this perception.
26 The classic study of the Hugenburg press, Ludwig Bernhard's Der 'Hugenberg-Konzem' (Berlin,
1928). has still not been translated. not even in the age of Murdoch. The following is based on the
summary in Modns Eksteins: The Umits of Reason. The German Democratic Press and the Collapse
of WeimarDemocracy (Oxford, 1975) pp's 78-82, which isbased on Bernhard. Later studies are by
Valeska Dietrich: Alfred Hugenburg (Berlin, 1960); John A. Leopold's Affred Hugenburg seems to
ask the wrong questions.
27 This was pointed out long ago. In the six months from October 1929 to March 1930 "every speech
made by Hitler and the other Nazi leaders had been carried with great prominence by the Hugenburg
~ain of papers and news agencies. To millions of Germans who had scarcely ever heard of him before
Hitler now-becamea familiar figure, thanks to a publicity campaign entirely paid for by Hugenburg's rival
party" . A.Bullock:Hitfer. A Study in Tyranny (1962), p.149.
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The nationalist campaign against the Young Plan was was well reported in
Gramsci's periodicals.28 The contribution of the Hugenburg press was commented
upon by democratic observers at the time. The Times of London, for example,
observed that Hugenburg's success in getting the 10% of the electorate's votes
needed for the referendum against the Young Plan was due to his "control over a
powerful group of important newspapers and significant cinematographic
interests". 29 The Social Democratic Minister of the Interior, Severing, was
sufficiently concerned by the violence of the right-wing press to introduce a 'Law for
the Protection of the Republic' in December 1929 asking for the power to ban
newspapers in order to combat "the demagogy of Hugenburg".30
This significantly affects our understanding of §2.26. The German Newspapers
written in the first half of 1930. The empirical data contained in this note were taken
from an article by Paolo Vita-Finzi in the Rivista d'italia for May 1927 and were
therefore, strictly speaking, 'out of date' by the time he came across them.31
However, the right-wing press campaign against the Young Plan gave the question
of the political power of the press in Germany fresh currency or attua/ita and this is
probably why Gramsci selected and noted any 'relevant' facts he could find, even if
they were dated. For Gramsci the press was the most 'dynamic' part of the
"ideological front" of the ruling class (§3.49): the latest offensive of the Hugenburg
press against the Young Plan showed what an "ideological fronf meant in reality.
The Rising Profile of Hitler
Although Gramsci had known of Hitler since the time of the Munich putsch in 1923
and had referred in passing to a government of the 'Hitler-Mussolini' type32, there
is no evidence in the notes written around the turn of 1929-30 that he attached any
special importance to him. At what precise point, then, did Gramsci's perception of
28 The issue of RSE for 8 October 1929 which carried the first news of Stresemann's death also
included the first reports of the violent agitation now launched by the extreme Right to defeat the new
reparations plan (ie, theYoung Plan) Stresemann negotiated before his death: -Demonstrations of
political protest are being staged by the various nationalist parties whilst the right-wing press
conducted a lively battle against the govemmenf.See also CC (Cose Straniere) 2 November 1929.
29 RSE, 17 December 1929.
30 Ibid.
31Paolo Vita-Finzi: Letters dal/a Germania: I'enciclopaedia a quattlo soIdi (La stamps politics tedesca).
Rivistad'/talia, 15 May 1927 (see QCIV p.2546). Note that this issue of the Rivistad'/talia was listed in
the material dispatched to his brother Carlo on 15June 1930. Seethe Jist in aclV p.23n.
32 See the article 'Sonomi e I Suol Amici' in L 'Ordine Nuovo, 15 March 1924, written at the time of
Hitler's trial for his part in the Munich putsch. CPC p.171.
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Hitler's potential begin to change? To establish this we must follow Hitler's
progress through Gramsci's periodicals.
In August 1929 the Rassegna settimanaie della stampa estera reported at length
the annual congress of the National Socialist Party at Nuremberg. The congress
gave a particularly warm welcome to the representative from Italy who was greeted
with applause and shouts of 'Long live Fascist Italy'. In his keynote speech Hitler
said that "the National Socialists consider it necessary to oppose Stresemann's
mistaken pro-French policy by reaching an understanding with France's natural
enemy, Italy, and that it was therefore their task to prevent exciting public opinion in
Germany against Italy and in Italy against Germany". The following day Hitler
reviewed a parade of Storm Troops and announced from the rostrum his
movement's claim to the German tradition: "A Reich which denies the military spirit
of 1914 has no reason to exist and must give way to a new Reich armed with the
extreme will to restore Germany to itself, to its civil and military traditions".33
The Nuremberg party congress of August 1929 was a 'media event' which attracted
a certain amount of national and international publicity but it was not until Hitler
joined forces with Hugenburg in September that he moved from the fringe into the
main arena of national politics and started to get continuous press coverage.
Although the press reports in the Rassegna settimanaie associated the agitation
against the Young Plan primarily with Hugenberg, by the start of November
precedence was being given to reporting Hitler's contributions rather than
Hugenberg's. The success of the National Socialists in the municipal elections in
Berlin and the split in the Nationalist party caused by Hugenberg's tactical alliance
with the "racists" indicated that the anti-Young Plan campaign was changing the
relation of forces on the German Right34 . Thus the Temps of Paris reported (19
November):
There is no doubt that the results of the municipal elections in the major centres show that the
Nationalist party has suffered significant losses to the advantage of the populists and above all the
'racists'. An extreme, ultra-revolutionary, demogogic, and imperialist Right has thus been
reconstituted in Germany with tendencies which had virtually disappeared from German politics in
r~t years. This is manifestly the result of the direction in which Mr. Hugenberg has taken the party
whICh he claims to lead like a dictator and which he has foolishly launched into a campaign of agitation
for the plebisicte against the Young Plan without leaving himself any way out. 35
33 RSE, 20 August 1929, p.1866.
34 The results of the municipal elections in Berlin and the split in Hugenburg's party were reported in
RSE 29 November and 17 December1929
35The Temps of Paris reported in RSE, 26 November 1929
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The Times of London (23 November) also commented on the shift taking place,
although it needed the help of the political dictionary:
Mr. Hugenberg would find himself in a much better position in his own political camp but for the
alliance he entered into, for the purposes of his campaign against the Young Plan, with the National
Socialists [fhe party of Hitler: editor's note) who are not socialists but extreme nationalists who are
more appropriately defined as 'fascists'. It is certainly true that without their help he would not have
obtained the minimum number of votes needed to hold a referendum. Germany would then have
been spared all the rancour and bitterness inevitably provoked by Mr.Hugenburg's efforts to
persuade a majority of his electors to vote against the Young Plan. However, in their enthusiasm
Mr.Hugenberg's allies have poured scorn on the Nationalists' lack of zeal. They have done even
worse: they are starting to displace the Nationalists. In the recent elections at both the state and
municipal levels the 'fascists' have won seats at the expense of the nationalist candidates. This cannot
be at all agreeable to the party's leader or to its more moderate supporters.36
The beginning of a realignment of the German Right was reflected in the first article
on Hitler to appear in Gerarchia in December.37 The German contributor who was
obviously a Nazi himself reported on "a movement which is daily gaining ground in
Germany". He wanted to correct the false impression left by an earlier article in
August which suggested that Hugenberg not Hitler was the leader of the 'fascists'
in Germany.38 The article was consistent with Hitler's agenda at Nuremberg of
fostering a better understanding with Fascist Italy. However, the task was not
without difficulty in view of the radical importance which, by this account, the
National Socialists attached to "the value of race" - an element which played no
part at this stage in the ideology of Italian fascism. Moreover, the memory of Hitler's
past aSSOCiationwith Ludendorff might have created the impression that his
movement was merely Mlegitimist"·and favoured a restoration of the Hohenzollern
monarchy. "Serious people" like Hitler did not even consider this possibility, he
observed. Not that Hitler was hostile in principle to the monarchy, any more than
Mussolini was: merely that -he considers the question of the form of the State as
less important than that of the internal structure of the State".
Once Hugenberg's 'law' against the Young Plan had been presented to the
Reichstag in December 1929, and emphatically rejected, the Plan began its
passage through parliament. The nationalist campaign against it now moved from
the plebiscitary to the parliamentary phase (January-March 1930). Gramsci's
periodicals had little to report about Hitler and the National Socialists until their
36 The TimBs reported In RSE, 3 December 1929
37Geert von Sohwochau: 'LaGermanla e Hitler', GER December 1929
38 Alberto Spalnl: '1ilablrlnto tedesco', GER August 1929
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tactical alliance with the Nationalists was ended after ratification of the Young Plan
in March.39 Instead, they concentrated on the further splits in the Nationalist party
which developed at this paint over the issue of the party's attitude to the new
government of Bruning.4O The agrarian faction led by the former leader von
Westarp joined the new government in order to secure more protection for eastern
agriculture whilst Hugenburg's faction remained in 'absolute' opposition. The
disarray in the leadership of the Nationalist party accelerated the disintegration of
its mass base, which began to move towards the National Socialists. The latter's
success in the elections in Saxony in June 1930, largely at the expense of the
Nationalists, made a big impression and raised Hitler's profile again in the
periodicals41 . The Frankfurter Zeitung (24 June) attributed the Nazi victory to three
main causes:
The whole National Socialist movement is above all a movement of feelings. Such a movement does
not spring from a single cause but has several roots. The first and deepest root is the outcome of the
war, the enormously deep injustice imposed on the German people by the Versailles Treaty. The
second root is the so-called crisis of parliamentarism. This institution is not sick but what the
parliamentary representatives have made of it is to some extent unhealthy. The third root, and
possibly the most important at this moment, lies in economic conditions. The enormous pressure
weighing on the masses, the unemployment, the insecurity, the terrible competition with so little
opportunity - all this has radicalised vast sections of the bourgeois classes as well. They [the National
Socialists] are not socialists in the usual sense of the word but they do have a certain anti-capltallst
orientation. Naturally other causes have contributed as well: anything, so to speak, is useful to a
movement in its initial stage.42
The victory in Saxony was followed by news of a challenge to Hitler's leadership by
Otto Strasser over the ideological question of the party's 'socialism'. Hitler moved
immediately to expel Strasser from the party, thus protecting his position as the
-infallible pope" on questions of the party's ideology. According to the interpretation
of Strasser's revolt in the Bayerische Kurier of Munich (4 July) "the enterprise
'Nationalsozialismus' has been unmasked by his (Strasser's) declaration that its
SOCialismis nothing more than a means to justify the end"43 . The Regensburger
Anzeiger (8 July) recognised the danger to the movement arising from competition
for the leadership: "Rivalry for the leadership of the party will always be its most
39 On relations between the two parties at this point, RSE 15 and 29 April 1930, pp's 799-807 and
924-925.
40 RSE, 6 and 13 May 1930, p.1011-1015 and p10SO-1052.
41 On the Nazi Victory in Saxony, RSE 1 and 8 July 1930, p.1435-1442 and p.1495-1496.
42 RSE, 8 JUly 1930, p.1495.
43 RSE, 22July 1930, p.162~-1626
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vulnerable point and might prove dangerous one day, especially the day when
Adolf Hitler closes his eyes"44 . The sharpest commentary on Hitler's leadership at
this point, however, came from the Catholic paperGermania (8 July):
The special mark of the National Socialist movement is above all its complete lack of scruples in
fighting its political enemies. The programme of the movement itself, on the other hand, is of such
secondary importance that its effect on the masses is hardly noticeable. This is precisely the
difference between National Socialism and other parties. There is one other difference, though: it is
exclusively the work of one single man, Hitler. VVhoever wants to understand the nature of National
Socialism, therefore, must first of all get to know the character of its founder. He is essentially a man
who hates whatever gets in his way True, he is filled with a real passion for the greatness of his
country and is determined that it shall become a strong State. Nevertheless, his own greatness is
revealed in two ways: he knows the psychology of the masses in depth and displays an unlimited
brutality. He looks at the masses as they really are, ie, from the point of view of feelings. Fanaticism and
brutality are in a certain sense the fundamental concepts of his theory of propaganda; its practical
principles include concentration on a single point and the utmost patience in waiting for the effect.
The psychology of Hitler is simple and clear, as we see, and this is precisely the secret of his influence
on the masses. 45
These reports in the Rassegna settimana/e on the rise of Hitler and the National
Socialists in Germany in the summer of 1930 formed the immediate background to
the first part of §2.75 which was written at this time. 46 This was a summary with
critical commentary in two parts, written at different times, of Robert Michels'
writings on political parties. Gramsci's interest in this first part centred on the
concept of the 'charismatic leader' in politics which Michels claimed to have
'discovered' - a claim which he questioned, attributing the concept to Weber
instead. Although Gramsci directly considers the case of Mussolini, who was cited
by Michels as an example, he makes no direct reference to Hitler. Nevertheless,
there can be little doubt that the currency (attua/ita) of this note was provided by
the emergence in the summer of 1930 of another 'charismatic leader' in Germany.
This interpretation is confirmed, as we will see, not only by the date of §2.75 but
also by its content.
The 'Dictatorship' of Bruning
In July the Reichstag voted against Bruning's programme of financial measures to
deal with the deepening economic crisis. The chancellor now carried out his threat
to dissolve the Reichstag and, failing a new majority, to govern by presidential
44 Ibid. p.1626.
45lbid. p.162S.
46 §2.7S, QCI p.230-234
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decree under article 48 of the German constitution.47 This marked a new phase in
the crisis of hegemony in Germany which was now to be governed without the
consent of parliament.
As the election campaign got under way in August, Gramsci wrote §3.119 under
the rubric 'past and present'.48 Here he sought to explain the weakness of the
political parties in Italy throughout the period from the Risorgimento to Fascism. He
was particularly interested in one political element, "the so-called dictatorships of
Depretis, Crispi, and Giolitti" [Gramsci's italics] in which the government stood
above the political parties and indeed deliberately acted to disintegrate them. The
result was that Italy was effectively governed by the bureaucracy, which took over
the function of the political parties and became a kind of political party in itself - "the
State-Bonapartist party" as he called it. At the end of the note Gramsci's mind
turned again to Weber's writings, notably his famous critique of post-Bismarckian
Germany which described "a 'similar' state of affairs in the Kaiser's Germany".
However, this was more than simply a lesson in the pre-war histories of Italy and
Germany: the currency of §3.119 must be understood against the background of
the new phase of the German crisis which now opened, the so-called dictatorship
of Bruning.
The Battle of Ideas:
the Aeichstag Election Campaign
The Reichstag election campaign in the summer of 1930 was fully reported in
Gramsci's periodicals. The battle of ideas in Germany was fought out against the
background of the accelerating economic crisis triggered off by the Wall Street
Crash. As the Comintern's change of tactiC showed, this circumstance had
strengthened conventional Marxist wisdom on the economic determinants of
political movements. It was characteristic of Gramsci's turn of mind, however, to
choose this moment to pose the question of "the value of the ideologies" in Marxist
theory, ie, the role of ideological 'forces' as against economic ones in determining
political outcomes. This he did in a series of notes in Notebook 4 written at this
point. 49 These notes implicitly challenged the 'economistic' prejudice underlying
47 On the dissolution of the Aeichstag, ASE 22 and 29 July 1930, p. 1623 and p.1660.See also CC
(Case Straniere), 2 August 1930.
48 §3.119, QCI p.3S6-388
49 §4.15, §4.20, §4.22, §7.19, §7.21 in QCI p.436-437, p.441, p.442 and QCII p.868-869.
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the new tactic of the Comintern which assumed, consciously or unconsciously, that
the political outcome of the new capitalist crisis was "predetermined" in favour of
the Communists. The reports Gramsci read in his periodicals at this time about the
mass expansion of the ideology of National Socialism told him otherwise.
A main theme of the reports Gramsci read was the crisis of the 'middle' parties in
Germany and their unsuccessful efforts to form a bloc; another was the various
attempts on the eve of the election to launch new parties, notably the State party.
However, it was the advance of the extreme parties, the Communists and the
Nazis, which elicited most comment. One French paper predicted that in view of
their recent electoral successes in Saxony, Thuringia, and East Prussia Hitler and
the Nazis would probably win about 50 seats in the coming elections. 50 Another,
referring to the recent advance of the "supernationalists" in the state elections,
predicted that the mass exodus from Hugenburg's party to Hitler and the 'racists'
would continue in the national elections.51 The changing relation of forces on the
German Right was a clearly definable trend, although no one predicted the full
extent of the shift. Judging by the variations in the names given to the new mass
movement - 'supernationalists', 'tascists', 'racists' etc etc - political commentators
were even less certain how to define the elements of change and continuity in the
transformation of nationalist ideology.
The electoral expansion of the Nazis prompted a number of attempts to analyse the
party's ideology and to explain its mass appeal. The most perceptive of these were
the articles in the New Statesman (16 and 30 August 1930). 52 In common with
other reports the New Statesman saw the Nazi movement as filling the ideological
vacuum created by the disintegration of the traditional ruling ideas. G ram sci called
this disintegration the "crisis of authority" and related these notes on the value of
the ideologies to his earlier notes on this theme.53 In the last of these, Gramsci
ruled out the possibility of a 'restoration' but "not completely", and went on to refer
to the possible appearance of a new 'combinations'.54 This new 'combination' in
Germany was National Socialism.
50 Mstln Quoted In RSE, 19 August 1930, p.1826.
51 Homms Libra Quoted in RSE, 19 August1930, p.1827.
52 Reported In RSE, 26 August and 9 September 1930, pp's 1908-1909 and 2018-2019.
53 14.22, QCI p.442.
54 §3.34, QCI p.311.
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The ideas, feelings, and traditions of the German conservatives are completely confused. The
development of the National Socialist movement is part of this process of disintegration. The National
Socialists (they are sometimes called fascists and not without reason since they have little or nothing
in common with socialism even though they have an anti-capitalist tendency) will certainly make gains
in September. They had twelve seats in the last Reichstag and the forecast is that they will have 30 to
60 deputies in the next parliament. They could have almost the same number of seats as the
COmmunists .
The National Socialists have progressed mainly at the expense of the Nationalists. The latter are
strong especially east of the Elbe where the Junkers are still powerful. They attract the greater part of
what is left of the aristocracy, at least in Prussia, and also that part of the middle class which is still
traditionalist and monarchist. As for the monarchy itself, there is no such thing in German politics.
There are monarchists and a certain idea of monarchy, which is fast disappearing, but there is no
monarchist movement. It is often said that the German republic needs a conservative democracy.
There was a time when the Nationalists seemed to be moving in this direction but the largest of the
four groups into which the party has split is now moving in the OPPOSitedirection, along a parallel path
to the National Socialists although there is little love lost between them. There are several reasons for
this but the main one is Dr.Hugenburg. 55
What exactly were the elements of this 'combination' and what held it together?
The New Statesman was clear that 'revolutionary' anti-Semitism was the
organising element of Nazi ideology but this raised deeper issues about the
rationality of ideology itself. The logic of Hitler's anti-Semitism was clear to see but
was "beyond belief'. It could only be explained as a lie, useful for tactical reasons.
The National Socialist Workers Party demonstrates that political parties are held together and spurred
to action by catchphrases and expressions which stir the people rather than by logical and carefully
considered arguments. Otherwise it would be impossible to explain the undeniable progress of the
fascists in Germany since their ideology is a mixture of vague theories about race, anti-Semitism and
'true' SOCialism,and it would be hard to explain why whole groups of people are so convinced by it that
they become absolutely fanatical followers of the party.
The thing that really holds the ranks of Germanic Fascism together is an ancient, innate instinct: anti-
Semitism. Having had to suffer so much during and after the war, the German people wanted to lay the
blame on a scapegoat of some kind. The Jews, who have a relatively good standard of living, arouse a
lot of envy; they have never been regarded as true Germans but more or less as foreigners, and once
again they are now "the real cause of Germany's misfortunes·. It Is said that they were the secret allies
of France and Britain, that they betrayed the German army and brought about the revolution.
The expressions 'Judenrepublik' and 'Judenregierung' are used all the time nowadays by the National
Socialists in speaking of the Germanic State. Anyone who knows the character of the Germans will not
be surprised that they believe these ridiculous accusations. Of course, stirring up these anti-Semitic
instincts is only a tactic on the part of Hitler and the other party leaders. I cannot believe that Hitler Is
seriously thinking of crushing Germany's 600,000 Jews. He is obviously using this as a popular
method of attracting vast masses of people to his other political ideas. The outcry against the Jews can
be launched in order to create the warlike state of mind needed to establish fascism.
The party has also understood the necessity 01 adopting a so-called revolutionary attitude. Although
this is no more than a thin coat of vamish, the phraseology of the National Socialist party could easily
be taken for that of the Socialist and even the Communist party. A distinction is made between
55 RSE, 9 September 1930, p.2018-2019.
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capitalists who 'work' (Christians) and capitalists who 'gain' (Jews) and the aim is to emancipate the
German people from the clutches of international Jewish capitalism and to establish a national
socialism for the benefit of the poorer classes. The fact is that this bears no resemblance to socialism
in the Marxist sense but it seems that the German worker, disillusioned with the Socialists and the
Communists, is drawn increasingly to this form of revolutionary movement. 56
Perhaps the passage of most interest to Gramsci, however, was the New
Statesman's comparison of the purely negative politics of the two extreme parties,
the Communists and the Nazis. This resulted in an essential difference between
the two ideologies which may have stimulated the dialectical analysis of the
concept itself which we find in Gramsci's notes.
There is no reason why the extreme parties, as such, must always act negatively. The German
Communists act this way mainly because their leadership has very little ability and because they are
a Russian not a German party, in the sense of being completely dominated by Moscow which takes
no account of the internal affairs of Germany. The Communists could do a lot for the German workers
and a lot for Russia but they do nothing for anyone. Naturally, they are against the present German
system. This might not be a bad thing but they are against any compromise with this system. Now,
granted that there is no possibility of overthrowing this system and granted that social progress in
Germany is not possible without making compromises, the Communists have no achievements to
their credit. Although they are a revolutionary party, the effect of their strategy is anti-revolutionary.
Even if there was another German revolution it would not be led by the Communists or even
influenced by them.
The National Socialists are just as negative. True, they are not bound by orders from outside but they
are dominated by a kind of fantasy world filled with the most vulgar superstitions. At least the
Communists have a clear dogma and certain basic conceptions containing a core of reality, but the
National Socialists combine strong racial prejudice with a pseudo-Christianity. Their writings and
speeches are full of vivacity but cannot be translated into any other language. Their followers come
above all from the most impoverished groups of the middle class who are full of nostalgia for the
glories and privileges which vanished in the defeat and revolution; who maintain that the Jews,
pacifists and others are to blame for Germany's misfortunes; and who, seeing themselves reduced to
the economic level of the working class but at the same time sticking to what they believe is their SOCial
and racial superiority, surrender themselves to violence, kindled by a terrible rancour ..... 57
We can only speculate how the historicist Gramsci might have read this account of
National Socialism. The 'old' element of the combination consisted of the
"nostalgia for the glories and privileges of the past which vanished in the defeat
and revolution". The popular appeal of this element in the growing constituency of
the Nazis east of the Elba could be readily understood. The appeal of the lnew'
element was probably harder for Gramsci to understand. In the first place, far from
being new anti-Semitism was an 'ancient instinct', but post-war conditions in
Germany provided a culture in which anti-Semitism was born again in a new
'revolutionary' form and became the organising element of a political ideology. The
58 RSE, 26 August 1930, p.190S.
57 RSE, 9 September 1930, p.2019.
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'terrible rancour' of the impoverished middle classes gave the new ideology its
revolutionary 'force'. In §6.35 we see that Gramsci thought that the success of the
National Socialists in the latest elections testified to the greater appeal of 'racism'
in Germany than in Italy, but his attempt to explain this phenomenon in terms of
comparative history was only a tentative sketch which unfortunately he did not
return to.58
58 §6.3S. Ita/ian Culture. Doesany "racism" exist in Italy? QCII p.710.
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Notebooks 1-3
§1.48: The Crisis of Hegemony
The historical-political crisis in Germany between 1929-1933 was conceived by
Gramsci as a "crisis of hegemony"and his perception of the German events was
organised in terms of this concept. What did he mean by it?
Its origin in the notebooks can be traced to §1.48, one of the first drafts of the Notes
on French National Life which were written very early, by the end of 1929. Starting
from first principles, Gramsci returned to the roots of Marxism and rethought the
young Marx's famous synthesis of German philosophy and French politics which
attended the birth of Marxism in the years before 1848. He suggested that in
Hegel's doctrine of the private associations and in the political-journalistic
organisation of the French Jacobins can be found in embryo the same "element-of
politics": ie, the modern parliamentary State which developed in Western Europe
in the years after 1848, in which the consent of the governed was organised by the
"private" initiative of the bourgeoisie and given permanence by the political parties.
No doubt Gramsci wanted in these Notes on French National Life to add a further
chapter to Marx's classic analyses of French politics in 1848-51, bringing the
analysis up to date with the political realities of the post-1848 period.
From this starting-point Gramsci proceeded to describe the complex process of
construction of the parliamentary State in France after 1848. Extrapolating from the
history of France, "the richest in political elements", he arrived at a general model of
the parliamentary State designed to represent the "normal" state of affairs.
The 'normal' exercl.. of hegemonyon the now cla.. lc ground of parliamentary government
I. characterlNd by a combination of force and consent In equilibrium, without force
outweighing consent too much. Indeed, force apprear. to be supported by the consent of
the majority a. expr.. Hd through tha .o-called organ. of public opinion (which are
therefore artificially multiplied In certeln situations). Between foree and consent II..
corruption-fraud (which I. typical of certeln situations whare hegemony Is hard to exerel••
but where the use of force I. too rl.ky). This Involve. Intimidating and paralysing the
opponent or opponents by cornering their leadere - normally by .eeret means, but openly
when danger threaten. - In order to throw their rank. Into confusion and dl.order.1
This definition of the "norm" by a leading Communist intellectual might be
considered surprising since Gramsci's conception of the political history of Western
Europe since 1848 included the postwar period when the "norm" was
fundamentally challenged not only by Fascism but also by Communism. It was
1§1.48, QCI p.59 (PN1 p.155-156)
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particularly timely in 1929 when Italian fascism, which was originally "not for
export", was developing universal pretensions and claiming that in superseding the
"universal principles" of 1789 it marked the start of a new epoch. In 1929 there
were no few democrats as well as anti-democrats in Europe who were partly or
whollypel-5uaded by this claim and,lf anything, their number increased rather than
decreased after the advent of German 'fascism' in 1933. Gramsci's anti-fascism did
not draw him into a simple-minded defence of the "norm", however. As we see,
government by consent is presented in §1.48 not in terms of the universal
principles of 1789 but in terms of the realities behind the 'normal' exercise of power
in a parliamentary democracy, such as the manufacture of public opinion and the
corruption of political opponents. For all this, the fact remains that Gramsci was very
conscious of the anti-French orientation of Italian fascism and his decision to
ground his 'communist' political theory in the elements of French democratic history
and culture was an ideological as well as scientific choice.
In the postwar period when extension of the suffrage made government by consent
universal, the parliamentary State runs into increasing difficulties. Gramsci applies
the same spirit of realism in disentangling the "difficulties" from the various
ideological standpoints from which they were presented in his periodicals.
In the post-war period the apparatus of hegemony disintegrates and hegemony bacomes
Increasingly difficult to exercise. The phenomenon Is described by various namea and
from various standpoints, the commonest being "crisis of the principle of authority",
"dissolution of the parliamentary regime". Naturally, the main symptoms of this
phenomenon,In the arena of parliament and government, are the only onea ever ctalcrlbed
and thesa are explained In terms of the failure of the parliamentary 'principle', of the
democratic 'prinCiple' etc, but not the failure of the 'principle' of authority (this failure I.
proclaimed by others). On the practical level, the crisis Is reflected In the Increasing
difficulty of forming governments and the Increasing Instability of governments
them,elvea. It, Immediateorigin II.. In the multiplication of parliamentary partie. and In
the (permanent) Internal crise. of every party (Ie, every party experlencaa what
parliament a. a whole experiences: difficulty In governing).
To lOme extent thl. phenomenonal,o takes the form of corruption and moral decay. Every
Internal faction Is convinced It has the reclpa to halt the deterioration of the whole party
and I. preparedto use any means to take over the leader,hlp, Just a, [the party] In
parliamentIs convinced It I, the only party which ,hould form the government or at lea.t,
In return for ,upportlng the government, should have the biggest .hare of the posta.
Hence the quibbling and patty bargaining among parsonalltl.. which Inevitably ap.,.."
.candalous. Perhaps In reality there I, le81 corruption than one think.. The fact that
tho.. Who want to resolve the crl,l, on their own terms pretend to balleve In the
'corruption' and 'dissolution' of a 'principle' might even ba justified: everyone Is free to be
the best JUdgeIn choosing the most appropriate Ideological weaponsfor the aim, he
wants to achieve and demogogy could be regarded a, an excellent weapon.
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But the whole thing becomes comical when the demogogue doesn't know how to be one,
that la, when he proceeda In practice on the assumption that the habit is the monk, the
cap la the brain. Machiavelli and Stenterello.2
This account of the disintegration of hegemony was based on a synthesis of French
and German experience in the autumn of 1929. We saw that the events which gave
this note its immediate currency were the fall of Briand in France in October and the
split in the Nationalist party in Germany in November caused by Hugenburg's
alliance with the "racists" and the demagogic campaign against the Young Plan.
These events provided Gramsci with the main symptoms of disintegration on the
"practical" level, ie, the increasing instability of governments and the splitting and
multiplication of parties. The German dimension is particularly important since
Gramsci's point is that the anti-democratic parties were "disintegrating" as well as
the democratic ones. Thus, the leading fascist periodical Gerarchia reported the
ministerial crisis in France only in order to proclaim the failure of the democratic
principle, but ignored the splitting of the Nationalists in Germany which showed that
the anti-democratic principle, ie, "the principle of authority", was also in crisis.
Gramsci says in brackets that the failure of this principle was proclaimed by
"others": who were they? For the answer we must turn to his non-fascist periodicals
where he found further evidence of the crisis of hegemony on the "ideological"
level. Gramsci summarised this evidence in §3.03 which we will come to shortly.
Meanwhile we are left to ponder Gramsci's final reference to "the
demogogue who does not know how to be one" and who thus bears more
resemblance to Stenterello than Machiavelli. He appears to be thinking of the
leader of French monarchism, Maurras, but the immediate context suggests that he
was also thinking of his German equivalent Hugenburg who, precisely at this
juncture, was "the demagogue who does not know how to be one". For this German
Stenterello seemed to recognise that "monarchism" is not the best ideological
weapon of the demagogue and so joined forces with the leader of German
"racism", the real demogogue Hitler. The latter had much better credentials for the
role of Machiavelli but whether Gramsci recognised this at the end of 1929 seems
doubtful. Possibly he was being more ironic than he knew.
2 Ibid., p.59-60 (PN1p.156)
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§1.18, §1.48.The Monarchist Party In a Republican Regime
We said that to trace Gramsci's thinking about Germany we must follow what he
writes about France. His comparative (ie, 'Marxist') method of thinking starts by
selecting "elements of politics" from the experience of France which were a feature
(or not a feature) of the experience of other countries. Gramsci starts the notes by
selecting the following political element:
11.18. The error of Ifaurraa. Notes on the French monarchlat party. The monarchlat party
In a republican regime, like the republican party In a monarchist regime and the nationalist
party In a regime of national subJection, cannot but be a party aul generl. : that II, If It
wanta to have r.latlvely quick success, It must be the centre for a federation of parties,
more than a party charact.rls.d by all the particular details of Its gov.rnment programme.
Th. party ot a gen.ral syst.m ot gov.rnm.nt and not the party ot a particular
gov.rnm.nt ......Ev.ry party Is found.d on a class, and the monarchl.t party In Franc. Is
tounded on the remnants of the old landed nobility and a small number of Intellectual.. On
what do the monarchists count In ord.r to take pow.r and r•• tor. the monarchy? They
count on the collapse of the bourgeols-parllam.ntary r.glme and on the Inability of any
other .xlstlng organised force to be the political nucl.us ot a military dlctator.hlp which I.
expected or which th.y themselv.s have prearranged. Their IOclal cia.. force. could not
attain pow.r In any oth.r way. 3
What does this note tell us about Germany, or rather, what "element of politics" in
German experience does it correspond to? In Germany the "monarchist party in a
republican regime" was the German National People's Party led by Alfred
Hugenburg, together with the Stahlhelm , Germany's largest association of ex-
officers and front-line soldiers, with which it was closely associated. At first Sight,
the differences between the parties of Maurras and Hugenburg, let alone between
the two men, seem more striking than the similarities: for one thing, in view of the
regime imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, it was possible to describe
Hugenburg's party, seen from a different angle, as "a nationalist party in a regime
of national subjection" and compare it (as Gramsci does in §1.134) with similar
parties in other countries, including colonial regimes. Maurras' Action Francaise
was also ultra-nationalist , but not in the same state of "national subjection".
Gramsci was not unaware of these differences but for theoretical purposes he
started from the similarities. On the practical level, the first similarity was the policy
of "abstention" from electoral-parliamentary politics. This was deduced "logically"
from its ideology. Since the monarchist party was opposed in principle to a
republican regime, abstentionism, renunciation of electoral politics as such,
3 §1.18. QCI p.14-1S (PN1 p.108-1 09)
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followed from its a priori principles. However, if political parties exist to win the
consent of the masses, how did the monarchist party expect to achieve its aims if it
renounced this essential task?
When Hugenburg took over the leadership of the German National People's Party
in 1928 after its defeat in the Reichstag elections, he led the party into "absolute"
opposition to the German republic. The political significance of the change of
leadership lay precisely in the change to "abstentionist" tactics. In practice this
meant a purely negative politics. Under his leadership the party now renounced
positive electioneering in the country at large and adopted purely obstructive
tactics in parliament. Instead, he now relied on "extra-parliamentary" forms of
agitation, for which he had ample private resources. The most striking features of
his first big initiative, the campaign against the Young Plan, were extra-
parliamentary: the presence of the storm troops in the streets and the violent
campaign of the Hugenburg press. The propaganda against the new regime of
"debt-slavery" enabled the party to appear in the more appealing guise of "a
nationalist party in a regime of national subjection", but it remained all the same "a
monarchist party in a republican regime". The nationalist and anti-republican
elements of the party's ideology were closely connected, of course, Since
emancipation from the regime of "national subjection" was only be possible by
getting rid of the republic. Consequently it was not surprising to find that the
campaign against the Young Plan was accompanied by speculation about a
possible coup d'etat. by the Nationalist Right.
This brings us to another element in common between the parties of Maurras and
Hugenburg. The monarchist party in Germany, as in France, counted on the
collapse of the bourgeois-parliamentary regime and saw itself as "the political
nucleus of a military dictatorShip", which would then restore the monarchy. But
could the monarchy be restored by force alone, by a coup d'etat, without the
consent of the masses? One of the implications of Gramsci's concept of hegemony
was that this kind of "revolution" was not possible any more, either for the Right or
for the Left. The parliamentary crisis in France in 1925 provided evidence for this.
The Action Francaise deluded itself into thinking that the Republic was going to
collapse and invited Caillaux to form a military dictatorship. An essential ingredient
of the delusion was the faith that rural France would somehow rally to the call to
restore the monarchy.
- __ - ~~---~-- -----~~-~--
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Maurras' defeat is certain: It is his conception which Is false, because of Its excessively
logical perfection. Besides, Maurras sensed defeat at the very beginning of the crisis with
the Vatican which coincided with the French parliamentary crisis of 1925. While the
ministers succeeded one another In rotation, Action Franc/a.e publicly announced that It
was ready to assume power. An article was published In which they went so far as to Invite
Call1aux to collaborate - the same Call1aux whose execution by firing squad was alwlYs
being called for. The episode Is classic: the rigidified and rltlonallstlc politics typified by
Maurru, the politics of a priori abstentionism, of cosmic natural laws that govern society
Is bound to end up fading away, collapsing, and abdicating at the crucial moment. It then
becomes obvious that the great masses of energies do not flow Into the reservoirs
artificially created for them but follow the paths traced by history, changing direction In
line with the parties which have always remained active. Apart from being foolish enough
to believe that the Republic could collapse In 1925 because of the parliamentary crisis
(Intellectualism leads to such monomaniacal hallucinations), there was alao a moral
coUapse, If not on the part of Maurras (who may well have remained In his state of
apocalyptic illumination), on the part of his group which felt Isolated enough to appeal to
CalJlaux.4
_~~_OctObe~_~~29_Gra~sci could only wait t~ see whether the German republic
would prove to have as much "reserve strength" in a future crisis as the French
republic obviously had in 1925. The German precedent was the crisis of 1923
when the republic had survived a pathetic attempt to overthrow it by self-styled
"revolutionaries" of the Right (not to mention the real revolutionaries of the Left), but
the precedent was misleading since the catastrophic inflation of that year had used
up whatever "reserve strength" the republic could count on and thus reduced its
chances of surviving a second crisis.
Nevertheless, if the ideology of its main enemy was anything to go by (as Gramsci
was firmly convinced it was), the prospects of the German republic in October 1929
were far from hopeless. In §1.48 Gramsci analysed the ideology of Action
Francaise in detail and isolated the elements which accounted for its relative
popularity. One of these was its "rationalistic" character.
(Maurras') relative popularity derives precisely from this: his method la appealing becau••
It the same method of reasoning reason which gave rise to Encyclopaedl.m, the
Enlightenment, and the whole of French masonic culture. The men of the Enlightenment
had created the myth of the [noble) savage, or some such thing: Maurr.. creat.. the myth
ot the French monarchist past, except that this myth was once 'history' and Its
Intellectualistic distortions are all too .. slly corrected.s
Thus Maurras' myth was relatively popular because it substituted for the
Enlightenment faith in progress a sort of reverse faith in "regress", whereby the
monarchy appeared predestined by the laws of French history to be restored. But
this "rationalistic" element was rooted in French culture and was peculiar to the
4 §1.48, QCI p.63-64. (PN1 p.161)
5lbicl. p.61 (PN1p.158-159)
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French monarchist myth. It was difficult for the likes of Hugenburg to invent a similar
myth of the German monarchist past. For one thing, the history of the German
monarchy ended too recently (and ignominiously) to inspire a political mythology
and any attempt to create one could be "corrected" merely from living memory. But
Gramsci also suggests that the French myth was successful because it had its roots
in the national culture. If the German Right was to create a successful political myth,
it must have its own cultural imprint, but there was little sign that it was able to do
this at the end of 1929.
§ 3.03. Fathers and Sons: the Intellectual and Moral Disorder
Who were the inscrutable "others" in §1.48 who proclaimed the failure of the
principle of authority? The answer is in another note written around this time based
on an article in one of the French literary reviews Gramsci received, Las Nouvelles
Litteraires. This was about trends in recent German writing, so the expression
"crisis of authority" often used in Gramsci's notes referred to Germany in the first
instance. So far we have reconstructed his Franco-German synthesis from the
method, the sources, and the context of his thinking: there has been little trace of it
in the notes themselves. The German dimenSion now surfaces in the notes for the
first time. In §3.03. Gramsci explores contemporary expressions of the German
ideology. He discovered that "myth-making" was thriving in Germany, in the
literary more than the political field. Moreover, to his 'Franco-German' way of
thinking there appeared to be nothing peculiarly German about the myth: it
resembled the "noble savage" of French culture mentioned in the context of
Maurras' ideas. Moreover, the fact that the main inspiration behind this myth was
the ideas of Freud tended to confirm its descent from Enlightenment thinking.
Nevertheless, this new "noble savage" of German fiction seemed a more
"romantic" than "rationalistic" creation.
To return to the political field for a moment, the reason why Hugenburg - the
German 'Stenterello' - appeared ridiculous in the role of demogogue was that the
principle of authority in its traditional forms had lost its magic and appeared
increasingly old-fashioned. Evidence of this failure of traditional German ideology
was provided by modern German writers who attacked the old principle of authority
in all its forms. Judging from these writers, there was an unusual "crisis of
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generations" going on in Germany which was leading to a new form of intellectual
(and moral) disorder. The fathers were unable to educate the sons, not even by
means of legal coercion, and had abandoned their paternal responsibility
completely. Gramsci found this ideological phenomenon "extremely interesting"
and mentioned it in a letter to Julia on 29 December.
It Is strange and Interesting that Freud's psychoanalysis Is now creating, eapeclally In
Germany (as far as I can gather from the reviews I've read), tendencies similar to those
which existed In France In the eighteenth century; It Is well on the way towards forming a
new type of 'good savage', corrupted by society - le, by history. The result la a new kind
of Intellectual disorder which Is really exceedingly Interestlng.6
Considering G ramsci had not studied Freud, his analogy with the 'savage' of the
French Enlightenment was a remarkably good guess. In his Introductory Lectures
(1916-17fFreud was fond of citing Diderot as one of the literary sources of his
theory of the oedipus complex.
More than a century before the emergence of psychoanalysis the French philosopher Diderot bore
witness to the importance of the oedipus complex by expressing the difference between the primitive
and civilised worlds in this sentence: 'If the little savage were left to himself, preserving all his
foolishness and adding to the small sense of the child in the cradle the violent passions of a man of
thirty, he would strangle his father and lie with his mother' 7.
Freud's appeal to Diderot indicated that he was engaged in the same rational
enterprise of teaching the little savage to understand his violent emotions and, by
learning to cope with them, to grow up into a civilised man. However, Gramsci
perceived that this Freudian literature in Germany was a far cry from the Age of
Reason for the manner in which some of these writers resolved the oedipal
neurosis of their heroes was neither rational nor moral. In §3.03 he makes this
clear in more detail:
,3.03. German Intellectuals. 1) Hans Frank, The LIIw Is the InJustice. Nine atorl .... ch
illustrating the thesis that summum Jus, summa InJuria. Frank Is not a young writer
fascinated by paradoxes. He Is 50 years old and an anthology of his stories of German
hlltory has been published for schools. A man of strong convictions. He I. an opponent of
Roman law, the lex dura, not Just of this or that Inhuman and antiquated law but of the very
Idea of the Juridical norm, of an abstract Justice which generall .. s, codifies, defln .. the
crime and prelcrlbes the punishment.
6 Letter to Julia, 29 December 1929, Lei p.301-302 (Translated in HH p.1 05). See also §1.33. Freud,
QCI p.2S.
7Quoted in Peter Gay: Freud for Historians (1986) p.94
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Hans Frank's book Is not an Isolated case but symptomatic of a state of mind. A defender
of the West would S88 It as the revolt of 'Germandisorder' against latin order, the revolt
of sentimental anarchy against the rule of Intellect. But Germanauthors understand It
Instead as the restoration of a natural order on the ruins of an artificial one. Not for the
first time, personal analysis sets Itself against the principle of authority. which Is
attacked In all Its forms: religious dogma, monarchical power, official teaching, the
military State, the marriage bond, paternal prestige and above all the Justice which
protects these transitory Institutions and which merely coerces, constralns,and arbitrarily
deforms public life and humannature. Man Is unhappyand bad as long as he Is shackled
by the law, by custom, and by traditional Ideas. He must be freed from all thl. If he Is to be
saved. The creative virtue of destruction has become an article of faith.
Stefan Zweig, H.Mann, Remarque, Glaeser, Leonhard Frank.....
2) Leonhard Frank, The Reason.The hero assassinates his former professor because the
latter had disfigured his soul. The author supports the Innocenceof the killer.
3) FranzWerfel. In one of his novels he maintains that It Is not the murderer but the Victim
who Is to blame. There Is nothing of de Qulncey In him [Ie, the hero): his Is a moral act. A
father, an ImperiOUSand brutal army general, ruins the life of his son by making him a
soldier for which he has no vocation. Has he not committeda crime by showing such
Inhumanity? He must be sacrificed for his double usurpation, as a leader and as a father.
Thus the theme of parricide and the apology for It arises, the absolving of Orestes not on
account of contrition for the tragic guilt but by virtue of a categorical Imperative, a
monstrous moral postulate.
Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex, the hatred of the father - as master, role-model
rival, first expr.. slon of the principle of authority - Is made part of the natural order of '
things. Freud's Influence on German literature Is Incalculable: It has become the
foundation of a new revolutionary (I) ethic. Freud has given a new twist to the eternal
conflict of fathers and sons. Th. emancipation of the sons from paternal tutelage Is the
fashlonabl. thesis among today's novelists. The fathers abdicate their 'patriarchal role'
(patr/arcato) and make honourableamends to their sons who, In their moral Immaturity, are
only capable of breaking this tyrannical and perverse social contract, of abolishing the
constraints of a hypocritical duty (cf. Hauptmann,Michael Kramer, Jacob Wassermann'.
story A Father ).
4) Wassermann,Oer Fa" "'aurltlus: typical of the anti-Justicethem. II
Peter Gay observes that "writers agreed neither on the meaning of the father-son
conflict nor on its proper outcome"10. In this sense it posed what Gramsci
would call "intangible questions". The son's revolt against the irrational authority of
the father could be supported as a rational bid for freedom, but it could also be
represented as a regression to a state of savagery devoid of any moral order. As
we see, it was this last mode of resolving the conflict which Gramsci found
"extremely interesting".
But what kind of 'evidence' did Gramsci think he was dealing with in §3.03? Given
the conservative nature of the rules of evidence by which historians operate, they
might well be inclined to dismiss Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex as more
9 §3.03, QCI p.286-288.
10PeterGay: WeimarCufture (1974) p.121
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pertinent to the realm of fiction than tact.n Gramsci approaches the fictional father-
son conflict in German writing as an ideological fact I to be treated as no less
positive and weighty by historical materialists as economic facts. Moreover, his
dialectic of past and present, of history and politics, may have connected up this
ideological fact with the historical perspective sketched in §1.44 of Germany's
"intellectuals". For were not the principles under attack by these writers - "religious
dogma, monarchical power, official teaching, the military State, the marriage bond,
paternal prestige, and above all the justice which protects these transitory
institutions and merely coerces, constrains, and arbitrarily deforms public life and
human nature" - precisely the values of Germany's traditional ruling caste, the
Prussian Junkers? To be sure, the latter's monopoly of power had been broken by
the defeaf and revolution of November 1918 but the dissolution of the ruling ideas
was a slower process. The election of Hindenburg as president of the Republic in
1925 - the very embodiment of "the principle of authority" in its traditional form -
testified to the residual longing of many Germans in the twenties for the old
certainties. Nevertheless, the longer the republic proclaimed in November 1918
survived, the more the alternative of a restoration of the ancien regime lost all
credibility. Despite the disintegration of parliamentary government in Germany in
1929-30, it was far from clear to Gramsci at the time of writing these notes what
alternative the old ruling caste could plausibly offer. This much was clear to him:
the disintegration of the main anti-republican party under Hugenburg's leadership
suggested that the German monarchists were no more credible an alternative to
the republican regime than Maurras and the French monarchists were in France.
So what was Gramsci'S perception in late 1929 of the alternative? The German
writers reviewed in §3.03 offered few clues, for the 'restoration' they called for - ie,
"the restoration of a natural order on the ruins of an artificial one" - had more to do
with destruction of the moral and legal order than with the restoration of old political
forms. Indeed, Since this natural order was founded on Freud's oedipus complex -
ie, the hatred of the father - there could be no question of interpreting it to mean a
restoration of traditional forms of political authority. But what kind of alternative
"natural order" were these German writers proposing? Although the conflict of
fathers and sons was an 'eternal' question (in Croce's sense), Gramsci noted that
11 For a discussion of this question see Peter Gay: Freud for Historians (1986) pps 93-99.
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the particular form it took in these writers was far removed from the moral order of
classical Greek tragedy. Their treatment of this eternal conflict was "strange", their
claim to be working out a new "revolutionary ethic (I)" obviously bizarre, their
attempt to morally justify parricide nothing less than "monstrous". Gramsci himself
clearly inhabited a different moral order. We can see from the letter to his wife in
December that in spite of being in prison he had no intention of abdicating his
paternal responsibility to educate his own sons. This was the "natural order" of
things. The alternative natural order proposed by these German writers was really
a new form of intellectual and moral disorder.
11.127.Th. Struggl. of Gen.r.tlon. .nd CI•••••
Gramsci followed up these observations on the "fathers-and-sons" crisis in §3.03
with his reflections on "the youth question" in §1.127 and §3.34. The theme of
rebellion of the sons and abdication of the fathers reappears in §1.127 together
with a further evocation of the "morbid forms" this rebellion takes. However, the
conflict of generations is now seen in marxist terms as Gramsci schematically
defines its relation to the class struggle. He suggests that the crisis of fathers-and-
sons can be resolved on a class basiS, but this solution becomes difficult when the
phenomenon takes on a "national character".
11.127. The Youth Que.tlon. There.re m.ny youth 'que.tlona' but two .re particularly
Important In my view: (1) The educationof the 'young' I. alway. the work of the 'old'
gen.r.tlon. Ther. will ba conflict, dl.cord etc but the.e .re .uperflclal phenom.na
Inh.rent In .ny educationaland disciplinary ta.k •• long a. the cia•• dlff.rence does not
com. Into It. Th. I. when the 'young' (or a .Ignlflc.nt part of them)of the leading cl...
(under.tood In the bro.dest .enae, Ie, not Just In the economicbut In the polltlc.l-moral
Hn •• aa well) r.bal .nd pa•• ov.r to the progres.lve cl••• which ha. become hl.torlcally
mature.nough to take pow.r. But In thl. ca•• the 'young' pa.. over from the leader.hlp 0'
the 'old' cia•• to the lead.r.hlp of the 'old' of .nother cl.... The 'young .tlll remain
.ubordlnat. In reality to the 'old' ••• gener.tlon for all the dlffer.nc.. of t.mperam.nt
and vivacity mentioned abov•.
(2) Whenthe phenomenontakes on a .o-called 'n.tlonal' ch.r.cter, - I., when the cl•••
dlff.r.nc. doe. not com. openly Into pl.y - th.n the question becom.. compllc.ted .nd
confuaec:l.The 'young' find them.. lve. In a permanent.t.te of rebellion becauae the
profound eau... of th.lr rebellion per.l.t without the po•• lblllty of baing analy.ed,
crltlcl.ed, .nd r.. olved (not In .b.tr.ct, conceptual term. but In • real, historical
.anH).The 'old' .r. dominant In f.ct but...... '.pres mol Ie deluge': they fall to educ.t.
tha young .nd to pr.pare them to take over. Why?
Thl. meansthat the tim. ha. comewhen the 'old' of anothercl••• must lead theaeyoung
peopl. but are preventedfrom doing .0 by extrinsic factors, by political-military pre"ur •.
The normal open expr... lons of the .truggle b.lng .uppre•• ed, It attack. the .tructure of
the old cia•• like a devouringcancermaking It 'eeble and rotten. Th•• truggle a•• ume.
morbid form. Ilk. my.tlcl.m, .en.u.lI.m, mor.1 .pathy, pathologic.I degeneration. of •
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psychological and physical kind etc. The old structure falls to contain and satisfy the new
demands. The permanent or semi-permanent unemployment of the so-called Intellectuals
II one of the typical symptoms of this failure and Is particularly harsh on the youngest
who are left 'with no future'. Moreover, this situation leads to 'closed ranks' of a feudal-
military character, which merely sharpens the problems which It cannot find a way to
resolve. 12
The thematic affinity between §3.03 and §1.127 indicates that the ideological origin
of these generalisations was the 'father-and-sons' crisis in Germany. Gramsci may
have written them in such a way that they could also apply to Italy even though the
political conjuncture there was quite different. But how did the political conjuncture
in Germany at the turn of 1929-30 shape these general ideas?
The answer appears to be that Germany (not for the first time in its history) was
precisely where the phenomenon had taken on a "national character". The
economic difficulties following upon the Wall Street Crash were likely to pose the
class question in Germany more sharply than ever before, particularly in the minds
of the "sons" now facing the prospect of permanent unemployment and "no future" .
Instead the burning political issue at the end of 1929 was the national question.
The demogogic campaign of the ultra-nationalists against the Young Plan put the
national question at the top of the political agenda and threw the class question
into confUSion. The 'National Socialist' movement which moved to centre-stage at
this point was precisely the political expression of this "confusion" of the two
questions, although we do not know if Gramsci was thinking specifically of the
Nazis. The strong appeal of this new movement to the younger generation,
particularly in the universities, impeded the kind of class-based solution to the
'fathers-and-sons' crisis which Gramsci proposes. A further impediment was
"political-military pressure". The 'fathers' of the progressive (ie, revolutionary) class
are prevented from leading the 'sons' of the ruling class by political-military
pressure. This probably refers to the political action of the storm troops of the Right,
especially as he goes on to discuss this shortly afterwards in §1.133. By disrupting
the political activities of the Left, the storm troops were forcibly suppressing the
"normal" open expressions of the struggle.
Gramsci's analysis gives no hint that the "youth question" was common to both
sides of the political spectrum, the Right and the Left. In fact, the age-profile of their
membership suggests that the divisions between the two main parties of the Left
and the Right in Germany - Social Democrats-Communists, Nationalists-
12 §1.127, QCI p.11S-116 (PN1 p.212-213)
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Nazis - corresponded to a "generational" divide.13 If the sons of the ruling class
were in revolt against their fathers, the age-composition of the Communist party
suggests that the 'sons' of the working class were also in rebellion against their
'fathers' in the Social Democratic party. In other words, the 'young' rejected the
leadership of the 'old' on both sides of the political spectrum. How far was Gramsci
aware of this?
It is important to note that the "scientific" principle of Gramsci's political theorising
was based on studying elements of politics common to "both sides", so that
analysis of one side was potentially instructive to the other. For example, moving
from §1.127 we find Gramsci asking shortly afterwards, in §1.133, whether the left
should employ the same tactic of using shock troops as the Right. He answers this
question negatively, but the dialectical process or "turn of mind" is clear enough.
Gramsci may have selected the "youth question" in §1.127 knowing that like the
question of shock troops in §1.133 it was an "element of politics" common to both
sides. We know that ever since 1923, if not even earlier, Gramsci had a poor
opinion of the political-intellectual capacity of the leaders of the German
Communist party but we would not expect him to discuss such matters in the
notes.14 Instead, in the notes Gramsci's dialectic usually starts by studying
elements of politics on the other side in the hope of offering instruction to his own
side. Judging by his poor opinion of the German leaders, his own side was clearly
in need of instruction where leadership of the young was concerned.
Meanwhile, for Gramsci the youth question is another way of seeing the crisis of
hegemony with particular focus on the "moral crisis" of the young. In describing the
morbid expressions of their rebellion, he evokes the same kind of "moral disorder"
which he found in German writing, as in the apologetic treatment of parricide. He
associates this with the permanent unemployment of "the so-called intellectuals" -
13 See Oetlev Peukert: The Weimar Rspubllc. The Crisis of Classical Modernity (1993) p.151-152,
although in the absence of systematic studies of the membership structures of the two parties of the
Left, the author strikes a cautionary note by observing that he is presenting "an ideal-type dichotomy".
14 "So far as the German situation is concerned ....... the two groups which are competing for the party
leadership are both Inadequate and Incapable-: thus Gramsci's Circular letter of 9 February 1924 to
Togllattl, Terraelnl and others, In Palmiro Toglletti: La formazione del gruppo dirigente del partito
comunlstsltsllsno 1923-1924 (Edltorl rlunlti, 1969) p.188. (Translated in SPW 1921-26, p.192); see
also his further letter to Terracinl of 27 March 1924: "The German situation is stili not very clear It seems
to me, either In the party or in the country. Obviously It Is necessary to support the left which
represents the real movement of the revolutionary masses: but has the left found Its appropriate
political and Ideological expression in the current leaders? This, it seems to me, is the essence of the
problem : It could result In acute and profound crises as yet unknown to the party and could even
bring It to the edge of catastrophe-. ibld.,p.262.
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where "intellectuals" appears to mean the same as it did in §1.44 where Gramsci
calls the "ruling stratum" [ceto governitivo ] "intellectuals". In this context, he seems
to be referring to the university students - the "superfluous generation", as they
were called15 . With the onset of the Depression the job prospects of the 'sons'
vanished and the 'fathers', fearing for their own jobs in the traditional field of the
civil and military administration, "closed ranks".
More by instinct than knowledge, it seems, Gramsci put his finger on a key aspect
of the political conjuncture at the end of 1929. It was still too early to tell which way
this "superfluous generation" would turn politically. Gramsci presents us with a
picture of the dying of the old ruling class, its structure devoured by the "cancerous"
rebellion of its own sons. There is no suggestion at this stage that Hitler and the
Nazis would somehow 'rejuvenate' this structure and provide this dying class with
a final period of remission. However, this process had already begun, probably
without Gramsci knowing its full details. The violent nationalist campaign against
the Young Plan mobilised the university students, the "intellectuals", who now led
the way in reorganising the entire "ideological fronf of the ruling class. The process
can be followed in the succession of Nazi victories in elections to the student
unions of one university after another in the course of 1929-30, largely at the
expense of the Nationalist candidates 16.The fact that the university authorities put
up so little resistance to this process was concrete testimony to what Gramsci
called the 'abdication of the fathers'.
13.34. 'Interregnum' and 'Re.toratlon'
In the last of this series of notes, probably written in June-July 1930, Gramsci
retums to the post-war 'crisis of authority' first mentioned in §1.48 where (it will be
recalled) it was described as a breakdown in the normal combination of force and
consent by which the ruling class usually exercises its hegemony. However, the
configuration of Gramsci's thinking alters again as he now tries to put the crisis of
authority into a historicist perspective apparently using political elements drawn
from English historical experience: "interregnum-restoration". The crisis is now
redefined in historicist terms as an "interregnum" during which "the old is dying and
the new cannot be born": the morbid phenomena described in the earlier notes
15 On the 'superfluous generation' see Peukert cit., p.89-95, especially p.94-95.
16The process is described by Karl Dietrich Bracher in The German Dictatorship. The Origins,
Structure. and Effects of National Socialism (1973) p.21Q-213.
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are now seen as characteristic features of this 'interregnum'. The key question is
how will this interregnum end.
13.34. Past and Present The aspect of the modern crisis which Is deplored as a 'wave of
materialism' Is connected with the so-called 'crisis of authority'. If the dominant class has
lost the consent, Ie, If It no longer 'leads' but merely 'dominates', exercising nothing more
than coercive force, this means that the broad masses have lost faith In the traditional
Ideologies and no longer believe what they used to believe etc. The crisis consists
precisely In the fact that the old Is dying and the new cannot be born: morbid phenomena
of all kinds can be observed during this Interregnum.
This paragraph should be linked to what has been written about the so-called 'youth
question' which la caused by the 'crisis of authority' In the leadership of the older
generation. and the mechanical prevention of those able to lead from carrying out their
minion. The problem Is thiS: can such a serious rift between popular mass.. and
dominant Ideologies a. that which has occured since the war be 'healed' merely by
applying force to prevent new Ideologies from taking hold? If a hlatorlcally normal solution
of the crl.ls Is prevented In this way, must the Interregnum necessarily end In favour of a
re.toratlon of the old? The character of the Ideologies ought to rule this out, but not
ab.olutely.
Meanwhile the phyalcal depression will lead In the long-term to widespread sceptiCism and
a new 'combination' will be born In which, for example, Catholicism will become the purest
Jesultl.m etc. From this too It can be concluded that highly favourable conditions are
being created for an unprecedented expansion of historical materlallsm ...The death of the
old Ideologies takes the form of scepticism toward. all general theories and formulae; of
application to purely economic facts (earnings etc), and to a form of politic. which Is not
merely realistic In fact (as It always Is) but cynical In Its Immediate manifestation... 17
To pinpoint the question which interests him, Gramsci asks two questions which
invite the answer "no". Can the crisis of authority be resolved purely by using force?
If force alone cannot solve the crisis, must it be resolved by restoring the old
ideologies? Gramsci rules out this second possibility because of the "character of
the ideologies" themselves. The ideology of monarchism, for example, like other
expressions of "the principle of authority", had lost all credibility as an alternative to
the republic in Germany (and in France). Meanwhile, during the interregnum falling
living standards ("the physical depression") will result in general scepticism
towards the ruling ideology (for example, "Catholicism") and in any new
"combination" (ie, of force and consent )18 the ideology will degenerate further into
pure deceit rthe purest Jesuitism"). This general failure of the ruling ideology in the
context of falling living standards was creating favourable conditions for an
17 QCI p.311-312 (Translated in SPN p.275-276). I have not been able to trace the exact expression
Mwaveof materialism- in Gramsci's periodicals at this time, including Civilta cattolica and Croce's La
Crftfca which seem the likeliest sources of this moralistic-sounding phrase.
18Gramsci's new ·combination· must mean a combination of ~orce and consenr since it makes no
sense to speak of a combination of Catholicism and Jesuitism. He was probably thinking of the
combination of Fascism (the State, ie, force) and Catholicism (the Church, ie, consent) established by
the Concordat of 1929.
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unprecedented expansion of communism ("historical materialism").
Gramsci wrote this note shortly after his brother Gennaro told him of the change of
tactic on the part of the Italian Communists in line with the Comintern's directive to
all European parties to prepare for the revolutionary "offensive". He not only told his
brother that the change of tactic was a mistake, he wrote it down in the note
immediately preceding this one, ie, §3.33. Some Causes of Error, although its
practical origin was hidden by Gramsci's familiar "mask of generalisation".19 But
whilst he had no hesitation in immediately declaring that it was a mistake as far as
Italy was concerned, he was probably prepared to give the new tactic the benefit of
the doubt as far as Germany and other countries were concerned, at least until he
had evidence to show that it was a general mistake. This evidence was provided
by the results of the Reichstag election on 14 September 1930.
Meanwhile, Gramsci's analysis of "the death of the old ideologies" in this note is
entirely consistent with what he had written so far in §3.03 and §1.127 about the
German crisis, ie, "the 'crisis of authority' in the leadership of the older generations
and the mechanical prevention (ie, "political-military pressure") of those able to
lead from carrying out their mission". But his hypothesis on what might happen at
the end of the interregnum, ie, "an unprecedented expansion of historical
materialism", is new. It seems that as long as the interregnum lasted, Gramsci
gives the leaders of the Comintern the benefit of the doubt and in line with the
'official' perspective looks forward to a "revolution" rather than a "restoration"
at the end of the interregnum. For the time being "pessimism of the intellect" was
Suspended in favour of "optimism of the Will". Indeed, Gramsci applies his intellect
in this note to justifying the Comintern's optimistic perspective as plausibly as he
can without surrendering to the pure "economism" on which it seemed to be based.
Even so, Gramsci could never entirely suppress his pessimism of the intellect: a
restoration could be ruJed out, but "not absolutely".
Political Struggle and Military Warfare
(I) 11.133: the Question 0' the 'Shock Troops'
We have seen that the science of politics founded by Machiavelli consisted in the
fact that its practical rules could be useful to 'both sides' to any conflict: Gramsci
19§3.33. Some Causes of Error, QCI p. 310-311. For the place of this note in Gramscl's thinkingsee
chapter 2 below.
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agreed with Croce that this demonstrated the 'objective validity' of such rules.20
This conception was applied by Gramsci to the politics of the class struggle which
was fought at its most general level between two sides, the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat, the ruling and the revolutionary classes. An essential feature of his
political 'theoriSing' therefore is the moment of 'synthesis' in which the two sides
are compared to one another in terms of a common element of politics. This
explains the impression of 'ambivalence' left by so many of the notes, where what
Gramsci writes appears to be applicable to opposite sides. The purpose behind
this approach was fundamentally pedagogic , to educate the revolutionary class
politically by revealing how the ruling class rules. Naturally, it would be a mistake to
conclude from this that knowing the enemy necessarily means imitating him: since
the structural position of the revolutionary class is different from that of the ruling
class, it cannot simply imitate the latter's methods. Thus, the moment of synthesis is
accompanied in Gramsci's theorising by the moment of distinction which
differentiates between the two sides. But this is not to deny that studying the
methods of the ruling class will be 'useful' to the revolutionary class in developing
its own methods of struggle.
Gramsci's notes on "the question of the shock troops" provide an example of the
moment of distinction. He first raised this question in the context of his analysis of
the post-war crisis of hegemony in France which he contrasted in this aspect with
the experience of "other countries", a reference no doubt to the fascist squads of
post-war Italy. 21 He then developed his analysis in §1.133 and §1.134 some
months later in January-March 1930 where he compares the tactical use of shock
troops in military warfare with their similar use in political struggle. But by now the
currency (attualita) of the question was given by the experience of Germany in
1929 where (as Gramsci learned from the periodicals) shock troops were currently
deployed by both sides in the political struggle, including the communists. He
clearly considered this a tactical error on their part.
20 The scientific principle is first formulated in §4.04. Machiavellism and Marxism and repeated In
§4.08. Machiavelli and Marx in QCI p.425 and p.431.
21 The relevant reference in §1.48 is: -The question of shock troops. The crisis of ranks, the large
number of reserve officers. In other countries the shock troops represented a new volunteer army, a
selection of mHitary cadres which had a basic tactical function. Contact with the enemy was made solely
by the shock troops, who formed a sort of veil between the enemy and the conscript army (like the
flaps of an envelope)" QCI p. 60.
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§1.133. The relationship which existed In 1917-18 between the shock troop. and the army
as a whole can and has led political leaders to draw up erroneous pian. of campaign. Th.y
forget: 1) that the shock troops are simple tactical units and presuppose an army which I.
not very effective to be sure, but which Is not completely Inert. For even though discipline
and fighting spirit have slackened to the point where a new tactical deployment Is
advisable, they stili exist to a certain degree - a degree to which the new tactlc.1
form.tlon precisely corresponds. Otherwise there would have been In.t.nt defeat and
rout. 2) that the use of shock troops .hould not be considered • sign of the general
combatlvlty of the rna.. of the troops but, on the contr.ry, as a .Ign of their pa.. lvlty and
relative demorall.atlon ........•...
Another point to keep In mind Is that In polltlc.1 .truggle you mu.t not Imitate the method.
used by the dominant classes, otherwise you will e.slly be ambushed. In the current
.truggle., thl. I. what often happens. A weakened State .tructure I. like a flagging .rmy ;
the .hock troops - Ie, private armed org.nlsatlon. - enter the field .nd h.v. two talkl: to
use Illegal methods, whilst the State appears to rem.ln within the framework of legality, to
reorganise the State It.elf. It I. stupid to Imagine that this private Illegal action can be
countered by similar action, that shock troops ean be fought by u.lng .hock troops. Quite
apart from the other differences In the conditions of the two sides, thl. a•• umes that the
State will remain pas.lve throughout, which Is never the c•• e.
The cia.. difference Is fundamental. Only • cl... with .mple financial re.ources who••
member. are not .n tied down by having to work fixed hours every d.y, can h.ve
perm.nent specialised a.s.ult organls.tlons. These org.nlsatlon., which have line.
become professlon.l, can catch the enemy off guard .t .ny hour ot the d.y or night .nd
Itrlke decl.lve blows. Hence the tactical use of Ihock troop. cannot be al Important for
some cl ...... s for other." 22.
The importance of §1.133 and §1.134 in the notebooks is that they inaugurate the
whole comparison between political struggle and military warfare in Gramsci's
process of theorising. Although he suggests that the comparison must be taken
with "a pinch of salt" it results in some of the most sophisticated metaphors in his
political theory. By tracing the origins of these metaphors we see that their success
was essentially due not to the vitality of Gramsci's language or the vigour of his
imagination - important though these are - but to their close adherence to real
experience. What experience did he have in mind in this case?
The question of shock troops was first introduced in §1.48 where Gramsci
described the general crisis of hegemony in post-war Europe. This consisted in the
difficulty of the State in obtaining the consent of the governed, a task which
depended on the private initiative of the ruling class who normally formed political
parties for this purpose. This is what Gramsci means here by a 'weakened State
structure': ie, weakened by the lack of consent of the ruled who are likened to a
"flagging army". Since the mass of the troops lack 'fighting-spirit' and will not
willingly fight, the ruling class turns to the shock troops - private armed
organisations whose fighting spirit conceals the relative demoralisation of the
22 QCI p.121. (Full translation in SPN p.232).
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'conscript' army as a whole. Thus Gramsci sees their deployment not as a sign of
strength but of the underlying weakness of the ruling class who have to rely more
on force than consent to maintain their position.
This analysis matches very accurately the situation of the German Right as it
appeared at the turn of 1929-30. The private initiative of the German ruling class
was represented by the Nationalist party which under Hugenburg's leadership
since 1928 continued to disintegrate. The leading group split into factions and the
rank and file continued to desert the party. This was the reality behind the
Nationalists' show of 'strength' in the 'Impressive' rallies of the Stahlhelm and in
the noisy propaganda campaign against the Young Plan. Moreover, the
propaganda 'concentration' staged by their junior partners the National Socialists
at the Nuremberg party congress merely concealed the lack of mass support for the
party at the polls although, as we see, Gramsci did not altogether discount their
discipline and fighting-spirit. He gives no suggestion at this stage of the huge
'reserve strength' which the ruling class had at its disposal if only it could find the
right leader.
(II) 11.134: Underground Warflre
There remains the question of legality. Gramscl says little about this in §1.133
other than to distinguish between the State's public observance of legality whilst
'privately' having recourse to illegality. Here he takes us into the domain of
'appearances' and shows how the 'mask', which most marxists would be only too
eager to 'strip away', is crucially important in itself. Again, the analysis works
because it is based on real experience - in this case, the secret preparations for
'frontier defence' being undertaken by the Stahlhelm in the demilitarised zone of
the Rhineland. In §1.134 he compares the different forms of pOlitical struggle to
three types of warfare - war of movement, war of position, and underground
warfare, the latter including "the secret preparation of weapons and combat troops" .
Germany's political struggle against France is an example of "underground
warfare"; if Germany allowed the pretense of legality to slip, it would play into the
hands of France.
Thua It would ault France If the GermanNltlonellat Right were to be Involved In In
Idventurlat coup d'etet which would oblige the auapeeted lIIegll military organlaatlon to
come out Into the open prematurely Ind eo permit In Intervention which would be very
timely from the French point of view at
23 QCI p.123. (The full text is translated in SPN p.229-231).
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1 2.26, 13.49: The 'Ideological Front'
Comparisons between political and military tactics and strategy were, of course, a
commonplace of the language of the Comintern. Gramsci suggested that such
metaphors should serve "to stimulate thinking" but by 1929-30, the year of Stalin's
tactical 'turn', they featured in the Comintern's reports and resolutions more as a
substitute for thinking and showed little appreciation that political struggle was
"enormously more complex". The most "stimulating" metaphor of this type in
Gramsci's repertoire is the suggestion that the superstructures of civil society are
like the trench systems of modern warfare. This was first presented in §7.10 in
December 1930 and was based on the results of the Reichstag elections a few
months earlier. By tracing its origins in the notebooks we find it started from
GramsCi's observations of the life of civil society in Germany at this time although
he applied it to the countries of Western Europe generally.
To gain a more concrete idea of this metaphor, we must first turn to §2.26. The
German Newspapers written in May-June 1930. This was a careful summary of an
article on the German political press in a back number of Rivista d'ita/ia for May
1927 which he read before dispatching it to Tatiana on 15 June24 . Like many of the
notes in Notebook 2 it was not much more than a piece of research material
compiled without critical comment. 25 It is not until we come to §3.49 that we find
the concept or framework which 'organised' this material in Gramsci's mind: this
was the metaphor of the 'ideological front' of a ruling class.
The currency (attualita) of this concept depended, however, on recent develop-
ments in Germany where the right-wing press of Hugenburg had carried on an
orchestrated propaganda offensive against ratification of the Young Plan. As we
see, Gramsci's research material extended beyond the Hugenburg press to include
the papers of the democratic press groups, but the right-wing press at this time was
the most 'dynamic' part of this "ideological front".
24 Paolo Vrta-Rnzi: 'L'Enciclopedia a quattro soldi (La stampa political tedesca)', Rlvista d'/talia, May
1927.
The date of §2.26 is based on the following proof: the preceding notes §2.05 - §2.18 were based on
back issues of Nuova Antologia for 1927 sent to Tatiana on 20 May 1930 (OCIV p.2372-2373).§2.19-
§2.31 were based on back numbers of Rivistad'ltaIia for 1927 sent to Tatiana on 15 June 1930 (QCIV
p.2377). This would indicate that Note 2.26 was written between these dates.
25 The only addition Gramsci makes to the details contained in this article is to note that the Berliner
Tageblatt was edited by Theodor Wolf.
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§ 2.26. The German Newspapers. Three big press groups, Ullsteln, Mosse, and Scherl _
the first two democratic, the third right-wing (the Hugenberg pres.). The Ullateln group
[Includel]: the Voaa/ache Zeltung, for the educated public, low circulation (40,000 copies)
but of European Importance, edited by George Bernhard (thought to be too Francophile);
the Morgenpoat, Berlln'l and pos.lbly Germany'. blgge.t circulation paper (possibly
500,000 copies) read by the petty-bourgeoisie and the workers; the Serllner Allgemeine
Zeltung which concentrat.1 on municipal I.su .. ; the Serllner lIIustr/erte (like the
Domenlcll del Corrlere ), very widely read; the Berliner Ze/tung 11mMlttlIg, a sensationalist
paper which reaches 100,000 reader. dally; the Uhu, the Querachnltt (the Cro •• roada),
Ole Korlllle, of the sam. type as Lettura ; and other publications to do with fashion,
commerce, technical lubJectl etc. Uilltein Is linked with the Te/egrllllf of Amsterdam, the
Az Ellt 01 Budapeat, the Neue Frele Prealle (01 Vienna), (and the Corr/ere dell" Se" reil ..
on Ullitein for Ita newl from Berlin).
The Rudolph Mo.. e publllhing house publlah .. the big democratic dally Berliner Tllgebl"tt
(300,000 coplea) edited by Theodor Wolf, with 17 lupplements (Bellagen) and apeclal
editions 10r abroad In German, French, and Engllah, expensive and hard to read for
ordinary folk; the Serllnar Morganzeltung, the Serllner Volkezeltung, popular In atyle but
with the lame political orientation. La Stampa of Turin reil .. on the Mosa. group.
The Scherl publl.hlng houle: the Lokal Anzelger, favourite reading of the shopke.per.
and petty bourgeol.l. atlll loyal to the old Imperial Germany; the T"g for a more salect
public; the Woche, the Gllrten/eube ('Pavilion').
New.papers from right to left: the Deutsche Zeltung, ultra-nationalist but Imall
circulation; Hitler'. Volkl.cher Beobachter, .mall circulation (20,000). The Neue
Pruas/sche Zeltung, .tlll called the Krauzzeltung, alao with a Imall circulation (10,000): It
II the cla •• lc organ of the Junkers (PruI.lan latlfundlltl), arl.tocratlc ex-offlcera,
monarchl.ts and absolutl.ts who have kept their wealth and solidarity ba.ed on landed
property. On the other hand, the Deutsche T"gesze/tung, organ of the Bund der Landwlrte
(Farmer.' Alsoclatlon), he. a circulation of 100,000 coplea; It la read by the small farmer.
and farm manager. and helps to keep public opinion In the countryside loya' to the old
regime.
German national [papera): Loksl Anze/ger (180,000); Sch'e./ache Zeltung; Berliner Bor.en
Zeltung (right-wing financial paper); Tagllche Rund.chau (30,000) but Important because It
wa. Stre.emann'. official mouthpiece; Deutaclre Allgemeine Ze/tung, organ of heavy
Indu.try, alao popular-German In character. Other popular-German paper. - that I.,
moderate rlght·wlng papara giving conditional .upport to the pre.. nt regime and read by
the Indultrlall.t. are: the "agdeburg/ache Zeltung, the Kolnl.cM Zeltung (52,000) with a
European reputation ba.ed on Ita authority In foreign polley matter., the Hannove"cheJ
Kurler, the Munchner Neue.t. Nllchrlchten (135,000) and the Lelpzlger Neues'e
Nllchrlch'en (170,000).
New.papar. of the centre: the Oerm"nl. (10,000) but the catholic provincial papars like
the Kolnl.che Vo/kazeltung have a very big reader.hlp.
The democratiC papars are the belt produced: the Vo.a/aclre Zeltung, the Berliner
T.g.bl.tt, the Serllner Bor.en Courier, the Fr.nkfurter Zeltung. The Social Democra..
produce a humorous paper, Lac"'" link. (Laugh Left).liII
There are two technical points to make about this summary. Firstly, in a footnote to
the circulation of Hitler's paper, the author of the source noted that "all these figures
are arrived at inductively and are broadly approximate". They were taken from the
yearbook of the German press published by Mosse which "never fails to give the
circulation of the newspaper of Kotschenbroda but does not give accurate
28 QCI p. 182·183.
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circulation figures for the really important papers". As far as Hitler's paper was
concerned, the figure of 20,000 for 1927 seems to have been quite an accurate
guess. 271n any case, these particular figures were out of date by the time Gramsci
wrote this note and their accuracy was not essential for his purposes. Secondly,
although the author reviewed the main political papers "proceeding from right to
Iefr, the left-wing press was dismissed in a single paragraph with passing
references to the Social Democratic Vorwaerts (70,000) and the Communist Rote
Fshne described as "almost unreadable like our own defunct Units and full of
theses, counter-theses, clauses, premisses, paragraphs, hypotheses, corollaries,
orders, appeals and proclamations from MoscoW". Whatever Gramsci thought of
this comment, this would explain why the political spectrum he describes did not
extend to the left-wing press.28
The 'organising' concept of this empirical material is in §3.49 written shortly after in
June-July 1930.29Gramsci now framed the press in terms of the military metaphor
of an "ideological front" although his vision of this front looked far beyond the front-
line where the press was situated.
,3.49.Que.tlon. of Culture. Ideological Afaterla/. A stuelyof how the Ideological structure
of a dominant class Is actually organised, Ie, the material organisation designed to
maintain, defend, and develop the theoretical or Ideological 'front'. The mo.t consplcuoue
and dynamic part of It Is the press generally: publllhing houl. (which have an Implicit
and explicit programmeand are founded upon a given philosophy), political newlpaperl,
reviews of all klndl (SCientific, literary, scholarly, popular knowledge etc), the whole
rangeof periodicals down to parish newl-sheets. Such a study would be gigantic If done
on a national scale, so a study of one city and a serl. of studies of Mveral cltl.. could
be done. For a newspaperreporter, such a study ought to provide a general framework for
hie work; In fact he ought to do a study Ilk. this for himself. Imagine how many fine
I.. de,. could be written on this subJectI
The p..... II the most dynamic part of this Ideological structur. but not the only Plrt. It
embrac.. everything which directly or Indirectly Influenc.. or might Influence public
opinion, ranging from libraries, schools, circles and clubs of every kind, to architecture,
.... arrangementof streets, and street nam... The position which the Church ha. kept In
modernsociety cannot be explained without knowing the persistent and patient effort It
'Z1Oron J.HaIe's The Captive Press in the Third Reich (1964), p.59, cites the figure of 17,800 as the
combined circulation of the three daily papers of the Nazis in 1927.
28 A good.study of the democratic press is Modris Ecksteins op.cit., with a useful appendix on the
political onentation of the German press which compares circulation to voting figues, p.312-313.
A useful study of the communist press in the Weimar era is Helmut Gruber: 'Willi Munzenberg's
German Communist Propaganda Empire, 1921-1933', Joumal of Modem History, September 1966.
29 The dating of 13.49 rests on the following proof: the preceding 13.19-13.27 were based on
material sent to Tatianaon 15 June 1930 (QCIV, p.2377). Subsequent notes in the series §3.54-
13·63 were based on Issues of various reviews for June, July, August 1930 (QCIV p.2597-2599).
This would Indicate that §3.49 was written after 15 June butprobably not later than 1 August.
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makes to keep developing Its own section of this material structure of Ideology. If It is
done properly, a study like this would be quite Important; apart from supplying a living
historical model of such a structure, It would encourage a more careful and exact
calculation of the active forces In society.
What can a revolutionary (/nnov.trlce ) class set against this formidable network of
trenches and fortifications of the dominant class? The schismatic spirit, le, the growing
consciousness of Its own historical personality. This schismatic spirit must progressively
expand until It embraces not only the class which Is the protagonist of change but also the
classes which are potentially Its allies. All this demands a complex Ideological effort
which must start from an exact knowledge of the area to be evacuated of the human ma••
It contalns"31
The internal relation between the factual material in §2.26 and the organising ideas
in this note is clear enough. The three publishing houses of Ullstein, Mosse, and
Scherl would thus be parts of the vast material structure which forms the
"ideological front" of the ruling class. The newspapers they publish would be the
"trenches and fortifications" which make up this front. The circulation figures and
the sociological profiles of their readers give a more exact knowledge of the
"human mass" contained by these trenches etc. We might add that such
phenomena as the multiplication of newspapers (mentioned in §1.48), changes in
ownerShip, circulation battles and drives, press campaigns etc would be eVidence
of the "dynamic" character of this section of the front However, the "depth" of the
front extends far beyond the press to slow-moving institutions like the Church which
still remains an "active force" in society.
The empirical data summarised in §2.26, therefore, provided Gramsci with a
concrete foundation for the theoretical argument presented in §3.49. There are two
further aspects of §2.26 worth noting.
Firstly, a significant principle of selection was Gramsci's special interest in those
sections of German public opinion which remained loyal to the old imperial regime.
One reason why the old ideologies were slow in dying was because a 'network of
trenches and fortifications' existed to maintain and defend them: this included the
Laka' Anzeiger - "favourite reading of the shopkeepers and petty-bourgeoisie loyal
to the old imperial Germany" - and the Deutsche Tageszeitung , which "is read by
the small farmers and farm managers and helps to keep public opinion in the
countryside loyal to the old regime". The most obvious expression of this
ideological continuity was the Prussische Zeitung , "still called the Kreuzzeitung ,
the classiC organ of the Junkers (Prussian latifondists), aristocratic ex-officers,
monarchiSts, and absolutists who have kept their wealth and solidarity based on
landed property". Thus, the thread started in §1.44 about Germany's 'traditional
30 QCI p.332-333.
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intellectuals' surfaces momentarily here in this survey of the German press. The
ideas and values of the old ruling class were deeply embedded in German culture
regardless of the trivial circulation of their newspaper, but it remained to be seen
how these ideas and values would be 'transformed' under conditions of crisis. In
Gramsci's historicist perspective it was not essentially an economic or political
crisis but an existential crisis of Germany's 'traditional intellectuals', although it was
not yet clear in 1929-30 what the outcome would be.
Secondly, in summarising the material of §2.26 Gramsci was obviously struck by
the large number of provincial newspapers in Germany (he lists Magdeburg,
Cologne, Hanover, Munich, Leipzig, Frankfurt as examples, apart from the Catholic
provincial papers) in addition to the Berlin dailies. He comes back to this shortly
after in §3:83, albeit in a different context:
In Italy there are no centres like Paris, London, Berlin etc which ab.orb thou.and. of
Journalists who constitute a real professional category of economic significance, and
average salarl88 In Italy are very low. Moreover, In Germany the number 0' newlpaper.
published throughout the country Is Impressive and the concentration [of paper.) In Berlin
Is matched by an ample stratification nationwide. 31
The amplitude of the German provincial press was probably what he had in mind
when he remarks in §3. 119 below that the life of civil society was richer in
Germany than in Italy. Whatever the case, the ample 'stratification' represented by
the German provincial newspapers was just as important a part of the 'ideological
structure of the dominant class' as the newspapers of the capital, especially when
we consider the full extent of Hugenberg's penetration of the provincial press by
this time. We might add that provincial publishing houses also had their place in
this 'ideological structure': oonslder, for example, the influential role of the Munich-
based publisher Lehmann during the Weimar period in promoting 'racial values'
and giving academic respectability to 'racial science'.32
Gramsci's oblique perception of the importance of the provincial press in the
ideological structure of the dominant class can be linked to what has been called
31QCI p.363. The phrase ·un'ampia stratificazione nazionale- in the first draft Is changed to ·una vasta
stratificazione in prOVincia- in the second draft (aclll p.2274-227S). This note was probably written
before or during August 1930, which is the date of the source used in writing the later notes 13.101-
§3.102.
32See especially Gary D.Stark: Entrepreneurs of Ideology. Neoconservative Publishers in Germany,
1890-1933 (University of North Carolina, 1981).
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"the revolt of the provinces" in Weimar Germany.33 This was more than merely a
conservative backlash against 'Berlin' - the symbol of modernity: it was also
a revolt against the traditional leaders of provincial society,which resulted in the
'conservative' Nationalists being displaced by the 'radical' Nazis. This changeover
was part of what Gramsci calls a new ideological "combination" and its character is
better described as "transformist" than "revolutionary". In this context it is interesting
to follow this transform ism at the level of language, especially as Gramsci often
starts from the vocabulary of politics to detect significant changes in ideology.
At the same time. it was not surprising that this revolutionary change was cloaked in an exaggerated
display of antiquated ideological vocabulary. The figures who had been dominant in provincial politics
found their traditional integrationist language being commandeered and taken to extremes by the
new movements. which projected themselves as the sole trustworthy and consistent representatives
of the beliefs for which the older generation had previously been the acknowledged spokesmen. The
process was seen particularly clearly in the way in which the NSOAP displaced the ONVP. The further
the ONVP conservatives moved to the right. the more they found that they were producing
arguments for persuading people to make the full switch to their younger. more dynamic and more
radical rivals. 34
As we see from notes on terminology written in 1932 and 1933, Gramsci did not
regard National Socialism as having 'revolutionary' significance. But whatever
interpretation is given to the secular historical trend 'hidden' beneath the language
of National Socialism - whether 'reactionary' or 'revolutionary' or 'modernising' etc
- Gramsci was determined to stress that far from being a mere 'appearance' waiting
to be 'unmasked', ideology was an effectual political force in its own right. In this
sense the expansion of National Socialism in Germany testified to what he called
"the validity of the ideologies".
Gramacl, Weber, and Micheli
(I) 12.75 ('Irat part]: Charlamatlc Leadera and Partl..
Gramsci must have been familiar with Weber's writings on German politics from
the period before he went to prison. In §3.119 he cites Enrico Ruta's translation of
Weber's Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order.A
Political Critique of Bureaucracy and Party Ufe published by Laterza in 1919.
Since he did not have this work in prison, the precise bibliographical details he
33 See Oetlev J.K. Peukert: The Weimar Republic. The Crisis of Classical Modernity (1991) p.230-
236.
34 Ibid. p.234.
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gives must have been taken from the publisher's catalogue.35 However, his
comment - "The translation is very imperfect and imprecise" - indicates that he had
read this work, probably when it was first published.
Weber's ideas are mentioned in two notes written in July-August 1930: in the first
part of §2.75 where a secondary reference is made to Weber's concept of the
'charismatic' leader in politics and in §3.119 where Gramsci refers to the above
work containing his critique of bureaucratic rule in imperial Germany. Why did
Weber's ideas on these questions come to the forefront of Gramsci's mind in the
summer of 1930?
We have seen from the background that by the summer of 1930 Gramsci's
periodicals carried regular reports of the reorientation of the parties of the extreme
Right and the growing prominence of Hitler and the National Socialists in German
pounce, Gramsci read reports from the Volkischer Beobachter of the acquisition of
the new party headquarters in Munich, the Brown House, of the extraordinary
growth in party membership (Hitler claimed 250,000 by this time), and of "the
incessant and vast development of the National Socialist party".36 The party now
boasted particularly of its success in attracting the "intellectuals", ie, professional
people of all sorts - academies, officials, chemists, engineers, etc, above all
university students.37 People from all walks of life were rallying around the new
"condottiere" Hitler. This rising tide was confirmed by further reports of the
spectacular success of the party in the state elections in Saxony in June.38
However, Gramsci also read about the so-called 'Strasser criSis' - the challenge to
Hitler's leadership made at this time by Otto Strasser which threatened
momentarily to stem the tide.39 Strasser feared that the reorientation of Nazi
propaganda towards the bourgeoisie in 1929-30 meant abandoning the 'socialist'
elements of Nazi ideology. This in turn raised the question of Hitler's exclusive
prerogative as leader of defining what the party's ideology was. Strasser was
35 Professor Gerratana's conjecture in aclV p.2614.
36See the reports in ASE, 24 June 1930, p.1387-1388.
37"The barrier is breeched: the great bourgeois masses are turning to National Socialism to
collaborate in the foundation of the new Third Reich. The best of the bourgeoisie, the young people,
are already with us whether we like it or not. The triumph of the movement in the universities is
unparalleled. In spite of warnings and sanctions, the academic youth are rushing to our side and,
throwing away all the old ballast, are putting on the brown shirt" . Quoted from Volkischer Beobachter
of 7 June, RSE, ibid.
38 RSE, 1 and 8 July 1930, p.1435 and p.1495-96.
39RSE, 22 July 1930, p.1623-1624.
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immediately expelled from the party and Hitler reasserted his prerogative by
making an 'infallible' statement of the party's aims. There is no mention of all this in
§2.75 but it was in the periodicals. It seems highly likely from the timing of this note
that the currency (attua/ita) of Gramsci's reflections on charismatic leadership was
provided precisely by the political situation in Germany where a new charaismatic
leader had now appeared.
§2.75 is a long note written in two parts, the second being added a year later in the
summer or autumn of 1931. Gramsci summarises the material of an article by
Robert Michels on political parties adding his own critical interpolations in
brackets.40 The article appeared soon after Michels was appointed to a chair at the
University of Perugia which Mussolini had personally offered him. Gramsci's main
aim in this note was to investigate the phenomenon of charismatic leadership of
political parties in order to determine whether or not it is correct to speak of
"charismatic parties" as a distinct type. He saves his answer to this question - an
emphatic "no" - until the second half of the note a year later. Meanwhile Michels
supplied a lot of illustrative material on this question, although the conceptual
content is mostly drawn from other authors, especially Weber.
According to Max Weber (Wlrtsche" und Gesellsche". Grundrl.. der Soz/./okonom,k, II I •
2nd edition, Tublngen 1925. pp 187,839) [the political party) originates from two klnda of
cau... : In particular, It originates •• a .pontaneou. a•• oclatlon for the purpo.e. of
propaganda and agitation which .eek. power so that Ita active membera (militants) will
have the moral and material opportunities to achieve either objective ends or perIanal
advantag.. or both. The general orientation of political parties conalat.. therefore, In
Mechtstreben, whether personal or Impersonal. In the flrat e.... peraonal partl .. ar.
baaed on the protection of Inferlora provided by a powerful men. Examples of thl. type are
common In the hl.tory (1) of political parties.
Michels then proceeds to cite a number of examples from the history of political
parties but the selection seems to be so random as to amount to rather less than
"history" in Gramsci's eyes: this seems to be the point of his question mark. The fact
that the socialist parties in Germany and France were named after their leaders (for
example. the Marxists and Lassalleans in Germany between 1863-1875) is taken
by Michels as proof that "the socialists have not broken with this bourgeois
tradition" of charismatic leadership. Michels then moves from Weber's ·powerful
man" to his own cherished notion of the "charismatic leader". which gives Gramsci
the first occasion to interrupt on Weber's behalf:
40 R.Michels: 'Les Partis politiques et la contrainte sociale', Mercure de France, 1 May 1928,QCI
p.230-234.
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When the leader exerts an influence over his supporters because of qualities which are so
exalted as to appear In their eyes supernatural, he can be called a charismatic leader
(from the Greek, meaning gift from God, reward; cf. M.Weber, op.clt., p.140) [This note Is
numbered 4b, Ie, It was Inserted In the drafts: certainly not because of the translation of
the Greek but perhaps because Weber cites It. Michels has made a lot of noise In Italy on
account of 'his' discovery of the charismatic leader which, In all probability, was already
to be found In Weber (necessary to check this). Michels' book on Political Sociology of
1927 should also be consulted. Nor does he mention the fact that a conception of
leadership by the grace of God already eXisted, and howl
For examples of charismatic leaders Michels returns to the case of Lassalle and the
early history of the Socialist party in Germany. His description of Lassalle's style of
leadership was interesting to Gramsci for what it told him about the "phases" of the
development of political parties. The interplay between past and present in his
mind seems obvious from his selection of material, for "Hitler's" party was currently
going through a similar "primitive" phase of development, which was exhibited by
his similar style of leadership.
He [Lassalle] took pleasure In boasting to his supporters of the worship accorded him by
the delirious masses and by the virgins dressed In white who sang hymnl to him and
offered him flowers. This charismatic faith was not only the fruit of a somewhat
megalomaniac psychology, but allo corresponded to a theoretical conception. We must,
he told the Rhenish workers as he explained his Ideas on party organisation to them, forge
all our scattered wills Into a hammer and put It Into the hands of a man whose Intelligence,
character, and aggression ensure that It strikes vigorously (cf. Michels, Lea partl,
pOl/tlques, 1914, p.130j he does not refer to the enlarged Italian edition of 1924). It was
the hammer of the dictator. Later on the masses demanded at least a sembl.nce of
democracy and collective power, groups of leaders began forming In Increasing numbers
who refused to accept the dictatorship of a single person.
It is tempting to suggest that in summarising this material on LassaUe Gramsci was
really investigating the historical antecedents of "National Socialism" in Germany.
In fact, Gramsci gave no credence to "National Socialism" as an ideology and, as
we will see, preferred to describe the party's ideology as "Hitlerism".41 This was
consistent with his understanding of the nature of charismatic leadership in which
the party's ideology is defined solely by the leader. Had Hitler's party reached the
"phase" when groups of leaders began forming "who refused to accept the
dictatorship of a single person"? The recent expulsion of Otto Strasser suggested
not: the party had not yet advanced beyond the "primitive" stage. Moreover,
Strasser's challenge to Hitler's leadership confirmed to Gramsci that the
'socialism' of this self-styled 'soclallst' party was strictly meaningless except as an
41See the reference to "the expansion of Hitlerism" in §7.n. The intellectuals. The political parties,
written at the end of 1931, in OCII p.910.
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'instrument of rule'. This is what he will mean later in 1933 by saying that
charismatic leaders, once they have achieved power, are "subject to the law of the
turncoaf' (la legge del tornaconto ).42 In addition to the precedent set by Mussolini
who betrayed the Italian Socialist Party in 1915, the expulsion of Strasser in 1930
over the socialist element of Nazi ideology helped to define this "law of the
turncoat" in Gramsci's mind. As for the ideology of "Hitlerism" Gramsci tended in the
notes to equate this with "racism" and later, in 1933, indicated the latter's particular
antecedents quite accurately.43 Meanwhile, what Gramsci is trying to arrive at in
§2.75 is a historicist understanding of charismatic leadership which, he suggests,
is characteristic of a primitive phase in the development of a political party. This
was his perspective on Hitler's party in the summer of 1930.
This is the 'German' sub-text of §2.75 and the substance of its attua/ita at the time
of writing in the summer of 1930. But there is one example of a charismatic leader
so far missing from Michels' article, who was 'celebrated' by Michels in a far from
'scientific' spirit: this was Mussolini, to whom Michels had every reason to be
grateful. Gramsci was more 'scientific' than the brand new professor when it came
to analysing Mussolini as a leader of the charismatic type. For Mussolini had risen
to power from "socialisr beginnings, only then to obey "the law of the turncoar: his
successor Hitler, the 'German Mussolini', seemed to be doing the same. When
Michels cites the example of Mussolini, Gramsci makes his most significant
interpolation.
Thus Michels: Mussolini Is another exampleof the party leader who combines something of
the prophet snd the believer. Moreover,he II not only the sole leader 0' a great party but
also the .ole head of a great State. He represent. the full.. t expreaalonof the Id..
contained In the axiom 'I am the party' as 'ar a. the r.. pon.lbillty and burden of work are
concerned". Thus Gramsci. [Hlltorlcally Inaccurate. Since then the formation 0' groupe and
all collective dlscu•• lon have been banned becau.e they proved to be dlsastroua.
Muaaollnl uaea the State to dominatethe party and, up to a point, u... the party to
dominate the State at difficult momenta.Moreover, In the modern world the ao-callecl
charllma of which MichelI .peak. alway. colncld.. with a primitive pha.e In the
developmentof mas. partl.. In which It. doctrine appear. nebulou. and Incoherent In the
ey" of the ma.... and need. an Infallible pope to Interpret and adapt It to the
clrcum.tances. The more thl. happen., the more the party orlglnat.. and tak ... hape on
the ba.110' Incoherent and muddled Ideologl.. a. opposed to a coherent conception of
the world which II rich In potential becauaeIt I. the expr.. llon of a hl.torlcally e... ntlal
and progr... lve cia... Tha.. Ideologl.. are nurtured by feeling. and emotion. which have
.tlll not re.ched the point of dllsolvlng becau.e the cia.... (or the cia•• ) which express
tham, h.vlng arrived hl.torlcally at the point of dlaaolutlon, .tlll have a certain balll and
cling to the glorl .. of the pa.t In order to .hleld them.elv.. from the future].
42 §15. 07. Machiavelli. Elections, OCIII p.1761.
43 §14.27. Popular Literature. The Popular Origins of the 'Superman '. •...... it is also necessary to
examine the racist tendencies which culminated in Gobineau, and then in Chamberlain and in Pan-
Germanism (Treitschke and the theories of 'power' )" celli p.1685.
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The interplay between past and present, between Mussolini and Hit/er, is the key
to how Gramsci's mind works. His ironic reference to the party's need for an
"infallible pope" clarifies what he meant when he suggested that long before
Michels' discovery of the charismatic leader "a conception of leadership by the
grace of God already existed, and how!". But who is the infallible pope he has in
mind here? Ostensibly he is talking about Mussolini, but as so often in the
notebooks sybilline generalisations about "the modern world" or "the present time"
alert the reader to the likelihood of something more current. In this case Gramsci
was thinking of the recent split in the Nazi party precisely over its "incoherent and
muddled ideologies" and of the role of Hitler, its infallible pope, who was called
upon "to interpret and adapt it to circumstances". Moreover, the expulsion of
Strasser for refusing to accept the dictatorship of a single person and for
demanding at least a "semblance of democracy" was evidence to Gramsci's mind
that the party was still in a primitive phase of development.
The 'German' significance of §2.75 is confirmed by the underlying continuity of
Gramsci's historicism between this and the earlier notes we have examined. This is
apparent, for example, when he refers to the feelings and emotions of those
classes which, "having arrived historically at the point of dissolution, still have a
certain basis and cling to the glories of the past in order to shield themselves from
the future". What particular "classes (or class)" did he have in mind here? This
might plausibly refer not only to the Junkers [Prussian latifondists] mentioned in
§2.26 "who have kept their wealth and solidarity based on landed property", but
also the small people mentioned in the same note, sometimes referred to by
German historians as the old Mitte/stand , ie, "the shopkeepers and petty-
bourgeoisie" of Berlin as well as "the small farmers and farm managers" who
remained loyal to the old regime. This suggests that Gramsci's historicist
perception of "Hitlerism" at this point consisted in seeing it as the pOlitical
expression of "dying classes" - a conception which made increasing sense in the
context of the economic depression after 1929. Moreover, in §3.34 Gramsci did not
entirely rule out the possibility that the interregnum might end in a "restoration".
During the interregnum when the 'old' is dying and the 'new' cannot be born, new
"combinations" of force and consent could be expected. In Germany it now
appeared that this new "combination" was Hitlerism, whose "incoherent and
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muddled" ideology was characteristic of the easrly phase of the new combination.
However, in §3.34 Gramsci suggested that the new combination of the dying class
would have less "ethical" content than ever - Catholicism being reduced, for
example, to "the purest Jesuitism". The ideology of Hitlerism was, in fact,
completely devoid of ethical content but not for the millions of Germans who were
deceived by it, including the young "idealists" in the universities. Indeed, Gramsci
scarcely suspected in the summer of 1930 that the ideology of a dying class would
prove to be so "expansive". The Reichstag election of September 1930 would show
that what lay at the end of the "interregnum", in fact, was an unprecedented
expansion of Hitlerism, not Communism.
(II) 13.119.The Dlctatorahlp of the Bureaucracy or 'the State-Bonapartlat party'
The second reference to Weber's ideas at this time comes at the end of §3.119,
probably written in August 1930. The note explains "the weakness of the political
parties in Italy (except to some extent the Nationalist party) throughout the period of
their existence from the Risorgimento onwards" (ie, until their suppression in 1926).
This is then compared to "a 'similar' state of affairs in Wilhelmine Germany" as
described by Weber in his articles of 1917-18 which appeared as the imperial era
drew to a close and as the shape of the 'new political order' in Germany was being
actively contemplated. But §3.119 is not simply a lesson in the comparative history
of Italy and Germany. Gramsci places this note under the rubric 'Past and Present',
raising the question of the interplay between the two 'moments'. The movement of
his thinking in this note is as follows: it starts from the element of politics he sees in
the present political situation in Germany; he then examines the potitioal history of
Italy in terms of the same element and suggests that according to Weber's
analysis, a 'similar' element can be found in the political history of Germany; the
comparison in turn serves to illuminate the present situation in Germany which now
appears to be a kind of 'restoration' of this old element. The 'new' political order in
Germany envisaged by Weber in 1918 appeared in 1930 in danger of being
overtaken by old habits. Would the outcome of this situation be the same as in Italy,
ie, the suppression of the political parties?
What is the element of politics in this note? This consists in the power struggle
between the parliamentary parties and the State bureaucracy. Gramsci followed
Weber in seeing that the weakening of the former strengthens the power position of
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the latter. A government which stood "above the parties" - that is, which did not
depend for its existence on a majority in parliament - amounted to rule by the
bureaucracy even though its ministers may be drawn from the leading personnel
of the parties. G ramsci selected this element from what he learned from his
periodicals about the political situation in Germany at this time. With the fall of the
'Weimar Coalition' in March 1930 parliamentary government in Germany effectively
ended and was replaced by the first of the 'presidential' cabinets headed by the
parliamentary leader of the Centre Party, Heinrich Bruning. Of course. Gramsci
could not have known what historians have since told us about the "concrete plans"
of the presidential circle for an authoritarian government standing "above the
parties"44 but it is plausible to suggest that he read their authoritarian intentions
accurately enough. In July the new Chancellor, unable to get a parliamentary
majority to approve his programme of financial reforms. carried out his threat to
dissolve the Reichstag and. failing a new majority. to govern the country by
presidential decree. This was the immediate context in which Gramsci wrote
§3.119.
Gramsci responded to this turning-point in German pOlitics by turning his attention
to the history of political parties in Italy. He argues that the main cause of their
weakness is to be found in the lack of solidity (deliquescenza ) of the economic
classes in Italy. "in the gelatinous social and economic structure of the country", but
this explanation was "somewhat fatalistic". Since the economic classes in imperial
Germany could hardly be said to have lacked solidity, this would not explain a
'similar' weakness of the political parties there. Instead. his comparison between
the two countries was based on the role of the State in relation to the parties.
13.119 (extract) In f.ct, If It I. true that partie•• re only the nomenclaturefor cl...... It la
also true that p.rtl ... re not .Imply • mechanic.I .nd p••• lve expr.. alon of tho.e
cl..... but react energetlc.lly upon them In order to develop. solidify, .nd unlveraaU..
them. This Is precisely what did not h.ppen In Italy .
The State-governmentbe.rs some responsibility for thl. state 0' .".Irs (one can call It
respon.lblllty to the extent th.t It prevented the strengtheningof the St.te It.elf - In
other word.. It demonstr.ted that the Stat.government w.. not • national f.ctor). In fact
the governmentoperated•• though It w•• a 'party'. It .et ItMlf over .nd above the
partl.. , not so a. to harmonI.e their Inter.. ts .nd .ctlvltl.. within the perm.nent
fr.mework of the State'. natlon.1 life .nd Intere.t., but .0 a. to dl.lntegr.te them. to
detach them from the bro.d m...... nd to have '. force of non-partymen linked to the
governmentby p.ternall.tlc tl.. of • Bonapartl.t-C.... rl.t type'. Thl. I. the w.y the ao-
c.lled dlctatorahllM of Depretls,Crlspl, .nd Glollttl .nd the parll.mentary phenomenonof
tran.forml.m .hould be analyHd. Cia.... produce partie•• nd partie. form the perlonnel
44 See in particularthe observations of Kar1Dietrich Bracherin The German Dictatorship (1973)
p.218-220.
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of State and government, the leaders of civil society and political society. There has to be
a useful and fruitful relation up to a point between these manifestations and functions.
There can be no formation of leaders where there Is no theoretical, doctrinal activity of
parties, where there Is no systematic effort to discover and study the reasons for the
existence and the development of the class they represent. Hence, scarcity of State and
government personnel; squalor of parliamentary life; ease with which the parties are
disintegrated, by corrupting and absorbing the few Individuals who are Indispensable.
Hence, squalor of cultural life and wretched narrownen of high culture: Instead of
political history, bloodless erudition; Instead of religion, superstition; Instead of books
and great reviews, the dally paper and scandal-mongering; Instead of serious politics, the
dally round of quarrelling and personalised clashes. The universities, and all the
Institutions which develop Intellectual and technical abilities, since they were not
permeated by the life of the parties, by the living realities of national life, produced
apolitical national cadres whose mental formation was purely rhetorical, not national. Thus
the bureaucracy became estranged from the country, and via Its administrative positions
became a true political party, the worst kind of all, because the bureaucratic hierarchy
replaced the Intellectual and political hierarchy. The bureaucracy became precisely the
State-Bonapartlst party.
See the books which appeared after 1919 criticising a 'similar' state of affairs (but far
richer In the life of 'civil society') In Wilhelmina Germany, for example Max Weber's
Parliament and Govarnment In the New Order In Germsny. A Polltlca' Critique of
Bureaucracy and Party Life. Translation and preface by Enrico Ruta, pp.xvl-200. 10.00
lire. (The translation Is very Imperfect and Imprecise). <IS
In the context of 1930, this passage is immediately about the politics of Germany
not the history of Italy. The clue to its sub-text is the element of politics common to
the histories of Italy and Germany. This consists in the tradition in both countries of
substituting government by the parliamentary parties with government by the
'State', which thus usurps the function of leadership which belongs to the parties.
Gramsci brings this perspective to bear on the new political situation created by the
collapse of the Weimar coalition in March 1930, which marked the tranSition from
parliamentary to bureaucratic rule in Germany.
The Bruning cabinet appointed in April 1930 was selected by President
Hindenburg and his circle of advisers. Although the ministers were drawn from the
parliamentary parties, they were not chosen as representatives of the parties. On
the contrary, this was an attempt to detach them from the parties and to create a
government 'above the parties' - what Gramsci calls "a force of non-party men
linked to the government by paternalistic ties of a Bonapartist-Caesarist type". This
description46 answers quite accurately to the 'paternalistic' ties between the old
soldier Bruning and Hindenburg, although the most complete expression of this
type of authoritarian government or 'dictatorship' would be von Papen's cabinet
which succeeded Bruning'S in May 1932.
45 QCI p.387-388. (The full text is translated in SPN p.227-228, which I have followed apart from one
or two changes).
46 Gramsci's description is a quotation, which I have not been able to trace.
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With little more than a bibliographical reference to go by, any attempt to retrace
Gramsci's reading of Weber's book would be largely speculative but it is possible
at least to suggest briefly how Weber's analysis 'aligns' with Gramsci's.The
essence of Weber's critique was that the political leadership of imperial Germany
was exercised not by party politicians but by officials with no qualification or talent
for political leadership I these qualities being cultivated precisely by the life of the
political parties. This was the legacy which Bismarck left to Wilhelmine Germany
after his fall in 1890. Weber argued that the political parties in the Reichstag did not
fail to produce political leaders after 1871 but that Bismarck deliberately acted to
disintegrate the parties and to eliminate any leaders with sufficient intellectual
independence and political talent to become his rivals. The 'classic' case was his
disintegration of the National Liberals after 1878, which was particularly successful,
but he applied this aim to all the parliamentary parties. His preferred technique was
to 'behead' the parties by inviting their leaders to join the government which, under
Article 9 of the imperial constitution, required them to resign their parliamentary
seats. By thus detaching them from their parties, he turned them from potential
leaders into mere officials.
As far as Iam aware, there were personalities fully equipped with all the qualities needed for
leadership in all the parties in Germany, without exception. Von Bennigsen, von Miquel, von
Stauffenberg, Volk and others amongst the National Liberals, in the Centre party von Mallinckrodt
and Windthorst, the Conservatives von Bethusy-Huc, von Minnegerode, von Manteuffel, the
Progressives von Saucken-Tarputschen and the Social Democrat von Vollmar - all these men were
natural leaders with political qualifications. They all disappeared from view or left parliament, as von
Bennigsen did in the eighties, because there was no chance of them achieving the leadership of
affairs of state in their capacity as party leaders. \Nhen parliamentarians like von Mlquel and Moller
became ministers, they had first to abandon their political convictions in order to be fitted into
ministries run purely by officials <47
Weber seems unaware of the common 'aristocratic' provenance of the 'natural
leaders' he selected from the political parties in the Reichstag, whereas for Gramsci
the weakness of the political parties in Germany (except, as we will see, for the
Centre and Social Democratic parties) was rooted precisely in the 'political
monopoly of the nobility'. The effect of Bismarck's elimination of political talent,
however, was to create a powerless parliament which engaged in purely 'negative
politics'. A parliament without power failed to attract natural or 'born' leaders who,
47 Weber: Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order. Towards a political
critique of officialdom and the party system, in Political Writings. edited by Peter Lassman and Ronald
Speirs (Cambridge. 1994) p.171-172.
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instead, found an outlet for their ambitions in the life of civil society in Germany.
As an example Weber chooses the career of a man whose views were
diametrically opposed to his own: without directly naming him, the reference was to
Alfred Hugenburg.
Does anyone believe that the present leader of the Krupp works, formerly a politician from the Eastern
Territories and official of the state, was simply destined to direct the greatest industrial enterprise in
Germany, rather than head one of the most influential ministries or a powerful party in parliament? 48
Given the impotence of parliament and the purely official character of ministerial
posts, however, a man with such a strong instinct for power found an alternative
field of activity where his abilities and ambitions were welcomed - the field of large-
scale private capitalist enterprise. Thus, the poverty of political life in imperial
Germany resulted from this process of negative selection, whereby "all the men of
this nation with any talent for leadership have been diverted down this path, into
the service of private capitalist interests ..... ". As for their political ambitions, Weber
referred to the latest field of private capitalist enterprise to absorb Hugenburg's
energies, for "men of that type prefer to finance pan-German newspapers and to
allow the litterateurs to churn out their nonsense in them". Weber died in 1920 and
it was left to Gramsci to observe the next chapter of Hugenburg's career - as
Germany's biggest newspaper baron and, after 1928, as the leader of a powerful
party in parliament. However, in this capacity Hugenburg's strong instinct for power
was matched only by his complete lack of talent for political leadership.
To summarise: from this analysis of the currency (attualita ) of §2.75 and §3.119,
we see that Gramsci's perception of the German situation in the summer of 1930
was guided by two threads drawn from Weber's thought: the emergence of a
charismatic leader and the return to bureaucratic in place of parliamentary rule.
Gramsci now waited upon further developments of the crisis before elaborating
these threads in later notes.
48 Ibid. p.172.
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§4.22. The Importance of the Ideologies
During the summer of 1930 Gramsci wrote a cluster of notes in Notebook 4 under
the heading Croce and Marx in which "the most interesting point to examine is the
ideologies and their value (va/ore )".49 In the third of these notes he suggested that
the question could be analysed empirically as well as conceptually:
§4.22. Croce and Marx. The value of the Ideologies . The phenomena of the current
decomposition ot parllamentarlsm could serve as an example for the discussion about the
value of the superstructures and of social morphology (question of the crisis ot authority
etc: see scattered notes).m
Gramsci was immediately thinking of Germany where "the decomposition of
parliamentarism" closely corresponded to the current situation. In fact Germany in
1930 showed all the symptoms of the general crisis of hegemony described in the
seminal §1.48:
On the practical level the crisis is reflected in the increasing difficulty of forming governments and the
increasing instability of governments themselves. Its immediate origin lies in the multiplication of
par1iamentary parties and in the (permanent) intemal crises of every party (ie, every party experiences
what parliament as a whole experiences: difficulty in governing). 51
In March the Weimar Coalition had collapsed and was succeeded by the
'dictatorship' of Bruning (the background to §3.119). The country was now
governed by presidential decree in the absence of parliamentary consent. In July
Bruning dissolved the Reichstag and fixed new elections for 14 September. The
bourgeois political parties continued to splinter and multiply: as the election
campaign got under way in August, the creation of no less than three new parties
was announced.52 In short, the disintegration of the apparatus of hegemony in
Germany was more apparent than ever in the summer of 1930.
As we have seen, however, Gramsci was more interested in the crisis of the
German ideology than of the German parliament, particularly the ideology of the
German Right for whom "the principle of authority" was fundamental. Indeed, the
'German' origin of §4.22 is confirmed precisely by his reference to the scattered
49 §4.15. Croce and Marx, QCI p.436, followed by §4.20, §4.22 with the same title, QCI p.441, 442.
50 §4.22. Croce and Msrx, QCI p.442.
51 §1.48, QCI p. 59.
52 See in particular RSE, 5 August 1930, p. 1712, reporting the start of the election campaign and the
creation of new parties, ie, the Peasant party, the Conservative Popular party, and the State party.
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notes he had written on "the crisis of authority".53 The fullest description of what he
meant by this was in §3.03. German Intellectuals in which he noted the trend
among contemporary German writers to attack the principle of authority in all its
forms - "religious dogma, monarchical power, official teaching, the military state, the
marriage bond, paternal prestige, and above all the [system of] justice which
protects these transitory institutions". By the crisis of authority, then, Gramsci meant
the disintegration of the ideology of Germany's old ruling class - a global crisis of
the "ruling ideas". But all this bore witness to the failure of the ideologies not to
their value. The point about the crisis of authority was that the old ruling ideas had
lost their value. So what did Gramsci mean by their "value"?
The theoretical question posed by Gramsci in these Croce and Marx notes
corresponded to the ideological conjuncture in Germany in the summer of 1930 as
the Reichstag election campaign got under way: the election campaign was a
demonstration of "the value of the ideologies". Gramsci argues that Marx's doctrine
of the ideologies was dialectical - twO-Sided, not one-sided. On the negative side
the ideologies were appearances or "illusions" - that is to say, they were practical
constructs, instruments with which the ruling class led the rest of society. Croce's
interpretation reproduced only this negative side of Marx's doctrine. On the positive
side, however, the ideologies - in the first place Marxism itself - were the means of
liberation which destroyed the ruling "illusions" and taught men to become
conscious of their revolutionary tasks. "Marx explicitly affirms that men become
conscious of their tasks on the terrain of the ideologies, the superstructures, which
is no small affirmation of "reality" ".54 Either way, the value of the ideologies was
essentially practical or "concrete".
The question in Gramsci's mind as the German election campaign got under way
was: would the election show that the German proletariat was conscious of its
revolutionary tasks or would it show that the ruling class was still able to lead by
inventing new "illusions"? It turned out that the only parties to make gains in the
elections of September 1930 were the Communists and the Nazis, but Nazi gains
were far more impressive and Gramsci was in no doubt about the significance of
the result. By the time he wrote the second draft of §4.22 sometime in 1932, in the
notebook on Croce, the mass expansion of "Hitlerism" was part of his perspective
and the success of this new "illusion" was reflected in the second verslon,
53 The previous notes on the "crisis of authority" were §1.48, §3.03, §1.127, §3.M.
54 §4.1S. Croce and Marx, QCI p.437.
94
§10.41.XII. Note 1. The phenomena of the modern decomposition of parliamentarism can offer many
examples of the function and concrete value of the ideologies. How this decomposition is presented
in order to hide the reactionary tendencies of certain social groups is of the greatest interest (del piu
alto interesse). There are many scattered notes on these questions written in various notebooks (for
example, on the question of the crisis of the principle of authority etc) which should be collected
together and referred back to these notes on Croce. 55
In other words, Gramsci was particularly interested in the way the Nazis used a
populist "revolutionary" phraseology borrowed from the Left - putting an end to the
republican "system" etc - in order to disguise the "reactionary" tendencies of the
Right, ie, of the agrarians and industrialists who together formed the traditional
dominant bloc.
Postscript:
f6.35. 'Does any 'racism' exist In Italy?'
What exactly was this new German ideology? During the election campaign there
were many attempts to explain it. As we saw, the most searching analysis of its
"elements" was in the English review New Statesman but even so the reporter
concluded that its mass appeal was emotional not rational. "Otherwise it would be
impossible to explain the undeniable progress of fascism in Germany since their
ideology is a mixture of vague theories about race, anti-Semitism, and 'true'
socialism .....".56 Gramsci called it "Hitlerism". This was in line with his conception of
"charismatic" leadership which, it will be recalled,
coincides with a primitive phase in the development of mass parties when its doctrine appears
nebulous and incoherent in the eyes of the masses and needs an Infallible pope to interpret and
adapt it to the circumstances. The more this happens, the more the party Originates and takes shape
on the basis of incoherent and muddled ideologies ....... These ideologies are nurtured by feelings
and emotions which have still not reached the point of dissolving because the classes (or the class)
which express them, having arrived historically at the point of dissolution, stili have a certain basis and
cling to the glories of the past in order to shield themselves from the future. 57
Gramsci therefore named this muddled ideology after its infallible pope, Hitler, but
he also recognised the "feelings and emotions" which nurtured it. The extraordinary
success of the Nazis in the Reichstag election was an undeniably impressive
demonstration of these feelings and emotions but Gramsci's first attempts to
comprehend them met with little success. The most direct ( but not the most
55 §10.41. XII. 'One of the most interesting points to examine in depth is Croce's doctrine of the
political ideologies ...", QCII p.1322-1323.
56 The articles in the New Statesman were reported in RSE, 26 August 1930.
57 §2.7S. R.Michels ... , QCI p. 233.
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important) sign in the notebooks of the first impression made on Gramsci by the
German election results can be found in the miscellaneous Notebook 6. This was
started in November 1930 while he was still busy on Notebook 4. To understand
the mass expansion of Hitlerism, Gramsci looked for equivalent elements of this
German ideology in Italian culture, but he could only find 'abstract' rather than
'concrete' examples.
§6.35. italian culture. Dou any aort of 'raclam' .xlat In Italy? Ther. have been many
att.mpta but th.y are all pur.ly IIt.rary and abstract In charact.r. Italy dlffera from
G.rmany In thla r.apect although there are som. Int.rutlng, If .xtrlnalc, almllarltlea
b.tw •• n the two countrl.a: 1) the tradition of locallam and consequently the belated
achl.vem.nt of national and atate unity. (An .xtrlnalc almllarlty alnce the orlglna of
ltaly'a reglonallamdlff.r from Germany'a.Two main el.m.nta contributed to It In Italy: <a)
the reemergenceof local rac•• aft.r the fall of the RomanEmplr. (b) the barbarian
Invealon. firat, the foreign conqueror. later. Int.rnatlonal r.latlon. had an Influence In
Germanybut not In the form of direct occupation by for.lgn.r.). 2) MedI.vaI universalism
was more Influential In Italy than Germanywh.r., during the R.formatlon, the Empireand
the lay outlook triumphed much earll.r than In Italy. 3) Th. domination Into modern tlm_
of the propertied cia.... of the countryald. although the [.oclal] r.latlon. are v.ry
dlffer.nt The Germanla moreconsciousof race than the Italian.
Raclam: the hlatorlcal r.turn to Romanlam,not f.lt very much outBid. literature. Generic
glorification of the race [atl,.". ], .tc. The atrang. thing la that racl.m today la aupported
(In/mllan S.rbar. [andArcltallano ] ) by Kurt Erich Suck.rt, an obvloualy raclat and
aup.r-vlllage (.tr.p.... ) nam.. RememberArturo Foa'a glorlflcatlona of the Italic race
during the war, much the aam. a. Suck.rt'a.sa
Gramsci identifies racism as the key element of Hitler's ideology and assumes that
the mass breakthrough of his party in the September elections concretely
demonstrated the German consciousness of race. Whether he was correct in this
hypothesis is questionable but it is interesting to see how he tried to build it into his
wider framework of interpretation. In attempting to explain why "the German is more
conscious of race than the Italian" we should note the sweeping perspective with
which he compares the historical development of the two cultures or 'traditions'.
This was consistent with the approach recommended at this time in §4.49. The
Intellectuals (November 1930) for studying the history of the 'traditional
intellectuals' whose origin and formation, he suggests, should be traced as far back
as Roman times. It seems that Gramsci was trying to understand the "raCists- as the
latest product of Germany's cultural 'tradition'. A further clue to his line of enquiry
58 §6.3S. Italian Culture, QCII p.710-711. A further allusion to the success of the National Socialists in
the recent election is in the following §6.42. Tendencies in Italian Cufture. Giovanni Cans where
Grarnsci observes: ·In writing CheFare? Cena wanted to unite the nationalists with the filo-socialists
like himself; but what did all this petty-bourgeois socialism in the style of De Amicis basically amount
to? Wasn't it the embryo of that so-called national socialism (socialismo nazionale, 0 nszionalSDCia/ismo
) which has tried in so many ways to make headway in Italy and which has found a favourable terrain In
the post-war period-. QCII p.718-719.
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into this question is provided by the third element of comparison between Italy and
Germany, ie, "the domination into modern times of the propertied classes of the
countryside". This general description could well apply to Germany's 'traditional
intellectuals', the Prussian Junkers. The extraordinary success of the racists in the
latest round of German elections was due to a large extent to winning over the
masses of the eastern countryside who usually voted for the Nationalists, the party
of the Junkers. The racist ideology of the Nazis - one thinks especially of volkisch
ideas of 'blood and soil' - appeared to be particularly "concrete" for the rural
classes of Germany. Moreover, Gramsci is clearly inclined to think of racism as a
form of anti-modernism. The nearest equivalent in Italian culture as he saw it was
the "super -village" current in Italian fascism represented by Suckert and others,
although unlike its German "blood and soil" equivalent these ideas never had any
'concrete' value in Italy.
The fact that Gramsci chose to emphasise the importance of the superstructures at
the moment of the deepest structural crisis in the history of capitalism - the crisis of
1929 - would seem to justify the description of him as "the theorist of the
superstructures". However, the pivotal problem of Gramsci's theory remains the
relation of structure-superstructures. In this same series of notes onCroce and
Marx he made a further suggestion:
This argument about the concrete value of the superstructures In Marx should be
thoroughly studied . RememberSorel'. concept of the 'historical bloc'. If men become
eonecteus of their task on the terrain of the .uper.tructur .. , this m.ans that there Is a
nee.. sary and vital nexus betweenstructure and .uperstructures, Just as there Is In the
human body between the .kln and the .keleton...... 18
This reference to the idea of the "historical bloc" explains Gramsci's obscure
reference in §4.22 to "social morphology", which is the shape or structure of the
historical bloc. But how might this concept apply to the example he recommends,
ie, the decomposition of parliamentarism in Germany? In this case, we might say
that the polltical party of the Junkers, the Nationalists, and the SOCialclasses of the
eastern countryside constituted a historical bloc held together over a long period of
time by the same traditional ideology. However, the decline of the Nationalists
under Hugenburg's leadership and the progress of Hitler's party indicated to
Gramsci that this historical bloc was, if not disintegrating, at least changing shape
and complexion.
59 §4.1S. Croce and Marx. QCI p.437.
Chapter 2
September 1930-December 1931
From the Reichstag Election to the National Government in Britain
The Letters and Testimonies
"The world is vast and terrible and complicated " 1
The rift with his comrades {December1930}
In November 1930 Gramsci started up an "organic cycle of conversations" with the
other communist prisoners at Turi during the exercise periods in the prison yard.2
The timing of his initiative was probably due to the arrival in the autumn of many
new communist prisoners. These comrades had been "activated" by the party's
new tactical policy but in trying to carry it out had exposed themselves to arrest by
the Fascist security police. Gramsci's initiative was singularly ill-timed. He wanted
to dispel the "economistic" illusions of those comrades who believed that the
capitalist crisis of 1929 would soon bring about the collapse of the Fascist regime
in Italy, and to encourage a greater spirit of realism by explaining the full complexity
of the revolutionary task which still lay before them. By this time Gramsci knew the
results of the recent elections in Germany.3 These strengthened his sceptiCism
towards the "miracle-working" political effects of economic crises, even
"catastrophic" ones. However, his lessons in political realism were not what the
comrades wanted to hear. Although he was careful to avoid direct criticism of the
party's new tactic, which fostered the very economistic illusions he wanted to
destroy, it was obvious to everyone that he disagreed with it. The atmosphere of
"diffused inquisition"4 now spread to his comrades in prison who questioned his
loyalty to the party. When Gramsci learned that some of them were discussing the
question in a sectarian spirit, accusing him of "deviating" in one way or another, he
broke off the collective conversations immediately. He did this for pOlitical reasons,
not out of personal pique: with his strong sense of communist "discipline", he
1 "The world is vast and terrible and complicated and the wisdom we are learning will become
proverbial.. ..By now I must be wiser than Lao-Tse who, when he was born, had the knowledge and
composure of a man of eighty". To Julia, 18 May 1931, LeI! p.423.
2 The political conversations are described by Fiori cit., p.253-2S8 and by Spriano cit., p.65-71. The
best primary sources are Athos Lisa: Memorie (Milan, 1973) and Bruno Tosin: Con Gramsci (Rome,
1976). See also the section 'II careere' in the collection Gramsci vivo nelle testimonianze dei suoi
contemporanei, a cura di Mimma Paulesu Quercioli, prefazione di Giuseppe Fiori (Milan, 19n).
3 The Reichstag elections were held on 14 September. The earliest report of the results in GRamsci's
periodicals was in RSE, 23 September 1930, p.2097-2098.
4 The phrase used in §3.32. ·Rendrs la vie impossible" ,QCI p. 310, written soon after his brother's
visit in June to inform him of the party's new tactic.
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wanted to avoid being the cause of "factionalism" in the party at all costs. The
atmosphere can be judged from the hostility of some comrades who thought that
"we should denounce his disruptive influence on the party, and that we ought to
begin by excluding him from our company and driving him out of the exercise
yard".5 Such was the situation when Bruno Tosin arrived at the beginning of
December. "The differences of opinion led to such a sharp disagreement that he
decided to suspend the conversations. This is how the situation arose where
Antonio was, as far as I could see, isolated from the majority of the other
comrades-e. It is important to note the date of this rift, December 1930,
which has a significant bearing on the meaning of §7.10. Gramsci remained on
speaking terms with individual comrades, including some like Athas Lisa who
supported the party line, but the break-up of the communist 'collective' only
confirmed the idea expressed in §3.32, ie, that his disagreement with the party had
"rendered life impossible". Unable to discuss the reasons why the tactical policy
was a mistake, he wrote them down in the notebooks. They can be found in a
famous note, §7.10, written precisely in December 1930. Here Gramsci found a
way of telling the truth under "impossible" circumstances.
Meanwhile, Gramsci's need for closer contacts with his family was growing
stronger in the autumn of 1930. He was relieved to get detailed news about the
condition of Julia's mental health from his friend Piero Sraffa who had visited her
at the sanitorium on the Black Sea where she had gone for a psychoanalytical
curet . The news encouraged him to make a fresh attempt to get a dialogue going
with her. He also reached out to his family in Sardinia. In a letter to his mother just
before Christmas, he described his spiritual state after four years in prison. He
professed the same stoical serenity he had described to his brother Carlo a year
earlier. While his moral fortitude was as strong as ever, however, the past year at
Turi had taken its toll and the self-confident, sermonising tone had given way to a
more sober, even vulnerable tone of voice.
Darling mamma,thla la the fifth Chrlatmaa.Ince my arre.t and the fourth that I am
apendlng In prlaon.....But don't Imagine that my .erenlty I. any I.. a than It wa•. It', true I
am four year. older, I havemany grey hair., I have loat my teeth, I don't laugh a.... lIy
al I uled to, but I think I havegrown wiler and my experienceof men and affaire I. richer.
What's more, I haven't 10lt my talte for life, I am stili Inter_ted In the wide world•.,And
eo I haven't grown old yet, have 11Weonly becomeold whenwe begin to 'ear death Ind
5 Quoted in G.Fiori'sAntonio Grsmsci - Lifeo's Revolutionary (1970)p.257.
6 Bruno Tosin, ConGramsci (1976) p.98.
7 To Julia, 4 November 1930, Lei p.362-363.
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when we are displeased to see others doing what we can no longer do ourselves. In this
sense, I'm sure you haven't grown old either in spite of your age.....8
The agonies of communication with Julia continued, however. Her letter to him in
January began cryptically: "When I think of writing, every day, I think of what makes
me stay silent; I realise that my weakness is new to you.....".9 Gramsci tried "to get
their relationship on a normal footing, making sure that you don't feel any
inhibitions and restraints in writing to me".10 The intriguing question is whether or
not there was a 'political' dimension to Julia's silence. Was the 'hidden' element in
Julia's letters which Gramsci could never fathom, due to political censorship, to
'external' interference by the "invisible tribunal" in Moscow? Did not political
censorship come into play in an exchange of letters between fascist and
communist states, including private letters? If this was only a suspicion lurking in
Gramsci's mind, it was at least a plausible one. For the moment, Gramsci was
inclined to attribute Julia's illness to her sense of "communist duty". Sceptical about
the value of a psychoanalytic cure, he thought her depression was connected with
"a social environment which permanently demands an extremely strong tension of
the Will"11 - a reference, surely, to the "oppressive" atmosphere in the Soviet Union
created by the First Five-Year Plan of 1929; "it seems to me that you are at present
obsessed with the feeling of your own responsibility, which makes it seem that your
strength is inadequate to the duties you want to perform".12When Julia first met
Gramsci back in 1922 he was writing to Trotsky about Italian Futurism whilst she, a
musician, dreamed of transforming the world by music in the romantic spirit of
Romain Rolland. Now in 1931 it seemed to Gramsci that Julia was a casualty of the
extreme utilitarian ideology of "socialist construction" with its overwhelming
emphasis on material values. Stalin's Plan brought out the streak of fanatical
utilitarianism which had long been an element in the Russian revolutionary
tradition and which had no place for "useless people" like musictans. As the terrible
1930s began they both found themselves in conditions of ''force majeure" but they
must try to hold on to all the beauty of life, in the present as well as the past.
BTo mamma, 15 December 1930, Lei p.371-372. [Translated in HH,p.129-130).
9 To Julia, 9 February 1931, QCII p.392.
10 ibid., p.393.
11 ibid., p.394.
12 Gramsci did not know that Freud's latest work,Civilisation and its Discontents (1930), dealt precisely
with the crushing sense of duty imposed on individuals by modern civilisation. Again, for all his
scepticism Gramsci was more in tune with Freud's thinking than he knew.
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In any case, you are right, in our world, mine and yours, every weakness is grievous and
every strength a help. I think that our greatest misfortune Is that we were together too
little, and always In abnormal general conditions, cut off from the real and concrete life of
everyday. Our task now, In the conditions of force majeure In which we find ourselves, Is
to make up for these deficiencies In the past so that we may preserve all the moral
stability of our union and salvage from the crisis all the beauty that there certainly was In
our past, and which lives on In our children ...You must help me to get to know the children
better and to share In their life, In their formation, In the way they affirm their
personalities. In this way my 'fatherhood' will become more real and will always be a thing
of the present: It will become a living 'fatherhood', not Just a memory In an ever-receding
past.13
To make his fatherhood a living thing, he usually included something for the
children in his letters; these are Gramsci's best moments. In April he commented on
Delio's early efforts at handwriting, wondering "why he should start writing from
right to left and not from left to right. However, I'm glad he writes with his hands:
that's something anyway. If he had taken it into his head to start writing with his feet,
that would undoudtedly have been a good deal worse".14 In August, on learning
that the boys were keen on catching frogs, he drew upon his childhood knowledge
of natural life to tell them how to distinguish edible frogs and to catch and prepare
them for eating. "I think Delio and Giuliano could easily pass into the history of
Russian culture, even at their present tender age, by introducing this new foodstuff
into popular usage; they would thus realise several millions of roubles' worth of
new human wealth, wresting it from the monopoly of crows, ravens and grass
snakes".1S
The health crisis of August 1931
On 3 August 1931 the steady deterioration in Gramsci's health reached a dramatic
turning-point. He told no one about it for a fortnight.
It etarted like this. At on. In the morning on 3 August - a fortnight ago to the day - III of •
sudd.n I coughed up blood. It wa.n't anything Ilk. a real contlnuou. haemorrhag., the
Irresistible flow I've heard deacrlbed by others: I felt a gurgle In my breathing Ilk. the
fe.llng you have when you g.t catarrh. An abrupt cough followed, and my mouth filled with
blood. Th. coughing was not alwaye vlol.nt, wa.n't .v.n particularly pronounced; It wa.
exactly the eort of cough you g.t when you've got eomethlng or other In your throat; It
came In Isolated throwe, without any continuous fits or paroxy.m. of coughing. Thil
laeted until about four. In the.. three hour. I coughed up over halt a pint of blood. Aner
four I got no more mouthful. of blood, but at Intervale I coughed up catarrh mixed with
gout. of blood ...... B.for. coughing up the blood I had .uffered .xc.ptlonally from the
13 ibid., p.395. (Translation in HH,p.133-135).
14To Tatiana, 20 Apri11931 [Gramsci wrote 'March' by mistake), LCUp.413-414.
15ToJulia, 31 August 1931, LCUp.455.
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heat of the season, and sometimes found myself bathed In sweat, especially at night time.
These nocturnal sweating bouts lasted until five or six days ago, then they stopped
••••• 1 think I've given you all the essential Information. I ought to add that this hasn't
weakened me to any appreciable extent, nor has It had any psychological repercus.lone16
It is interesting that he waited a fortnight before reporting this event to Tatiana. Al-
though it happened in the early hours of the morning. there was no hint of it in the
letter he wrote to her later that same day. 3 August. except for a proud assertion of
his will to survive "even under the worst conditions". Gramsci said that the physical
crisis had had no "psychological repercussions", but these can be judged from the
letter he wrote that day. This contains one of the great moments of 'truth' in the
prison letters when Gramsci contrasts the life of the 'affections' with the life of the
'will'. What Gobetti called "the intimately aristocratic character" of Gramsci's
suffering is there to see-n-utl1t:fwas far-from being blinded by his own pride.
You need never fear that the feeling of baing per.onally Isolated may plunge m. Into
depre•• ion, or Into some .uch state of mind smacking of high tragedy. In point of fact I
have never f.lt the need of any .xt.rnal relnforc.m.nt of morll .trength to h.lp me live
my life with courage even under the wor.t conditions: .0 I'm .v.n I... In need of such
reinforcement today. now that I feel that my .trength and my will have relchad an ev.n
higher degree of .olldlty and worth. But while In the pa.t. a. I have said. I felt almo.t
proud to find my•• lf I.olatad. today Instead I feel the meann.... the aridity, the
.habbln .. s of a IIf. which I. founded on nothing but the will. Thl. I. my .tat. of mind at
the pres.nt tlm •• 17
Gramsci knew that he had passed a turning-point in his physical health. He
acknowledged this in November when his will-power had almost succeeded in
winning another battle. not unconnected with the haemorrhage he suffered in
August.
A. a matter of fact, In the period from July to today I have not only succeeded In reducing
the amount of tobacco smoked to a m.re 40 per cent of what I smokad bafor••....•but I
think I'll manage to cut It down even mora In the future. Indeed, my ballef I. that
eventually I shall cut my .moklng down to the minimum•• v.n If I don't .ucceed In giving It
up altogether. It'. true, though, that the amount you .moke depends on the amount of
bralnwork you have to do: I read little and think I••••• 0 my Intellectual effort these day.
Is slight. Th. r.sult Is that I .moke I.... I can't manage to concentrate my attention on
any .ubJect: I feel myself as stultified Int.llectually as I am worn out physically. This
.tlt. of affair. will probably II.t for at least the whole winter; my .trength will therefore
ba Just lbout sufflcl.nt to keep me from going further downhill. but not enough to give m.
any chance of recov.ry.-
16ToTatiana, 17 August 1931,LCII p.444-445 [Translated in HH p.155]
17To Tatiana, 3 August (Gram sci writes 'July' by mistake) 1931, OCII p.440.
18 To Tatiana, 9 November 1931, LCII p.492-493.
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As far as the 'life of the affections' was concerned, his children remained a constant
source of inspiration. In December he learned from Julia that there was an 'animals
corner' at the boys' school. The natural pedagogue in him wanted to know more
and made an evocative contribution of his own.
For example, I might tell Delio of my childhood experiences with living creatures; or
perhaps It would seem like a fairy tale to him when I say that I have seen hares dancing -
or rather jumping, though the country people see It as dancing - In the moonlight, or a
hedgehog family (father, mother and the little hedgehogs) going on an expedition to
collect apples by the light of the autumn moon?19
The 'business of the reviews':
the new penal code of1931
Gramsci had better access to non-fascist sources in 1931 than at any time before
or after. At the start of the year on Piero Sraffa's advice, Tatiana took out
subscriptions on his behalf to two English-language reviews, the Manchester
Guardian Weekly and the Labour Monthly. 20 As a high-quality source of current
political facts and analysis, the Manchester Guardian Weekly was particularly
important to Gramsci's work in 1931. Tatiana also sent him some issues of a
bimonthly French review, La Critique Socia Ie, and in July he asked her to take out
a subscription.21 Two further items important for current affairs, were the
Russian supplement of the Economist of November 1930 giving a detailed account
of the progress of the Soviet Five-Year Plan and the issue of Econom ia for March
1931 devoted entirely to the causes of the world economic depression. In a letter to
Tatiana on 29 June 1931, Gramsci conveys the difference made by the opening
of these English-language 'windows' on the world:
You can tell Plero that I am making fast progress In reading English. I find It much easier
than German. I read quite rapidly although the dictionary I have Is not good enough and
lacks many words of a technical nature or more closely connected with current usage, I
read the extract from the Economl.t on the Flv.Vear Plan In two or three days and I don't
think a 81ngle word escaped me 22
The fact that these foreign-language, non-fascist periodicals passed the prison
censor is surprising especially in view of their content. Labour Monthly and
19To Julia, 14 December 1931 (Gramsci writes 'November' by mistake), Lell p.510-511. [Translated in
HH p.185].
20To Tatiana, 26January 1931 (Gram sci writes'1926' bymislake), Lell p.389.
21 To Tatiana, 27 July 1931, ten p.436-437.
22To Tatiana, 29June 1931, ten p.432.
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Critique Sociale were both marxist reviews, the former edited by the British
Communist R. Palme Dutt, the latter by the French 'Trotskyite' Boris Souvarine. In
1929 the lawyer attached to the Special Tribunal had specified that G ram sci was
not allowed to receive "books of political agitation"23 but, quite apart from the
problem of defining what these were exactly, this was only "advisory" and there
was nothing in the penal regulation saying that prisoners could not receive foreign-
language reviews, whatever their political content. This legal loophole was
removed by the introduction of Alfredo Rocco's new criminal code in 1931. Alert to
the difference this could make to his work, Gramsci immediately asked for the text
of the new regulation: "I would like to have the recent issue of the Rivista di diritto
penitenziario where the new prison regulation is published" (27 July 1931).24 The
new regulation specifically listed six reviews to which prisoners were allowed to
subscribe which, not surprisingly, did not include any foreign-language reviews.
The new regulation was all not all bad news, however, since it removed the old
prohibition on political newspapers and prisoners were now allowed to receive
these by formally requesting permission of the prison governor, who could
withdraw it at any time. Gramsci immediately took advantage of this: "Dearest, I
have received the prison regulation and will forward the request to be allowed to
read one or two political newspapers, if and as it is allowed" (17 August 1931).25
Permission was duly granted and Tatiana took out a quarterly subscription to
Corriere della Sera which Gramsci began receiving in October 1931.26 He was
disappointed by the quality of the Carriere's news reporting, especially its lack of
continuity, but when the subscription came up for renewal at the end of December
he saw no alternative but to renew it and no point in subscribing to a second paper.
The latter'. [Corrl.r. 'a] defecta muat be .ymptomatlc of a slckn... which has spread
through the entire pre.. at the preaent time. The lack of continuity [n••• una organic'''' ]
In tha new.; the dlscuaslon of avants rafarrlng to pracadlng avants which haven't been
raported, a. If the reader ought to know about them (la, as If the reader read. Mveral
papera or raada foralgn papera).Tha lack of commant on facta of the first Importance like
tha conver.lon of the Banca Commarclal. or the creation of Credlto Moblllare, marely
23 See text of Gramsci's petition to Mussolini, September 1930, in OCIV p.2375.
24 To Tatiana, ten p.437.
25 To Tatiana, ten p.447.
26 See 'Indice dei period lei citati nei Quademi', QCIV p.3146, where the first issue of Corrieredella
Sera for1931 to be cited in the notes is for 15 October.
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reproducing comment and news in the foreign press: these defects cannot be limited just
to the Corriere. So what would be the point of having a second paper which would be
nothing more than a poor copy of Corrlere and full of mistakes? ZJ
Meanwhile, the new penal regulation only listed six reviews. The consequences of
losing all but six of his reviews, including the foreign-language ones, were serious
enough to persuade Gramsci to petition Mussolini directly for permission to
continue receiving all of them. The petition, which was sent in October 1931, is a
useful inventory of Gramsci's periodicals at their peak:
The recent ministerial arrangements regulating the possibilities granted to prisoners to
subscribe to periodical reviews lead me to apply to you, Sir, who about a year ago give a
favourable reply to a petition of mine similar to this one. The new arrangements establish
a list of reviews generally permissible and this list Includes only some of the revle.s to
which I have subscribed for the past four and half years with the permls.lon of the Special
Tribunal for the Defence of the State. I would automatically be deprived ot these other
reviews.
The reviews I am reading which are Included In the list are: 1. Nuova Antolog/a
2.Gerarchla 3.Crlt/ea Fasclsta 4.Pegaso 5. Educez/one Feaclsta a.polltlce.
The reviews not Included In the list are: Formagglnl's L'ltalla che acrlve 2. Rassegna de"•
• tampa estera produced by the Ministry of Foreign AHlars 3.La Nuovs Italla ,Florence 4.
La Reforms Social .. Turin 5. B.Croce's La Critics a.La Clvllte Cettollca 7.La Cultura
8.La Nuovs Rlvlste Storlca 9. II Msrzocco 10. L'ltelle Letterer/e 11. Nuovl Studl dl
Dlrltto, Econom/a e Polltlca 12. Leonardo 13. I Probleml dl Lavoro 14. Oa. Oeutache
8uch 15. Nlmm und Lie.1 (two German bibliographical revlewa) 18. Labour Monthly
(monthly publication of the Labour Research Department) 17. Manchester Guardian
Weekly 18. Les Nouvelles Lltteralres, Larous.e 19. Nouvelle Revue Franca/a .. Galllmsrd
20. La Critique Soclale, Marcel Rlvlere.lII
When the reply to this petition came in December, Gramsci was granted permission
to receive only the Italian-language reviews. Consequently, the subscriptions to the
six foreign-language reviews were cancelled at the end of the year.29 As far as
political news and analysis were concerned, the loss of the Manchester Guardian
Weekly was particularly grievous and the Carriere della Sera scarcely
compensated in view of its poor quality. With the marginal exception of the Jesuit
review Civilta cattolica , from the start of 1932 Gramsci was entirely dependent for
political news on fascist or "fascistised" sources.
27 To Tatiana, 28 December 1931, LCII p.S14. See also the comment on the poor quality of Carriere
in his letter to Tatiana of 16 November 1931, Lell p.494.
28 Text of petition to Mussolini. October 1931, in QCIV p.2376-2377.
29To Tatiana. 14 December 1931, LCII p.508.
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The Periodicals and Corriere della Sera
The German Elections, 14 September 1930
The earliest report of the German election results in Gramsci's periodicals was in
the issue of Rassegn~ settimanale della stampa estera of 23 September 1930.1
On 15 September the German newspapers gave the complete election results as follows. Out of 35
million voters:
Social Democrats 8,572,016
State Party 1,322,608
German Nationals 2,458,497
Economic Party 1,379,359
Centre 4,128,929
Bavarian Centre 1,058,556
Communists 4,587,708
National Socialists 6,401,210
Populists 1,657,757
Combined German-Hanoverian PeasantsIPopular Conservatives 1,562,843
Peasant Party 339,072
Christian Social Party 867,072
Agrarian League 193,899
Given this number of voters and given these votes, there will be 83 more deputies in the new
Reichstag than in the previous one and the total number of deputies will increase from 493 in the
previous Reichstag to 576. These 576 mandates will be distributed as follows:
Social Democrats 143 seats, from 153 in the old Reichstag
German Nationals 41 seats, from 78
Centre 68, from 61
Communists 76, from 54
Populists 30, from 45
State Party 20, from 25
Economic Party 23, from 23
Bavarian Centre 19, from 16
National Socialists 107, from 12
Schiele's Peasant party 18, from 13
Hanoverians 3, from 0
Popular Conservatives 5, from 0
German Peasant Party 6, from 13
Christian Social Party 14, from 4
Agrarian League 3, from 0
1 RSE, 23 September 1930, p. 2097-2098.
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Gramsci could check the accuracy of this data against the reports of the results
given in other periodicals.2 They were prominently reported under the headline
'Hitler's Triumph' in the September issue of the leading Fascist review Gerarchia,
but Gramsci did not receive this issue or any others from August 1930 onwards
until months later and was unable to explain why.3 When the back numbers
eventually arrived in February 1931, Gramsci signalled to Tatiana that he did not
think that the German elections had anything to do with the delay. The signal was
disguised in the following piece of plausible-seeming nonsense often encountered
in his letters to her:
It seems to me that the service has not been bad even If some Incident happens from time
to time, and that there Is no reason to think 11/ of the Germans, who have nothing to do
with It In any ca... since the managerof the bookshop Is Italian and the owners are
Itallanlsed Swl.s. Perhaps you didn't know that there was a period In Italian cultural
history when the booktradewas virtually a monopoly of Swl.s entrepreneur. who did us •
great service especially In Milan and Turln.....etc, etc.4
The extraordinary success of the Nazis (or 'Hitlerites') and the advance of the
Communists were immediately singled out as "the distinctive features of this set of
results".5 The reaction of the foreign press was far-reaching and dominated the
press reports on German affairs in theRassegna settimanale for weeks to come.e
The issue of 7 October alone, for example, contained no less than 30 pages of
foreign press comment on the German elections. Given the scarcity of news from
communist sources, the reports of Moscow's reaction must have been read by
Gramsci with special inter~st. However, the elements of political judgement they
contained about the German situation cannot have inspired much confidence:
2 For example in NA,1 October 1930, under the rubric 'Rassegna Politica', p.390-393; in CC, 4
October 1930, under the rubric 'Cose Straniere'. See also, but note that Gramsci did not receive the
issues of Gerarchia for the second half of 1930 until February 1931.
3 Giuseppe Bevione: 'II Trionfo di Hitler', GER, September 1930. To Tatlana, 29 December 1930, Lei
p.3n. The mysterious delay of Gerarchia can be traced in the letters to her of 22 September, 29
December 1930, 26January, 23 February 1931. Lei p.355, p377, icu p.389, p.397-398.
4 To Tatiana, 23 February 1931, tcu p.397. [Translated in HH p.136].
5 RSE, 23 September, p.2098.
6 For press reaction to the election results, see the issues of RSE for 30 September (p.2175), 7
October (p2.201 and p.2208), 14 October (p.2291), 21 October (p.2320 and p.2350); for further
comment on the National Socialist movement, see RSE, 11 November (p.2525), 18 November
(p.2576).
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An editorial in Isvestiya of Moscow on 16 September commented on the elections in Germany as
follows:
'The German elections could be described as an 'earthquake' of far-reaching importance which has
been coming for some time. The growing discontent in the country since the massive crisis, the panic
of the petty-bourgeoisie and the rise in the revolutionary spirit of the working class masses have risen
to the surface and have destroyed the equilibrium of the German democratic republic for good. The
result of the elections indicate that Germany has reached a turning-point in its post-war history and has
entered upon a phase of acute class struggle.
The huge number of votes cast for the German fascists must be seen as an expression of no
confidence in Germany's present political system. The votes cast for the National Socialists are not
really votes for Hitler and his company but votes of no confidence and desperation, an expression of
the panic which grips the country and an illustration of the seriousness of the German cnsls. In contrast
the votes cast for the communists are votes of confidence in the party of the proletariat and show that
the German working class is ready for the class struggle and the decisive battle against the
bourgeoisie' 7
Isvestiya saw two possibilities in the new Reichstag, neither of which showed very
much insight in Moscow into the German situation: either a return of the 'Grand
Coalition' with Social Democratic participation or a government of the Right. "In the
second hypothesis all the power would be in the hands of the National Socialists
but they would compromise themselves in the eyes of the masses all the more
rapidly and the resulting disillusion would be sudden and disastrous". The
revolutionary tactic of the German Communists depended increasingly on this
deeply fatalistic perspective, which Gramsci would describe in 1933 as "the policy
of so-much-the worse, so-much-the-better" (la politica del peggio }.8 The lack of
objectivity was even more apparent in the political judgement of Pravda : in spite of
"the huge increase in the fascist votes", the result was proof of "the maturing of a
revolutionary crisis".
Another editorial in the Moscow Pravda the same day said: 'The German elections are of historic
importance. They mark the first stage in the development of the world economic crisis, they have
shaken the capitalist stabilisation of Europe again, and finally they indicate how far the German
proletariat has been revolutionised'.
The paper therefore celebrated at length 'the magnificent victory of the Communists'. emphasising
'the successes in individual regions' and especially 'the great success in Berlin'. Acknowledging' the
huge increase in the fascist votes' the paper sought to explain it by 'the deception practiced on the
petty-bourgeois and working masses who voted to change their lives'.
The paper then addressed itself to the economic conditions of Germany saying: ' The logical
consequence is that we must expect decisive social movements. The main significance of the
elections lies in the maturing of a revolutionary crisis. But since the process of maturing will not
happen inevitably we advise our 'fraternal' communist party to go on organising the masses, taking the
lead in strike actions, guiding the revolutionary movement according to the directives of the Third
International which have been proved correct by the very result of the German elections. The German
7 RSE, 7 October, p.2223-2224.
8 §15.06. Machiavelli. Total and Partial Conceptions of the World and Practical Orientations, 00111
p.1760. This is similar to 'he infantile theory of ·so much the worse, so much the better" referred to
in §14.33. Machiavelli, QCIII p. 1690, wrmen around the same time.
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Communist party was never as near to achieving its task of winning over the working masses as it is
today. This imposes on it an enormous historical responsibility.
The victory of the fascists imposes on the communist party the struggle for the hegemony of the
working class. It is necessary to organise and lead the economic strikes which will certainly break out in
the coming months, it is necessary to lead the action of the unemployed, it must try to transform the
economic struggle into a political battle. It is necessary for our party to pay the utmost attention to the
rural proletariat. It must tell the German proletariat the story of how the Russian proletariat freed itself
from foreign debts and imperialist slavery. 'Historic possibilities' lay open to the German communist
party. It must make every effort to lead the German masses in the struggle against capital and against
fascism.9
The last months of 1930, immediately after the German elections, were the most
theoretically creative phase of the prison notebooks. The evidence of this creativity
is in the "immense" Notebook 4 and its sequel, Notebook 7. Three interconnected
series of notes can be distinguished: on the validity of the ideoiogies10 , on the
structure-superstructure relatlonn , and on the intellectuals12 . What was the
connection between the German elections and these lines of inquiry?
As we saw from the political background, the question of "the value of the
ideologies" corresponded to the conjuncture in Germany at the time of the election
campaign in the summer of 1930, when Communists and Nazis fought out "the
battle of ideas". In §4.22Gramsci thought that the current situation in Germany
could offer a case study of "the value of the ideologies". The first traces of the
election result were in the 'miscellaneous' notes §6.35 and §6.42. These were
about its ideological significance. In §6.35, in answer to the question "Does any
racism exist in Italy?" Gramsci concluded that "Germans are more conscious of
race than Italians" - a statement made on the strength of the election result. In §6.42
Gramsci investigates the Italian antecedents of "national socialism" (the text
reads:socialismo naziona/e 0 naziona/socia/ismo ) which "has met with a
favourable response in the post-war years" - again, a statement now confirmed by
the election result. It seems that "the huge number of votes cast for the German
fascists" carried more weight in Gramsci's mind than it did in the Soviet press.
In the second series of notes on the structure-superstructure relation, Gramsci sees
the German election result in the perspective of the catastrophic economic
"irruption" of the Wall Street Crash a year earlier. This is the perspective of the
9 ibid., p.2224.
10 The series on the value of the ideologies is: §4.15, §4.20, §4.22, §4.35, §7.19, §7.21.
11 The series on the structure-superstructure relation is: §4.12, §4.38,§4.45, §7.10, §7.24
12 The first draft of the notes on the intellectuals is §4.49, written in November 1930.
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famous note, §7.10, written in December 1930. Gramsci argues that it was a
mistake to assume that such crises will automatically revolutionise the 'attacking
forces' and automatically demoralise the 'defending forces', causing the latter to
lose faith in their strength and in their future. His evidence for this was the
6,400,000 voters in Germany who had now turned to Hitler as their last hope.
However, the significance of §7.10 was not purely theoretical. For the current tactic
of the Comintern was based precisely on this mistake. The mistake was discernible
not only in Moscow's interpretation of the German result, but also in the
"economistic" illusions of Gramsci's communist comrades in prison. Unable to
convince them of this mistake, however, Gramsci committed his reasons to paper in
§7.10: the immediate context shows that this note is a critique of the current tactic of
the Comintern in an 'orthodox' disguise.
There was no immediate or direct connection between the German elections of
September 1930 and Gramsci's first notes on the intellectuals. The fact remains
that Gramsci wrote the sketch of the "traditional intellectuals" in Germany in §4.4913
immediately under the impr~ssion of the success of the Nazis in the latest
elections. Two threads in the German notes tend to converge at this point,
corresponding to the two moments of past and present, history and politics: the
notes on "the criSis of authority" referred to in §4.22 are followed by the sketch of
the "traditional intellectuals" in §4.49. Gramsci thus tended to relate the expansion
of 'Hitlerism' to the crisis of Germany's traditional intellectuals.
The Financial Panic. July1931
We saw that Gramsci broke off the 'cycle of conversations' at the end of November
because his comrades would not listen to any suggestion that the current tactic of
the party rested on mistaken 'economistic' assumptions. It seemed that Gramsci
was confronted with a crisis of authority of his own. His anti-economistic argument
in the conversations was then synthesised in §7.10. Structure and Superstructure.
written in December 1930. According to Athos Usa's report, however,
the analysis of comrade [Gramscij took no account of the interdependence of the Italian economy and
those of other capitalist countries. of the consequences inherent in the sharpening of the world
economic crisis. of the symptoms of radicalisation of the working class. of the crumbling of the SOCial
categories forming the base of some other pseudo-proletarian political parties (social democracy). of
13The date of thse notes is certain since Gramsci writes directly in §4.49: -I am writing in November
1930·. See QCI p.482.
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the influence of the development of the Soviet economy, etc: for he started from the belief that the
objective conditions for the proletarian revolution had existed in Europe for over 50 years 14
Not satisfied on these points, Lisa and the other comrades who disagreed with him
asked him "to make a provisional survey of the national and international scene
from an economic standpoint ".15 If Scucchia's testimony is to be believed: "He
answered us jokingly: 'I'm a student of economics, not an economist. So if you want
news about economic matters, you'll just have to get it from the reviews and the
data we have available". 16
Given the material difficulties of the task, it is hardly surprising that Gramsci never
made the provisional survey asked of him.17 The nearest approach to it in the
notebooks was the an outline for a comprehensive research project on the Italian
economy in §6.96. Review Models: the Economy. Review of Italian Economic
Studies. 18 The first section was to be "Italy in the world economy" for which it
would be necessary to consult "general works in which the Italian economy is
examined in the context of the world economy. Books like Mortara's Economic
Prospects, the League of Nations' Economic Yearbook, the publications of the
Dresdner Bank on world economic forces etc". There followed a detailed survey of
the elements of the national economic 'terrain' in their international setting, which
was to include "the world economic crises and their repercussions in Italy". This
survey of the Italian economy, however, did not address the current crisis and its
possible consequences (which his comrades had asked for) but was written 'for
eternity' - the outline of a project to be undertaken sometime in the future. For
traces of the current crisis, we must look to other notes in the same series in
Notebook 6.
The volume of analysis and comment in Gramsci's periodicals on the current
economic crisis increased enormously in the course of 1931. The academic
economists had now got the new phase of the world crisis starting in October 1929
14 Athos Lisa: Memorie (Milan, 1973) p.89.
15Angelo Scucchia in Gramsci Vivo nelle testimonianze dei suoi contemporanei , a cura di Mimma
Paulesu Quercioli (Feltrinelli, 1977). p. 220. My italics.
16ibid., p220.
17But note the principle stated precisely at this time in §7.24. Structure and superstructure:"A
structural phase can only be concretely studied and analysed after the whole process of
development has been completed not during the process itself, unless one proceeds by hypotheses
and by making it perfectly clear that they are only hypotheses- QCII p.872. My italics.
18§6.96, written in the summer of 1931, in QCII p.77Q-771.
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sufficiently in their sights to attempt to analyse its nature and causes. Prodded by
his comrades, Gramsci began to collect material on the crisis. In February he asked
for the new edition of Mortara's Prospettive Economiche for 193119 and, soon after,
Tatiana sent him some numbers of the review Economia , including the issue for
March 1931 entirely devoted to 'The World Economic Depression'.20 The review
contained the replies to a questionnaire about the causes of the crisis sent by the
editor, Prof. Gino Arias, to leading foreign and Italian economists, together with a
critical summary by Arias himself. Gramsci took a particular interest in Arias' views
on the crisis which were well publicised at this time. In May Arias represented
Fascist Italy at a special session of the League of Nations in Geneva attended by
economic experts to discuss the causes of the crisis. Arias' report to the conference
put forward what he described as a "decisively anti-conjunctural, organic
interpretation" of the crisis, which he then propagated in articles in the leading
Fascist review Gerarchia .21
Gramsci's critical engagement with Arias' interpretation of the crisis is in §6.123
and §6.130. However, the immediate stimulous behind these notes came from the
real world. In his report to the special session in May Arias raised two questions:
•Are the present signs of recovery, as we hope, the precursors of a new favourable
conjuncture? If the present crisis is a crisis of the structure, of the whole economy,
however, can the favourable conjuncture which seems to be imminent be regarded
as a definitive end of the crisis?". The real world has a way of proving experts
wrong, however 'brilliant' their use of language. No sooner had Arias gone into
print about "the favourable conjuncture which seems to be imminent" than the
world crisis arrived at a distinctly unfavourable conjuncture: the finanCial crisis of
the summer of 1931.
The crisis began in May (as the economic experts met in Geneva) with a 'run' on
the Creditanstalt bank of Austria and spread rapidly to Germany where Chancellor
Bruning reported "a disastrously developing financial situation". The volume of
withdrawals from the larger German banks increased throughout May, June, and
19ToTatiana, 23 February 1931, Len p. 398.
20See §6.123 based on the issue of Economia for March 1931, QCII p792-793.
21 Gino Arias: 'il signiflcato storico della crisi economica', GER, June 1931, and 'Probleml economicl
mondiali', GER, August 1931.
112
July. In June Bruning's announcement of new economy measures and President
Hoover's declaration of a one-year moratorium on debt repayments did nothing to
restore confidence. In early July news that one of the big four German banks of
deposit, the Danat, was on the brink of failure threatened to trigger a general run on
the banks, including the savings banks. On 13 July Bruning issued an emergency
decree ordering a general closure of the banks. Gramsci could follow the unfolding
financial crisis in Germany through the periodicals; we know, for example, that he
was following the Manchester Guardian Weekly closely at this time. Under the
headline 'Grave Financial Crisis in Germany', the issue of 17 July gave a day-by-
day account leading up to the moment of paniC on 12-13 July:
12 July. The situation has taken a turn for the worse at the weekend. There has been a record exodus
of foreign capital- yesterday's total alone is over 90,000,000 marks (£4,500,000).
The German public, hitherto very steady, particularly during the anxious fortnight when the Hoover
moratorium was held up, has begun to show signs of nervousness. The flight of foreign capital is now
accompanied by a flight of domestic capital. It is particularly in the provinces that there has been a run
on gold and foreign currency at the banks .....
13 July. The Danat Crash. The closing today of the Bourse and of the Danat (Darmstadter and National
Bank), the biggest of the German private banks, brought the seriousness of the financial crisis home
to the German public with a sudden shock. It has long been known that the bank was in difficulties .....
There has been a considerable run on all banks, particularly the savings banks. The latter fulfilled all
requirements this morning, but in the afternoon no sums bigger than 100 marks (nominally £5) were
paid out here in Berlin. (Some of the prOvincial savings banks paid sums up to 300 marks). The run on
the Berlin savings bank was so great that the staff was unable to cope with the crowd of customers,
and shutters were lowered at one o'clock. Post office savings, according to a statement by Herr
Schatz, the Postmaster General. are in no danger at all.
14 July. [Referring to the Institut fur Konjuncturforschung 's predictions of the economic effects of
the crisis, including intensified competition on world markets, bankruptcies of firms, increased
unemployment etc. the report continued:] The purge that must now come will, it is feared, be a cruel
one. Whether it will shake the German social structure or not depends largely on whether the new
hardships that seem to be impending are equally distributed or not. Politics are very much in the
background at the moment, but they can hardly remain so much 10nger.22
The public mood was still precarious at the end of the month as 3 August, the day
scheduled for ending the restrictions and reopening the banks, approached. In
spite of the government's deflationary policies, the trauma of the 1923 inflation still
haunted the public memory. The reopening of the banks, especially the savings
banks, was the decisive test of public confidence.
22 'Grave Financial Crisis in Germany', MGW, 17 July 1931. See also the reports of the financial crisis In
Germany in RSE, 21,28 July (pp's 1610,1630) and 11 August 1931 (p.1748).
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To appreciate the difficulties of the German Government and of the Reichsbank it must be rembered
that in Germany inflation is not merely a term to be found in the textbooks of econom ics, but a grim
reality like a war, or some desolating epidemic. The fear has certainly diminished, for the difference
between inflation and deflation has been manifest. But there is still a chance that it will flare up again,
all the more so as the Nazis and the Communists have done all they can to keep it smouldering
throughout the crisis.
As for the savings banks, only a very small fraction of their total deposits could be paid out over the
counters without disastrous results. Will there be a run on the savings banks or not? Probably not, but
there can be no certainty and even a partial run would be dangerous. Nor can anyone tell whether
deposits turnecl into cash will be hoarded or converted into goods. Whether there will be another
scare, economic or political in origin, or whether the cash, after being kept for a while, will be
redeposited - all this depends on the state of the public mind, and that is a thing no one can assess
with any certainty even if the general symptoms are reassuring. 23
A superficial 'trace' of the financial crisis in Germany can be found in §6.90.
Psychology and Politics in which he comments on the frequent use "especially in
periods of financial crisis" of the word 'psychology' to explain certain phenomena.
However, its influence went deeper than this. In the first place, Gramsci felt
compelled by the financial crisis to attempt a first analysis of the causes of the world
economic crisis. This was §6.123. Past and Present. Observations on the Crisis,
1929-1930-? in which he takes issue with the 'historical' explanation offered by
Arias. The following note §6.130 on the exact meaning of the term "conjuncture"
which Arias was 'flashing' around in Gerarchia at the time is connected with this.
The critical encounter with Arias led Gramsci to adopt a new set of terms in
analysing the structure-superstructure relation. In his first statement of this question
in §4.38 he distinguished between "occasional" and "permanenf' movements of the
economic structure: the first were useful in judging the action of pOlitical
personalities and groups, the second in judging the action of whole social groups.
This fundamental distinction in his theory remained unchanged, but after the
financial crisis of 1931 he adopts the terms 'conjunctural' and 'organiC' used by
Arias, but not before he had redefined them for himself. However, his whole mode
of analysing structural phenomena continued to serve political purposes, ie, to
judge political personalities and movements. As the Manchester Guardian Weekly
observed, politics in Germany could hardly remain in the background for long.
23 'Renewed Crisis in Germany', MGW, 31 July.
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The Revolt of the Berlin SA and the Prussian Plebiscite
The principle that occasional or 'conjunctural' movements are more closely linked
to immediate political agitation was applied by Gramsci in observing political
events in Germany at this time. For alongside the reports of the financial panic in
the Manchester Guardian Weekly during July and August 1931, Gramsci was
reading about the plebiscitary campaign of Hitler and the Nazis in Prussia at this
time. The plebiscite calling for the dissolution of the Prussian Landtag was due to
be held on 9 August. To trace the 'imprints' of this campaign in the prison notes,
however, we must briefly recapitulate its stages.
In February 1931 the right-wing parties walked out of the Social Democratic-
dominated Prussian Landtag and began organising another petition. If sufficient
signatures were collected, a plebiscite would be held on whether or not to dissolve
the Landtag. The petition was submitted and a plebiscite was duly authorised for 9
August. The constitutional procedure afforded Hitler and the Nazis the opportunity
to launch another demogogic campaign similar to that against the Young Plan the
previous year, from which they reaped such impressive rewards in the September
elections. Before the new plebiscitary campaign could gather momentum, however,
it was rudely interrupted by another challenge to Hitler's leadership from within his
own movement. The revolt was provoked by his order to the Storm Troops in
February to stop street-fighting in compliance with an emergency decree of
Bruning's government curbing political violence. It was led by Walter Stennes,
leader of the Berlin SA, who challenged not only Hitler's tactic of 'legality' but his
whole authority as leader. According to the report in Gerarchia :
Hitler reacted violently against these tendencies and left no doubt that he, as founder of the
movement, would remain its supreme leader The mass of supporters and those leaders like
Dr.Goebbeis who were most concerned about public opinion understood that Hitler was right and
were prepared to accept discipline and obey his orders. In this way the Stennes revolt enabled Hitler
to conSOlidate and strengthen his position as supreme leader, to increase his popularity and at the
same time to win a decisive victory for the party's idea of national unity Having rid himself of certain
tendencies (Stennes has joined Strasser in forming a National Socialist revolutionary group), the
movement has resumed its forward march behind its condottiere. Whether the movement will proceed
in a peaceful or violent way only the future will tell 24
24 Giuseppe Renzetti: 'Hitleriani Dissidenti', GER, June 1931. The SA revolt was also reported under
the rubric 'Cose Straniere' in CC, 2 May 1931.
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The spreading financial panic in July threatened to coincide with the climax of the
Prussian plebiscitary campaign fixed for 9 August. On 17 July the Manchester
Guardian Weekly observed: "It is possible that the Nazi leaders might attempt a
revolution. Such an outcome is perhaps unlikely in view of the admirable restraint
shown by the German people in these trying days, but it would be foolish to rule it
out entirely".25 On 24 July under the alarmist headline 'Dangers in Germany.
Political passions rising to fever heat', the Weekly reported the threat by the
Communist Party to vote with Hitler and the right-wing 'National Opposition' in the
plebiscite - a threat described as a piece of 'demogogy' worthy of the tactics of the
extreme right. Speculating on the possible fall of the Bruning government, the
paper observed that "the political calm of the last few days has been broken and
political emotions have begun to rise very high. The extremist papers are full of the
wildest threats, libels, and falsehoods" .26 A week later on 31 July the Weekly
reported that public fear of another inflation had subsided "but there is still a
chance that it will flare up again, all the more so as the Nazis and Communists
have done all they can to keep it smouldering throughout the crisis" .27
In fact the financial situation began to stabilise before the Prussian plebiscite
on 9 August. By this time the crisis had started to spread from Germany to Britain.
Its most important political outcome would be not a Nazi 'revolution' in Germany but
the fall of the Labour government in Britain. Nevertheless, as the day of the
plebiscite approached the Weekly kept the political options open. On 7 August it
reported that public confidence was returning: there was no run on the banks when
they reopened. However, the outcome of the plebiscite remained uncertain and the
Berlin correspondent had not ruled out the chance of a Nazi seizure of power: "The
extremists - that is to say those who are for direct action for the German counterpart
of a 'March on Rome' - are gaining ground. Whether Hitler is with them or not is
uncertain - in all probability he is undecided".28 The result was reported on 14
August: the right-wing National OppoSition, joined by the Communists, were
defeated, polling 10,000,000 votes against the required 13,300,000. The paper
blamed the defeat on the defection of the Communist vote: "It is clear that the
25 Under the rubric 'Comment and Criticism', MGW, 17 July 1931.
26 'Dangers in Germany. Political passions rising to fever heat', MGW, 24 July.
27 'Renewed Crisis in Germany. Good chances of recovery', MGW, 31 July.
28 'Confidence returning in Germany. The referendum in Prussia', MGIN, 7 August 1931.
116
Communist rank-and-file have stood by their class and have refused to act as the
agents of the German counter-revolution. They will not go into action as
instruments of the Nazis and of the potential White Terror even if Moscow wishes
it".29 The failure of the Prussian plebiscite relieved the immediate political tension
and encouraged the paper to think that the advance of extremism of the Left and
the Right had been halted, if not reversed. This cautiously optimistic prognosis was
based on the alleged failure of either the Nazis or the Communists to take
advantage of the worsening economic Situation in 1931:
Germany's economic situation has grown steadily worse since last September and it promises to grow
even still worse. But there has not been a corresponding growth in political radicalism The
explanation probably lies in the complete absence of any real leadership in the radical parties - the
Nazis have not yet a single leader of anything more than demagogic ability, while the Communists
have not even got a leader who can make a stirring speech. 30
The most obvious trace of the plebiscitary campaign in Prussia in the prison notes
can be found in §6.97. Past and Present. Great Ambition and Petty Ambitions. 31
This note may have been suggested by the Manchester Guardian Weekly's
comment comparing the "demagogy" of both sides, the Communists and the Nazis.
The notebooks give no clue about what Gramsci thought of the tactic of the German
Communists in the Prussian plebiscite, but it would probably have confirmed the
dim view he had long since taken of the political capacity of the German
Communist leadership. Whatever the case, Gramsci's account of the "inferior type"
of demogogue in §6.97 undoubtedly refers to Hitler and the plebiscitary
campaigning essential to his style of leadership. However, the most significant
effect of the Prussian plebiscite campaign was to prompt Gramsci to return to the
critique of Michels concept of 'charismatic parties' started a year earlier in
Notebook 2.32 His observations on 'demagogy' were, in fact, a continuation of his
thoughts on 'charismatic' leadership. The continuity of the prison notes may have
been interrupted due to the homeorrage he suffered on 3 August which left him
temporarily unable to write. However, sometime in August or September he wrote
29 The Referendum in Prussia. Failure of dissolution campaign', MGw, 14 August 1931. See also the
reports on the failure of the Prussian plebiscite in RSE, 18-25 August (p.1799), 1 September
(p.1886), 8 September 1931 (p.1915)
30 ibid.
31 §6.97, QCII p. rrs-rrz:
32 §2.75(ii). Robert Michels .... , QCI p.234-239. The second part starts from: -II capo carismatioo puo
appartenere a qualsiasi partito ..... ."etc. For the dating of this second part, see below.
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the second half of the two-part note, §2.75, which confirms that the question of
charismatic leadership of political parties remained the guiding-thread of his
thinking about the rise of Hitler.
The Catholic Bishops' Warning on Nazism
The unexpected success of the· Nazis in the September elections aroused great
anxiety among the Catholic bishops in Germany who issued a succession of
statements at the close of 1930 and in early 1931 warning Catholics of the dangers
of this new ultra-nationalist movement. The latest of these was the instruction
issued on 5 March 1931in the name of the Cardinal-Archbishop of Cologne and
the bishops of the Rhineland province. This was reported in an important article in
the Jesuit review Civilta Cattolica for 16 May 1931.33 It was the first authoritative
account of the National Socialist movement in Germany including a biographical
profile of its "condottiere" Hitler, a complete translation of the party's 25-point
programme, and a survey of early Catholic reactions to the movement.
The instruction of 5 March expressed regret that the Nazi leaders had not
responded to earlier requests by the Catholic bishops to clarify the aims and
principles of the movement and thus to remove the legitimate doubts and anxieties
on the part of the Catholic population. Indeed, they had done nothing to prevent
"the growing confusion of ideas and the spread of errors contrary to Catholic
doctrine", nor had they expressed any disapproval of "the irreverent
language and downright crude insults used by the National Socialists against the
ecclesiastical authorities". After reminding the faithful of the condemnation
pronounced by the Holy Father, Pius XI, against the Action Francaise movement,
"which is obviously similar in certain key pOints to the errors of the (German)
National Socialist leaders", the bishops issued "the most solemn warning with
respect to National Socialism insofar as the political ideas and doctrines it supports
are irreconcilable with Catholic doctrine". Two particular aspects of the movement's
nationalism were singled out as being irreconcilable with the universality of
Catholic doctrine: firstly since the revelation of Christ was for all the peoples and
tribes of the earth, "as Christians we Catholics do not recognise any religion of race
[italics in original] ": secondly as the word Catholic means universal, "we
33 'II NazionaisociaJismo in Gerrnania', CC, 16 May 1931, p.309-327. All subsequent quotations are
taken from this article. See also the report -I sociaInazionalisti, la repubblica e la Chiesa- in RSE, 9
June 1931, p.1239.
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Catholics do not recognise any purely national church".
The bishops' warning stopped short, however, of an outright condemnation of the
National Socialist movement based on Pius Xl's pronouncement against Action
Francaise even though its 'errors' were much the same. Why was this? The
Church's reluctance to extend the papal condemnation of Action Francaise to
National Socialism no doubt depended on calculation of the movement's political
prospects which had been transformed by the election of September 1930. There
was now a much greater possibility of Hitler coming to power in Germany than
there ever was of Maurras taking power in France. This disturbing possibility led
the Church to clutch at straws. Its hopes rested on a perceived difference of attitude
towards Catholicism between Hitler and the other Nazi leaders, especially the party
ideologue Rosenberg:
As far as the religious aspect is concerned, the book [Main Kampf] avoids attacking the Catholic
Church. Adolf Hitler takes a favourable view of several elements of catholicism - the unity, the firm
faith in dogma (amidst the continual fluctuation of the data of science), the celibacy of priests, from
which stems, as he says, "the wonderful youthfulness, the spiritual flexibility and potent energy of this
gigantic organisation-. He rejects the struggle against 'ultramontanism' because it causes conflict
between Catholics and Protestants from which only the Jews profit. Hitler is resolutely anti-Semitic.
Hence those who would throw the nationalist movement into a crisis due to religious struggle are
judged to be worse enemies than the Communists. But as the document of the Rhineland episcopate
mentions, on this point the movement's practice suggests otherwise.
In fact, apart from Hitler the movement has several leaders and writers who stoke up the fire against
the CathOlic Church. One of these is Alfred Rosenberg, editor-in-Chief of the party's main organ
the Volkischer Beobachter [National Observer], who is well-known for his furious hostility against the
Church and against any Christian sentiment.. ...3..
Although the German bishops clearly repudiated what they called "the religion of
race", it seemed that the Jews were the best guarantee the Catholic Church had
that Hitler (in spite of Rosenberg's hostility) would not launch a new Kulturkampf if
he ever came to power in Germany.
When Gramsci read this account of National Socialism in Civilta Cattolica , what
was the guiding-thread of his thinking? Gramsci approached the question from the
French rather than the German side. He was still working on Notebook 5 at the
time compiling notes from back numbers of his reviews, including Civilta Cattolica .
One of these was §5.141. Integral Catholics, Jesuits, Modernists taken from an
article of September 1929 on 'The long crisis of Action
34 'II Nazionalsocialismo in Germania', cit., p. 311-312.
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Francaise and its causes'.35 At the end of this note he remarked that "a suggestion
for the rubric 'past and present' could be taken from this note". What did he have in
mind? It is likely that the connection lay in the possibility now raised by the German
bishops that the papal condemnation of Action Francaise might be extended to
National Socialism. This putative link between the two movements in Gramsci's
thinking is confirmed by the additions he made when he rewrote this note in
1934.36 By this time the Vatican had signed the Concordat with Nazi Germany
(June 1933) thus settling for an 'Italian' rather than a 'French' solution to the Nazi
problem. Nevertheless, it seemed from the Nazis' anti-Catholic campaign of 1934
that the Concordat was no guarantee that Hitler would not launch a new
Kulturkampf. Gramsci expressed surprise at the Catholic Church's attitude to
Hitlerism given that its anti-Christian tendency was plain to see long before he
came to power.3? He probably remembered the warning of the German bishops in
1931.
The Growing Climate of Anti-Semitism
The account of the National Socialist programme in Civilta Cattolica stressed that
the essential foundation of the movement was anti-semitism.
The Jewish spirit is 'putting private interest before public interest' and its material means are the
Jewish system of banks, loans, and credit management. Hence every National Socialist must be an
anti-semite, but not every anti-semite is a National Socialist. For there is a merely negative anti-
semitism which aims to exclude the Jews from the life of the State and from the economy but keeps
the Jewish spirit and its methods. National Socialist anti-semitism, however, is positive and
constructive insofar as it wants to eradicate the Jewish spirit and its methods completely 38
Nazi anti-semitism may have found a more receptive public audience after the
financial panic of the summer of 1931. The financial crisis seemed to testify to Nazi
claims about the priority of "private interesf, the reality of "interest slavery', and the
prevalence of the "Jewish spirif'. Meanwhile, evidence of Nazi anti-semitism in
35 §S.141. Integral Catholics, Jesuits, Modemists, QCI p.6?1-673. Redrafted in 1934 in §2O.O4,
QClllp.2100-2103.
36 Note in particular: "The truth is that the Pope, and thus Civilta Gattolica likewise, have steered well
clear of identifying and 'punishing' with the same sanctions those individuals or groups which in other
countries have the same tendencies as Maurras and do not attempt to hide them" . QCIII, p.2101 (Full
text translated in FSPN, p.88-92).
3? §20.04, QCIII p.2103.
38 'II Nazionalsocialismo in Germania', cit. p. 319.
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action was provided by the footsoldiers of the movement whose riotous action in
the streets of Berlin on 12 September was reported in the Manchester Guardian
Weekly.
The Nazi disorders are the worst anti-Semitic excesses there have yet been in Germany. It has now
become difficult to give any assurance that Germany is a country safe for Jews. That this is a very grave
matter indeed hardly needs emphasis. It is not made any less grave by the efforts of the German
Conservative press to minimise what has happened. 39
This was the general background to Gramsci's exchange of letters with Tatiana on
the question of anti-semitism. In early September 1931 she wrote to him about a
film she had recently seen by the German director E.A.Dupont, Two Worlds, about
anti-semitism in pre-war Poland. Gramsci feared that she really believed in the
existence of the "two worlds" (ie, of Jews and Gentiles) and tried to rescue her from
"a way of thinking worthy of the Black Hundreds, the Ku Klux Klan, or the German
swastikas".4O
The British General Election, 27 October 1931
In the second half of July the financial crisis spread from Germany to Britain. This
was initially due to technical reasons rather than a loss of confidence in sterling:
Germany's introduction of exchange control on 15 July caused foreign depositors
to withdraw their money from London to restore their lost liquidity. However, the
publication of the report of the May Committee on 1 August with its alarmist
projections of a future budget deficit transformed the liquidity crisis into a crisis of
confidence in sterling.
The confidence of the domestic depositor apparently remained unshaken: there
was no run on the banks in Britain as there was in Germany. Nevertheless, the
Labour Government of Ramsey MacDonald now came under strong pressure to
balance the budget, to prove that it was firmly against inflationary policies which
might lead to a devaluation of the pound. Apparently unable to get cabinet
agreement on the necessary economies, MacDonald announced the resignation of
the Labour government on 24 August and the formation of a 'National' Government
with Liberal and Conservative participation under his own leadership.41
39 'Anti-Semitic Riot in Berlin', MGW, 18 September 1931.
4OTo Tatiana, 5 October 1931, ten p.475.
41 'A National Government in Office', MGW, 28 August 1931.
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Snowden's budget on 10 September failed to stop the run on the pound and on 21
September Britain abandoned the gold standard.42 Up to this point MacDonald
had resisted the growing pressure of the Conservatives to call a general election,
reassuring the Liberals (who strongly opposed the idea) that an election was
unthinkable in the midst of the gold standard crisis. Now that the gold standard was
abandoned, he capitulated to Conservative demands. Confidence would be
restored by the election of a National Government with a popular mandate to take
harsh measures to tackle the crisis. Parliament was dissolved on 5 October and a
general election called for 27 October.43
The election campaign of the National 'bloc' deliberately fanned the fears of the
ruinous consequences of the re-election of a Labour Government. In a
controversial radio broadcast on 17 October Snowden denounced the Labour
manifesto as "Bolshevism run mad"44 whilst MacDonald scared an election
audience by brandishing a handful of German banknotes from the 1923 inflation.
The Liberal Runciman warned the depositors of the Post Office savings bank that
Labour would squander their hard-earned savings to pay for the dole.45 In short,
every effort was made to mobilise the panic of the British middle classes in support
of the 'National' cause.
For news of the British election campaign Gramsci probably relied on the reports in
the Manchester Guardian Weekly although this was now supplemented by
theCorriere della Sera which he began receiving in October 1931. The
extraordinary result was reported in the English weekly on 30 October under the
headline 'Government Majority 500. Labour Party submerged'.46
42 'Britain Suspends the Gold Standard' and the editorial 'Off the Gold Standard', MGW, 25
September 1931.
43 'Parliament appeals to the Country', MGW, 9 October 1931 ; 'Le elezioni inglesi previste per iI 27
ottobre', CS, 7 ottobre1931. Further reports on the British election campaign CS 9,10,14,15,18, 20,
21,25,27 ottobre 1931.
44 'Mr.Snowden's Attack on Labour' , MGW, 23 October 1931. See also the report of Snowden's
broadcast in 'Tutta la tecnica mobllitata per la campagna elettorale inglese', CS, 200ttobre 1931.
45 Editorial: 'The Savings of the Poor', MGW, 30 October 1931.
46 MGW, 30 October 1931. Gramsci directly refers to this issue in §7.94. English Labourism ,CCII
p.923, confirming that this was the source he used for the election results. See also MGW, 6
November 1931, for the final state of the parties in the new Parliament.
See also: 'Grande vittoria nazionale in Gran Bretagna' under the rubric 'Recentissime', CS, 28 ottobre
1931, and 'Completa disfatta dellaburismo britannico', CS, 290ttobre 1931.The British election result
was also reported in RSE, 3 November 1931 , p.2370.
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The Party Strengths
Government Opposition
Conservatives 470
National Labour 13
National Liberals 33
Liberal Nationals (Simon Group) 31
Independent ___!
Total 551
Labour 51
Liberals 5
Independent Labour 1
New Party 0
Communists 0
Irish Nationalists _2
Total 59
The aggregate vote was:-
For the Government 14,150,915
Against the Government 7,215,915
With five results to be declared in the next few days,
the alignment of parties is:-
Seats Gains Losses Net Gain Net Loss
Government
Opposition
551
59
221 5
5 221
216
216
Under the headline 'The Tory Parliament' the editorial commented:
The result of the election of 1931 has no parallel in our political history The Conservative vote has
been solid; the Liberal vote has gone almost unitedly for the Government; at least 10 per cent, and in
many places a great deal more, of the Labour poll of 1929 has turned against its party. More than
anyone could have thought possible party distinctions have been sunk for the sake of returning the
candidates who protested most loudly that they were the true supporters of the 'National Government'
Gramsci's response to the British elecnon results of 1931 was to compare them
with the German election results of 1930 to see what had happened to the political
parties in the two countries. His observations were set out in two notes,
§4.69 and §7.n.47 These were later brought together and redrafted as §13.23.
Observations on Some Aspects of the Structure of Political Parties in Periods of
Organic Crisis.48 Although he does not refer directly to the British election, it is
probable that the phenomenon described in §4.69 of the "fusion of a class under a
single leadership in order to solve a dominant, life-or-death problem" refers to the
crushing victory of the National Government in Britain. Gramsci called this
parliamentary solution of the crisis "organiC" in contrast to the solution by means of
the "providential man" which was under preparation in Germany.
47 §4.69. On the Parties I QCI p.513; §7.77. The Intellectuals. The Political Parties, QCII p.910.
48 §13.23, QCIII p.1602-1605.
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Whilst the headlines in Gramsci's sources presented the result of the British
election as a historic defeat for the Labour Party, later notes indicate that he was
more interested in the fate of the Liberal Party. We know this from a direct reference
in §15.02. Machiavelli I written in 1933.49 Gramsci argued that the industrialists do
not have a permanent political party of their own but "make use of all the existing
parties at one time or another". This might explain why traditional 'industrial' parties
like the English Liberal party or the French Radical party - which do not "represent
a single big class, but a nexus between big classes and small classes" - appear
and disappear from time to time. He referred back to what had happened in Britain
after October 1931 "where the Conservative party has devoured the Liberals who
traditionally claimed to be the party of the industrialists".50 The fact that this note
was written at the time of the German election of March 1933, however, suggests
that Gramsci thought of the disappearance of "middle parties" as a general
phenomenon which included Germany.
Public Opinion 'Booms':
the political use of radio and the 'yellow press'
The use of the radio during the British election campaign was a new aspect of
political 'technique' which was remarked upon in both the British and the Italian
press. 51 A week after the results were declared, an editorial in the Manchester
Guardian Weekly put the question in a wider perspective and expressed serious
misgivings about its potential use in elections "to manufacture public opinion with
unprecedented rapidity".
There is, first, the question how unanimity is obtained, whether by fair argument or by the
unscrupulous arts of the demogogue. A hundred years ago it was natural to see in bribery and
intimidation the main hindrances to the free exercise of the franchise. Those dangers have almost
disappeared but more insidious ones have taken their place. Of these the chief is the possibility of
clouding the mind of the electorate by sudden appeals to emotion. The danger developed with the
popular press and has now been enormously reinforced by broadcasting. The Khaki election of 1900,
the Chinese slavery cry of 1906, the 'make Germany pay' election of 1918, the anti-Communist scare
of 1924, and the scare about the pound in 1931 are the most conspicuous examples. It will be notiCed
that on the last two occasions it was an appeal to panic which created the conditions favourable to
mass movements of opinion. A general sense of fear is very easy to spread and extraordinarily difficult
to remove except as time may show the causes of fear to be imaginary. Nobody now believes that
49§15.02, ocm p.1750-1751.
50 ibid., p.1750.
51 See, for example, the editorial comment on 'Politics by Wireless' in MGW, 25 September 1931: and
'La radio e iI grammofono aiutono I'oratoria elettorale inglese' under the rubric 'Recentissime', CS, 23
October 1931.
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there is, or was in 1924, a serious Communist menace in this country, or that the Zinovieff letter ever
had more than the smallest intrinsic importance. Probably not one person in a hundred now
remembers what the Zinovieff letter was about. The scare about the pound was not so obviously
manufactured as the scare about the Zinovieff letter, but the public's fears were played upon more
persistently and with even less regard to probability, or scrupulous regard for the whole truth, than in
1924. A decisive verdict at the polls under such circumstances is evidence not of fitness for
democratic government but of fresh difficulties which must be surmounted before democracy can be
said to be safe. The fact that the mass mind can be created so easily and so quickly out of so little is
occasion not for rejoicing but for serious misgivingS52
The editorial thought that the National Government's crushing majority was a
serious danger to democracy. The publicity system had combined with the electoral
system to produce a distorted result. The government was given "dictatorial
powers" and was warned against acting as "the agent of single class" .
The scales are weighted wrongly in two ways. We have, firstly, a publicity system which makes it
possible to manufacture public opinion with unprecedented rapidity, and an electoral system which
gives exaggerated representation to the majority thus manufactured. If what is wanted is firm and
stable government, this is not the way to go about it. If distortion occurs in one direction it will occur in
the opposite direction later on, and government will oscillate between extremes. That, indeed, is the
most probable outcome of the present situation. But it holds a clear threat to the future of democracy
in this country. The government has acquired dictatorial powers. It will be almost free from the
restraining influence of Parliamentary criticism and debate. So long as it uses its powers with discretion
and restraint the tyranny may be masked. But if it ever begins to act as the agent of a single class or
interest it will arouse such resentment as, in the absence of all constitutional outlet, may even threaten
the foundations of democratic government.
In §1.48 Gramsci had pointed out the key role played by "the so-called organs of
public opinion" in maintaining the 'normal' equilibrium of force and consent on
which the hegemony of the dominant class depended. In §7.83 and §7.103 he
takes the concept of "public opinion" a step further in the light of the British election
campaign, traces of which can be detected in both notes. He invents the notion of
public opinion "booms", ie, "stimulating on the spur of the moment bursts of panic or
artifical enthusiasm as a means of achieving certain goals, for example in
elections". As the British election showed, the radio had played a special role in
manufacturing the necessary 'boom'.
The Harzburg Front
In spite of the failure of the plebiscite in Prussia, the German Right kept up the
momentum of its campaign against the 'system'. On the eve of the reopening of
the Reichstag in October, the forces of the National Opposition met at Harzburg.
52Editorial 'A Democratic Triumph?', MGW, 6 November 1931.
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The liberal Manchester Guardian Weekly was struck by the anachronistic aspect of
the 'Harzburg Front' which it compared to a scarecrow with the sawdust running
out. It doubted whether the assorted elements making up this so-called 'front' could
ever be an effective political force:
The Hitlerites, the Stahlhelmers (Steel Helmets), Hugenburg's Nationalists, Dr. Schacht, General von
Seeckt, the handful of industrial magnates, and the odds and ends of princes and generals of the old
regime are too incongruous a medley to feel, or think, or act in concert. The 'National Opposition'
spent itself in quarrelling for precedence - the Nazis wanted to march ahead of the Stahlhelmers, and
the Stahlhelmers at the head of the Nazis. Cheers for Hugenburg were drowned by counter-cheers
for Hitler 'Harzburg' has become a symbol, a kind of scarecrow wearing a spiked helmet, and
holding the colours of Imperial Germany - black, white, and red - in one hand and the Nazi red flag with
the white disk and anti-Semitic swastika in t!1e other.53
It was not the petty rivalry between the Nazis and Nationalists that impressed
Gramsci but the way in which the new "intellectuals" of the German Right, the
Nazis, publicly associated themselves with the traditional intellectuals. Their public
collaboration with these 'reactionary' elements, however, did not prevent them from
being presented by fascist writers as 'revolutionaries'. A further article on the
Harzburg Front in the fascist Nuova Antologia in December observed that the
failure of the Prussian plebiscite was only an episode in the ongoing siege of
Social Democratic-Centre stronghold in Prussia, and looked forward to the coming
year when fresh elections for the Reich Presidency and for the Prussian Diet were
due. The writer illustrated the way in which fascists appropriated the "revolutionary"
imagery of the communists. With obvious schematism it argued that just as the
Social Democrats were being outflanked by the 'revolutionary' Communists, so the
Nationalists had now been overtaken by the 'revolutionary' Nazis. Under
Hugenburg's leadership the Nationalists with "their empty dreams of restorations
and of impossible returns" had lost touch with the new realities. Their purely
negative politics had
suddenly led to the unexpected upsurge of National Socialism which assumed such gigantic
proportions in the elections of 14 September 1930 that it has taken over the leadership from and
almost swamped the old German-National Right, and together with them is pushing at the doors of the
State; meanwhile the progressive embourgeoisement of the Socialists has ended up by pushing the
masses in increasingly big cohorts. step and step in the last three general elections, towards
Communism which has also rapidly swelled to gigantic proportions. Thus the two arevolutions· have
emerged. the National Socialist and the Communist. The gloomy twilight of the hybrid social-
bourgeois republic of Weimar is played out between these two poles. 54
53 Under the headline 'German Chancellor hits out', MGIN, 16 October 1931. For the Harzburg Front
see also under the rubric Germania, RSE, 20 October 1931 (p.2252 and p.2281).
54 Giuseppe Piazza: 'L.acrisitedescae ilfrontedi Bad Harzburg', NA, 1 December 1931
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Notebooks 4-7
§7.10. Structure-Superstructure
In November 1930 Gramsci began a new series of notes on the structure-super-
structure relation. This included the famous §7.10.Structure and Superstructure
in which he began to develop the implications of his analysis of this problem for
political tactics and strategy. This note (and its 'twin' §7.16) is often taken with some
justification to be a synthesis of Gramsci's whole theory. A study of the historical-
political context of §7.1 0, however, throws fresh light on its meaning. There are
three aspects which have not been fully recognised or appreciated.
Firstly, the note is an attempt to explain the general implications for tactics and
strategy of the results of the latest German elections of September 1930 in which
the relatively modest gains made by the Communists were far outweighed by the
dramatic advance of Hitler and the National Socialists.
Secondly, the note is a critique of the current tactic of the Comintern - the tactic of
the 'third period' after 1929 - although Gramsci chose, for complex prudential
reasons, to give his views an impeccably orthodox disguise. Under the
Circumstances, his disagreement with the Comintern's policy placed him in an
'impossible' position: condemned by the fascist tribunal in Rome, he now faced
condemnation by the "invisible' tribunal" in Moscow. In §7.1 0 Gramsci found a way
of telling the truth under impossible circumstances.
Thirdly, the note was deliberately intended to have a double meaning . This was
entirely consistent with his fundamental conception of the objective or 'scientific'
status of political theory. The political theory is cast in the form of an elaborate
military metaphor based on the experiences of the First World War, but when he
describes the 'attacking' and 'defending' forces we cannot be entirely certain which
side is which, the Left or the Right, since attack and defence may pertain to both
sides. This ambiguity is the main strength not the main weakness of Gramsci's
thought (as some have argued). In this case, the ambiguity is particularly useful in
analysing the two faces of Fascism as both 'attack' and 'defence', both 'revolution'
and 'restoration'.
*
127
Past and Present: 1923 and 1930
The Circular Letter, February 1924
To understand the synthesis contained in §7.1 0 we must trace the history which it
"recapitulates". For there is a complex "symmetry" of past and present in Gramsci's
thinking in this note. The symmetry is between two events which we will call the
German 'October' of 1923 and the German 'September' of 1930: the first refers to
the failure of the revolutionary attempt by the Communists in Germany in October
1923, the second to the breakthrough of the Nazis in the German elections of
September 1930. The election results convinced Gramsci that the international
tactic of "frontal attack" was as mistaken in 1930 as it proved to be in 1923, but in
1930 the mistake had the opposite political significance from what it had after
1923.
The origin of §7.10 can be traced back to the circular letter Gramsci sent from
Vienna in February 1924 to the other members of the new leading group of the
Italian Communist party.1 The letter was written in the context of the debate going
on in the Comintern about the lessons of the failure of the revolutionary attempt in
Germany in October 1923 - the so-called German 'October'.2 The decisive testing-
ground of the international tactic was Germany, so what happened in that country
was crucially significant for every other European party, including the Italians.
Gramsci appreciated that "the key to the international situation" in 1930 was
Germany just as it had been in 1923, and the tactical argument of §7.1 0 - war of
position or war of manoeuvre? united front or frontal attack? - depended primarily
on the current situation in Germany.
The agenda of Gramsci's circular letter was set by Terracini who invited him to give
his views on two interconnected questions:-
Firstly, what were the implications of the German defeat of 1923 for the current
tactic of the Comintern, namely, the tactic of the united front adopted after the Third
Congress in 1921 in place of the tactic of frontal attack? The implications were
1Gramsci to Togliatti. Terracini, and others. 9 February 1924 [the 'circular letterl in Palmiro Togliatti:
La formazione del gruppo dirigente del Partita comunista ita/iano nel 1923-1924 (1969) p.185-201
(Translated in SPW p.191-203].
2 It was at Trotsky's suggestion that the revolutionary attempt in Germany in 1923 should coincide with
the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in October 1917: hence the German 'October'
expressed Trotsky's ·schematic· thinking. which faifed to differentiate tactically between East and
West.
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spelled out in a report headed Lessons of the German Events and United Front
Tactics written by Zinoviev and approved by the Praesidium in January 1924.3
Terracini, who was then in Moscow, sent Gramsci a copy. The essence of
the tactical question was this: did the defeat in Germany show the failure of the
united front or the failure of frontal attack? Gramsci thought the united front tactic
was correct and blamed the defeat on the leaders of the German Communist party
who did not apply it in practice. The defeat of October 1923 was a repeat of the
defeat of March 1921 ("a new March 1921") which led to the adoption of the
united front tactic in the first place. It therefore strengthened the case for sticking to
this tactic, only making sure that it was properly applied in practice. Gramsci often
remarked on "the absence of leaders which is characteristic of Germany".4 He
thought that the leading groups of the left and the right of the party were "both
inadequate and incapable".5 In a further letter to Terracini Gramsci repeated his
pesslrnlstic view of the political capacity of the left which now took over the
leadership of the German party:
Obviously it is necessary to support the left which represents the real movement of the revolutionary
masses, but has the left found its true political and ideological expression in the present leaders? This
is the crux of the problem, it seems to me. It could lead to acute and profound crises as yet
unforeseen by the party; it could even bring the party to the edge of catastrophe.6
His view of the leaders of German Communism had not changed two years later.
Giovanni Farina, an Italian delegate to the Sixth Plenum in Moscow in February-
March 1926, recalls:
On returning to Italy I had a conversation with comrade GramSCi. I gave him my impressions of some of
the people in the German delegation attending the Plenum (Rosenberg, Ruth Fischer, Urbans, and
some others). I still remember what Gramsci said: "The German proletariat is like a very deep and well-
contained sea and aUthese people are just floating corks. They have no links with the masses .....
We'll have to see where the storm will carry them". 7
3 G. Zinoviev: 'Lessons of the German Events and United Front Tactics' in The Communist
International (Monthly Organ of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, published
simultaneously in English, Russian, French and German), No.2, February 1924, p.84-103.
4 Circular letter, in Togliatti cit., p.188.
5 ibid., p.188.
6 Gramsci to Terracini, 27 March 1924, in Togliatti cit., p.262.
7Giovanni Farina: 'Gramsci come I'ho conosciuto', in Gramsci: Scrittidi Tog/istti ete (Soeieta Edltrice
L'Unita, Roma, 1945)
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What was the relation between past and present on the question of tactics? In 1929
the Comintern reversed its tactic, from united front back to frontal attack. Gramsci
knew immediately this was a mistake as regards Italy since "frontal attack" simply
could not be applied in the current situation. But the elections in September 1930
showed that it was not right for Germany either: this was obvious not only from the
electoral breakthrough of the fascists but also from the solidity of the SOCial
democratic vote. The German 'September' of 1930 indicated that the tactic of
frontal attack was likely to end in defeat, just as it had done in the German 'October'
of 1923: this was the first element of 'symmetry' in §7.1O.
Secondly, Terracini asked Gramsci to explain why he refused to sign Bordiga's
Manifesto of the Communist Left issued in December 1923.8 The manifesto
reviewed the differences of the Italian Communists with the Comintern since the
Third Congress of 1921. Bordiga argued that the Comintern's tactical policy was
useless internationally because it was "too Russiann• Judging from the timing of the
manifesto, he must have thought that the latest defeat in Germany was due to
this. Gramsci summarised Bordiga's position as follows:
He thinks that the tactic of the International reflects the Russian situation, ie, was born on the terrain of
a backward and primitive capitalist civilisation. For him this tactic is extremely voluntaristic He thinks
that for the more developed countries of central and western Europe this tactic is inadequate or even
useless. In these countries, the historical mechanism functions according to all the approved
schemes of Marxism. There exists the historical determinism which was lacking in Russia, and
therefore the overriding task must be the organisation of the party as an end in itself.9
Gramsci took a different view. He agreed that there was a difference between the
relatively primitive capitalist civilisation in Russia and the more advanced capitalist
countries of Europe ('East' and 'West'), but the German defeat of 1923 showed that
the essential difference was not structural but superstructural.
I think that the situation is quite different. Firstly, because the political conception of the Russian
communists was formed on an international and not a national terrain. Secondly, because in central
and western Europe the development of capitalism has not only determined the formation of the
broad proletarian strata, but also - and as a consequence - has created the higher stratum, the labour
aristocracy, with its appendages in the trade union bureaucracy and the social democratic groups. The
determinism, which in Russia was direct and drove the masses on to the streets for a revolutionary
uprising, is complicated in central and western Europe by all these political superstructures created by
the greater development of capitalism. This makes the action of the masses slower and
8 On Gramsci's response to Bordiga's manifesto and his exposition of the differences between them,
see Paolo Spriano: Storia del partito comunista italiano. Oa Bordiga a Gramsci (Einaudi,1967), p.304-
313.
9 Circular letter cit., p.196-197.
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more prudent, and therefore requires of the revolutionary party a strategy and tactics altogether more
complex and long-term than those which were necessary for the Bolsheviks in the period between
March and November 1917.10
This passage contains the second element of 'symmetry' in §7.10: the complicating
effects of the superstructures in the West. In 1923 the structural determinism in
Germany (ie, the catastrophic inflation) could not have been more compelling, but
far from "driving the masses on to the streets for a revolutionary uprising" the action
of the German proletariat was "complicated by all these polttlcal superstructures".
Gramsci saw that the structural crisis of 1929 was just as catastrophic as that of
1923, but the German 'September' of 1930 showed the complicating effects of the
superstructures, only Gramsci had now extended the scope of the 'terrain' to
include the superstructures of civil society as well as political society. In view of the
complex network of superstructures in the advanced countries, which he compared
in §7.10 to the "trench systems of modern warfare" , Gramsci saw no reason for a
change of tactic. The tactic appropriate to the 'Western' front was the united front,
not frontal attack.
This brings us to the third element of symmetry between past and present.
Bordiga's criticism of Russian leadership of the Comintern recalled Lenin's
last speech at the Fourth Congress in 1922. Lenin's admitted that the policy on
organisation adopted at the previous congress had been a "mistake" because the
European comrades (he specifically referred to the Italians) had been unable to
implement it in their own countries. As Lenin put it, the policy could not be
"translated" into European languages because it was "too Russian". Gramsci had
attended the Fourth Congress in person and was deeply impressed by Lenin's last
speech. He recalled his words in §7.02 at the start of the same series of notes as
§7.10 and §7.16.
17.02. Translatability of scientific and philosophical languages. In 1921, on qu.. tlons of
organisation, Vlllci said and wrote: "we have not been able to 'tranllate' our own language
Into 'European' languag.... 11
10ibid.
11 §7.02, QCII p.854. Gramsci mistakenly gives the date of the Third Congress In 1921 whereas the
speech to which he refers was to the Fourth Congress in 1922. In this connection, note Lenin's
remark to Clara Zetkin during the Third Congress in 1921: "You once wrote to me that we Russians
should learn to understand western psychology a little and not thrust our hard, rugged methods upon
people all at once. I took notice of thar. Clara Zetkin: Reminiscences of Lenin p.28.
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The third element of symmetry was Lenin's definition of a "mistake". Gramsci made
a note of Lenin's words because he regarded the Comintern's current tactic of
frontal attack as a mistake. It could not be "translated" into European languages.
This was because Stalin, the current international leader, was "too Russian". In
§7.16 Gramsci implied this without directly saying it, but direct confirmation of
his intention can be found in the oral not the written record.
Trotsky's Lessons of October, September 1924
In the circular letter of February 1924 Gramsci disagreed with Bordiga that the
policy of the Comintern was too Russian since "the political conception of the
Russian communists was formed on an international not a national terrain".
Gramsci was thinking of Lenin and Trotsky. Indeed, Trotsky's theses on the united
front (1922) were an attempt to solve precisley the problem raised by Lenin of
"translating" Russian thinking into European languages. The German defeat
of 1923 showed that the "translation" in Lenin's sense of the word, ie, translation
from theory into practice, was far from successful, but Gramsci blamed this on the
political deficiency of the German leaders. When we turn to the prison notes,
however, the contrast in "the political conception of the Russian communists"
could not be sharper: where Lenin was "profoundly national and profoundly
European" in §7.16, Trotsky was now "superficially national and superficially
European". Why did Gramsci change his judgement of Trotsky?
The appearance of Trotsky's Lessons of October in September 1924 raised doubts
in Gramsci's mind about Trotsky's knowledge of European languages, in Lenin's
sense of "practical" knowledge. Trotsky argued that the German communists had
missed the revolutionary moment in 1923 because they stuck to the official tactic of
the united front instead of making "a brusque tactical turn" in sufficient time to sieze
the revolutionary opportunity which had suddenly arisen. Had they shown the
same tactical flexibility as Lenin and the Bolsheviks in 1917 they could have taken
power. Although he agreed with Trotsky about the political shortcomings of the
German leaders, Gramsci's explanation of the German defeat was already more
complicated than this. In particular, the 'retarding' effects on the German proletariat
of the political superstructures, especially social democracy, made any attempt to
use Russia as a 'model' for Germany - as in Trotsky's German 'October' - far
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more problematical than Trotsky's argument seemed to recognise. Indeed, Gramsci
had already concluded in February: "This makes the action of the masses slower
and more prudent and therefore requires of the revolutionary party a strategy and
tactics altogether more complex and long-term than those which were necessary
for the Bolsheviks in the period between March and November 1917".12 In fact,
Gramsci's thinking about the lessons of the German defeat was already set on a
divergent path from Trotsky's, and so it was not entirely an exercise in communist
'discipline' when he supported the official criticism of the Lessons of October .13 It
was on the strength of Trotsky's position after the German 'October' of 1923 that
Gramsci would later describe him in the notebooks as "the political theorist of
frontal attack in a period when it only leads to defeat". However, by this time his
sharp criticism of Trotsky was outdated and gratuitous - unless, that is, the current
situation in 1930 had given it an entirely new meaning.
In fact, the criticism of Trotsky was a fourth element of symmetry between past and
present. In ordering a change to "frontal attack", Stalin was now making the same
error for which Trotsky had been 'officially' condemned at an earlier stage. Gramsci
wrote §7.10 and §7.16 in the form of critiques of the revolutionary theories of
Luxemburg and Trotsky respectively: his orthodoxy in these notes can only be
described as "impeccable". But the political context in which he wrote them shows
that Gramsci's orthodoxy was a machiavellian "disguise".
The Mistakes of 'Luxemburgism' and 'Trotskyism', 1925
In April 1925 Gramsci went to Moscow to participate directly in the work of the Fifth
Plenum of the Comintern. The campaign of criticism sparked by Trotsky's Lessons
of October still filled the atmosphere and was echoed in the official document
which emerged from the Plenum, the Theses on the Bo/shevisation of Communist
Parties .14 The German defeat of 1923 was attributed to the theoretical errors of
'Luxemburgism' and 'Trotskyism' which were now officially defined and
denounced. The relevant thesis ran as follows:
12Circular letter cit., p.197.
13The article 'Come non si deve scrivere la storia della rivoluzione bolscevica. A proposito del 1917 di
Leo Trotzki' originally appeared in the Pravda and was translated and published In /,Unita on 19
November 1924. See Gramsci's 'heading' to the article in CPC, p.211-212.
14See The Communist International: Documents, Volume 111923-1928, selected and edited by Jane
Oegras (London, 1971) p.188-200.
133
Among the most important mistakes of the Luxemburgians of practical significance today are: (a) the
unbolshevik treatment of the question of 'spontaneity' and 'consciousness', of 'organisation' and 'the
masses'. Their false ideas on this question ..... prevented them from appraising correctly the role of the
party in the revolution; (b) underestimation of the technical factor in preparing insurrections was, and is
in part today, an obstacle to the correct treatment of the question of 'organising' the revolution; (c)
mistakes in regard to the attitude to the peasantry .
Trotskyism is a particularly dangerous deviation from Leninism; it is a variety of menshevism combining
'European' opportunism with 'left-radical' phrases which frequently conceal its politically passive
character. Trotskyism is not an isolated deviation towards menshevism but a year-long system of
struggle against Leninism. Nor is Trotskyism a purely Russian phenomenon; it is international in
character. To achieve Leninism in the Comintern means to expose Trotskyism in all parties and to
liquidate it as a tendenCY15
Whatever reservations he may have had about their form, Gramsci must have
agreed with the substance of these criticisms. Indeed, the official criticisms of
Luxemburg and Trotsky are deliberately echoed in §7.10 and §7.16. But the whole
political context had changed by 1930-31 and this changed their political meaning.
As Gramsci perceived that past heresy had now become present orthodoxy. The
official criticism of the errors of 'Luxemburgism' and 'Trotskyism' provided Gramsci
with an impeccably orthodox disguise with which he could 'safely' commit to writing
what he thought of the Comintern's current "error".
The Tactical Mistake of1929-30
At the end of 1929 the Comintern made a 'tactical turn' which coincided with the
new phase of economic crisis triggered by the Wall Street Crash. The resolution
adopted by the Comintern Executive in Moscow in February 1930 launched a new
slogan, first invented by the "heretic" Rosa Luxemburg: the political mass strike:
11. In those countries which have entered the phase of crisis, the expansion of the revolutionary
surge is revealed not only in the sharper character of the strikes themselves but also in the variety of
the forms of struggle The slogan of the political mass strike is the order of the day.
14.lv.The development of industrial struggles .imposes on communist parties the task of
popularising the slogan of the political mass strike.18
The new policy was immediately adopted by the Italian Communist party and
announced by Togliatti the same month:
15 ibid .• p.191-192.
16 'Resolution on the Economic Crisis and Unemployment'. February 1930, in The Communist
International. Documents. Vol.3 1929-1943, selected and edited by Jane Degras (London. 1971)
p.107-108.
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As the vanguard we must pursue this directive and energetically launch the propaganda for the
general strike, and for the political general strike; both our own organisations and the masses must
start preparing for the general strike.17
As we saw, Gramsci was informed of the change of tactic by Gennaro in June 1930.
"It was an extraordinary novelty, for which I was completely unprepared".18 He
immediately thought the tactical change was a mistake as far as Italy was
concerned. This was the "practical origin" of §3.33.Some Causes of Error, which
must have been written shortly after hearing the news.
§3.33. Some Causes of Error. A government, or a politician, or a social group adopts a political or
economic line. They draw general conclusions from it, interpreting present reality and forecasting its
future development, far too easily. They do not take sufficient account of the fact that the policy being
applied, the initiative being promoted etc, may be based on a miscalculation and may not correspond
therefore to any "concrete historical activity". In historical as well as in biological life there are, along
with live births, such things as abortions. History and politics are inseparable, they are in fact the same
thing, but it is still necessary to discriminate in judging historical facts and political facts and actions. In
history, given the breadth of perspective on the past and given that the very results of actions are
proof of their historical vitality, fewer errors of judgement are made than in judging political facts and
actions still in course. The great politician must therefore be 'highly cultivated', that is, he must 'know'
as many elements of present-day life as possible. He must know them not in a 'bookish' or 'erudite'
way but in a 'living' way, as the concrete substance of his political 'intuition'. (Still, if they are to become
the living substance of his 'intuition' he must also learn them 'from books'). 111
This note corresponds to Gramsci's negative reaction to the news reported by
Gennaro. The change of tactic was a mistake because it did not correspond to any
"concrete historical activity" in Italy. The politician who made this mistake was not
"highly cultivated", otherwise he would have known this. If he had known anything
about the "elements of present-day life" in Italy, for example, not to mention other
countries, he would not have made this mistake. Indeed, it seems that this politician
did not know the first thing about the concrete elements of life outside his own
country since he did not even read books about them. Gramsci leaves us to
speculate about who the politician in question was, but were not these the
characteristics of the present leader of the international movement, Stalin, who
does not compare with the "great politician" Lenin or even the "bookish" Trotsky?
17Quoted in Paolo Spriano: Storia del partite comunista italiano.Gli anni della clandestinita (Einaudi,
1969) p.244 and note. From a speech by Togllatti published as an editorial under the title 'Necessita di
una svolta' in La State Operaio, 2, February 1930
18Letter to Tatiana written the sarne day, 16 June 1930, Lei p.339.
1913.33, QCI p.31Q-311.
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The German 'September', 1930
The results of the elections in Germany persuaded Gramsci that the international
tactic was generally mistaken. He must have been particularly interested in what
the results revealed about the speed of the political process. The analysis he had
made after the German crisis of 1923 regarding the slower tempo of the
revolutionary movement in the West was vindicated by the results. The relatively
modest shift of working-class support from the Social Democrats to the
Communists confirmed that the 'determinism' set in motion by the economic crisis
of 1929 was indeed 'complicated' by the political superstructures, making the
action of the masses 'slower and more prudent'. But if this was true of the forces of
the Left, could the same be said of the Right? The most remarkable feature of the
results was the unexpected speed with which the forces of the Right realigned
themselves behind Hitler and the National Socialists. This altered the whole
relation of forces and convinced Gramsci that what was maturing in Germany was
not a revolutionary crisis, but the possible catastrophe of the German Communist
party which he had feared since 1923. Far from proving the directives of the Third
International right as the Soviet press claimed, the German election results proved
them wrong.
The Political Conversations, November 1930:
the Question of "Lightning Speed".
Gramsci kept his disagreement to himself until November when he started up the
cycle of conversations with the other communist prisoners at Turi. He wanted to
educate the comrades to be more realistic in their thinking and to dispel the false
hopes which the new line encouraged that the fall of Fascism in Italy was imminent.
The speed with which they thought this was going to happen was positively
Russian. According to Giuseppe Ceresa:
He was offended by the superficiality of certain comrades who, in 1930, would habitually assert that
Fascism was on the point of eollapse (two or three months more by the winter at the latest, these
glib prophets would say ) Gramsci fought against these mechanical, abstract, anti-Marxist
positions, mostly founded on the idea that economic 'misery' would be the decisive factor in
propelling the masses into a proletarian revolution. He used to point out that hunger and misery can
provoke uprisings, revolts, which may even shatter the existing equilibrium of the social order, but that
many other conditions must be fulfilled before capitalism will be destroyed 20
20 Giuseppe Ceresa: 'In Carcere eon Gramsci' In GIamsci: Scrltti di Togliatti etc (Paris, 1938) p.11O.My
italics.
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As we saw, the attempt to combat these illusions met with little success. By the time
Bruno Tosin arrived at the start of December, Gramsci had terminated the
conversations and the communist 'collective' had broken up amidst accusations
that his posltion was not communist. However, the revelation by Tosin that the
leaders of the party shared this 'Russian' illusion of speed seems to have been the
immediate catalyst in getting Gramsci to synthesise his thoughts in §7.1 O.
The news which he [Tosin] passed on to us was not very different from what we already knew but what
astonished us was the assertion that the party leadership predicted the revolution by the end of the
yea r. We did not hide from Tosin our disbelief at this rosy prospect and invited him to tell Gramsci what
he had told us. 21
I lie. Tosin] made no secret of my belief that the continued presence of the party in Italy. the growth of
wage demands and strikes which were spreading to many regions. could lead in a short time to
broader movements. to a general strike which would bring down Fascism. 22
*
This complex history was now synthesised in §7.10. Written as a critique of Rosa
Luxemburg's theory of revolutionary spontaneity in The Mass Strike, it was really
a critique of the Comintern's current tactic which had now adopted the universal
slogan of the political mass strike. Gramsci's perception that past errors had
become present orthodoxy meant that §7.10 has a "double-meaning". Moreover,
this was entirely consistent with his conception of the scientific status of political
theory which depended on its objective validity for opposite sides. Disguised as a
critique of Luxemburgism, its credentials were impeccably orthodox. What Gramsci
put on paper could neither be potentially exploited by the Fascist tribunal as anti-
communist propaganda nor used by the 'invisible tribunal' in Moscow, if it ever
reached their eyes, as evidence to indict him for heresy. The critique rested on a
categorical denial of the element of "lightning speed" with which a catastrophic
economic crisis was supposed to revolutionise the masses. This economistic
illusion was directly encouraged by the new policy as he discovered from talking to
his comrades. The results of the German elections in September 1930 were
decisive evidence in support of his critique, which was strikingly consistent with the
conclusion he drew from the German 'October' of 1923 on the effects of the
political superstructures in the West in retarding the revolutionary movement of the
workers.
21 Athos Usa: Memorie (Milan.1973). p.96-97. My italics.
22 Bruno Tosin: Con Gramsci (Rome. 1976). p. 96. My italics.
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RememberRosa's little book translated by Alessandri in 1919-20whose theory was based
on the historical experiences of 1905 (not studied very closely, It would appear, since
Rosa neglected the voluntarist and organisational elements which were far more extensive
than she credited but which she tended to Ignore, without realising It, because of her
'economlstlc' bias). In my view this little book Is one of the most significant attempts to
apply the theory of war of manoeuvre to historical science and political technique. The
Immediate economic element (crises etc) Is seen as the field artillery whose task was to
open a breach In the enemy's defences - a breach sufficient for one's own troops to rush
In and obtain a strategiC success which, If not final, at least brought final success nearer.
Of course, In historical science the effect of the Immediate economic element was far
more complex than tha effect of field artillery In the war of manoeuvre, because It was
conceived as being twofold: 1) It opens a breach In the enemy's defences after throwing
him Into disarray and causing him to lose faith In himself, In his forces, and In his future;
2) In a flash It organises one's own troops and creates the necessary cadrea, or In a flaah
It at least puts the existing cadres (formed up to that moment by the general historical
process) In a position where, from being scattered, they can be concentrated; and In a
flash It creates the necessary concentration of Ideology and objectives to be achieved. It
was a form of Iron economlstlc determinism with the aggravating factor that these effacts
were conceived aa happenlng-w1thllghtnlng speed In-time and space. It was thus out and
out historical myatlclsm, the awarung of a 80rt of miraculous illumination :!B
Picking up a suggestion of Krasnov, an ex-Tsarist general whose novel he was just
reading, Gramsci examines the role played by the war of movement on the Eastern
front in 1914-17. He obeervesthat the successful incursions of the Russian army in
both the Austrian and German sectors of the front, were brilliant but ephemeral:
they did not alter the fundamentally positional nature of the war.
The war of position, In fact, Is not simply constituted by the actual trenches but by the
whole organlsstlonal and Industrial system of the territory which lies to the rear of the
army In the field and notably by the rapid fire-power of artillery, machine-guns, and rlflea
and by their concentration (not to mention by their abundance, whereby material lost after
a breakthrough can be 8wlftly replaced) :14
When this passage is read in its immediate political context, the concrete meaning
of the metaphor starts to become clear. In describing the capacity of the enemy in
"the German sector" to swiftly replace and concentrate material lost after a
breakthrough, Gramsci is evolving a metaphor for the class war in Germany at that
point. The surprisingly massive vote for the National Socialists in the recent
elections demonstrated the strength of the enemy's reserves and his capacity to
23 §7.1O. Structure and Superstructure, QCII p.858-860.The date of this note,December1930,is
basedon the referenceto Krasnov'snovelwhichhad been sentto Gramscibutwitheld by the prison
authority (see the listof forbiddenbooksInthe petitionto Mussolini,September1930, in QCIV
p.2375).WhenGramscireceiveda favourablereplyto his petitionat the start of December (Letterto
Tatiana, 1December1930,Lei p.370)Krasnov'snovelwas handedover. Notethat this coincided
exactlywiththe rupturein relationswithhiscomradesin prisonover the party'stactic,asconfirmedby
BrunoTosinwhenhearrivedat Turi at the start of December.
24 ibid., p.859.
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'concentrate' them rapidly at a particular point. But to convey the key idea of the
depth of these defences, of "the whole organisational and industrial system of the
territory to the rear of the army in the field", Gramsci looks beyond the political
parties and their relative strengths in the elections to the superstructures of civil
society in Germany which he had studied during the past year, since the 'eruption'
of October 1929 in fact.
The aame reduction muat take place In the art and aclence of polltlca, at least In the ca••
of the moat advanced Statea, where 'civil aoclety' has become a very complex structur.
resistant to catastrophic 'eruptions' of the Immediate economic element (crlaes,
depresslona etc). The superstructures of civil society are like the system of trenches In
modern warfare. It would happen that a furloua artillery attack against the .nemy trench••
seemed to deatroy everything when, In reality, It had only destroyed the surface defene••
and when the moment came to advance the attacking forces found themaelves confronted
by defencea which were stili In tact. The aame thing happens In polltlca during the great
economic crises. The crisis does not have the effect of organising the attacking troops
with lightning speed In time and space, stili leas doea It fill them with fighting aplrlt. On
the other hand, the defenders do not get demoralised, nor do they abandon their defene••
even amidst the ruins, nor do they 1088 faith In their own atrength or their own future.
Of course, things do not remain Just as they were, but they do not develop with lightning
apeed and there Is no definitive forward march as anticipated by the atrateglata of
political Cadornlsm. The events of 1917 were the last occurance of this kind. They marked
a decisive turning-point In the history of the art and science of politics.
It Is therefore a question of studying In depth which elementa of civil society corr8lpond
to the defenalve systems In the war of poaltlon. I say 'In depth' advisedly because they
have been studied but only from a superlflcal and banal standpolnt. ..
The continuity in Gramsci's structure-superstructure theory from the circular letter of
1924 to this text of 1930 is striking and in both cases events in Germany are the
decisive catalyst. The catastrophic crises of 1923 and 1929 were prevented from
developing into communist revolutions by the complicating effects of the
superstructures. In this text Gramsci develops the theory in two new ways.
Firstly, the metaphor of trench warfare enables him to see the positions of
both sides of the 'Western' front at once - dialectically, that is - whereas the original
analysis had been solely concerned with the Left. Judging from the election results
the main political superstructure of the German proletariat, the Social Democrats,
proved remarkably resistant to the economic eruption of 1929 and there was no
massive surge of support for the Communists, but Gramsci shows little inclination in
the notes to take up arms against Social Democracy and has nothing to do with the
current theory of 'social fascism'. The fact that he broke off the conversations after
being accused by some comrades of taking up a 'social democratic' position was
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evidence enough of the internecine passions dividing the Left and of the difficulty of
discussing the current 'offensive' tactic in the dispassionate spirit which he was
committed to in the prison writings. The trenches of the enemy presented a different
picture, however. The economic eruption of 1929 hastened the disintegration of the
political superstructures of the German bourgeoisie, but the massive surge of
support for the National Socialists in the election showed the capacity of the enemy
to swiftly replace its losses. Far from being demoralised and abandoning the
defences, the German bourgeoisie demonstrated by voting for Hitler and the
National Socialists that they "had not lost faith in their own strength or their own
future". The interesting element of the analysis was precisely the "lightning speed"
with which this occured. In a relatively short time the National Socialists had
achieved the very degree of "concentration of ideology" which the Communists
dreamed of. It seems that lightning speed was denied the attackers but not the
defenders. Moreover, the sudden breakthrough of the 'charismatic' Hitler
suggested that the possibility of "miraculous illumination" in politics could not be
ruled out entirely.
Secondly, whereas the earlier analysis turned on the complicating effects of the
political superstructures, Gramsci now introduces the superstructures of civil
society. This Hegelian concept made its way into his thinking in the course of
1929-30. It greatly enlarged his vision of the struggle, enabling him to see beyond
the 'surface' defences and take in the full 'depth' of the defensive system behind
the lines. To some extent he had already obeyed his own injunction to study these
superstructures in depth: the factual data he collected in §2.26. The German
newspapers and his observations on the constituent elements of the "ideological
fronf of a ruling class is an obvious example of what was meant by the defensive
system in a war of position. The campaign of the Hugenburg press against the
Young Plan helps to explain the relatively sudden "concentration of ideology"
demonstrated by the massive vote for the National SocialiSts. Less obviously, his
observation of themes in the contemporary German novel in §3.03. German
intellectuals , notably the impact of Freudian ideas, can be seen as an investigation
of another "superstructure" of civil society. However, at the time Gramsci probably
did not foresee that the comprehensive attack by German writers on the traditional
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ruling ideas - the "crisis of authority" - was preparing the ground for a very different
'revolution' from the one anticipated by the Communists.
We said that §7. 16 has a double meaning because attack and defence in the war
of position may pertain to both the Left and the Right. This is the 'scientific' core of
Gramsci's observations. Read as he certainly intended, ie, as a critique of the
Comintern's offensive tactiC after 1929, by the 'attackers' he meant the
Communists; but it could not have escaped his attention that the 'defenders' led by
the National Socialists developed the sort of 'momentum' normally reserved by
revolutionary theory for the attackers and that their victory in the elections looked
more like an offensive 'breakthrough' than a rearguard action. The attraction of
Hitler and the National Socialists, particularly to the younger generation, owed
much to their image as a dynamic 'revolutionary' movement. Their victory in the
election was therefore proof of what Gramsci called "the value of the ideologies", by
which he meant that Marxists are wrong to discount the ideologies as "mere
appearances" simply because a political movement is not really what it claims to be
for these "appearances", as the National Socialists showed, are powerful
instruments of political rule.
17.16. War of Position-War of Movement [Rusalan Mentalities)
We saw that the failure of the German 'October' of 1923 was officially blamed
on the theoretical errors of Luxemburgism and Trotskyism. We also saw that
Gramsci's critique of Luxemburgism in §7.10 had a 'double meaning' arising from
the relation of past and present, according to which past errors had become
present policy. §7.10 must therefore be read as a critique of the Comintern's
current tactic disguised in an impeccably orthodox form. This critique was
decisively substantiated by the results of the recent German elections.
A similar relation of past and present might explain why Gramsci also recalled the
errors of Trotskyism in §7.16, written at more or less the same time.2S Given the
close connection between the two notes, we are bound to ask: does §7.16 also
have an implied meaning? No less an authority than the late Paolo Spriano
25 The date of §7.16 is based on the reference to Trotsky's autobiography. Gramsci had petitioned to
be allowed to read it and, after getting a favourable reply, asked Tatiana at the start of Decemberto
send him a copy (To Tatiana, 1 December 1930, LCI p.370), which he confirms having received at the
end of th1Jmonth ("I have received from the bookshop the books I ordered through you·: to Tatiana,
29 December 1930, LCI p.3n). This places §7.16 exactly at the tum 011930-31.
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remarked on a striking paradox in Gramsci's notes on Trotsky, but he
dismissed the possibility of any relation between past and present and was
completely confident about Gramsci's intentions.
Here in fact [in the Notebooks] the judgement on Trotsky always appears critical, whether based on
his reputation as a Marxist, or on his political position, to such an extent that Gramsci sometimes seems
hasty in accusing Lev Davidovitch of superficiality and schematic thought. The reasons why Gramsci
showed himself very much opposed in 1925-26 to the Russian opoosnlons are not in fact replaced by
others in the notes. Here too Gramsci seems ready to reaffirm the line of continuity between Lenin
and Stalin, especially regarding the correct treatment of the peasants. At most, one might observe,
Gramsci's judgements can all be referred to an earlier situation, whether they are of Trotsky as 'political
theorist of frontal attack in a period in which it only leads to defeats' (ie, 1921-26), or see in Trotsky the
expression of the most coercive, 'administrative', Bonapartist tendencies. The paradox is that, both
for the theory of the 'third period' as for that of forced collectivisation in the countryside begun in
1929-30, the criticisms of Trotsky can also apply to Stalinl However, this is certainly not the reference
Gramsci intended to make in the prison notes on these issues 28
The most reliable guide to Gramsci's intention in the prison notes is the principle
that political theory is 'scientific' insofar as it applies to opposite sides. We should
therefore expect Gramsci's notes to have double meanings since this dialectic is
the key principle of his mode of theorising. Moreover, the possibility that he meant
his criticisms of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution to apply currently to Stalin
is not to deny that he meant what he wrote about Trotsky. Indeed, in conversation
with Bruno Tosin in December Gramsci made it clear that his own disagreement
with the current line did not imply any support for the Trotskyist Opposition' and the
sharp criticism of Trotsky in §7.16 emphasises this position. Nevertheless, the
context of Gramsci's criticism suggests that he intended it to apply to both sides.
Stalin is conspicuous by his absence in §7.16, it is true, but he is present in
Gramsci's conversations. Remarks about his 'mentality' made to Tosin and Riboldi
at this time show that Gramsci was prepared to say, but not to write, what he
thought about the shortcomings of Stalin's international leadership. In §7.16
Gramsci compares them both with Lenin, Trotsky explicitly and Stalin implicitly,
and found that both fell short of the 'model' for different reasons. The exemplary
character of Lenin's international leadership was defined in §7.02, at the start of
this series of notes, where he recalls the moment in Lenin's last speech to the
Comintern admitting that they had made a mistake because "we have not been
able to 'translate' our own language into 'European' languages''27. Lenin had set
an example to his successors not only in his admission of fallibility but also in his
26 Paolo Spriano: Antonio Grarnsci and the Party: the Prison Years (London, 1979) p. 66-67.
27 §7.02. Translatability of scientifie and philosophieal languages , QCII p.854.
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recognition of the danger of being "too Russian" in international policy, for the result
was that the European parties could not put the Comintern's resolutions into
practice - the most serious mistake 'Marxists' could make. Thus, Gramsci'S Lenin is
"profoundly national and profoundly European", the two sides of his mentality being
interdependent.
What of Lenin's successors? Trotsky had obviously made a mistake in the German
'October' of 1923 but judging by the Lessons of October he stubbornly refused to
admit it. By refusing to see that Russian revolutionary tactics and strategy could not
be implemented in an advanced country like Germany at that time, he was both
"superficially national and superficially European".
It should be seen whether Bronstein's famoua theory about the permanent character01
the movement la not the polltlcsl reflection 01 the theory of war of manoeuvre (recall the
observation of the eoaaack general Kraanov) - Ie, In the laat analyala a reflection of the
general economlc-cultural-aoclal conditione In a country In which the structurea of
national life are embryonic and looa., and Incapable of becoming 'tr.nch or fortrea.'. In
thla caM one might say that Bronstein, apparently 'Western', was In fact a cosmopolitan
- Ie, auperllcally national and superllcally Weatern or European. IIItch on the other hand
was profoundly national and profoundly European.
By deliberately echoing the theses of 1925 accusing Trotsky of" 'European'
opportunism", Gramsci insured himself against the charge of 'Trotskyism'. But why
did he recall the past mistake of Trotsky at this point, the turn of 1930-31, when he
had just let it be known to his comrades in the political conversations that he
thought the current tactic of "frontal attack" was a mistake? The context of this note
clearly suggests that, contrary to Spriano's view, it is about past and present. In
fact, it is about the current mistake.
As we said, the leader responsible for the current mistake, Stalin, is conspicuous
by his absence in §7.16, but the empty space is "logically" filled by Gramsci's off-
the-record remarks to Tosin and Riboldi at this time.
[Tosin). When I spoke to him about the debates which had taken place at the Seventh Plenum of the
International [November 1926-January 1927] he was obviously very concerned about the
consequences for the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and the Comintern. In his view the collegial
leadership of the Comintern was paralysed or at least weakened as a result. For this reason he
regretted the fact that in the past Stalin had never had the opportunity of living abroad and working in
the international field in contrast to lenin and the other Bolshevik leaders, since this necessarily
restricted his vision of the development 01 the world movement as a whole.
[Tosin p.102]
The logic was that the 'Russian-European' nexus which to Gramsci's way of
thinking defined the nature of Lenin's and to a lesser extent of Trotsky's
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internationalism, was broken by Stalin altogether. Stalin was purely and simply
"too Russian". Not knowing the first thing about European "languages", his 50-
called international policy was untranslatable. This was the mistake Lenin had
warned about in his last speech to the Comintern.
In another conversation with Riboldi, probably sometime before May 1931, Gramsci
went much further in his criticism of Stalin as international leader, but the logic
remained perfectly consistent. The sharpening of Gramsci's attitude may have
been because of something that he read in the meantime in his periodicals: this
was Stalin's famous speech of February 1931 justifying the ever-increasing tempo
of the Five-Year Plan by the urgent needs of national defence. In the key passage
of the speech, Stalin articulated his vision of Russian history:
To slow down the pace means to remain behind. Those who remain behind are beaten. We do not,
however, wish to be beaten. No, we do not. The history of the old Russia consisted in the fact that it
was continually beaten owing to its backwardness. It was beaten by the Mongolian Khans, it was
beaten by the Turkish Beys, it was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords, it was beaten by the POlish-
Lithuanian pans, it was beaten by the English and French capitalists, it was beaten by the Japanese
barons. It was beaten owing to its backwardness, on account of its military backwardness, of its cultural
backwardness, its political backwardness, its industrial backwardness, its agricultural backwardness. It
was beaten because one could do so with impunity and obtain advantage from it. ....
In the past we had not and could not have any fathenand. Now, however, as with us the workers are in
power, we have a fatherland and shall defend its independence. Do you want our socialist fatherland
to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this you must liquidate this
backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop a real Bolshevist tempo in the promotion of
the economy. There is no other way. Therefore Lenin said during the October days: 'Either death or
catching up with and passing the advanced countries'. We are 50 or 100 years behind the advanced
countries. We must cover this distance within ten years. We must either do that or be trodden under
foot.28
Stalin's speech was addressed to Soviet industrial managers responsible for
achieving the targets of the Five-Year Plan, not to foreign communists gathered in
Moscow for the next session of the Comintern. But to European communists like
Gramsci inclined to think that the policy of the Comintern was too Russian, it
provided a penetrating insight into the 'Russian' mentality of the present
international leader. Gramsci's intellectual and, especially, moral reaction on
reading this speech is a matter of speculation: it must have been very complex
especially in view of the sentimental ties binding him to his Russian wife and
children and the sense of responsibility he felt for their future. Whatever the case,
28 English translation of the full text published in Labour Monthly, March 1931. When Gramsci did not
receive any issues of a review to which he subscribed, as a general rule he always mentioned it in his
letters to Tatiana. There is nothing in the letters to indicate that he did not receive this issue.
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an exchange of words with Riboldi at this time may reflect the impression this
speech made on Gramsci of Stalin as "international" leader
[Riboldi). 'And Stalin? How does he measure up in this respect? Does he follow the tradition of Lenin?'
[Gram sci]. 'You have to remember that Stalin's mentality [habitus mentale] is quite different from
Lenin's. Lenin lived abroad for many years and so possessed an international vision of political-social
problems. This cannot be said of Stalin who stayed in Russia all the time and kept the nationalist
mentality which is expressed in the cult of the 'Great Russians' ... Also in the International Stalin is first a
Russian and then a communist: we have to be careful [bisogna stare attenti ]' 29
Two years later in 1933 Gramsci would try to defend Stalin from exactly the
accusation of "nationalism" which he himself had levelled against him in
conversation with Riboldi in 1931 - an accusation which, he would then say, "does
not get to the heart of the question".3O But for the moment Gramsci had no 'second
thoughts' about describing the mentality revealed in Stalin's speech as "the
nationalist mentality which is expressed in the cult of the 'Great Russians'".
Apart from the differences in the 'mentalities' of the Russian leaders, the
substance of Gramsci's critique of permanent revolution in §7.16 was meant to
apply to the current tactic of frontal attack in Europe. Gramsci argued that the war
of position was the only possible one in Europe at this time and that the united front
was the appropriate tactic for this kind of warfare. Significantly he invokes Lenin in
support of his view, suggesting that this was the 'Leninist' line. Gramsci did not
believe that the capitalist crisis of 1929 marked the start of a new period (the 'third
period') and did not justify a change in international tactics. Any doubts he had on
this score were removed by the results of the German election. The overall relation
of forces revealed by these results "imposed" on the revolutionary class a
defensive war of position for which the united front was the correct tactic. Gramsci
again Cites Krasnov mentioned earlier in §7.10, to describe the nature of the war of
position in Europe, but Krasnov's observation that "armies could rapidly
accumulate endless quantities of munitions" in the West was essentially a
metaphor for politics. Did not the massive and sudden vote of the petty-
bourgeoisie for Hitler and the Nazis in the German election demonstrate how, in
politics as well, "armies could rapidly accumulate endless quantities of munitions"?
29 Ezio Riboldi: VlCende Socialiste (Milan, 1964) p.182. The sequence of Riboldi's recollections
suggests that this exchange was before May 1931.
30 §14.68. Machiavelli, OCIII p.1728-1730. For a contextual analysis of this note, see Chapter 4.
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It seems to me that IIItch understood that a change was necessary from the war of
manoeuvre applied victoriously In the East In 1917 to a war of position which was the only
form possible In the West - where, as Krasnov observes, armies could rapidly accumulate
endless quantities of munitions, and where the social structures were of themselves stili
capable of becoming heavily-armed fortifications. This Is what the formula of the 'United
Front' seems to me to mean, and It corresponds to the conception of a single front for the
Entente under the sole command of Foch.
IIItch, however, did not have time to expand his formula - though It should be borne In mind
that he could only have expanded It theoretically, whereas the fundamental task was a
national one; that Is to say It required a reconnalsssanee of the terrain and Identification
of the elements of trench and fortress represented by the elements of civil SOCiety, etc.
In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; In the
West there was a proper relation between State and civil SOCiety,and when the State
trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The Stata waa only an
outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks:
more or less numerous from one Stata to the naxt, It goes without saying - but this
praclsaly necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each Individual country 31
Gramsci understood that the rise of fascism in Italy in 1921-22 imposed a change of
international tactics and therefore marked the start of a new 'period'. Now, the rise
of fascism in Germany in 1929-30 showed that the nature of the period was
unchanged and so to change tactic at this stage was a mistake. Contextual
analysis shows that his criticisms of the mistakes of Luxemburg and Trotsky had the
opposite political significance from what they appear to have: they were really
criticisms of Stalin.
17.19, 17.21.The Validity of the Idaologlas
After the German elections Gramsci continued his parallel investigations of the
significance of the ideologies and the relation of structure-superstructure. An
important link between the two lines of inquiry was established by the question:
when can an ideology be called a "superstructure"? The answer depended on its
relation to the structure. There is reason to suppose that behind "the mask of
generalisation" Gramsci was thinking of the two ideologies which had met with
success in the elections, communism and fascism or (more to the point)
"Hitlerism". Both were seen as expressions of a "collective will" in the process of
formation, but their significance differed from a structural standpoint. The collective
will represented by communism was grounded in the modern-day structure, in the
world of production, which was, potentially, the foundation of a new civilisation: the
collective will represented by Hitler was more antique in origin and was a
phenomenon frequently observed in the past. In §7.12 Gramsci begins to evolve
31 §7.16, QCII p.865-867 [Translated in SPN p. 236-238].
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a "historicist" distinction between the two ideologies, Communism and Hitlerism,
behind the familiar mask of generalisation.
§7.12 (Extract). Tendency to conformism In the contemporary world, wider and deeper
than In the past: [the] standardisation In the mode of thinking and acting becomes
national or even continental In scope. The economic base of the collective man: big
factories, Taylorlsatlon, rationalisation etc. But did the collective man exist In the past or
not? He existed under the form of charismatic leadership, as Michels would say: that Is, a
collective will was obtained through the Impulse and the Immediate suggestion of a "hero",
a representative man; but this collective will was due to extrinsic factors and was
continually forming and disintegrating. Instead, today's collective man Is formed
essentially from the bottom upwards, on the basis of the position which the collective
occupies In the world of production. The representative man stili has a function even
today In the formation of the collective man but much less than In the past, so much so
that he can disappear without the collective cement crumbing and the whole construction
collapsing.
It Is said that "western scientists consider the psychology of the masses to be nothing
other than the resurgance of the ancient Instlnctl of the primordial horde and thul a
regression to cultural stages left behind long ago"; this statement should be referred to
the so-called "psychology of the crowds", or of the calual multltudel; It II pleudo-
scientific, linked to polltlvlst loclology :2
Further on in §7.19 we find Gramsci putting the same question in a different way.
Here he argues that the Marxist concept of ideology gets distorted because lithe
name ideology is given both to the necessary superstructure of a particular
structure and to the arbitrary elucubrations of particular individuals"
§7 .19. Ideologl.s .....
It II therefore neceslary to dlstlngullh between historically organic Ideologies, Ie, tho••
which are neceslary to a given structure, and Ideologies that are arbitrary, rationalistic,
'willed'. To the extent that Ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity that
Is 'psychological'; they 'organlse' human malses, and create the terrain on which men
move, acquire conlcloulne.. of their position, Itruggle, etc. To the extent that they are
arbitrary they only create Individual 'movements', polemics, and so on (though even th•••
are not completely useless, since they function like an error which by contrasting with
truth, demonstrate It).:m
Which of these alternatives did he apply to Hitlerism? The question was directly
related to Gramsci's developing analysis of the charismatic leader in politics. To
describe the ideology as 'Hitlerism' implied that it merely consisted of "the arbitrary
elucubrations of a particular individual". Indeed, Gramsci had earlier observed that
a specific feature of the charismatic leader was that he was the "infallible pope" of
32 §7.12. The man-individual and the man-mass, QCII p.862. The Quotation was taken from Rene
Fulop-Miller: /I vono del boscevismo (See Professor Gerratana's note to §7.12 in OCIV p.2751-2752),
one of the books which Gramsci had successfully petitioned to be allowed to read and which was sent
to him by Tatiana at the end of December 1930. Gramsci's analysis implied that, contrary to the
meaning intended by the author, the statement was more appropriately applied to fascism than to
communism.
33 QCII P.868-869.
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the movement's ideology, reserving for himself alone (as the Strasser case of 1930
demonstrated) the role of arbiter in all questions of ideology. What could be more
'arbitrary' than that? Yet how could the 'arbitrary' ideology of an individual have
such wide 'collective' social appeal in the September elections? Didn't this suggest
that it was, after all, "the necessary superstructure of a particular structure"? The
tendency of his analysis was to deny that Hitlerism had any "permanenf' structural
basis or validity: the essential feature of this type of collective will was its
"impermanence", it was continually forming and disintegrating. But how did it form
in the first place?
Gramsci did not deny the "psychological" validity of Hitlerism and its power to
"organise" the human masses: the election result was proof enough of that. Indeed,
it was precisely at this time that Gramsci was writing in another notebook about
"the transformation in the psychology of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois
nationalists" in Germany since the death of Stresemann in 1929. This formulation
seemed to give the change of psychology "permanent" social significance, but if
Hitlerism was seen as the expression of "dying classes" its foundations were less
permanent than they appeared. On the other hand, the psychology of crowds,
which certainly played a key role in the mass appeal of Hitler, was considered a
"transitory" phenomenon, to do with the "casual multitudes".
A further aspect of the validity of the ideologies was the question of their "solidity".
In §7.21 Gramsci starts to develop this aspect by returning to the arsenal of
concepts contained in Marx's writings. His purpose was to probe the solidity of the
popular "belief" in Hitler and to assess what difference this popular belief, which
had formed with such lightning speed, now made to the analysis of the situation in
Germany, ie, to the material relations of force.
17.21. Validity of the Ideo/ogle.. Rememberthe affirmation frequently made by M.rx .bout
'the .olldlty of popul.r belief.' •• • nec.... ry element of • particular .Ituatlon. Whathe
eay. more or lau I. 'when thl. w.y of conceiving thing. ha. the foree of popul.r ballef.'
etc (Look up the.e quotation. and analy.. them In the context In which he expre.aed
them). Another of Marx'. affirmation. I. that a popular conviction often has the .ame
energy •• a material force or .omethlng of the kind, which I. extremely .Ignlflcant. The
.naly.l. of theae propo.ltlon. tend., I think, to reinforce the conception of historical bloc
In which precl.ely the material fore.. are the content .nd the Ideologle. are the form,
although thl. dl.tlnctlon betweenform and content ha. a purely didactic value .Ince the
mater'.' fore.. would be Inconceivablehl.torlcally without form and the Ideologl.. would
be Individual whim. without the material forc....
34 QCII p.869.
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These notes raise more questions than they answer. but the questions give a clear
enough idea of the tendency of Gramsci's thinking. Whilst acknowledging that
Hitlerism had become a "material force", Gramsci is sceptical about how long it will
last. He does not think that it is a "historically organic ideology" because it has no
permanent, structural basis; unlike communism it was not the necessary
expression of a class with an essential function in production. Its "psychological"
validity has more to do with the transitory psychology of crowds, of the "casual
multitudes" who had fallen temporarily under spell of a charismatic "hero".
§6.90, §6.97. Demogogy In a time of Financial Panic
During the summer of 1931 Gramsci studied the movements of structure-
superstructure in Germany with an eye to the possible relation between them. He
applied the first principles set out in §4.38 and §7.24. According to the first of these
there are two kinds of structural 'movement' which should be taken into account in
assessing superstructural phenomena: the occasional and the permanent. "The
occasional leads to political analysls and is useful for judging political groups and
personalities; the permanent leads to social-historical analysis and is useful for
judging the big social groups".35
The financial crisis in Germany in the summer of 1931 was an example of an
'occasional' movement of the structure. It started in Austria in May, then spread to
Germany in June-July, before moving on to Britain in August-September where it
brought down the Labour Government. The most obvious 'trace' of this crisiS in the
notes is §6.90. Psychology and Politics.
§6.90. P.ychology and PolitIc •. The word 'psychology' II often uled, elpeclally In perloda
of financial crilla, as If It wal the effective caUle of certain marginal phenomena.
Psychology (lOIS of confidence, panic etc). But what does 'psychology' mean In thll
Instance? It la really a fig-leaf for polltICI, le, for a certain political altuatlon. Since
'polltlca' la uaually understood al the action of the parliamentary factlonl, partlel,
newspapera, and generally any courae of action which Is carried on In a planned and
public way, the word 'plychology' II used to deecrlbe elementary ma.a phenomena which
are neither planned nor organlaed nor vl.lbly directed and which expo.e a break In the
loclal bloc between the rulers and the rUled. By 'psychological pr.. lurea' like th8le the
latt.r .xp..... their lack of confld.nce In the lead.r. and d.mand that the people In
charge of financial (and therefore economic) a"alrs and their pollcle. be changed. Saver.
do not Invest their savings or withdraw them from certain ventur .. which 188m particularly
risky etcj they are content with minimum Intereat and even with no Int.re.t at allj
sometime. they prefer to loae som. of their capital In order to aafeguard the r•• t.
Can theee general crlsel of confidence be pr.vented by 'education'? They are
symptomatic precisely becaUle they are 'generalised' and It la hard to Instil new
35§4.38. Relations between structure and superstructures, QCIp.4SS.
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confidence when they are 'generalised'. The frequent succession of these psychological
crises Indicates that an organism Is sick, Ie, that the society as a whole has lost the
capacity to produce capable leaders. Hence we are dealing with political crises or rather
soclo-polltlcal crises of the ruling group :IS
The connection between 'occasional' and 'permanent' structural movements
is indicated by Gramsci's concluding remarks. If occasional crises are frequent and
generalised, they are symptomatic of a permanent, "organic" crisis. An organic
crisis means that the social bloc between rulers and ruled is breaking up and that
the ruling group can no longer produce leaders who inspire confidence.
What links did Gramsci see between the financial crisis and "immediate
politics"? The crisis coincided with the plebiscitary campaign initiated by the Nazis
to dissolve the Prussian parliament, the fortress of German social democracy. In
fact, by the time the plebiscite was held on 9 August the financial panic had begun
to subside and a calmer mood was returning. The plebiscite failed to gather
sufficient votes to achieve its goal but not without inflicting further damage on the
increasingly fragile democratic system: some 10 million Germans had voted 'yes'
to the Nazi initiative. An interesting trace of the Prussian plebiscite can be found in
the observations on 'demagogy' in §6.97. Great Ambition and Petty Ambitions.
These observations about ambition could and and should be linked up with others about
so-called demogogy. Demogogy means several things: In the perJoratlve sense It means
using the popular masses, by knowingly exciting and feeding their passions, for one's own
petty ambitions (parllamentarlsm and electioneering provide a favourable terrain for this
particular kind of demogogy which culminates In Caesarlsm and Bonapartlsm with
plebiscitary regimes). But If the leader does not regard the masses .s a servile
Instrument, useful to achieve his own ends and then to be discarded; If he alms to achieve
organic political alms, which the masses themselves must nece.. arlly accomplish, lf he
carries out constructive 'constituent' work, then the demogogy Is of a higher order. The
masses have to be helped to ralae themeelvee up by raising up single lnellvldlals and
entire 'cultural' strata. The Inferior type of demogogue presents himself as Irreplaceable,
creates a deaert around himself, systematically crushes and eliminates possible
competitors, eeeks direct contact with the masses (plebisCites etc, great orstory,
spectacular stunts, the whole hallucinatory, choreographlcal apparatus: this Is what
Mlche', has called the 'charismatic leader') rr
The context suggests that Gramsci's remarks about "the inferior type Of
demogogue" referred to Hitler. The financial crisis was interpreted as expressing
the masses' lack of confidence in the present government and its policies. They
were demanding a change of leaders. The plebiscitary campaign gave the
36 §6.90, OCII p.767-768.
37 §6.97, OCII p. rn-rrz.
150
'demogogic' Hitler the opportunity to offer himself as the solution to the leadership
crisis of the ruling group. However, the plebiscite failed and the possibility
mentioned in Gramsci's sources that Hitler might use the plebiscitary campaign to
launch a German 'March on Rome' did not materialise.
§6.123, §6.130. Conjunctural or Organic Crisis?
Gramsci's studies of the economic crisis in 1931 led him to change the terminology
he used for 'occasional-permanent' movements of the structure and to introduce
the terms 'conjunctural-organic' crises. The catalyst for this change was the articles
of Gino Arias, editor of the review Economia . In May Arias had represented Fascist
Italy at a special session of the League of Nations to discuss the causes of the
world economic crisis. In an article in the June issue of Gerarchia written before
the financial crisis, Arias summarised the "decisively anti-conjunctural, organic
interpretation" of the current crisis which he had put forward at the League of
Nations conference.
The description of the 'cyclical phase' or 'conjuncture' , however accurate, is only the starting-point of
the study of the crisis. But we must then ask: is the world suffering from a cyclical depression
analagous to those which occured many times before the war or are we faced instead with an organic
or 'structural' crisis, a real crisis of the whole economy (organismo economico )138
Arias pointed out that structural crises develop over a long period - "about a
generation" - and invest all aspects of the economy."Perhaps it is too soon to say,
but I am fully convinced that the present crisis appears to be the most acute phase
of a real structural crisis, the start of which can be traced back to the immediate
post-war period. I would not like to say whether it will be resolved rapidly or
slowly" .39 Although his long-term prognosis for recovery was quite pessimistic,
Arias was quite optimistic about the short-time prospects: "Are the present signs of
recovery, as we hope, the precursors of a new favourable conjuncture? But if the
present crisis is a crisis of the structure, of the whole economy, can the favourable
conjuncture which seems to be imminent be regarded as a definitive end of the
crisis?"4O
38 Gino Arias: 'II significato storicodellacrisi economica', GER, June 1931, p.482.
39 ibid., p.482.
40 ibid., p.484.
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Gramsci must have noted Arias' untimely error of judgement in suggesting that a
'favourable conjuncture' was imminent at the very moment when the European
financial crisis was beginning. The error served to focus Gramsci's attention on
Arias' confusing use of the term 'conjuncture' which at one paint was taken to mean
the same as 'cyclical phase' and at another was used to mean something like
'favourable moment'. We know from §7.41, which was written at this time, that
Gramsci regarded the slipshod use of terminology as the hallmark of the "pseudo-
theoretical affirmations of Gino Arias" and his school.41 Gramsci now adopted the
same pair of terms as Arias, 'conjunctural-organic' crisis, but not before he had
redefined them more exactly for his own analytical purposes. In particular,
observation of the financial crisis during the summer months had impressed on him
the rapid speed and short duration of the 'conjuncture'.
16.130. EncyclopaedIc Id•••• ConJunctur•. Origin of the expreaalon: this helps to
understand the concept better. In Italian It equala economic fluctuation. It I. connected
with the phenomenaof the post-war period which occured very rapidly In time. (In Italian
the term 'congluntura' stili has the meaning of 'favourable or unfavourable (economic)
moment'. What la the difference between 'situation' and 'conJuncture'? The conjuncture
would be the whole complex of Immediateand tranaltory features of the economic
situation: the latter concept must therefore be undertstood .s referring to the most
fundamental and permanent featur.. of the situation Itself. Hence the study of the
conjuncture la more cloaely linked to Immediate polltlca, to tactics <andto agitation),
whilst the 'situation' la linked to strategy and to propagandaetc)e
Gramsci's critical encounter with Arias was not limited to matters of terminology. In
a further article in the August issue of Gerarchia, this time written in the light of the
financial crisis in Germany, Arias remained undeterred by his mistake and restated
his structural or 'organic' interpretation of the current crisis.
I have already observed .....that the economic and financial vicissitudes of Germany in the past decade
are rooted in a phenomenon which predates the current crisis by far and is one of its causes even
though few economists have paid much attention to it: ie, the disequilibrium which still exists today
between saving and consumption, or rather between the quota of income which is saved and the
quota consumed. In a certain sense, the world crisis can be defined as a crisis of over-consumption,
and its moral causes are all too apparent (on this see Jannaccone's 'Reply to the questions about the
crisis' in the March issue of Economia ). In the countries ruined by the inflation this phenomenon
assumed huge proportions and virtually created a new mentality which still exists today and won't
easily disappear 43
Gramsci accepted Arias' invitation. He turned back to the articles in the March issue
of Economia devoted entirely to 'The world economic depression' which had
41§7.41.Economics, QCII p.890.
42 §6.130. Encyclopaedic Ideas. Conjuncture, QCII p. 797.
43Gino Arias: 'Problemi Economici Mondiali', GER, August 1931, p.647.
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already been sent to him and wrote §6.123. Past and Present. Observations on the
Crisis of 1929-30-? 44 This was Gramsci's first attempt in the notebooks to analyse
the causes of the economic crisis. He did not redraft it but instead made a second
attempt at causal analysis later in §15.05, written at the start of 1933. In view of his
reputation as the 'theorist of the superstructures', it is of particular interest to see
how Gramsci approached this task.
He started by stating Jannaccone's view that the crisis arose not from under- but
from over-consumption. The crisiS was caused by
a profound and probably far from transitory disturbance In the dynsmlc equilibrium
between the quota of national Income consumed, the quota of national Income saved, and
the rhythm of production needed to maintain unchanged or to progressively raise the
standard of living of a population which Is Increasing at a given rata of net Increas •. The
breakdown of this equilibrium can occur In a variety of ways: expansion of the national
Income consumed at the expense of the quota saved and reinvested for future production;
decrease In the rate of productivity of capital, Increase In the rate of net growth of
population. In other words, at a certain point average Individual Income becomes constant
Instead of Increasing, then progressively decreases Instead of remaining constant. This
Is the point when crises break out. The diminution of the average Income brings about a
contraction of consumption, both absolutely and relatively, and consequently further
contractions of production etc
The world crisis was therefore a "crisis of saving" and could only be overcome by
increasing the quota of national income saved for investment. Gramsci found
Jannaccone's observations "undoubtedly acute". His analysis of the economy as a
"dynamic equilibrium" between a number of competing "tendencies" answered to
Gramsci's strongly anti-economistic understanding of Marxism. The main thrust of
this note, however, was his refutation of the "purely tendentious and partly silly"
conclusions which Arias drew from Jannaccone's thesis. In answer to the question
"what is the reason for this over-consumption?" Arias argued that it was due to the
policy of high wages followed by a number of countries, above all the United
States. Gramsci questioned this:
Can It be proved that the working masses have raised their standard of living to such an
extent that It represents overconsumption? In other words, has the relation batween
wages and proflta become catastrophic for profits? This could not be demonstrated
statistically, not even for America.
Gramsci then came to his own 'hypothesis' about the causes of the structural crisis.
Whilst accepting Jannaccone's view of the "crisis of saving", he argued (in accord
with first principles) that its origins were historical in nature:
44 §S.123. QCII p.792-793. All quotations from this source.
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Arias 'neglects' a 'historical' element of some importance: In the distribution of national
income, especially via commerce and the stock exchange, has It not happened that a
category of 'wlthdrawers' (pre/ev. tori ) has appeared In the postwar period (or at least
Increased In comparison with the preceding period) which does not have any necessary or
Indispensable productive function yet absorbs a considerable quota of national Income?
Gramsci immediately runs into difficulty, with one parenthesis after another, as he
tries to identify and define this category. For example, to describe this category by
the most general term, "the non-wage earners", failed to account for "the category
of [wage-earning] workers employed in the service of the social categories which
are absolutely unproductive and parasinc". Even accepting the general heading of
"the non-wage earners" Gramsci recognised the difficulty of measuring statistically
the quota of national income absorbed by them. The most positive idea for
measurement he suggests was a statistical 'snapshot' of the economically active
population. "A relation between 'employed' workers and the rest of the population
would provide the image of the 'parasitic' weight which rests on production".
Without really resolving these difficulties, Gramsci nevertheless concluded:
The category of unproductive parasltel, In both the absolute and relative sense, hal
grown enormously In the postwar period and thll II the category which devours lavlngs.ln
European countries It II even greater than In America atc. The causes of the crilis
therefore are not moral (enJoymenta etc) or political In nature but aoclo-economlc, Ie, of
the same character al the crilis ltaelf: society creates Its own pOisons by having to
provide a living for ma.. es of tha population (not Just unemployed wag.earners) who
Impede lavlngl and thus break the dynamic equilibrium.
Again, Gramsci's thesis raises more questions than it answers. For example, how
appropriate was it to categorise a mass of the population as 'parasitic' whilst
rejecting the view that the causes of the crisis were 'moral' in nature? How could
the category of unproductive parasites be defined with any degree of rigour if thei r
parasitism was 'relative' as well as absolute? How could the thesis be 'tested'
without specifying which social categories were parasitic and without knowing what
quota of national income they consumed? Whilst acknowledging in a later note that
"the concept of 'paraSitic' needs to be accurately defined", it was central to his
thinking from the very start of the notebooks.
Palt and Prelant
The Ruin of the Middle Classes in Germany
The thesis tentatively put forward in §6.123 stems from Gramsci's first notes on
Americanism in Notebooks 1 and 3. In these he analysed the attempts in postwar
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Europe to introduce 'rationalised' systems of production as theorised by Ford,
Taylor, and others in relation to the automobile industry. The precondition of
Americanism according to these notes was
'the rationalisation of the population', ie, that numerous classes with no function in the world of
production, ie, absolutely parasitic classes, do not exist. The European 'tradition' is characterised
precisely by the existence of such classes made up of social elements like the civil service, the clergy
and intellectuals, landed property, commerce. The older a country's history, the more these elements
have left behind over the centuries residues of idle people who live off the 'pension' left by their
ancestors. Statistics of these social elements are very difficult to work out because it is very hard to
find the 'heading' which can cover them all.46
Gramsci convincingly identified and analysed these parasitic elements in Italian
society but added that "this situation is not only found in Italy but to a considerable
extent throughout Europe, more so in southern less so in northern Europe".46 How,
then, did this analysis apply to the countries of northern Europe?
The case of Germany is interesting because this was where the introduction of
'Americanism' in the postwar period seemed to go furthest, ie, where the brutal
precondition of 'rationaliSing the population' and hence of eliminating the
unproductive classes left over by 'tradition', seemed to become a real process. In
this connection Gramsci was interested in an impression of Pirandello's in an
interview of April 1929 (ie, before the Wall Street Crash) on the alleged opposition
which Americanism encountered in Paris in contrast to its immediate, enthusiastic
reception in Berlin. "In Berlin you do not feel the gap between the old and the new
Europe because the very structure of the city offers no resistance". 47 At first
Gramsci took the remark at face value and offered the following 'structural'
explanation for Berlin's supposed lack of 'resistance':
In Berlin the middle classes were already ruined by the war and the inflation and German industry was
more highly developed than the French. By contrast the French middle classes did not suffer
(occasional) crises like the German inflation nor an organic crisis, much more rapid than normal, arising
from the introduction and (sudden) diffusion of a new method production.
Gramsci's explanation seemed to suggest that the war and the inflation, by ruining
the middle classes, had broken down the resistance of the German 'tradition' to
45 §1.61. Ameroianism, QCI p.70
46 ibid. p.71.
47 §3.11. Americanism, QCI p.296. Gramscl's source was 'Pirandello parla della Germania, del cinema
sonoro e di altre cose' (corrispondenza da Bertino di Corrade Alvaro) in L'ltaIiaietteraria, 14 April 1929.
OCIV p.2S77.
48 ·bidI .,p.297.
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Amercanism. They would therefore have been a sudden, traumatic way of
"rationalising the population", destroying the 'old' unproductive classes and
creating the conditions for Americanism. By this he meant the 'rationalisation
movement' in German industry in the 1920s financed by American capital.49 This
would explain why Gramsci could assert that "what is called Americanism today is,
to a very large extent, a phenomenon of social panic, dissolution, and despair of
the old strata who are destined to be crushed by the new order.. ...".50
Pirandello could not tell the difference, however, between the ideology and the
reality of Americanism in Germany. When Gramsci redrafted these notes on
Americanism in 1934 (ie, after the advent of the Third Reich) he was more sceptical
about the reality of Pirandello's remark, adding in parenthesis: "(Pirandello could
not say the same today, so it must be understood that he is referring to the Berlin of
the nightclubs)" and dropping his reference to the rationalisation movement of the
1920s.51 The correction implied that the "resistance" of the German "tradition- to
Americanism was greater in reality than Pirandello's superficial impression of 1929
had suggested. The advent of the Third Reich was testimony to this.
Gramsci probably realised that his perspective on the 1920s, linking inflation with
rationalisation, was too schematic and too 'German'. Nevertheless, his view of the
"revolutionising" social effects of inflation was constant. This can be seen by
contrasting the fate of the German and the British middle classes in the post-
inflation period. An interesting insight into his perspective on this can be found in
an observation in §5.86. England where Britain had avoided the crisis of 'tradition'
experienced by Germany:
Besides, the immediate return to the Gold Standard meant that England avoided the social crises
caused by the transfers of property and the lightning ruin of the petty-bourgeois middle classes. In a
traditionalist, conservative country like England, with its ossified social structure, what would have
been the results of the phenomena of inflation, fluctuation, and devaluation of the currency?
Certainly, much more serious than in other countries. III
Gramsci's remarks on the reaction of 'traditional' Europe to Amercanism raise
many interesting questions. As far as Germany's "reaction" is concerned, they
49 The reality of the "rationalisation boom" in German Industry in the1920s isdiscussed in the section
'The mania about the rationalisation mania' in Harold James: The German Slump. Politics and
Economics 1924-1936 (OXford, 1987) p.146-161.
50 ibid., p.296.
51 §22.1S. American and European Civilisation, QCIII p.2178.
52 §S.86. Eng/and, QCI p.615-616. Written November 193Q-March 1931.
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involve a number of questionable assumptions. How far could the German middle
classes be equated with 'old strata' left over by the German 'tradition'? How far
were the German middle classes ruined by the inflation, which wiped out debts as
well as savings? How far did the enthusiastic reception of Americanism in Berlin
determine an even stronger reaction against it in 'small town' Germany? The
answer to these questions depended on defining the German 'middle classes' but
Gramsci conspicuously avoided doing this.53 Perhaps this was no accident given
the highly differentiated character of the German middle classes, including the so-
called 'old' and 'new' Mitte/stand, and given their disintegration in this period as a
homogeneous class. The few indications about Germany in Gramsci's notes on
Americanism do not amount to anything like a theory, but they do point in the
direction of the classic interpretation of National Socialism as an expression of the
"crisis of modernity".
12.75 (II), 14.69, 17.77: The Crisis of Parties
On 3 August Gramsci reported to Tatiana having received and read Mortara's
Prospettive Economiche for 1931 but noted that "this year's volume seems to me to
mark a change of approach by the author compared to previous editions. The
economic crisis with all its frightening, unpredictable consequences must have
contributed to Mortara's new attitude. Whatever the case, such a radical change
from one year to another is scientifically scandalous" 54
His passing comment on "the frightening, unpredictable consequences" of the
economic crisis caught the climate of financial panic in the summer months of
1931. The same atmosphere was captured in his analysis of the charismatic party
§2.75 (ii) which he returned to at this time probably under the impression of Hitler's
plebiscitary campaign in Prussia. Gramsci now resumed the critical commentary on
Michels' Political Parties which he started a year earlier. He now decided that
there was no such category as charismatic 'parties', only charismatic
'personalities' .
The charismatic leader can belong to any kind of party, whether authoritarian or anti-
authoritarian (granted that anti-authoritarian parties exist, as parties. Indeed, It often
happens that anti-authoritarian, anarchist, anarcho-syndlcallst 'movementa' become
53Cf. §5.119. Encyclopaedia of polnical, philosophical concepts etc. Middle Class, QCI p.638-639.
where the meaning of the term in English, French, and Italian, but not German is examined.
54 To Tatiana, 3August 1931, Lell p.441. [Gramscl wrote-July" by mistake. He was writing on the day
of the first big crisis of his health, when he coughed up a lot of blood].
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'party' because the group comes together around personalities who are organisationally
'irresponsible', In a certain sense 'charismatic').
Michels' classification of parties Is very superficial and dogmatic, being based on
external and generic features: 1) 'Charismatic' parties, Ie, groups forming around certain
personalities with rudimentary programmes, and which are based on the faith and authority
of one Individual.
(There's no evidence of any parties of this type. At particular momenta certain more or
less exceptional personalities represent and express certain Interests. At certain
moments of 'permanent anarchy' caused by the static equilibrium of the conflicting forc .. ,
one man personifies 'order', Ie, the breaking of the deadlock by exceptional methods, and
all the 'frightened ones', all the 'rabid sheep' of the petty-bourgeoisie flock to his Iide.
Nevertheless, he does have a programme, however vague: Indeed, It la vague precisely
because It merely alms to reatore the external pOlitical casing of a SOCiety In crlals. The
crlsla It la passing through la not a real constitutional crisis but merely a crisis ariling
from having too much discontent. The sheer numbers of discontented, and the
simultaneous (but mechanically simultaneous) demonstration of discontent throughout the
nation, makes them difficult to control") 55
The guiding thread of this analysis - the notion of "the man of order" who breaks the
deadlock by exceptional methods - derived from Marx's classic analysis of the
'similar' political situation in France inThe Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
Gramsci was not the only marxist, of course, to apply the concept of 'Bonapartism'
to the rise of fascism in Italy and Germany but in his case the 'exceptional' solution
is integrated into a wider dialectical conception, first outlined in §1.4B, of the
breakdown of hegemony 'normally' exercised via the parliamentary regime. The
specific emphasis of this analysis is that exceptional force cannot be used any
more unless public consent is first prepared.
The success of Hitler and the Nazis in the elections of September 1930 indicated
that the crisis in Germany would be resolved by exceptional methods. Events now
provided Gramsci with the chance to contrast this with the 'normal' method of
solving the crisis. This was the British general election on 27 October 1931. As we
saw, Gramsci followed the election campaign in the Manchester Guardian Weekly
which reported the result on 30 October. The massive victory of the National
Government which was returned to power with a majority of 500 may have been
unprecedented, but Gramsci regarded this 'parliamentary' solution of the crisis of
parties as normal. The contrast - Germany-September 1930 - Britain-October 1931
- was theorised in §4.69. On the Parties.
At a certain point In the historical proceaa cia.... break away from their tradltlo .. 1
partleli In other words the traditional parties, given their particular organisational form
and the particular men who personify and lead them, cease to repre.. nt their cl .. 1or
fraction of their cia... Thll II the mOlt delicate and dangerous kind of crlsl. because It
opene the door to providential or charismatic men. A situation arl... In which the
55 §2.75 (Ii) A.Mlchels ... The second part starts from the paragraph: -Ucapo carismatico puo
appartenere a qualsiasi partito .... ." QCI p.234-239.
158
representatives and the represented are at odds with each other, and when something like
this occurs in the province of private organisations (parties and trade unions), It cannot
but be reflected In the State where the power of the bureaucracy (In a broad sense:
military and clvU) Is consequently strengthened to a formidable degree. How then does
such a situation arise?
The process differs from one country to another although Its content Is the same. The
crisis Is dangerous when It spreads to all the parties and all the classes, when, In other
words, the rank-and-fUe of one or more parties does not pass over very speedily to a party
which better expresses their general Interests. The latter Is an organic (normal)
phenomenon even If the speed with which It happens Is extremely rapid In comparison with
normal periods: It signifies the fusion of a class under a single leadership In order to solve
a dominant lIfe-or-death problem. If the crisis Is not solved In an organic way like this but
by means of the providential man, It means that a static equilibrium exists. This Is when
no class, neither the conservative nor the progressive, Is strong enough to win and even
the conservative class needs a master58
While the fascist sources played up the size of the defeat suffered by the Labour
Party, Gramsci was just as interested in the crisis of the Liberal Party. A week
before the election the editorial of the Manchester Guardian Weakly argued that
the outcome lay in the hands of the Liberal voter who faced "the difficult duty of
making up his mind between voting Labour and voting (in effect and without
disguise) TOry".S7 With the result declared it was clear that in spite of the editor's
advice to vote Labour, "the Liberal vote has gone almost unitedly for the
Governmenf'.58 In other words, Liberals voted for Conservative candidates in
'National' disguise.
Gramsci theorised the result of the British general election as "the fusion of a class
under a single leadership to solve a dominant, life-or-death problem". He meant
the fusion of the British middle class under the leadership of the National
Government with a "doctor's mandate" to take all necessary measures to deal with
the economic crisis. This fusion was 'organic' in the sense that the new leadership
was the political expression of the interests of the class it represented. This was in
contrast to the solution by means of the charismatic leader who (as we learned
from §6.97) does not pursue 'organic' political ends but "regards the masses as a
servile instrument, useful to achieve his own ends and then to be discarded".
Pa.t and Present
The 'Elective Dictatorship' in Britain
The massive majority of the National Government in Britain was not only due to the
blurring of party differences by the 'National' label but also to the absence of
5614.69, QCI p. 513.
57 Editorial 'The Uberal Vote', MGW, 23 October 1931.
58 Editorial 'The Tory Parliament', MGW, 30 October 1931.
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proportionality in the British electoral system, in marked contrast to the German
system. Gramsci was already familiar with the mechanics of Britain's 'elective
dictatorship' from an article by the historian Ramsey Muir, the Liberal party
chairman, which had appeared in November 1930 when the electoral reform bill
came before Parliament. Gramsci found the liberal critique of elective dictatorship
interesting and began to link it with the marxist concept of Bonapartism.
§6.40. Past and Present. The English government. An interesting article by Ramsey Muir on the
English system of government appeared in the issue of Nineteenth Century for November 1930
[reported in Rassegna settimanale della stamps esters, 9 December 1930]. Muir argues that it is not
possible to speak of a parliamentary regime in England because Parliament has no control over the
government and the civil service; it is only possible to speak of a party dictatorship and, what is more,
an inorganic dictatorship since power alternates between extreme parties. Discussion in Parliament Is
not what it should be, ie, discussion by [a) Council of State, but discussion by parties who compete for
the support of the electorate at the next election either by promises on the government's part or by
discrediting the government on the opposition's part. The deficiencies of the English system of
government have been cruelly exposed in the postwar period with its great problems of
reconstruction and adjustment to the new situation ....... Muir traces the origin of the party dictatorship
to the electoral system which has no alternative vote (ballottaggio ) and, in particular, no proportional
representation; this makes it hard to achieve compromises or to hold moderate opinions (or at the very
least it forces the parties into an internal opportunism worse than parliamentary compromise). Muir
does not comment on other phenomena: there is a small group inside the government which
dominates the whole cabinet and also one personality who exercises a Bonapartist functions
The electoral reform bill on which the Liberals pinned their hopes was lost when
MacDonald's Labour government resigned in August. Now the Manchester
. Guardian Weekly observed that Labour must be regretting that it did not bring the
Alternative Vote bill forward sooner.
And what is Labour thinking now of its scorn for electoral reform? It now finds itself in a much worse
position than the Uberal Party did after the last election [ie, 1929]. Its representation in the House is
ludicrously disproportionate to its strength in the country. For its 51 members It has a voting strength
of close on 7,000,000. The Uberals at the last election got 58 members for 5,000,000 votes cast.
Today the Uberals, for a little under 2,000,000 votes, secure 63 seats. A violent swing of opinion
always exaggerates the inherent unfairness of the present electoral system.eo
The liberal critique claimed that Britain's electoral system produced an "inorganic"
dictatorship since power alternated between "extreme parties" which did not
represent the majority of 'middle England'. However, the passing of the Liberal
rank-and-file into the Conservative camp in October 1931 seems to have
59 §6.40, Qell p714-715. Note that Gramsci wrote this note on Britain between §6.35 and §6.42 in
which we find the first traces of the election result in Germany In 1930.
60 Under the heading 'Members and Votes', MGW, 30 October 1931
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persuaded Gramsci (judging from §4.69 ) that the National Government was an
"organic" dictatorship of the British middle class.
*
The crisis of parties was further examined in §7.77. The Political Parties. The
Intellectuals, the 'twin' note of §4.69. Here Gramsci turns his attention from the
mass base to the leaders, who are significantly described as "the intellectuals". He
introduces a new concept to describe an essential quality of leadership in times of
crisis: this was tempestivita or tempismo, or the "ability to change with the times".
One of the most Important questions about pOlitical parties Is their 'ability to ride the
storm' (tempestlvlt. ) or 'aptitude to change with the times' (tamplsmo ) or how they react
against the spirit of 'habit' and the tendencies to become anachronistic and mummified.
In practice parties arise (as organisations) after historical events of Importance for the
social groups they represent. But they are not always capable of adapting to naw epoch.
or historical phases, they are not always capable of developing In step with the
development of the global relations of force (and hence the relative relations) In the
particular country or In the International field. This line of research must distinguish
between: the social group; the party's mass membarshlp; the party's bureaucracy or
general staff. Force of habit Is most dangerous In the last of these: If the party Is
organised as an autonomous, self-sufficient establishment, It will end up becoming
anachronistic. This Is when crises of parties occur, when all of a sudden they lose their
historic social base and end up 'suspended In mid-air': this Is what has happened In
Germany especially as a result of the expansion of Hltlerlsm. The tendency of political
organisations to become anachronistic can be studied most profitably In French parties:
born as a result of the Revolution of '89 and the movements which followed, their leader.
go on repeating an obsolete terminology which enables them to keep the old base In tact
whilst they make compromises with forces of a quite different and often hostile character
serving the Interests of the plutocracy 01
The bureaucratic (or "oligarchical") tendency of modern political parties was, of
course, the main argument of Michels' study of Political Parties, but the specific
concept of tempismo probably came from Trotsky's polemics of 1923-24, TheNew
Course and Lessons of October. Trotsky attacked the bureaucratic spirit which
was taking hold of communist parties everywhere, starting from the Russian party,
and argued that the bureaucratic mentality, the spirit of habit, explained why the
German communist leaders failed to change tactics and missed the revolutionary
moment in 1923. Gramsci now turned tempestivita or tempismo, the leadership's
ability 'to ride the storm', 'to change with the times', from a polemical weapon into a
scientific concept. He applied Trotsky's concept used in relation to the German Left
in 1923, to the German Right after 1929: in other words, he tested its 'objective'
validity for both sides. How exactly did he apply it to the 'other side'?
61§7.n, QCII p.910.
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Unusually Gramsci refers directly in this note to "what had happened in Germany
as a result of the expansion of Hitlerism", which enables us to read his mind more
reliably. The Nazis or 'Hitlerites' responded more speedily than any other party in
Germany to the new historical phase starting in October 1929. They showed
exceptional ability "to ride the storm" of the crisis and to harness the mass
movement which it set in motion. Their ability to improvise and adapt organisation
and propaganda to rapidly changing circumstances on the ground and to a wide
range of different social groups is well attested. In the Reichstag elections of
September 1930 the other right-wing parties were left "suspended in mid-air": the
election data available to Gramsci indicated that mass support for these parties
was halved and between them they lost some 3,000,000 votes to the Nazis.62 As
far as the People's Party (DVP), the moderate nationalists,were concerned, their
failure to adapt to the new crisis could be attributed to the untimely death of their
leader Stresemann whose "ability to ride the storm" had been proved during the
inflation crisis of 1923. Gramsci's thesis was primarily aimed, however, at the
-- - - ---
Nationalist Party (DNVP), the conservative nationalists, led by the 'reactionary'
Hugenburg. On taking over the leadership in 1928, Hugenburg deliberately
organised the leadership as an oligarchy, "an autonomous, self-sufficient
establishmenf which simply ignored the party's 'historical' social base in the
eastern countryside. Consequently the rank-and-file broke away from their
"historical" party in the elections of September 1930 and turned to the Nazis for
leadership, although when the expansion of Hitlerism reached its limit in the
election of November 1932, the old historical bloc proved to be more permanent
than it appeared to be in 1930.
Pa.t and Pr... nt
As the title of §7.n. The Political Parties. The Intellectuals indicates, two main
threads of Gramsci's thinking converge in this note: his analysis of political parties
and his account of the traditional intellectuals.
The analysis of political parties started from an element of French politics first
mentioned in §1.18. Maurras' error. Notes on the French monarchist party which
was useful also for analysing German politics. This was a category of political party
62 See the table showing changes in the popular vote of the major parties between 1928 and 1930 in
Giuseppe Bevione: 'II Trionfo di Hitler', GER, September 1930, p. 706. This was one of the issues of
Gersrchia for the second haHof 1930 which was unaccountably delayed but which Gramsci eventually
received in February 1931.
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which particularly interested him and which he did not find in Michels' typology, ie,
"republican parties in monarchist regimes, like monarchist parties in republican
regimes and nationalist parties in regimes of national subjection".63 Gramsci made
a study of Maurras' Action Francaise and thought of Hugenburg's party, "a
monarchist party in a republican regime", as a party of the same type (although the
imposition of the Versailles Treaty on Germany also made it "a nationalist party in a
regime of national subjection"). The tendency to become 'anachronistic' was
particularly marked in this type of party because its monarchist ideology
necessitated 'opposition in principle' to the republican system in which it existed
and operated. Whenever it tended to come to terms with the reality of the
republican system and thus to "change with the times", it compromised its
principles and consequently tended to split. On the other hand, whenever the
leaders stuck rigidly to abstentionism or "opposition in principle" as Hugenburg did,
they neglected the party's mass base whose real interests were best served by
participating in the 'interest' politics of the republic. As a monarchist party in a
republican regime, therefore, the "force of habir in Hugenburg's party was rooted
not only in the oligarchical tendency of the leading group but also in its stubborn
attachment to a traditional ideology which was increasingly "anachronistic". The
multiple splits in Hugenburg's party in 1929-30 were the most obvious symptom of
the wider crisis of hegemony of the old ruling elite or 'traditional intellectuals'.
However, Gramsci realised that the residual power of the 'traditional intellectuals'
in the German republic was located not in the political parties but in the State, in
the military and civil bureaucracy. His awareness of this was expressed in 'Italian'
language in §3.119 which, it will be recalled, was written during the transition to the
'presidential dictatorship' in Germany in 1930. Here he described a state of affairs
whereby the State actively worked against the political parties, by disintegrating
them and detaching them from the masses, in order to produce "a non-party force
linked to the government by paternalistic bonds of a Bonapartist-Caesarist type".
The disintegration of the political parties led to a situation where "the bureaucracy
was estranged from the country and, through its administrative poslnons, became a
true political party, the worst type of all, since the bureaucratic hierarchy replaced
63 §2.75 (ii). "He [Michels] adds two other types of party to these three: confessional parties and
national parties (it would be necessary to add monarchist parties in republican regimes and republican
. parties in monarchist regimes)·. QCI p.235.
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the intellectual and political hierarchy: the bureaucracy became precisely the
State-Bonapartist party".64 Seen in this perspective, Hugenburg's tactic of
'opposition in principle' was dOing the State's work. It was deliberately calculated
to wreck the whole party system of the German republic even at the cost of
wrecking his own party. It is not surprising that Hugenburg was the leading
advocate of a 'presidential dictatorship' under Article 48 of the republican
constitution since this was entirely consistent with his 'wrecking' tactics. Even as
the rank-and-file of his own party were breaking away and turning to Hitler, the
presidential dictatorship he wanted was becoming a reality. This perspective
explains what Gramsci meant in §4.69 by saying that the crisis of parties "cannot
but be reflected in the State where the power of the bureaucracy (in the broad
sense, civil and military) is, in consequence, strengthened to a formidable degree".
17.83 and 17.103. Public Opinion 'Booma'
The liberal critique in the Manchester Guardian Weekly of the National
Government's election campaign in Britain prompted Gramsci to develop one of the
threads of his original account (in §1.48) of the 'normal' exercise of hegemony in
parliamentary regimes: this was the idea of the 'manufacture' public opinion by the
State. Uberal thinking commonly assumes that this is exclusive to dictatorial
regimes where the State has a monopoly of "the so-called organs of public
opinion", but Gramsci's thoughts were immediately suggested by Britain, the
parliamentary State par excellence where no such monopoly existed. So how
does the State create public opinion in parliamentary regimes?
Gramsci now wrote a pair of notes on subject, the first abstract the second
concrete. The first 'situates' public opinion conceptually, in terms of his organising
dialectic of the State-civil society. This dialectic was based on his liberal
interpretation of Hegel (in §1.47) in which, it will be recalled, "the State 'educates'
consent by means of political and syndical associations which are, however,
private organisms left to the private initiative of the ruling class".
t7.83. Encyclopaedic Ide... Public Opinion. So-called 'public opinion' la .trlctly
connected with political hegemony. It I. the point 0' contact between 'civil .oclety' and
'political society'. When the Stat. wanta to Initiate a fairly unpopular cour.. 0' action, It
preventively create. the public opinion It require., I., It organls.. and centrall ... certain
elementa of civil .ocl.ty .....
64§3.119, QCI p. 388.
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Public opinion is the political content of the public political will. This could be divided and
so there is a struggle for the monopoly of the organs of public opinion - newspapers,
parties, Parliament • so that a single force shapes opinion and therefore the national
political will, scattering the opposition voices like so many atoms of dust (disponendo i
discordi in un pulviscolo individuale e disorganico) 85
The State, therefore, 'normally' educates consent by means of the political parties
which are "permanently organised consent". But under conditions of political
democracy the State, especially at election times, manufactures instant consent.
The power to do this depended on the State's 'contact' with elements of civil
SOCiety,such as private newspaper proprietors. According to the Manchester
Guardian Weekly, which was one of the 'opposition voices' in Britain scattered like
atoms of dust in the earthquake of 1931, "we have, firstly, a publicity system which
makes it possible to manufacture public opinion with unprecedented rapidity, and
an electoral system which gives exaggerated representation to the majority thus
manufactured".66 This liberal critique of the British election now found its way into
Gramsci's notes.
17.103. EncycloPlledlc Ide••• Public Opinion. Among the factors which hav. recently
upset the normal control of public opinion by organised parties with well·deflned
programmes, the yellow press and the radio are of primary Importance. They creste the
possibility of stimulating on the spur of the moment bursta ot panic or artificial
enthusiasm a. a m.. ns of achieving certain end., a. In elections for example. All thl. I.
connected with the nature of popular sovereignty, which Is exercised onee every 3,4,5
y.. r.: It I. enough to have the Ideological (or better stili emotive) upper-hand on thlt
particular day to win a majority which will la.t for 3,4,5 year., even If, once the emotion I.
gone, the mass of voters split from their I.gal expresllon (the legal country not being the
lame a. the r.. 1 country). The organism. In the best position to prevent or contain thl.
boom of public opinion are the free trade union. rather than the partl•• and thl. explain.
the effort to .ubordlnate them to Stlte control. Neverthele•• , the .ectlon of public
opinion which I. unorganls.ble (especially women, where women hive the vote) I. 80 great
that the.e boom. and electoral coups are alway. pos.lble wher.ver the yellow pr... and
the radio (under monopoly control of the government) are wld•• pr.. d..••117
The use of the radio by the National Government was a matter of particular
controversy during the British election. Snowden's notorious 'Bolshevism run mad'
broadcast of 17 October fanned the fears of the middle classes about Labour's
programme and spurred them into giving the 'doctor's mandate' which the National
Government demanded. This was probably the example Gramsci had in mind
when he wrote that "when the State wants to initiate a fairly unpopular course of
action, it preventively creates the public opinion required". Snowden's broadcast
65 §7.83. Encyc/opa8dic Ideas. Public Opinion, QCII p.914-915.
66 Editorial: 'A DemocraticTriumph?'in MGW, 6 November 1931.
67 §7.103.Encyclopa8dic Ideas. Public Opinion, QCII p.929-930.
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raised questions about the BBC's independence, particularly about the
government's claim to its monopoly use in times of supposed national cnsts, but
Gramsci's conception of the struggle to monopolise the organs of public opinion
reaches beyond the question of the State's control of broadcasting and
encompassed wider aspects of the control of public opinion: the tendency to
monopoly ownership of the press, for example, the tendency of political parties to
silence internal dissent, or the tendency to maintain an unreformed electoral
system which delivered 'crushing' parliamentary majorities.
Although these notes on public opinion appear to be isolated, they are clearly part
of Gramsci's integral investigation of the general crisis of political hegemony after
1929. Gramsci's original description of this phenomenon was based on France
(§1.48) but the main terms of comparison in his subsequent investigation were the
parliamentary regimes in Britain and Germany. The notes on public opinion booms
were written immediately in response to British politics in 1931 but are closely
related to other ideas developed in the course of 1930 in response to German
politics, notably about the role of newspapers in the 'ideological front' of the ruling
class (§3.34) or the demonstrable 'value of the ideologies' in the disintegration of
parliamentary regimes (§4.22).
The Exchange of Letter. on Antl-Semltlsm,1931-32
In a short note written in August 1931 Gramsci asked a question about Augustin
Thierry, a French historian of the Restoration period. The line of enquiry he
suggests appears to be of purely scholarly interest until we realise that he was
selecting a specific "element of politics" from the history of France, the privileged
starting-point of his political theory.
§7.51. HI.tory of the .ubaltern cl•• aea. The element of racial .truggle grafted on to the
cia.. struggle In Franceby Thierry had .ome Importance.How Important wa. It In France
In determining the natlonanstlc tone of the movementaof the subaltern cia ? The
'Galllcl.m' of Prouc:lhon'.worker Is to be .tudled, a. the mo.t complete expr lon of the
democratlc-Galllcl.t tendency represented by the popular novel. of Eugene Sue III
He was already contemplating the use of this 'element' for comparison with other
countries.69 For the time being he said no more about it but it is worth noting that
68 §7.51, 0011 p.897.
69 In the preceding §7.SO he notes that 'or a certain time Manzoni accepted Thierry's COnception(for
France) of the struggle of races within the bosom of the people (Longobards and Romans, like Franks
and Gauls in France) as a struggle between the humble and the mighty" .
166
from the start the line of enquiry is concerned not with the intellectual origins of
racism as such but with something much more specific, ie, the origins of the
interrelation, or rather 'interference', between the 'struggle of races' and the Marxist
'struggle of classes'. From the start, Gramsci was probably thinking in classic
Franco-German terms. Indeed, Thierry's conception of the struggle between the
'mighty' Franks and the 'humble' Gauls already implied a certain relation between
Germans and French. Whatever the case, this element of politics ( racial struggle+
class struggle) might be of particular use in analysing the Nazi movement in
Germany which was also a movement of the "subaltern classes" with a nationalistic
tone of its own.
*
The following month, in September 1931, Gramsci had occasion to return to the
question 'Does any 'racism' exist in Italy?' (§6.35) which he first raised in the
aftermath of the Nazis' election victory a year earlier. Tatiana wrote to him about a
film she had recently seen about anti-semitism in wartime Poland, Two Worlds, by
the German director E.A.Dupont. Gramsci feared that Tatiana, herself half-Jewish,
was persuaded to believe that Jews and Gentiles really inhabited two different
worlds, and considered this "a way of thinking worthy of the Black Hundreds, the
American Ku Klux Klan, or the German swastikas". 70 "The film is certainly of
Austrian origin, a product of post-war anti-semitism". There followed a protracted
and at times acrimonious exchange of letters with Tatiana, and latterly with Piero
Sraffa, which went on until March 1932.71 Gramsci used all his formidable powers
of logic, sparing neither sarcasm nor ridicule, to liberate Tatiana from a point of
view "which led straight to anti-semitism".
Gramsci's letters provide an interesting analysis of anti-semitism, a subject which
he mentions only rarely in the notebooks. They reveal all the impatience and at
times frustration of a powerfully rational intellect forced to confront the question of
'race' which - "when that word is understood in anything other than a purely
70 To Tatiana, 13 September 1931, icu p.464.
71These letters are translated in full in Antonio Gramsci: Letters from Prison, Volume 2, edited by
Frank Rosengarten and translated by Raymond Rosenthal (Columbia University Press, 1994). The
importance of these letters is noticed and discussed by Enzo Traverso in The Marxists and the Jewish
Question. The History of a Debate 1843-1943 (Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1994) p.159-166.
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anthropological sense" - is all "false mysticism".72 On a number of occasions he
tried to put an end to the exchange and say his last word on the subject: "As far as
I'm concerned, that just about settles the question, and I'm not going to let myself
be lured into starting others. The question of 'race', outside the realm of
anthropology and prehistoric studies, doesn't interest me".73 Despite this
disclaimer, Gramsci was informed and perceptive on the subject. His observations
are interesting in view of the Jewish tragedy which was about to unfold in
Germany.
As we see, Gramsci did not differentiate at first between the anti-semitism of the
'German swastikas' and of the Black Hundreds of pre-revolutionary RUSSia. Both
were expressions of what he called popular or 'classical' anti-semitism which, he
argued, had long since disappeared in Italy. Summing up the whole exchange in
March 1932 he wrote: "What I wanted to establish is this: that for some time now
popular anti-semitism (which is classical anti-semitism, that which provoked and
still provokes tragedies, and has some importance in the history of civilisation) has
not existed in ltaly .....".74 Here Gramsci seems to acknowledge varieties of anti-
semitism other than this 'classical' type. Whether or not he was thinking of the
'German swastikas', his reference in the same passage to the need to sterilise "the
bacillus of racist romanticism" 75 suggested other varieties of more recent origin. In
some ways his account of classical anti-semitism - the pogrom, the ghetto etc -
prefigures the stages of the Jewish tragedy about to happen in Germany but he
could not begin to imagine what the final outcome would be. Neither could Tatiana ,
of course, but her anxiety went deeper than Gramsci's logic.
28 September 1931. Gramsci's first point emphasised the extent to which the Jews
had been assimilated in Italy.
I'm eorry you haven't yet enlarged on the aubJectof the Jewa and the 'two worlds'. And I'm
.orry that thl. old hoodoo haa entered your head, eapeclally a.. lng aa there haa been no
antl-.emltlam In Italy for a long whUe now. Jewa ean become mlnl.tera of the crown (not
to mention prime mlnlatera, aa In the ea.. of Luzzattl); they can alao reach the rank of
general In the army. Marrlag.. of Jewa with Christiana are very numerous, particularly In
the big cltle.; and thl. la not only a working cia.. phenomenon,for a number of glrla of
the arlatocracy have married Jewish Intellectuals. In what way do.. an Italian Jew
(leaving aalde a amall number of Rabbla and traditionalist greybearda) differ from an
72ToTatiana, 120ct0ber 1931, LCn p.479.
73 ibid., p.480.
74 To Tatlana, 21 March 1932, LCII p.550.
75 Ibid., p.550.
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ordinary Italian of the same class? There's a much greater difference between such a Jew
on the one hand and a Polish or Gallclan Jew of the same class on the other. It's true
there was a little bit of pOlitical anti-semitism against Toeplltz, the director of the
Commercial Bank, and In 1919 La Rlvl." dl Milano was founded: this was as fiercely anti-
semitic as Its circulation was IImlted ....18
5 October. Next Gramsci pointed out the danger of the widespread diffusion of this
ideology among ordinary people like Tatiana. During the First World War the ruling
classes had deliberately exploited this, launching ideological 'waves' (the
equivalent in politics, perhaps, to offensives in warfare?) .
....The fact that you have toned down your statements on this question of the so-called
'two worlds' does not alter the fundamental erroneousness of your point of view, and does
not dlmlnlah the force of my assertion that we are dealing with an Ideology which belong.,
even If only marginally, to the same camp as the Black Hundred•. Of course, I under.tand
perfectly well that you wouldn't take part In a pogrom; nevertheles., for a pogrom to be
possible, It Is necessary that the Ideology of 'two Impenetrable worlds', of races etc,
should be widely diffused. This helps to create that Imponderable atmosphere which the
Black Hundreds can exploit, organising the discovery of a child's corpse drained of blood
and accusing the Jews of having murdered him In ritual sacrifice. The outbreak of the
World War showed how ably the ruling classes and groups know how to exploit these
apparently Innocuous Ideologies, In order to .et In motion the waves of public opinion. The
thing seems to me so very surprising In your ca.e that I would seem to myself lacking In
love for you If I didn't try to liberate you completely from every preoccupation with this
questlon.71
Gramsci went on to observe that supposedly 'racial' characteristics were really the
result of the long history of Jewish segregation.
The Important thing to remember In connection with this question Is that the Jews were not
liberated from the ghetto until 1848, and that they remained In the ghetto segregated In
every way from European society for almost two millennia. Slnee 1848 the proce .. of
assimilation In the Western countries has bean so rapid and profound that one cannot help
thinking that It was only the segregation Imposed on them which prevented their complete
assimilation In the various countrles .....ln any ca.e, It Is worth noting that many
characteristic. which are taken a. racial are actually the reault of life In the ghetto. On
the other hand, the system of ghettos was Imposed In different ways In different countries
with the result that an Engll.h Jew, for example, has almo.t nothing In common with a Jew
from Gallcla.78
12 October. Given this "historicisf perspective on Jewish assimilation, Gramsci
found the idea of nations or races having "eternal" characteristics ridiculous. He did
not imagine in 1931 that the myth of the "eternal Jew", which belonged to popular
novels and films, could become the founding idea of a modern State, animating all
its policies and laws.
76To Tatiana, 28 September 1931, LCII p.472.
nTo Tatiana, 5 October 1931, LCII p. 475.
78 ibid., p.476.
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I was certainly wrong to start an argument. It would have been better to make a joke of It
and to counter your argument with the theory ot British 'phlegm', French '.rdour', Garman
'loyalty', Spanish 'hauteur', Italian 'Improvisation' and finally Slavic 'charm' - all things
which are very usetul tor writing serial novels or making popular fllma. Or elee I could
h.ve put to you the question: who Is the 'true' Jew, or the Jew 'In gener.I', or Simply m.n
'In general'. He won't be found, I don't think, In any .nthropologlcal or sociological
museum. Besides, what about their conception of God .s the 'Lord ot Hosts' ("dlo degll
eBereltin ) and .11 the I.nguage ot the Bible about the 'chosen people' .nd the mlselon ot
the Jewish people, which sounds like the language used by Kaleer Bill before the w.r:
what meaning does It h.ve tor tod.y's Jews?1v
2 November. The rapid assimilation of the Jews in the countries of Western Europe,
however, contrasted with their continuing segregation in the countries of Eastern
Europe. Having denied the existence of the 'two worlds' in the West, Gramsci ends
by acknowledging their existence in the East. Ironically, this is where Tatiana had
started from since Dupont's film Two Worlds was set in wartime Poland.
If the Jewish question Interests you, and you w.nt to get to grips with It sclentlftcally,
there .re two recent publlc.tlons which I hsve aeen quoted In • review, .nd which I would
like to recommend to you. They .re two reporta that ware read .t the International
Congrese of Popul.tlon Rese.rch recently held In Rome, .nd were I.ter published ••
separate pamphlets. One Is by Proteseor Uvlo Llvl and deals with the entire Jewl.h
popul.tlon ot the world; the other by Profeseor R.Bachl desls with ltall.n Jew. In
particular. Both seem to me, going by the summ.ry given, to be very Interesting .nd
Instructive. As tar as Italy Is concerned, It II only In Rome .ccordlng to Bachl th.t one
stili finds 8 relatively compact Jewish nucleus: elsew8r. In Italy the phenomenon ot
dispersion and .bsorptlon by the gener.1 environment la progressing. On • world scale the
coherent Jewish nucleua Is th.t ot E•• tem Europe; around this nucleu. the other Jewl.h
communities - those which .re letting themselves be .bsorbed by their environment - form
• sort 0' h.lo .... .In the .grlcultural countries ot Eastern Europe the segregation of the
Jews continues In tact, even without the ghetto.1Il
Tatiana passed Gramsci's letters on to Piero Sraffa in Cambridge. In his reply to
her dated 27 December 193181 , the relevant part of which she then passed on to
Gramsci, Sraffa suggested that he may have lost touch since ·what he says about
the Jews in Italy is no longer entirely true today". Since the Concordat of 1929 the
Jews as religious communities had been given certain advantages such as legal
recognition of the Jewish universities which pleased the old rabbis and the young
Zionists alike. However, the Jews continued to be excluded in fact, if not in law,
from membership of the Italian Academy and with occasional exceptions from
Parliament. Sraffa shrewdly noted that "both these apparently contrasting
tendencies are evidently aimed at making the Jews an isolated community once
79To Tatiana. 120ct0ber 1931, ten p.478-479. [rranslated in HH p.173]
8OToTatiana. 2 November 1931, LCnp.490.
81 Piero Sraffa: Lettere a Tania perGramsci, introduzione e cura dl Valentino Gerratana (Editori
Riuniti, 1991) p. 41-42.
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again".B2
8 February 1932. Tatiana passed on Sraffa's observations on 2 February. Gramsci
was not convinced. The signs of nascent anti-semitism in Italy alleged by Sraffa
could be explained by other reasons. However, there was one implication of the
Concordat which, although it did not apply specifically to Italy's Jews, seemed to
him highly significant : this was the possibility of "juridically instituting a category of
civil pariahs". Why did he think this was so significant? Was it because he knew
from their programme 83 that the Nazis intended to deprive the Jews in Germany of
their civil rights and thus reduce them precisely to "a category of civil pariahs"?
HI. ob.. rvatlons are objectively very Intereatlng but don't 888m quite right to me. I don't
think It 18 Justlflad to Infar that thara I. an 'evldant' tandancy 'to turn tha Jaw. back Into
an Isolatad community'; thl. tandancy .eem. to me to be rathar the '.ubJectlva' ana on tha
part of tha old rabbi. and tha young Zlonl.t.. Tha objective truth .eem. to be that tha
Concordat has laft tha Jaws In tha same position as the Prote.tants, but there exists or
there will exist a social category that will find Itself In a very unfortunate situation
compared to the Jew. and Protestsnts: this will ba (or already la) the prl .. ta who have left
the priesthood and the monks who have left the monaatery, who will therefore be excluded
from government posltlona, Ie, degraded as citizens. The fact that It has been poaslble
Juridically to Institute a category of civil pariahs like this seems to me far more Important
than the Juridical position of the Jews and Prote.tants who have been granted, In the
aplrlt of the law, legal rights which are anything but degrading.
I do not rule out the posalbillty that an antl- .. mltlc tendency may yet develop here but I
see no signs of It today. The signa that are taken to confirm Its exlatence can be
explained by other reasona and ara, In any ca.e, off .. t by other equally significant facta.
But the Important fact In my opinion 18 this: that .ome 01 the Jews approve 01 specific
measures against other Jews. Professor Levl-Clvlts of Rome University got Into trouble
becauae he did not attand tha official rellglou •• olemnltle. but It wa. tha Rector Del
Vecchio, hlm.elf a Jew, who caused the trouble for him; 80 It was not a que.tlon of race
but a question 01 politic.: a membar 01 tha ruling cia.. must render homage to Catholicism
as In.trumentum regnl, no matter what his faith. In the uma way the line drawn by the
Academy or Parliament proves nothing: world famou•• clentl.t. who aren't Jew. have
found and will find themselves excluded. The position filled by Teodoro Mayer at Credlto
Mobillare [sic) also seems to me to be Significant. I believe that In many cases It Is not
Judaism that counta but Judaism-Freemasonry, the fact that Freemaaonry was certainly
an Institution In which there were many Jews.M
Srafta was not persuaded by Gramsci's "other reasons". "Surely Nino doesn't
mean to say that in Poland, for example, the fact that the Jews are dealers or
moneylenders or non-peasants is "some other reason" for hostility against the
Jews, as though the "real reason" were to do with theological or anthropological
differences".85 Ignoring the reference to the recent appointment of Teodoro Mayer,
82 Ibid., p.42.
83 By this time Gramsci was familiar with the 25-point programme of the Nazi Party which was
reproduced In full in the article 'II Nazionalsocialismo in Germania', eMlta Cattolica, May 1931.
84ToTatiana, 8 February 1932, Lell p.531-533.
85Piero Sraffa to Tatiana, 1 March 1932, in Letterea Tania per Gramsci , cit., p.50-54.
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Sraffa suggested that the facts cited by Gramsci to support his case "belong to a
past stage".86 "Besides, it is necessary to distinguish between anti-semitism
and Two Worlds: the granting of certain privileges to the Jewish universities (ie, as
religious communities) is anything but an act of anti-semitism but it tends, as far as
it can, to make the distinction clear-cuf.87 He drew attention to the dilemma faced
by those Jews who are silently leaving their Judaism behind and assimilating with
other Italians, who find themselves since the Concordat having to declare in many
instances that they are either Jews or non-Jews. "For an infinite number of Jews or
half-Jews this has been a difficult problem to resolve: what they wanted to avoid
was having to 'leap', but today either you are a Jew or not a Jew - there is no
middle way".88 Sraffa could not explain these facts and asked for Gramsci's
opinion. "It is probably necessary to understand the relation of the State to the
Catholic Church in Italy. The attitude of the State towards the minor churches would
follow 'logically' from an explanation of this; in the case of the Jews, this could be
coloured by the example of foreign countries, especially by the Nazis and similar
movements" .89
21 March. Gramsci was impressed by Sraffa's observations and found the new
data he provided interesting "because I had no knowledge of facts such as
these".90 He refrained from commenting on Sraffa's new facts or his suggestion
about the influence of the Nazi movement on Italy. He confined himself to
reminding Tatiana of the starting-point of their debate - the alleged existence of
popular anti-semitism in Italy: he reminded her of this "because now we are talking
about something else" (meaning, presumably, Germany).
Whenthe queatlon la poHd In theH terma - thet la, within Ita proper IImlta and with all
germa of raclat romantlclamand more or I... confused Zlonlam well and truly .terlll.eeI _
the thing la worthy of attention. And the data you now provide are Inter.. tlng becau.. I
hed no knowledgeof facta auch .. theae. Whet I wanted to .. tabll.h la thla: that for aome
time now no popular antl-Semltl.m (which I. the cla.alcal antl-Semltlam, that which haa
provokad and atlll provok.. tragadl.. and haa Importance In the hlatory of clvlll .. tlon)
haa exlated In Italy, and that In no aen.. do the Jewa represent a apeclal culture, nor do
they have any particular hlatorlcal ml.. lon In the modern world, nor do they "parat8ly, by
them.. lvea, ferment the proc... of development of hl.tory. Thet wa. the atartlng-polnt of
our debate and It la neceaaaryto recall It because now we are talking about aomethlng
elae.8I
86 ibid., p.S2.
87 Ibid., p.S2.
88 ibid., p.53.
89Ibld.,p.53.
9OToTatiana, 21 March 1932, LeI! p.550.
91 ibid., p.S50. [Translated in HH p.201].
Chapter 3
January - December 1932
From the Presidential Elections to the Chancellorship of Schleicher
The Letters
•.... now there is someone who 'philosophically' accepts being manure .... ."
By the start of 1932 Gramsci was well on the way to becoming a "micromaniac", his
nerves being worn down by all the petty preoccupations and niggardly thoughts
brought on by prison life. He invented a new metaphor to describe his condition;
the quality of his irony, including his self-irony, was as intelligent as ever:
Prometheus at war with all the gods of Olympus appears to us a tragic Titan: Gulliver tied
up by the Lilliputians makes us laugh. If Prometheus, Instead of having his liver devoured
dally by an eagle, had been nibbled away by ants, he would have made us laugh too.
Jupiter wasn't very Intelligent for his time: the technique of getting rid of opponents was
stili not very advanced ..... 1
His interest in the myth of Prometheus can be followed in the notes at this time. His
exercises in translation from German included a rendering of Goethe's Ode to
Prometheus as well as an extract from Engels' piece On Goethe 2. In §8.214 (April
1932) he made a critical summary of an article on the subject in the latest issue of
the periodical Leonardo. This turned upon the contrast between the image of
Prometheus in Goethe's famous ode and in an unfinished play on the same theme
thought to have been written at a later date. The latter expressed a more complex
image of the hero which was closer than the ode to expressing Goethe's own
psychology. This was the focus of Gramsci's interest.
The rebellion of Prometheus Is 'constructive', he appears not Just as the Titan In revolt
but more especially as 'homo faber', conscious of himself and of the meaning of his work.
To this Prometheus the gods are not at all Infinite or omnipotent. 'Can you make me grasp
In my hand the vast expanse of the sky and the earth? Can you separate me from myself?
Can you expand me until I embrace the whole world?'. Mercury repll.. with a shrug of the
shoulders: It's [your] destlnyl And so even the gods are mere va.. als. But doesn't
Prometheus stili feel happy In his workshop, surrounded by his creations? 'This Is my
world, this Is my everything. Here I feel myselfl'. He told Mercury that as a child he
became conscious ot his own physical exlstanca whan he notlcad that his feet supportad
his body and his hands reached out Into space to touch. Eplmetheua had accused him of
particularism, of not racognlslng the sweetness of being at one with the gods, with
kindred, with the world and the sky. 'I've heard that story bafore', Prometheus replied, for
ha wasn't contant any mora with tha unity which embraced him from outslda himself, ha
must create a unity which springs from Inside himself. Such unity can only arise from
1To Tatiana, 18 January 1932 in LCn p.S24. [Translation in HH,p.186].
2 The translation of Engels' article On Goethe (which Gramsci wrongly attributed to Marx) was in
Notebook 7 (QCIV,p.2391) and Goethe's Ode was translated in Notebook C (QCIV,p.2440) reserved
for translations only, together with extracts from Goethe's Conversations with Eckermann. Both items
were probably translated in 1931.
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'the circle filled with his own actlvlty'.3
The image of Prometheus in his workshop finding within himself the strength to
resist the gods, corresponded to Gramsci working on the notebooks in his prison
cell, "the circle filled with his own activity", especially at a time when he was
conscious of losing all his contacts with the outside world. It also answered to the
conviction formed in his youth under the influence of Croce's writings that, even in
his hour of greatest need, "modern man can and must live without religion, whether
it is revealed or positive or mythological religion or any other expression you care
to use"4. However, any suggestion that he simply identified with Goethe's hero was
proved wrong a few months later when he again mentioned Prometheus in §9.53
(June 1932). This note was a more transparent statement of Gramsci's
'philosophical' state of mind; to express this he chose an altogether less 'heroic'
metaphor.
A dialogue. Something fundamental has changed. You can ... It. What la It? Before.
everyone wanted to be cultivators of history, to have active parts to play, each having an
active role. No one wanted to be 'manure' of history. But can the earth be ploughed
without flrat being manured? So there must be the ploughman and 'manure'. Everyone
acknowledg.. thl. In the ab.tract, but what about In practl .. ? 'Manure'. In order to be
'manure', mean. standing aside. returning to the darkn.... to obscurity. Something haa
changed becau.. now th.re I. someone who 'phllo.ophlcally' acc.pta being manur., who
know. that I. what h. must be and adapts hlms.1f to It.
You could .ay It'. like the question of the man on the brink of death exc.pt that there'. a
big dlff.r.nc.: being at d.ath's door m.ana being on the brink of a decl.lv. act which will
last Just a second wh.reas being manure lasts a long tim. and the question Is repeated
from one moment to the next. We only live once, as they say; your own personality Is
Irreplac .. bl•• It's not like playing a game where you are faced with a fortultou ••
Instantan.ous cholc. In which, aft.r a lightning appraisal of all the valu.. , you make a
decl.lon which can't be d.f.rred any long.r. In this case the decision I. d.f.rred .very
second and repeated every .econd. So som.thlng has changed, a. w. .ald ••.••.Th. Imag.
of Prom.th.u. who. Instead of being attacked by the eagle, I. devoured by ants. The Jew.
had tha Imagination to Invent Job: the Gre.ks could only Imagln. Prom.theus. But the
J.ws are mar. reall.tlc, mar. r.mors.I.... and have also glv.n their hero a higher
profile 5
Yet even someone who "accepts 'philosophically' being manure" has an ultimate
faith in the rationality of history and his reference to the Jews reminds us that this
3 §8.214. 'Popular Outline'. Suggestions on aesthetics and literary criticism, 0011, p.107S, based on
Leonello Vincenti: 'Prometeo', Leonardo, March 1932 (See Professor Gerratana's note in oolV
p.282Q-2821 ).
4 To Tatiana, 17 August 1931, in Lell, p.446, for Gramsci's reaction to the religious conversionof
his former professor of letters, Umberto Cosmo. See also §10.05. Croce and Religion, oolI,p.1217.
5 §9.53 in oolI,p.1128.
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faith was about to be tested to an unimaginable degree. A useful perspective on
this is provided by another reference to Goethe at this time. In the first half of 1932
Gramsci was writing in Notebook 10, his brilliant critical analysis of the
philosophy of Croce. He exchanged several letters with Tatiana on the subject.
Gramsci suggested that Croce's intellectual influence was partly due to his literary
style. This was reminiscent of Goethe's style in expressing qualities of inner
strength which Gramsci undoubtedly admired:
This literary style corresponds to the moral life of the writer In expreaslng an attitude of
serenity, composure and Imperturbable assurance which one might call Goethean. While
so many people are losing their heads and stumbling around with apocalyptic feelings of
Intellectual paniC, Croce becomes a landmark for all who wish to arrive at Inner strength
because of his unshakeable certitude that metaphysically evil cannot prevail and that
history Is ratlonallty.6
Tatiana suggested that Croce was "rather isolated at the present time" and no
longer as influential as Gramsci thought. Although Gramsci did not agree, she was
probably correct as far as Croce's current intellectual influence was concerned.
Judging from the tone of §9.53 Gramsci seemed to find a kind of serenity of his own
in philosophically accepting being the 'manure' of history; but the source of this
serenity, the "unshakeable certitude that metaphysically evil cannot prevail and that
history is rationality", appears 'anachronistic' as the Third Reich begins to cast its
shadow. In the correpondence of 1931-32 Tatiana herself seemed to succumb to a
certain "intellectual panic" in relation to the growth of anti-Semitism and Gramsci
had sought to guide her out of it by means of a wholly rational analysis of the
question of race. Nevertheless, Gramsci's rationality seems in hindsight more
'anachronistic' than Tatiana's panic, which was more in tune with the times.
Contacts with the Family
In February Gramsci kept his promise to his son Delio and wrote a delightfully
evocative letter to him recounting his childhood recollection of how hedgehogs
collect apples:
One autumn evening - It was already dark, but the countryside lay bathed In radiant
moonlight - I went with another boy, a friend of mine, Into an orchard full of fruit trees,
chiefly apple trees. We hid In a bush, facing Into the wind. All of a .udden the hegdehog.
came out of their holea; there were five of them, two big ones and three little one•• They
made their way In single file towards the apple trees, rambled about In the gra•• for a little
and then got down to work: they looked for the windfall. and rolled them together Into a
clearing, pushing them along with their leg. and their little snouta. In thl. way they built
6 To Tatiana. 25 April 1932. LCllp.567. [ I have taken the liberty of slightly modifying the translation in
HH p. 211-212).
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up a hoard, all the apples lying close together'?
His efforts to be a father to his sons were more rewarding that his attempts to help
Julia recover from her depression. He wrote some interesting letters to Tatiana
about it at this time in which he speculated about the causes and tried to advise
accordingly. These should be read against the background of the gigantic social
changes under way in the Soviet Union during the First Five-Year Plan and the
intense ideological atmosphere created by the State to bring these changes
about.a Gramsci thought that Julia's illness was rooted in an inferiority complex,
which was aggravated by the pressure upon the individual created by this extreme
environment:
Th. most Importantpoint seam. to be this: that a peychoanalytlccur. can be helpful onl,
to those .Iements In society which romantic Ut.ratur. used to caUthe 'Insulted and
Injured'.....1would d.scrlbe them a. tho.. Individuals who are caught up between the Iron
contrasts of mod.rn Uf•..•••.and are unabl. on their own to stsnd up to the .traln of thea.
contra.ts The situation becom.a dramatic at cartaln d.flnlt. mom.nta In history and
In c.rtaln d.flnlt •• nvlronm.nts: when the .nvlronm.nt I. super-h.. ted to extr.m.
t.nslon, and gigantic collectlv. forcas ar. unl.. shed which prea. hard on alngl.
Indlvldualaand drlv. them till It hurta, In order to obtain from them the maximumr.turn of
will and d.t.rmlnatlon for the purpo... of creation. Such situation. become dlsa.trou. for
.xc.ptlonally r.flned and s.n.ltlv. t.mperament•..... .1 ball.v., th.r.for., that a person
of cultur. (u.lng the word In Ita G.rman s.nse), an actlv.... m.nt In society (n Julia
certainly Is, and not m.r.ly for official r... ona .uch as the presenceIn har bag of a party
card which postulatessocial activity on her part) Is and must ba hi. or her own beat
psychoanalyst. 9
This analysis probably tells us more about Gramsci's perception of the Soviet Five-
Year Plan than it does about Julia's illness. Judging from the letters to Tatiana
which followed, in which Gramsci was forced to clarify what he meant by the
7 To Delio, 22 February 1932, LCII p.539. [Translated in full in HHp.194-196].
B By this time Gramsci was well-informed about this. He had read the Russian Supplement of The
Economist for November 1930 which he reported having read very carefully in a letter to Tatiana of 29
June 1931, in LCII p.432. There were also several articles on the Soviet Union in the Manchester
Guardian Weekly (for example, the article in the supplement on 'The Five-Year Plan in 1931 : The
Decisive Year', 23January 1931) and a long interview on the Five-Year Plan given by Trotsky to the
special correspondent of MGW published on 3 April 1931. This interview, which has passed
unnoticed, is almost certainly one of the sources of his reflections in §6.138.Past and Present.
Transition from the War of Manoeuvre (and from Frontal Attack) to the War of Position in the Political
Field as Well, which is often misinterpreted because it is thought to apply to the 'West' not the 'East'.
9To Tatiana, 15 February 1932, Lell p.534. [Translated in HH, p.191-193]. See also the fallowing
letter to Tatiana of 7 March in which he argues that, rather than resort 10psychoanalysis, ·one can
arrive at a certain serenity even in the clash of the most absurd contradictions, and under the pressure
of the most implacable necessity. But one can reach it only if one succeeds in thinking 'historically' or
dialectically and by identifying one's own task with intellectual dispassion; one's own, or at any rate
some well-defined task which one can regard as one's own, and which is within the limit of one's
capacity". ton p.545.
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'insulted and injured', it merely gave rise to further misunderstandings about the
exact nature of Julia's depression. At the end of March he wrote to Julia confessing
to "a certain inhibition when I try to make contact with you"10 . After receiving further
news of her in May, including a letter from his father-in-law in Moscow, Gramsci
regretted that in his letters to Julia he had been "throwing stones in the dark", doing
more harm than good.11 Again he was forced to explain to Tatiana what he meant.
I only meant that If I had had certain Information before, I would have expre•• ed my.elf
differently In my letter. to Julia etc. In.tead, for seme time now It ha. been like playing
blind man'. buff .....1 can't get you to under.tand that a prolonged lack of new. Inevitably
give. rl.e to .u.plclon •..... and end. up creating an endle.. chain of tragic
equlvocatlon •... 12
Increasingly, Gramsci wrote to Tatiana about Julia rather than to Julia herself. He
managed to overcome his 'inhibition' at the end of June when he wrote telling her
the story of 'A Man in a Ditch' who succeeds, after several appeals for help, in
getting out of the ditch by himself. He concluded by looking to the future rather than
the past and gave the first hint of divorce which he proposed later in the year.
We mu.t hurl all that'. pa.t Into the flames and build new IIvea from the ground up.
Why .hould we let our.elves be cru.hed by the lives we have led up to now? There'. no
.en.e In preserving anything at all apart from what was constructive and what was
beautiful. We must get out of the ditch, and throw off that toad .Ittlng on our hearts.13
The State of his Health
Towards the end of May Gramsci reported that insomnia, due to the constant noise
in the corridor outside his cell, had reduced him to "a state of enormous weariness
and exhaustion" .14 A few weeks later he developed a temperature and felt
feverish; solid food caused him to vomit and so he limited himself to drinking milk.
The result was that he had "become incapable of any form of intellectual
concentration, not even the minimum needed to write a letter".15 By the start of
August he felt a bit better although the summer heat had started to get to him: "it's
started to get overpoweringly hot. ...every effort I make leaves me bathed in sweat,
10ToJulca, 28 March 1932, ten p.554.
11To Tatiana, 16 May 1932, ten p.576.
12 ibid.
13 To Julca, 27 June 1932, tcu p.593-595.
14To Tatiana, 23 May 1932, tcu p.579.
15To Tatiana, 18 July 1932, ten p.597.
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which is disagreeable as well as enervating".16 All this was using up his great
reserves of patience and resistance. The point of crisis was reached at the end of
August when he got little or no sleep for eight days in succession: "In my opinion
I've reached the point where my powers of resistance are in danger of complete
collapse"17.
Gramsci was already in a highly precarious state, therefore, when there occured in
September- October "a succession of events which have combined to ruin my
health"18. These provoked a series of psychologically dramatic letters in which
Gramsci touched the depths of his inner self.
Firstly, without having Gramsci's go-ahead, Tatiana forwarded a request to
Mussolini on compassionate grounds to allow him to be visited by an outside
doctor, Professor Arcangeli. Deeply frustrated at having control of his life in prison
taken out of his hands in this way, Gramsci threatened to break off all contact with
her, but not before his tenderness had got the better of his severity:
Dear Tania, I'm vary fond of you and I reall .. that you've helped me more than anyone
elae to get through the periodic cri ... which I'm forced to undergo In prison and which
aggravate my nervoua atate, which la bad enough already. Neverthele .. , I have to tell you
that your attitude to life theee paat yeara, which have been hard and harah, la like the
attitude which com .. acro.. In reading the romantic library of Madam. d. Segur: your
optlmlam la Incredible, your hypo-theMa are alwaya what you would like to happen, you
have kept a naivety and freshnesa of feeling which are enchanting and endearing. They
endeared me during the yeara when we apent time together talking and dlacusalng,
notwlthatandlng the fact that I alwaya thought after my childhood experlencea that I
waa Immune to such 'weaknesses'. Nevertheless, In spite of all this, in spite of my
tenderne.. 'or you which haan't changed, I muet aek you to approach our relatione
completely differently If you want them to continue under the pr.. ent conditions. You
muet take no 'urther Interest in my priaon life and consequently you muat alter your
corr .. pondence about It If you don't want It to be broken off completely.19
Secondly, on 7 October his sister Grazietta, apparently without considering its likely
impact on him, sent news from Sardinia that his mother was dying. Gramsci's
response persuaded the family that the effect on his morale was such that it was
better to reassure him on this account and conceal from him the true state of affairs:
The Idea that mamma could be dying whUe I know nothing precise about It and have no
chance of a.. lng her again 0bae88" and torments me every minute of the day and night. I
remembar her at tho.. tlmee when ahe ahoWed great energy and strength, I can e.. quite
distinctly many scenes of our family Ufe In the peet, and I cannot Imagine that she could
be reduced to the state you describe and that she ,.. Ie herael' to ba near to leaving ue
16To Tatiana, 1 August 1932, tcu p.599.
17 To Tatlana, 31 August 1932, ten p.609.
18To Tatiana, 9 November 1932, Lell p.636.
19To Tatlana, 3 October 1932, Le" p.621.
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etc. Nor do I know whether or not you will be able to convince her how much I have always
loved her and how one of the bitterest regrets of my life, which has had so much Influence
In shaping my character, was seeing how she has had no respite In her life, no
satisfactions, no enduring peace. 20
Finally, at the start of November Gramsci received a telegram from his brother
Carlo with news that an amnesty for political prisoners had been granted to mark
the tenth anniversary of the March on Rome.21 For the next several weeks, much of
his correspondence was taken up with calculating how the amnesty applied to him
but Carlo's telegram had "really led me to think for seven or eight hours that I could
be freed".
These three events - the clash with Tatiana over the petition to Mussolini, Graz-
ietta's letter about his mother, and Carlo's telegram about the political amnesty -
left his nerves in shreds. It was at this juncture that he put to Tatiana the idea of
suggesting to Julia a divorce by mutual consent: the suggestion was made from
strength not from weakness.
We ahudder to think that In India wlvea have to die when their husbanda die and yet,
fundamentally, we don't appreciate that thla alao happens, In leaa Immediately violent
forma, In our civilisation. Why ahould a living baing be tied to a dead or almost dead ona?
It seama to me that the older generation whose morals were formed In the pre-war years
are outdated In their attitude to these matters and that the new generation, who make
declalona faster and without baing hidebound by outdated aentlments, are right. Aa I said,
It'a not a simple matter and It can't be done without a violent tear, leaving a painful wound;
nor can we be blind to the fact that after the decision there will be a certain period of
remorse, regret, and oscillation, but we can alao look forward to getting through this and
creating a new lIfe....J have thought about It one way or another for a long time, perhapa
ever since the day I was arrested - not very serloualy at first, then more deaply and
carefully.22
After analysing the possibility that the idea might be a "very romantic gesture" or a
"kind of sentimental blackmail", Gramsci ended up thinking that the best thing
would be to do it unilaterally, cutting off all relations with her without seeking her
consent:
Thla laat option haa tormented me very much but I have naver been and never will be able
to face It. By resolving the relationship In thla way, Julia would have a double burden
since ahe would lose all esteem for me (which would not be without consequencea for the
eateem she must have for herself) without avoiding any of the pain. The pain can't be
avoided but It can be limited, ao can other consequencea of • moral and Intellectual
nsture. The Initiative must come from me, that'a certain, and there can be no hiding from
the Inevitable consequences. I must face up to It with all the strength of my baing.
Although Julia 18 no longer a young woman, she can stili be free to atart • naw phs.. of
20 To Grazietta, 17 October 1932, Lellp.626-627.
21 To Tatiana, 9 November 1932, ten p.63S.
22 To Tatiana, 14 November 1932, ten p.637-638.
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her lIfe 1 shall go back Into my 'Sardinian' shell. This doesn't mean that I won't suffer
but I'll feel less with every day that passes and will adapt myself to It. I can bear It, I'll
get used to 1t.23
The business of the reviews:
"I've become 'anachronistic' in everything .... :
As a result of the new penal regulation, Gramsci cancelled the subscriptions to the
foreign-language reviews at the end of 1931, including the Manchester Guardian
Weekly. He was allowed to read the Corriere della Sera. Although he complained
about "the lack of continuity in the news", the Carriere reported political events in
Germany in the first half of 1932 closely and continuously. Gramsci had no difficulty
following the thread of German politics to the dismissal of Bruning and the
appointment of Papen at the start of June. Then on 6 June just as he was arranging
with Tatiana to renew the quarterly subscription, he abruptly cancelled his
instruction: 'The part about the newspaper was cancelled by me. Cancel the
subscription, don't renew it whatever you dO".24 The prison authorities had
discovered that the economic affairs section of the newspaper was being used as a
means of illicit communication and suspended the privilege altogether.25 The loss
of the Corriere in June, combined with the difficulty in concentrating cause by
chronic insomnia, left him feeling that he was losing contact with present-day life
and living increasingly in the past. This impression is confirmed by Gramsci's
letters of the second half of 1932:
To Julia, 15 August: I'm completely cut off from present-day lite (BnUB"ra) •.•.•1 read a
certain number ot revlew....... but In Italy the review. do not follow the Intellectual
currenta In the country very clo.ely and ao they don't evoke any kind of picture, stili I...
a picture of the constant motion of life. 26
To Tatlana, 5 September: I read very little, my memory go.. from one moment to the next.
The odd thing I. that while I remember pa.t events In great detail, I can't remember what
happened yesterday or even a few hours ago. 27
To Tatlana, 14 November: I get more and more Insensitive and malleable with every day
that pa......... 1 have already developed to a large extent the 'prlaon mentality' and In the
laat few day. I've noticed that thl. proc... has gone further than I thought. 28
23ibid.
24To Tatlana, 6 June 1932, icu p.584 and note 1
25Piero Sraffa: Letterea TaniaperGramsci, p.239.
26 LeI! p.606-607.
27LeI! p.612
28 LeI! p.638-639.
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To Julia, 19 December: I've lost much of my power of imagination and I've lost, too, most
of my contacts with what Is really going on In life. My memories are very lively but are,
after all, six years old by now and so much must have changed In that time. Inevitably,
I've become 'anachronistic' In everythlng ..._29
Although Gramsci sensed that he was losing touch with "the constant motion of
life", it would be a mistake to infer that he simply surrendered to this process. As far
as German politics are concerned, notes on the German unemployment figures
and on the Reichstag elections of 31 July indicate that he was still following the
thread of events in the summer of 1932. The relative paucity of references to
current affairs in the notes written in the latter part of 1932 suggests that Gramsci
may have lost his grip on the thread of events for a while and was (as he says in
December) becoming "anachronistic" in everything, including German affairs.
However, we should expect the pessimistic analysis of his intelligence to led to an
optimistic assertion of his will. The notes on Caesarism written in December 1932-
January 1933 are proof that at the turn of the year Gramsci reacted vigorously
against the tendency to become "anachronistic". As the "catastrophic phase" of the
German crisis approached, Gramsci turned particularly to the Rassegna
settimanale della stampa ester a where he could still follow the thread of German
events very closely.3D
29 Lell p.655.
30 Note Prof.Gerratana's observation that Gramsci consulted the Rassegna ssttimanaJedeila stampa
esters particularly closely in the first half of 1933. See the note to §15.01, QCIV p.2941.
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The Periodicals and Corrlere dells Sers
The Presidential Elections (March-April)
Since the fall of the Grand Coalition in March 1930 and the appointment of Bruning
as Chancellor, parliamentary government in Germany had been superseded by
rule by presidential decree under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. The country
was now governed by the high bureaucracy coordinated by a military-political
clique around the eighty-four year old President Hindenburg. The clique included
the 'political' generals Groaner, who combined the offices of Minister of the
Reichswehr and the Interior, and his protege Schleicher. The pivotal role of this
presidential clique was particularly 'visible' in early 1932 when Hindenburg's term
of office as president was due to come to an end. This opened the prospect of a
contested election in which a rival candidate, possibly Hitler, might stand against
Hindenburg and thus threaten the monopoly of the ruling circle. Bruning hoped to
avoid this by extending Hindenburg's term of office. This required a change in the
constitution to enable him to be re-elected by a two-thirds majority of parliament
instead of by direct popular vote. At the invitation of Groaner, who acted as
mediator between them, Hitler went to Berlin on 7 January to discuss with Bruning
whether or not the National Socialists would support this proposal in parliament. 31
When Hitler refused a few days later, after consulting the other leaders of the self-
styled National Opposition, a contested election was unavoidable.32
The run-up to the first round of the presidential election highlighted the 'fissures' in
the right-wing bloc.33 Unable to support the candidature of Hindenburg, neither
could the 'National Opposition' agree on a compromise candidate of their own:
Hitler's candidature was announced on 22 February, "creating an enormous
impression" 34 I whilst Dusterberg stood for the Stahlhelm and the Nationalists.35
31 'Bruning chiede I'appoggio di Hitler per iI prolungamento dei poten a Hindenburg', CdS, SJanuary
1932. See also Werner von Schulenberg: 'Bruning, Hitler, Hugenburg', GER, January 1932.
32 'Hitler e Hugenburg contro la proposta Bruning', CdS, 12 January 1932.
33 'Hindenburg si ripresenta contro i deliberati dei gruppi nazionali' (back page rubric Recentissime)
CdS, 16 February 1932. The paper suggested that the decision of the German Nationals and Steel
Helmets to contest the reelection of Hindenburg by putting up their own candidate was a deliberate
tactic designed to take away from Hindenburg as many votes as possible and thus make a second
ballot necessary. There is no evidence to suggest that Hitler and Hugenburg concerted their tactics to
this extent even If this was the effect.
34 'Hitler candidato contro Hindenburg' (Recentissime), CdS, 23 February 1932. On the
announcement of Hitler's candidature, see also the rubric Cronaca politics in NA, 1 March 1932.
35 'Ousterberg per gli 'Elmetti d'acciaio', CdS, 24 February 1932.
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Meanwhile, the left-wing forces were also unable to reach a compromise. The
Social Democrats declined to put up a candidate of their own and declared their
support for Hindenburg as the "lesser evil", whilst the Communists fielded their own
candidate Thalmann.
The contest was 'dramatised' in the Fascist press and the result of the first round
excited a lot of interest, no doubt because of the impressive challenge mounted by
Hitler which made a second ballot necessary.36 The result of the first ballot on 13
March was:-
Votes %
Hindenburg
Hitler
Thalmann
Dusterberg
18,651,500 (49.6)
11 ,339,400 (30.1)
4,983,300 (13.2)
2,557,700 ( 6.8) 37
Since Hindenburg narrowly failed to obtain an absolute majority, a second round
was necessary. Dusterberg withdrew and the 'National Opposition' supported
Hitler. The result of the second ballot held on 10 April, was:-
Hindenburg
Hitler
Thalmann
19,360,000 (53.0)
13,418,500 (36.8)
3,706,800 (10.2) 38
The results of the presidential elections, followed in rapid succession by the results
of the Prussian and state elections (April) and a further round of Reichstag
elections (July), provided Gramsci with further material for analysing the structure-
superstructure relation. The results overturned the conventional 'economistic'
36See for example: 'Hindenburg 0 Hitler?', CdS, 10 March 1932; 'La Giomata Storica della Gennania',
CdS,13 March 1932.
37 'Hitler decide di continuare Ie lotta per la conquista del potere in Germania', CdS, 15 March 1932;
Under the rubric Germania, RSE, 15 March 1932, p.542-548, and foreign press reaction under the
same rubric, RSE, 22, 29 March 1932. For an analysis of the results and prospects after the first
round, see Giuseppe Renzetti: 'Hindenburg e Hitler', GER, March 1932; Mario da Silva: 'Le elezioni
presidenziali tedesche', CF, 1 April 1932; under the rubric L '/talia e 1/ Mondo, 'Le elezioni presidenziali
in Gennania', EF, March 1932; under the rubric Cronaca politica, NA, 1 April 1932; under the rubric
Cose Straniere, 'Prime avvisaglie della lotta presidenziali', CC, 19 March 1932, and 'Esito delle elezioni
presidenziali', CC, 2 April 1932.
38 'VIVa impressione per la forte votazione otten uta dai social-nazionali', CdS,12 April 1932; under the
rubric Germania, RSE, 12 April 1932, p.753; under the rubric Cronaca polites, NA, 16 April 1932; for
comment on the result and prospects after the second ballot, Giuseppe Renzetti: ' Aspettl politici
attuali della Germania', GER, April 1932. See also the comment in 'Hitler e II Nazionalsocialismo', CF,
15 May 1932. This was the first of a series of articles by Mario da Silva in Critics Fascista trying to
explain Nazi doctrine to Italian fascists: see 'Basi dello Stato nazionalsocialista', 1 June;
'Nazionalsocialismo e democrazia', 15 June; 'Nazionalsocialismo e economia liberale', 1 August, 1932.
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wisdom of the communists that under circumstances of deepening economic crisis
the masses would turn "automatically", and with "lightning speed", to communism
as a solution to their problems, especially in the country with the strongest
communist party in Europe.
The Rising Curve of Unemployment
For the presidential elections were held against a background of deepening
economic crisis which could not have been more favourable from the Communist
standpoint: this was measured in the steeply rising curve of official unemployment,
which passed 6 million in February 1932 39. On the eve of the first round the
Corriere observed that Germany had reached a critical moment having
just come through a winter full of privations and delusions, a period of desperate struggle against the
difficulties which have been piling up year by year and now threaten to tum into an avalanche. It is
precisely this widespread exasperation in people's minds which is the unknown factor and threatens
the ruling candidate in spite of the prestige of Field-Marshall von Hindenburg's name.4O
Under these circumstances the paper predicted a strong showing by the
Communist candidateThalmann who would pick up "around 7 million votes,
perhaps more rather than less"41. When Thalmann polled less than 5 million votes
the Corriere , with evident satisfaction, expressed its amazement that "a people
which has six million unemployed could not even muster more than five million
votes for that form of desperation which follows the word of Moscow and is
represented by German Communism"42. The result of the second ballot in which
Thalmann's vote fell by over a million confirmed the inability of the Communist
Party to expand its mass support in conditions which were supposed to be highly
favourable to its cause. The economistic illusion of Communism could thus be
exploited by its enemies.
39 The unemployment figures were carried in the political reports of the Corriere. On 8 January 1932
its Berlin correspondent reported that "the unemployment index continues te rise inexorably: at the
end of 1931 Germany had 5,666,000 unemployed, an increase of 316,000 in the last fortnight of
December": 'Bruning chlede I'appoggio di Hitler', CdS, 8 January 1932. On 23 February the paper
reported that 'he unemployment statistics for the first half of February show a further increase of
81,000, the total without work rising to 6,127,000: 'Hitler candidate contro Hindenburg', CdS, 23
February 1932.
40 'Hitlero Hlndenburg?', CdS, 10 March 1932.
41 'LaGiomata storica della Germania', CdS,13 March 1932.
42 'Hitler decide dl continuare la lotta', CdS, 15 March 1932.
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The failure of Thalmann stood in striking contrast to that of Hitler. In polling over 13
million votes in the second round, Hitler had doubled the National Socialist vote in
the nineteen months since the Reichstag election of September 1930. On the eve
of the election the Carriere identified the main elements of the mass support for
Hitler and suggested that the economic crisis had set in motion an irresistable
'movement' in his favour.
Hitler is in a good position because his is a movement and not just a party. The masses of young
people, discontented and without hope for the future, move towards him when they do not turn to
Communism. The German petty-bourgeoisie, which ought to be the backbone of the Nation, was
defeated by inflation and remains economically helpless. They look to Hitler, however, not because
they think his programme is perfect - it remains generalised - but because he remains a patriotic man
who has in fact sharpened the tone of German nationalism, and because he offers a seductive formula
to whoever has lost his place in society or has no place at all: 'have done with it all' , ie, have done with
the system and the men who have failed to restore prosperity to Germany after the war. Hitler includes
in this the old ruling dynasties and so there is little likelihood of the imperial ghosts and their heirs
reappearing under his leadership.43
From Gramsci's 'scientific' standpoint, the expansion of support for Hitler was no
more an inevitable or automatic result of the economic crisis than it was for the
communist candidate Thalmann. The economic crisis was a necessary but not
sufficient condition. It created the potential for political change but it was the Nazis
rather than the Communists who succeeded in harnessing this potential at the
different political levels - presidential, Reichstag, state etc. Relatively little attention
has been paid to how this was done, in particular to the rapid expansion of the
organisation and personnel of the Nazi party after September 1930 without which it
could not have turned the mass movement to its political advantage. The 'speed' of
this process is particularly striking since changes in the organisational structure of
a political party 'normally' take longer to put in place and are slower to take effect.44
Even at the preSidential level where the minds of the electorate could focus on the
person of Hitler rather than on lists of party candidates, it required the orchestrated
work of thousands of party functionaries at all levels to harness the mass
movement set in motion by the economic crisis. The rapid recrultment, training,
and deployment of these forces in the course of the economic crisis was a
spectacular feat of political organisation without which the electoral expansion of
the Nazi Party could not be explained.
43 ibid., 15 March 1932.
44The most important study of the party's organisational structure in this period is Dietrich Orlow: The
HiS/ory of the Nazi Party, Vol.1, 1919-33 (David and Charles, 1971). The author observes: •As an
organisational feat the Reich presidential campaign was an immense accomplishmenr.
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Fascism, Catholicism, Nazism
The performance of Hitler in the presidential election was the occasion for a
renewed effort to promote a more favourable image of him to fascist (and catholic)
intellectuals in Italy. A key mediator between the two movements was Giuseppe
Renzetti who contributed a significant article toGerarchia at this point. 45 The first
essential was to remove the impression left by the warning of the German bishops
a year earlier that Hitler was "anti-Catholic".
The German clergy justified their attitude on the basis of a number of anti-Catholic declarations (which
were far from prudent and far from opportune, it must be admitted) by certain zealous party members
who support the idea of a national religion similar to the Gallican project which the Popes of past
centuries fought against, an idea arising from the statements and tendencies contained in a book,
The Myth of the 20th Century, written by the deputy Rosenberg, the director of the official party
newspaper.
Renzetti argued that the real motive behind the attitude of the German clergy was
political not religious: it was not really because the ideology of the Brown Shirts
was objectionable from a religious point of view but because their irresistable
advance threatened the existence of the Catholic Centre Party "which has been
able until now to play the role of arbiter of the parliamentary situations and
indirectly to exercise command functions". He cited a recent article in the CathOlic
paper Germania to show that the religious motive alleged by the German clergy
could not be taken at face value. The paper pointed out the danger to the Catholic
Church of "Jewish liberalism":
(in the article, which carne to conclusions largely similar to those of the National Socialists, it was said
among other things that almost all of Berlin's theatres, three-quarters of the press, 900/0 of the
advertising agencies and 60% of the journalistic agencies are in Jewish hands; that the immigration of
Galician Jews to Germany should be prohibited; that a clear distinction ought to be made on the part of
the State between the treatment handed out to the baptised and the unbaptised; that Jewish
emancipation ought to be prevented, etc).
Renzetti claimed that the attitude of the German clergy to National Socialism was
politically motivated. It was intended to keep the Catholic masses loyal to the
Centre Party. However, the Centre Party no longer represented the majority of
German Catholics. Most had no desire to mix religion and politics and were
alienated by the clergy's attitude. The interests of religion would be better served if
45 Giuseppe Renzetti: 'Aspetti polltici attuali della Germania', GER, April 1932, pp's 319-321. All
quotations from this source. The importance of Renzetti's role as a 'conservative' mediator between
the Italian and German movements was pointed out by Professor WoHgang Schieder in his lecture
'The German Right and Italian Fascism before 1933' delivered at the German Historical Institute in
London, 13 May 1999.
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the Church were a "purely religious, absolutely apolitical" organisation. He cited
Hitler's latest campaign speeches suggesting that the Centre was actually
furthering anti-Christian ends:
Hitler is not an anti-Catholic. In the past he may have flirted with what we might call'Nordist' ideas;
aggravated by the clergy's fight against him, he may have made some anti-Catholic declarations, but
that's all. In reality, he is fighting the Centre, and has said so recently in his speeches during the
presidential election campaign, because the Centre keeps Marxism in power and because the system
it is part of favours the development of Bolshevik culture. Indeed, far from being anti-religious Hitler
wants the State he supports to have a Christian basis. This is the only basis on which a national State
can be built.
Renzetti's article stressed the difference between Hitler and Rosenberg on which
the Jesuits pinned their hopes in the survey of the Nazi movement in Civilta
Cattolica the previous year. Moreover, in citing the Catholic paper Germania it
encouraged the tendency to see a basis for future mutuality of Catholicism and
Nazism in their shared attitudes towards the Jews. Gramsci read this poisonous
piece just as he brought the discussion on anti-Semitism in the prison letters to an
end in March 1932. At the very least it supported Sraffa's suggestion that anti-
Semitism in Italy had grown since the Concordat, especially under the influence of
the Nazi movement.
The Ban on the Storm Troops (April)
The reelection of Hindenburg was followed a few days later by a presidential
decree banning the Nazi Storm Troops. By 1932 the latter numbered some
400,000, four times the size of the Reichswehr itself.46 The timing of the decree
depended on the need to ensure internal law and order during the impending
elections to the Diets of Prussia and other states on 24 April. The decree emanated
from Groener in consultation with the Interior Ministers of the various states and
was signed, very reluctantly, by Hindenburg. The decree aroused opposition in
army circles and, with the help of Schleicher's intrigues, fatally undermined the
46'Lo scioglimento dei repartl social-nazionali ordinato con decreto di Hindenburg', CdS, 14 April
1932; 'Oignitosa e ferma protesta di Hitler', CdS, 15 April 1932. The number was quoted by Hitler who,
in his response to the decree, declared: -Let them dissolve my shock troops. This won't change the
heads of their members who will continue as long as they have hearts and minds to stay loyal to me.
Besides, since I can no longer lead and supervise their activity I don't feel responsible for the 400,000
members of the banned formations, for whose conduct I have answered up to now· quoted in CdS,
14 April 1932. Reports of the press reaction to the ban were under the rubric Germania in RSE, 19
April (p.815), 26 April (p.869 and p.907),3 May 1932 (p.931).
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president's confidence in his minister who within a month was forced to resign.47
The army leadership disliked the decree which seemed to set the Reichswehr in
opposition to the National Socialists. The Storm Troops were regarded as potential
recruiting material and already collaborated with the Reichswehr on manoeuvres.
Moreover, the fact that the ban did not apply to the para-military organisations of
the left, in particular the socialist Reichsbanner, was seen by the right-wing press to
have compromised the president's position 'above party'.48 Hitler was quick to take
advantage of the president'S embarrassment by observing with well-aimed
sarcasm that Groaner's first action after the presidental election was "to ban our
Storm Troops but to leave the Reichsbanner alone, as if this organisation was
considered necessary to the power of the State" .49The president was obviously
sensitive to this criticism and instructed Groaner to start an inquiry into the activities
of the Reichsbanner, to find legal grounds for banning it.
The instinct for compromise within the right-wing bloc proved stronger than the
desire for confrontation. An indication of this was that from the start Hitler and the
National SocialiSts were kept well-informed by sources within the government,
possibly Schleicher himself, of what was going on. On the day of the decree the
Berlin correspondent of the Corriere remarked that
relations between the National Socialists and senior functionaries in the central administration are
apparently intimate enough to allow them to follow very closely what is going on in the not very secret
offices of the Ministry. There was great surprise in administrative circles in Berlin that the 'Brown
House' was already in possession yesterday of virtually the exact text of the decree published only
today.50
The following day it reported on the "inside story" of the ban contained in Goebbels'
paper Der Angriff in which Groaner was said to have decided on the dissolution of
the Storm Troops "against the objections of his military advisers in the Reichswehr
Ministry".51
47On the decree banning the shock-troops and its role in the downfall of Greener, see F.LCarsten:
The Reichswehr and Politics 1918-1933 (Oxford University Press, 1966) pp's 338-350. Before
Greener's resignation on 12 May, Schleicher had already met Hitler twice to try to reach a compromise
which would Include the lifting of the ban.
48 See the detailed reports on the ban and Its aftermath in CdS, 14 and 15 April 1932.
49 Quoted in CdS,15 April 1932.
50 CdS, 14 April 1932, cit.
51 CdS, 15 ApriI1932, cit.
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The Elections in Prussia and other states (April)
The momentum of the mass movement of voters built up by the National Socialists
in the presidential elections carried over into the state elections a fortnight later,
although the latter presented the party with a more complicated task because of the
need to compile lists of candidates for the different states. 52The campaign started
before not after the second round of the presidential elections: by focussing on
Prussia in the presidential campaign, Hitler avoided duplicating his efforts in the
state elections.
It is precisely in Prussia, and especially in eastern part of Prussia, that Hitler has recently made the
most progress. With the figures ready to hand Hitler can show that if the mass sympathetic to him stays
the same today, he could win almost half the seats. By the same calculations his allies, the German
Nationals, would lose a certain number of the seats they currently have. But in union with each other
the national front would form the only party which in accordance with parliamentary principles ought to
be entrusted with the government... .....
Hitler is preparing for this struggle. His candidature in the second ballot of the presidential election
obviously gives him the opportunity to keep in motion the vast masses of his supporters including not
only those organised in the National Socialist movement but also the sympathisers who count a lot in
an electoral regime. Always remember that women as well as men can vote in Germany and that the
women outnumber the men.53
Hitler concentrated especially on the eastern districts of Prussia, the heartland of
the traditional German Nationalists. Hence it was not surprising when the
Nationalists whose voters had supported Hitler in the second presidential ballot,
suffered heavy losses to the Nazis in the state election. The gains of the Nazis
appeared all the more impressive as elections to the Prussian Diet had not been
held since 1928, when they were little more than a fringe party. The results, which
Gramsci studied closely, were as follows (1928 results in brackets) 54:-
Social Democrats
Centre
State Party
Communists
German People's Party
German National Party
Hannoverian Party
Christian Social Party
National Socialists
93 (130)
67 (71)
2 (22)
57 (45)
7 (34)
31 (81)
1 (2)
2 ( 0)
162 ( 6)
52See D.Orlow, Vol.1,p.253.
53 'Come Hitler si prepare alia battaglia per Ie elezioni della Dieta prussiana', CdS ,16 March 1932.
54 The election results for Prussia, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Anhalt, and Hamburg were reported with
obvious satisfaction under the headline 'Le consequenze della grande vlttoria di Hitler', CdS, 26 April
1932. They were also carried under the rubric Cose Straniere in CC, 7 May 1932; under the rubric
L 'Ita/is e "Mondo, EF, May 1932. Foreign press reaction to the results was under the rubric Germania
in RSE, 26 April (p.869 and p.907), 3 May 1932 (p. 931). An important analysis of the results was
Giuseppe Piazza: 'Le Elezioni in Germania', NA, 1 May 1932.
189
Across the states the National Socialists made big gains as the bourgeois parties
of the middle and the right disintegrated or disappeared: in Bavaria their seats in
the Diet rose from 9 to 43; in Wurttemberg from 1 to 23 seats; in Anhalt they won 15
seats compared to none in the old Diet; in Hamburg their success was less
spectacular, their seats increasing from 43 to 51. The Communists also made gains
although their capacity to 'expand' their popular vote and to make inroads on the
mass base of the Social Democrats proved to be limited. Indeed, in 'red' Hamburg
the Communists actually lost seats 55.
The most significant feature of this series of elections in the eyes of one observer
was the 'fusion' at the base of the German Nationalists and the National
Socialists.56 The author saw an analogy with what had happened in Italy where the
Nationalist Party founded by Enrico Corradini had fused with the Fascist Party and
was disbanded as a separate organisation after the latter had come to power. He
observed the same process happening in Germany in spite of the Nationalist
leader Hugenburg.
It seems to be greatly assisted by the infallible instinct of the people since the mass of their voters in all
the partial and local elections held since September 1930 have continued to transfer from the old
party to the new. This was most apparent in the second ballot of the presidential election when the
supporters of the German Nationalists, left a free vote, cast their votes almost en masse for the
National Socialists. It seems therefore that the transformation in Italian style of German Nationalism Into
National Socialism is likewise happening from below and despltethe incomprehension of the party's
general staff whose querulous resistance is no more than the surface effervescence which
sometimes accompanies complete and profound chemical fusions.57
The author made two further observations in support of the National SOCialists
worth noting (as far as Gramsci is concerned). Firstly, the disintegration of the
social base of the German Nationalists was due to the fact that its leaders were
incapable of bringing about the kind of social and political 'revolution' that the
National Socialists promised.
The whole conduct of the German Nationalists demonstrates the fundamental, congenital
incapacity of the old German nationalism to carry through a revolution. They have proved beYOnd
doubt by now that they cannot go beyond the 'revolutionary' limits of a worthless abstentionism on the
one hand or of an obsolete project to restore the monarchy on the other, not to mention being
completely devoid of and Indifferent to any social programme or concern. 'You are social reactionaries'
the National Socialists have always called the German Nationalists, even as they joined them in the
Harzburg Front. 'We are social revolutionaries'. That is the difference.58
55 In Hamburg the Communists won 26 seats against 35 in the old Diet.
56 Giuseppe Piazza: 'Le E1ezioni in Germania' , NA, 1 May 1932
57 Ibid p.55.
58 Ibid pps 52-53.
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Secondly, when challenged by other parties to define their social programme more
precisely, the author acknowledged that the National Socialists had been found
wanting. However, echoing the Berlin correspondent of the Corriere, he suggested
that the reason for this was that
true parties of action which accomplish real revolutions, do not arise with ready-made programmes like
Minerva springing fully armed from the head of Jove, but are born as 'movements', rather like natural
phenomena, out of a feeling which leads irresistibly to action. This feeling and action conceal in
embryo or in nuce the 'programme' of ideas, which are then explored and unfold only step by
step ..... 59
From Bruning to Papen:
the 'Cabinet of the Barons' (June)
On 30 May President Hindenburg dismissed Bruning who had governed for two
years by presidential decree. It was the first time in the history of the German
Republic that the Chancellor was forced to resign by the decision of the President
rather than by a vote of Parliament and the first time that a government was formed
without the collaboration of the parliamentary parties 60. With the support of the
Reichswehr and the landowners, the clique around Hindenburg now began their
attempt to create a presidential dictatorship which, under the appearance of being
"above the parties", was clearly orientated towards the Right. 61
Bruning was dismissed for a combination of reasons. The recent electoral
successes of the National SOCialists, who had adamantly refused to collaborate
with him and had long clamoured for his head, weakened Bruning's authority and
increased the pressure on the President to dismiss him. The popular vote of the
National Socialists counted less with Hindenburg, however, than the opposition to
Bruning within the ruling elite itself: in particular, the Reichswehr had lost
confidence in Bruning's government over the ban on the Storm Troops whilst the
agrarians were hostile to its policy of resettlement in the eastern provinces.
59 Ibid p.54.
60 'II Gabinetto Bruning costretto a dimettersi. Hindenburg ha un lungo colloquio con Hitler', CdS, 31
May 1932; 'Hindenburg incarica von Papen di formare iIGoverno', CdS, 1 June 1932; 'II nuovo
Gabinetto tedesco. Von Papen alia Cancellaria', CdS, 2 June 1932. Comment on the situation and
prospects at the fall of Bruning was in Giuseppe Renzetti: 'Le Fasi della rivoluzione tedesca', GER,
June 1932. Press reaction to the fall of Bruning and the new government of Papan under the rubric
Germania in RSE, 31 May 1932 (p.1155), 7 June 1932 (p.1216), 14June 1932 (p.1280).
61 The significance of this stage in the breakdown of German democrcacy Is analysed by Karl Dietrich
Bracher in The German Dictatorship (1973) pps 216-227.
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In a matter of hours a situation has come to a head which has been in the offing for several weeks. It
appeared inevitable once Schleicher had forced Groener to depart, which immediately made it clear
that the govemment could not survive against the will of the Reichswehr. For his part Bruning was too
closely involved with the policy of Groener to distance himseH in time. The president's absence from
Berlin was fully exploited by the circles around Schleicher who, having got rid of Groener, proceeded
to dismantle the very strong position which the Chancellor until recently had enjoyed with Hindenburg
for the past two years. The military have recently been joined in their attacks by the landowners of
eastern Prussia who areparticularly close to the President, who have strongly protested against the
colonisation projects of Stegerwald which amount to an expropriation of their estates in order to
promote intemal resettlement. 62
Bruning's dismissal was not followed by the customary 'ministerial crisis'. His
successor von Papen was announced the following day and the composition of the
new cabinet shortly after. The new chancellor was not charged with forming a new
cabinet since the distribution of offices had already been decided by Hindenburg's
circle without the usual negotiations with the leaders of the parliamentary parties.
The attempt to create a presidential cabinet "above the parties" was apparent in the
selection of ministers who had little or no connection with the political parties in the
Reichstag. In this respect Hindenburg's constitutional experiment in which the
principle of ministerial accountability to parliament was effectively abandoned, was
reminiscent of the state of affairs under the old imperial constitution - the
consequences of which had been analysed so incisively by Max Weber. The
homogeneity of the cabinet ministers derived precisely from their aloofness from
the political parties, their traditional, conservative mentality, and their aristocratic
social background. The democratic press christened it .. the cabinet of the nobles",
the left-wing press "the cabinet of the barons". 63
Whether Hindenburg's experiment was intended to be a permanent or a tranSition-
al arrangement was far from clear at the time. Was the aim to exclude Hitler from
power or merely to prepare the way for him? 64 The Carriere supported the claims
of Hitler and the Nazis and regarded it as a transitional government designed to
62 CdS, 31 May 1932.
63 "The Berliner Tsgeblstt defined it not as a cabinet of national concentration but a cabinet of the
nobles, full of illustriOUS names but devoid of personalities. The Vossische Zeitung on the other hand
defined it as an agrarian-industrial cabinet with a strong military tinge. Such a government is bound to
be opposed by the left-wing parties". Quoted from CdS, 1 June 1932. See also Giuseppe Renzettl:
'Le Fasi della Rivoluzlone tedesca': "The social democrats and the communists will fight against it as a
cabinet of barons, of a reactionary and military character" GER, June 1932.
64 The speculation on this question was reported in CdS, 31 May 1932. One commentator declared
that Papan's government "had no other task but to prepare the way for Hitler", under the rubric Note e
Rsssegne in HA, 1 June 1932; another said that "the decision of the Head of State immediately
appearecUo be a temporary expedient designed to prepare public opinion for more radical changes-
under the rubric L 'lta/is ell Mondo, EF, July 1932. •
192
prepare for their inevitable accession to power. Its editorial of 1 June clearly
forshado~~d _w~~t was to come in e~rly 1933:
No German government today can have real authority and stability unless it is supported by the rising
tide of the-national forces. ·It is possible that the Head of State, more or less in agreement with Hitler,
will succeed in putting together another cabinet of a provisional character charged with the function of
Iiquidation ....Until now Hitlerism has divided the country and, through having to struggle, could not
have done otherwise; only when it comes to power will it promote political reconciliation and spiritual
unity. There will be no doubt then about its first task: the repression of communism, the real enemy of
Germany and, on this account, of Europe.65
It is doubtful whether Hindenburg considered this outcome to be 'inevitable' in the
summer of 1932. A presidential government which did not depend for its survival
on a majority in parliament might yet be 'tolerated' if it responded to the pressures
of the political parties. The latter would no longer compete for power but behave as
pressure groups in much the same way as they had done under the imperial
regime. Thus Hitler was not invited to join the new cabinet but his conditions for
tolerating it were met in full: firstly, the president made a 'clean sweep' of Bruning's
cabinet and none of its ministers were reappointed; secondly, the ban on the Storm
Troops was lifted; thirdly, Papen immediately dissolved the Reichstag before it
reconvened and set new elections for 31 July. Hitler's 'toleration' ended, however,
as soon as the results of these elections were declared: the attempt to make
presidential government permanent was therefore unlikely to succeed.
The Reichstag Election (July)
Despite Goebbels' shrewd apprehension in his diary in April that "we are winning
ourselves to death in these elections" the results of the Reichstag election of July
showed little sign that the expansion of popular support for the National Socialists
had yet reached the point of exhaustion. The National Socialists doubled their
seats from 107 to 230, polling over 13 million votes much as Hitler had done in the
second presidential ballot in April but this time without the addition of the
Nationalist votes.66 The Nationalist vote itself proved surprisingly solid in view of
the losses suffered in the Prussian elections: Hugenburg's party lost only 4 seats
65 CdS, 1 June 1932.
66The results were reported under the rubric Germsnis in RSE, 9 August 1932 (p.1700); under the
rubric Speculum in GER, August 1932; under the rubric Cronaca politics in NA, 16 August 1932;
under the rubric Cose Straniere in CC, 20 August 1932; under the rubric L'lta/is e //Mondo in EF,
September-October 1932. For the fascist analysis of the results, see Giuseppe Renzetti: .Aspetti
della situazione poUtica tedesca', GER, August 1932; and further comment In Marlo da Silva: 'Sipario
su Weimar', CF, 15 August 1932.
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after losing 50 seats in Prussia in April.
Although the National Socialists were now the largest party in the Reichstag, the
combined seats of the two right-wing parties were still not sufficient to give them a
majority. This did not prevent Hitler from demanding complete power when he met
the President on 13 August. 67The violence before and after the election combined
with the indecisive result gave Hindenburg the excuse to exclude Hitler from power
altogether and to continue the experiment in presidential government. The official
press release of the Hindenburg-Hitler meeting spoke of the President's refusal of
Hitler's "demand for entire and complete control of the State" and his reluctance to
hand over power to "a movement which had the intention of using it in a one-sided
manner". 68 When the new Reichstag met for the first time on 12 September I Papan
avoided a massive vote of no confidence by dissolving it immediately and setting
new elections for the 6 November.69
From Papan to Schleicher
The state of political deadlock in Germany after Hitler's audience with Hindenburg
on 13 August now led one fascist commentator to speak of "a crisis of National
Socialism".70 What could Hitler and the Nazis do next without abandoning the
official path of legality? The crisis affected public opinion which now felt that all
ways out of the situation were blocked and that there was little prospect that the
new elections set for 6 November would produce a Reichstag very different from its
predecessor, especially as further expansion of National Socialism looked unlikely:
It was already possible to diagnose the crisis of National Socialism from the fact that it reached the peak
of its electoral development in the last election, having almost completely drained the reserves of the
defunct middle parties which it took advantage of in its rapid rise at parliamentary level... ...The
'revolution of the ballot-box' is finished in Germany as Well.71
67On the Hitler-Hindenburg meeting on 13 August see under the rubric Germania, RSE, 23 August
1932 (p.17S5), and reaction to Hitler's exclusion, RSE, 30 August (p.1810), 6 September (p.1869)
13 September 1932 (p.1957). See also under rubric L'ltaiiaellMondo, EF, September-October '
1932.
68 RSE, 23 August, cit.
69 On the dissolution of the new Reichstag, see under the rubric Germania, RSE, 20 September
1932 (p.1987); see also under the rubric Cose Straniere, CC, 1 October 1932.
70 Giuseppe Piazza: 'La Germania tra una rivoluzione e una restaurazione' in NA, 16 October 1932.
We cannot be sure Gramsci read this article because, unusually, he does not cite in the notes any of
the issues of Nuova Antologia for the second half of the year, the last one being for 16 August 1932.
We can presume he received it since he does not indicate in the letters any difficulties, which was his
usual practise when any of his reviews was interrupted or missing.
71 Ibid.
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The writer anticipated
further successive 'legal' or constitutional steps in the crisis, although it is difficult to speak of
constitutionalism at a time when the very guardians of the constitution can find no other means to
defend it from general attack than to start a debate about it whilst their own observance of it is strictly
minimal. Even in the case of constitutions in ruin, however, there are some points still worth clinging
on to in times of crisis and general dislocation, just as someone who is shipwrecked does not disdain
to hold on to a safety-plank even though it is part of the wreckage itself. These points certainly include
everything which refers to the popular origin and basis of power_?2
For example, the victory of the National Socialists in the July elections gave
Hindenburg the perfect opportunity to adopt the English practise of "winner takes
aU"as a constitutional expedient to justify their ascent to power. Amidst the
wreckage of the Weimar system of 'coalition' government, this English expedient
would have made possible the translnon to "the totalitarian form of party
government ".73
However, all this presupposed that Hindenburg wanted to prepare the way for
Hitler which he clearly did not. For this writer the pOlitical deadlock consisted in the
fact that Germany was caught between a 'restoration' and a 'revolution'. Far from
-" -
being the precursor of National Socialism, the presidential cabinet was a return to
the past and clung to the idea of a restoration of the monarchy as a solution to the
crisis; the recent revival of monarchist propaganda tended to confirm this. It had no
social programme to speak of even though a country like Germany with its huge
proletariat could not be governed without one. It embodied the old German
nationalism "which is not a movement of intellectuals but a movement connected
with the landed society of eastern Prussia, which constitutes a very important part
of the country".
What else are we to make of the somewhat ghostly reappearance of so many gentlemen with the high-
sounding name of 'von', from the old Klassenstadt or Junker State, who appeared to have been
variously reassembled for a film about a Wilhelmine ministry? Viewed in this light, the assembled
company appeared like romantic Don Ouixotes: although they swore a cavalier oath to uphold the
Weimar constitution, they rode and still openly ride the old nag of the monarchy which has become a
bag of bones since the war was lost ..... -74
Hitler and the Nazis offered the chance for the old German nationalism embodied
in the presidential cabinet to renew itself. In clinging to the past rather than looking
to the future, however, Hindenburg's 'sense of history' had failed him:
72ibid.
73ibld.
74ibid.
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This latest attempt by the old nationalism sprang from the constitutional 'wisdom' of President von
Hindenburg. If he had wanted to show any historical sense, however, he would have done better not
to derail or frustrate the revolution but to mediate it by contributing long-term political experience and
by ensuring that solid and permanent national interests are represented.75
The first concessions by Papen's government to Hitler - the dissolution of the
Reichstag, the lifting of the ban on the Nazi shock troops - were steps in the right
direction. If the present cabinet had followed this line, it could have accomplished
the urgent task of transition from the old to the new and taken its leave in an
honourable 'changing of the guard'.
The Reichstag Election and the Appointment of Schleicher
(November-December)
The results of the Reichstag elections of 6 November 1932 confirmed the belief that
the Nazis had peaked in the summer: they lost 2 million votes and 34 seats.76 A
striking feature of the results was the revival of the traditional Nationalists, the party
most closely identified with Papen's cabinet, who increased their seats from 37 to
52 at the expense of the Nazis. The slow erosion of the mass base of the Social
Democrats continued to the advantage of the Communists, whose seats increased
from 89 to 100. The result deepened the political deadlock since the possibility of
forming a government with a parliamentary majority was more remote than ever.
On 17 November Papen resigned as Chancellor, expecting to be recalled by the
President once the constitutional forms had been observed. On 21 November
Hindenburg invited Hitler as leader of the largest party to explore the possibilities of
a parliamentary majority knowing full well that the election results made this
virtually impossible. On 23 November Hitler rejected the President's invitation:
The leader of the National Socialists countered by pointing out the obvious impossibility of meeting
this condition but, not wanting to bum his bridges, suggested an intermediate solution: it would be
enough for him to govern by means of Article 48, which Hindenburg had already granted to Papan
and, before him, Bruning. But on 24 November the President refused on the grounds that (In the
words of the official document) -he could not take the responsibility before the German people for
entrusting the powers of a presidential government to the leader of a party which has always
proclaimed its totalitarian spirit and which, moreover, has always been opposed to the President
personally and to the political and economic measures he considered necessary". In short, a Hitler
government would mean a party dictatorship whilst Hindenburg wants a National Government: but
75ibld.
76 The results were reported under the rubric Germania in RSE, 15 November; in CC, 19 November
1932; in NA, 16 November 1932. Werner von Schulenburg's article: 'Le Elezioni in Germania' in GER
, November 1932, contained few facts anddid little to illuminate the background.
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how the latter can be formed leaving out the National Socialists is a problem similar to squaring the
circle.n
On 2 December it was announced that General von Schleicher, Minister of the
Reichswehr, was appointed Chancellor.7a Hindenburg had wanted to reappoint
Papen but could not do so against the objections of Schleicher who announced
that the Reichswehr had no confidence in Papen. The French paper Temps came
nearest to reading the situation:
There is no doubt that the Marshall's preference was for Papen, who was supported by Hugenburg's
Nationalists, by the leaders of big industry and by the men of the Prussian Right. However, the ex-
Chancellor declined recognising that his return to the leadership of affairs in the face of the open
hostility of all the parliamentary parties would provoke the most serious internal complications.79
In fact Papen's reappointment was vetoed by Schleicher even though he was the
President's choice. Speaking for the Reichswehr, Schleicher said that the army
would not countenance the risk of a civil war which the reappointment of Papen
might provoke. The army's word was final.
The National Socialist press adopted a more cautious tone than usual, regretting
the fact that the army had now been drawn into politics:
The manner in which the new Chancellor has been appointed is simply a desperate ploy to avoid at all
costs giving power to Hitler. We have no prejudice against General von Schleicher whose merits in the
field of army affairs we fully appreciate, but he has yet to prove himself to be a true man of State. We
are very concerned that he is not only Chancellor but also Minister of Defence because a political
struggle will immediately take on a military character. His every action will have repercussions in the
army. Until now he can be proud of having kept the army out of the political struggles but now that he
is an exponent of politics he will draw the armed forces into the political arena. Indeed, for reasons of
internal politics the latter could now find themselves part of the front against German freedom.eo
The same position was adopted by the re-elected president of the Reichstag,
Goring, in a short speech at the opening of the new Reichstag on 6 December. The
Nazis were definitely supporters of authoritarian government but this could
n Under the rubric Cronacs Politics, NA, 1 December 1932: note the reference to Article 48 of the
constitution. The exchange between Hitler-Hindenburg, including the text of Hindenburg's refusal,
was also reported under the rubric Germania in RSE, 6 December 1932. See also the rubric Cose
Straniere in CC, 17 December 1932.
78 On the appointment of Schleicher and his programme, see Werner von Schulenberg: 'E
Schleicher?', GER, December 1932; under the rubric Germania in RSE, 6 December (p.2590), 13
December (p.2650); 20 December (p. 2742), 27 December 1932 (p.2770).
79 Reported under the rubric Germania in RSE, 13 December 1932 (p.2653). The right-wing French
paper L 'Avenir welcomed the appointment of Schleicher comparing the role he would play in
Germany with the position of Mussolini on coming to power in Italy: ibid.
80 Under the rubric German;s in RSE, 13 December 1932 (p.2652-2653).
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depend on bayonnettes alone:
Bayonettes are sometimes useful things but not to support oneself with. We deplore the fact that the
nomination of the Minister of the Reichswehr as Chancellor will drag our small but excellent army into
the struggle of sides. The Reichswehr should not be used as an instrument of politics. Now he wants
to govern under Article 48, which is the purest absolutism. It should be made perfectly clear straight
away that to take away from the people's representatives the right to pronounce votes of no
confidence in the government clearly offends against the spirit of the constitution. The constitution
establishes that power in the State derives from the people: that is why power ought to have been
and must be entrusted to Hitler, who is supported by a third of the people.81
811bid.
198
Notebooks 7-12
In the course of 1932 Gramsci wrote notes in as many as eleven notebooks. Some
were added at the end of notebooks mostly written earlier, some were entered at
the start of notebooks mostly compiled later. The main body of his work in 1932
was concentrated in five notebooks numbered 8-13. There was a significant shift in
his pattern of work at this point: around February-March he started to reorganise
and redraft many notes written so far; sometimes he expanded the earlier drafts,
sometimes he simply transcribed them.1 Although they included many entirely new
notes, most of those in Notebook 10 (The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce),
Notebook 11 (Introduction to the Study of Philosophy), Notebook 12 (On the
Intellectuals), and Notebook 13 (Notes on the Politics of Machiavelli) were based
on earlier drafts. From now onwards Gramsci divided his time and effort between
writing new notes and rewriting old ones. Most of the new notes written in 1932
are found in the 'miscellaneous' sections of Notebooks 8-9.
§8.171, §7.95, §8.107. Questions of Language
Towards the end of 1931 Gramsci began a third series of 'Philosophical Notes'.
One of the earliest of these contained an interesting 'materialist' analysis of
ideology. Gramsci observed how the language of the intellectuals may remain
formally the same even though a new historical situation has changed its content.
§8.171 [extract) ....One of the characteristics of the Intellectuals as 8 crystallised SOCial
group ("Ie, one which sees Itself as continuing uninterruptedly through history and
therefore as being above the struggles of groups rather than as the expression of a
dialectical process through which every dominant social group elaborates Its own
category of Intellectuals) Is precisely to reconnect themselves, In the sphere of Ideology,
with a preceding Intellectual group by using the same conceptual nomenclature. A new
historical situation creates a new Ideological superstructure whose representatives (the
Intellectuals) must themselves be conceived as 'new Intellectuals' born out of the new
situation and not as a continuation of the preceding Intellectual milieu. If the new
Intellectuals put themselves forward as the direct continuation of the Ides. of the
preceding Intellectuals, they are not 'new' at all: Ie, they are not linked to the new social
group which represents the new historical situation but are left-overs from the old social
group and the old Ideas of their Intellectuals. Nevertheles. the fact Is that no new
historical Situation, however radical the change which brought It about, completely
changes the language, at least not In Its external, formal aspect. On the other hand the
content of the language has changed even If It Is difficult to be aware Immediately of the
precise change. Moreover, the phenomenon Is historically complex and Is complicated by
1The new phase of work was based on the plan (written at the turn of 1931-32) set out at the start of
Notebook 8 (QCII p.935-936) and was connected with his request for "special notebooks" in the
letter to Tatiana on 22 February 1932 (LeI! p.537-538). On the 'phases' of composition of the
notebooks see Professor Gerratana's preface to the critical edition, especially-oct,:J:xxv.
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the differences of culture typical of the different strata of the new social group, many of
whom In the Ideological sphere are stili Immersed in the culture of the preceding historical
situation. A class, many of whose strata stili have a Ptolemaic conception of the world,
can be the representative of a very progressive historical situation: these strata may be
backward Ideologically but are very advanced on a practical level, In terms of their
economic and political function etc. If the task of the Intellectuals Is to determine and to
organise the cultural revolution, In other words to adapt culture to practical life, then It I.
evident that 'crystallised' Intellectuals are reactionary etc ..... .2
What was the "practical origin" of these philosophical reflections? In this passage
Gramsci differentiates between the 'new intellectuals' of the Left (ie, the
communists) representing the progressive class, and the so-called 'new
intellectuals' of the Right (ie, the fascists). The date of this note suggests that his
starting-point may have been the reports of the big rally of the German Right held at
Harzburg in October 1931 in which Hitler and the National Socialists publicly
formed a common 'front' with the traditionalists, ie, the Nationalist leader
Hugenburg, the Stahlhelm leaders, and other figures from the old regime. What
else were the Nazis doing at the Harzburg rally if not seeking "to reconnect
themselves, in the sphere of ideology, with the preceding intellectual groupn? A
'materialist' critique of this event suggested, however, that whilst Hitler and the
National Socialists adopted the same "conceptual nomenclature" as the traditional
nationalists, the new historical situation had changed its meaning "even if it is
difficult to be aware immediately of the precise changen.
§7.95, §8.107. The Term 'Reich'.
At the end of Notebook 7 we find evidence of the sort of difficulty Gramsci meant.
Here he wrote a cluster of five notes dealing with questions of 'political nomen-
clature'. One of these, §7.95, written at the same time as §8.171 above, touched on
the term 'Reich'. Gramsci's periodicals had begun to contemplate the forthcoming
presidential elections in Germany. He noted the fact that the aged Field Marshal
Hindenburg, whose term of office was due to expire in early 1932, was referred to
by the title 'President of the Reich' not 'President of the Republic'. The traditionalist
term 'Reich' was still used even though the political context had completely
changed. When instead of using the German word 'Reich' political commentators
translated it into Italian, they commonly got the meaning wrong.
2 §8.171. On the 'Popular Outline'. The Question of Nomenclature and Content, OCII p.1043-
1044.The new series started at §8.166, probably written in November 1931.
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§7.95. Political Nomenclature. Reic h, etc. Find the exact historical and Ideological origin
of this term which Is wrongly translated as 'empire'. Likewise, the 'Commonwealth' of
British nations cannot be translated as 'republic' even though it also means 'republic',
Note Gramsci's habitual link between the two 'traditionalist' countries, Britain and
Germany. In English the word 'Commonwealth' once meant 'republic' and now
meant something like 'empire', whereas in German the reverse was the case: the
word 'Reich' had once meant 'empire' (as in Holy Roman Empire, for example) and
was now used as a substitute for 'republic'. When the presidential elections were
held a few months later, in March 1932, Gramsci returned to this question in
§8.107.
§8.1 07. EncyclopaedIc Ideas. Reich. As for the meaning of the term Reich, which does not
mean 'empire' at all (I notice sometlmel In Gerarchla It Is even translated as 'realm'
(regno », It Is worth noting that It exists In all the Germanic languages and occurs In the
Scandinavian languages In the corresponding term for Relchstag. It l88ms that Reich Is
really a Germanic term to Indicate In a general way the territorial 'State'.4
Gramsci noted that Gerarchia chose to describe "the venerable Hindenburg" as
'President of the Realm', a title with positively monarchist overtones in spite of the
fact that Germany was a republic. But the point he repeats is that 'Reich' does not
mean 'empire': why does he insist on this? Gramsci indicates that he had seen it
translated as 'empire'. This anachronistic meaning occured especially when
commentators tried to render into Italian the expression 'Third Reich'. One instance
of this was in the detailed account of the ideas of National Socialism published in
Civi/ta Cattolica earlier in May in which Dr. Goebbels was quoted as calling upon
the youth of Germany to rise up since "You are the nobility of the Third Empire" (ie,
Third Reich).s
Knowing what the 'Third Reich' came to mean we might think that 'empire' was a
better translation of Reich than territorial 'State' but to Gramsci it seemed a
completely anachronistic usage. These notes on the term 'Reich', however, are the
start of an enquiry into the meaning of a new historical myth, the 'Third ReiCh'.
Gramsci may have perceived as early as 1931 that this concept was the prime
example of the attempt by Hitler and the Nazis to claim what the "crystallised
intellectuals" claimed for themselves, ie, to be the uninterrupted continuation of
3 §7.9S. Political nomenclature. Reich, etc, aCIl p.923.
4 §8.107. Encyclopaedic Jdeas. Reich. QCII p.1004. An example of the mistranslation in Gerarchia can
be found in Werner von der Schulenberg: 'Bruning, Hitler, Hugenburg', Gerarchia, January 1932
(Professor Gerratana's note, QCIV p.2798).
5'11Nazionalsocialismo in Germania', CC, May 1931.
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German history. An essential property of this new historical myth was its 'messianic'
element, but Gramsci did not seem to think that this ingredient was particularly
'new' either. In the exchange of letters with Tatiana at this time (12 October 1931)
he suggested that he may have been wrong to have taken her supposed tendency
to anti-Semitism so seriously-ana-mighthave done better to make a joke of the
whole thing by posing a series of absurd questions:
Or I could have asked you the question how can we possibly know who la the "true" Jew, or
the Jew "In general", or eyen man "In general" - the anawer to which can't, I think, be
found In any anthropological or sociological museum. And what's more, what does their
conception of God as "the god of armies" mean for today's Jews and all the language of
the Bible about "the chosen people" and the ml•• lon of the Jewish people, which
r.aemb/ea the language uaed by Kalaer Bill (Gluglle/mone) before the war.8
The absurdity of trying to identify the Jew "in general" appears to us, in the wisdom
of hindsight, rather less ridiculous than it appeared to Gramsci's rational mind in
1931 for the imponderable element of Nazi anti-Semitism lay precisely in its
abstract universality which turned the Jew "in general" into the object of hatred. But
the key point for the present purpose is the link in Gramsci's mind between the
'mission' of the Jewish people and that of the German people. This may have been
no more than a casual analogy on his part, of course, but the context of the
exchange suggests that the link was 'dialectical' and revealed a turn of mind which
tended to synthesise opposites. The Kaiser's vision of the national 'mission' of the
German people would thus be the 'antithesis' of the biblical mission of the Jewish
people, but Gramsci may have perceived that the racial element of this national
mlssion - ie, anti-Semitism - had now become the key.
Paat and Preaent
The thread of Gramsci's enquiry into the term 'Reich' followed a circuitous route to
§15.48. This was written in April 1933 just as the rhetoric of the so-called 'Third
Reich' became reality. On the way there Gramsci changed route, or rather
countries. In notes written towards the end of 1932 he analyses myths of national
'missions' in terms of Italian not German CUlture, referring especially to the
doctrines of Mazzini.7 But this Italian stage of the route left its 'trace' in §15.48, so
we can be reasonably sure of having followed, all along, the same thread.
6To Tatiana, 12 October 1931, Lell p.479.
7 See in particular §9.127. Risorgimento, QCII p.1190-1191.
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Machiavelli (1) A study of keywords like 'Third Reich' used by movements of the German Right.
Historical myths like this are essentially a concrete and effective way of presenting the myth of the
'historical mission' of a people. The point to study is precisely this: why is this form 'concrete and
effective', or simply more effective than another? In Germany the uninterrupted continuity (ie, not
interrupted by permanent foreign invasions) between the medieval period of the Holy Roman Empire
(the first Reich) and the modem period (from Frederick the Great to 1914) makes the concept of the
'Third Reich' immediately comprehensible. In Italy the concept of the 'Third Italy' during the
Risorgimento could not be easily understood by the people because of the lack of historical continuity
and homogeneity between ancient Rome and papal Rome (in fact the homogeneity even between
republican and imperial Rome was hardly perfect). Hence the relative success of Mazzini's watchword
of 'the people's Italy' which tended to mean a complete renewal of popular initiative in a democratic
sense, a new Italian history in contrast to Gioberti's 'Primato'. The latter tended to present the past in
terms of its theoretically possible continuity with the future, ie, with a particular political programme in
the here and now presented in a broad historical perspective. But Mazzini's myth did not take root and
his successors watered it down and mixed it up with bookish rhetoric. The medieval Communes,
which were an effective and radical historical renewal, might have served Mazzini as a precedent but
they were exploited instead by the federalists like Cattaneo. [This theme should be related to the first
notes written in the special notebook on Machiavelli).8
§S.210. The term 'revolutionary'
Another ambiguity in current political nomenclature concerned the term
'revolutionary'. The confusion arose because fascist intellectuals freely
appropriated the term to describe their own movements. Writing in December 1931
an Italian observer of the rally of the German Right at Harzburg, for example, made
no distinction between the Nazi and Communist 'revolutions'. Gramsci asked:
Do we have to accept as 'revolutionary' all those movements which try to dignify and to
justify themselves by calling themselves 'revolutions'? There Is an Inflation of concepts
and revolutionary phraseology here, as though the hat makes the head or the habit makes
the monk. De Sanctls already observed and ridiculed this attitude In The Jew of Vero,.. It
Is also necessary to see If the phraseology of 'revolution' Is purposely used to create 'the
will to believe', the latter being well-supported by solid 'collateral' arguments (In the
shape of tribunals, police etc). The fact that so many Nletzscheans masquerading as
rebels against existing reality and social conventions etc have ended up stomaching
them, and have thus emptied certain attitudes of any serious content, Is perfectly true,
but this Is no reason to allow one's Judgement to be guided by charlatans of this 8Ort .... 11
8 §1S.4S. Machiavelli, ocm p.1S0S-1S09.
9 §S.210. History and Anti-History, QCII p.106S. De Sanctis' essay on Father Brescianl's novel The
Jew of Verona is in Sagg; Critic; (1952 edition), a cura di Luigi Russo, Vol. I, p.44-70. The following
passage from De Sanctis illustrates Gramsci's point. including the 'collateral' arguments:
-Shortly after [ie, after 184S] the reaction puts on the revolution's clothes and starts mimicking it. It
simulates the public meetings, the cries, the enthusiasm; we have the demonstrations, the petitions
and the rounds of applause, and you would have said it was the thing itself if, once the fear had
ceased, he had not courageously added his own contribution, the gallows, the prisons, and The Jew
of Verona. Thus, a mad emperor passes himself off as Alexander the Great, a fine figure of a man
apparently restored to life, simply by dressing in the same style; but underneath the surface of the
skin the wolf reveals its true nature as it bares its teeth and shows its ferocity· (p.4S).
See also the editors' comments on 'Father Bresciani's Progeny' in SCW, edited by David Forgacs and
Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, p. 298-301.
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Past and Present
Gramsci's reference to the novel by the Father Bresciani, which was originally
.serialised in the Jesuit review Civilta Cattolica, is particularly interesting in terms of
his dialectic of past and present. Coming in the middle of his exchange of letters
with TatiaRa(September 1931-Mard'l 1932) on whether or not ther-e was any anti-
Semitism in Italy, it seems that Gramsci saw this novel as a possible way of
understanding German anti-Semitism in the context and perspective of Italian
culture. Was not Bresciani's 'Jesuit' vision of the 1848 Revolution in The Jew of
Verena similar to the Nazi vision of communism or 'Bolshevism' as part of the
Jewish world conspiracy? Gramsci would return to the 'spirit' of The Jew of Verona
towards the end of the notebooks. Writing in 1934-35 in the light of the Nazi
dictatorship, he describes the kind of social psychology in which a cultural product
such as this thrives:
The psychology which precedes an intellectual phenomenon of this sort is created by panic, by a
cosmic fear of demonic forces which are beyond understanding and so cannot be controlled except
by constructing something universally repressive. The memory of this panic (of its acute phase) is
long-lasting and decisively shapes the will and the feelings: creative freedom and spontaneity
disappear and what remains is the rancour, the spirit of vengeance, the stupid blindness - all hidden
by a mellifluous and jesuitical disguise. Everything is reduced to the practical (in the worst sense),
everything is propaganda, polemic, implicit negation expressed in mean, narrow-minded, often vile
and repulsive form as in The Jew of Verona. 10
§8.195. An 'Explosive Synthesis of the Collective Will'
After the elections of 1930 it was commonplace to express surprise at the volcanic
suddenness with which the mass movement of Hitlerism had erupted. The
commentator on the nationalist rally at Harzburg , for example, remarked that "the
refusal of the Right to participate in the State has been prolonged for so long that it
has resulted all of a sudden in the unexpected upsurge of National Socialism
which emerged in the elections of 14 September 1930 as already such a gigantic
movement that it has taken over the leadership and almost swallowed up the old
German National Right and, together with it, is pushing at the doors of the State" .11
In the early months of 1932 Gramsci followed the elections in Germany for
the Presidency of the Republic. His primary source of news was the Corriere della
10 §23.36. Methodological Criteria, QCIIl p.2232.
11 Giuseppe Piazza: 'La crisi tedesca e iI fronte di Bad Harzburg', NA, December 1931.
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Sera which reported the elections very closely, although his periodicals also had
much to say during and after the event. In the first ballot on 13 March Hitler polled
over 11 million votes against 18 million for Hindenburg: this rose to 13 million votes
in the second ballot on 10 April against 19 million for Hindenburg. In the eighteen
months since the Reichstag elections of September 1930, Hitler and the National
Socialists had doubled their mass vote. This was the background of §8.195 in
which Gramsci discussed Marx's famous proposition from the 1859 Preface that
"society does not pose problems for itself unless the material conditions for their
solution already exist".
This proposition Immediately poses the problem of the formation of a collective will. To
analyse critically what It means Involves research Into how precisely permanent collective
wills are formed and how they set concrete alms for themselves In the short- and medlum-
term, Ie, a collective course of action. It Is a question of more or le88 long procelles of
development and rarely of sudden, explosive 'syntheses'. Such 'explosions' do occur but
on close examination It can be seen that they are more destructive than reconstructive;
they remove external and mechanical obstacles In the way of an Indigenous, spontaneous
development. The Sicilian Vespers could be taken as a typical example.
The formation of a collective historical movement could be concretely stUdied, analysing
It In all Its molecular phases - something which Is rarely done since It would weigh down
any approach: usually It Is assumed that the currents of opinion have already taken shape
around a group or a dominant personality. In modern conditions the problem Is expressed
In terms of the party or a coalition of related partie.: how a party Is first eatabllshed, how
Its organisational strength develops, what social Influence It has etc. The molecular
proces8 Is extremely minute and must be analysed In the smallest detail. The
documentation for this 18 made up of a vast quantity of books, pamphlets, newspaper and
review articles, conversations and oral debates repeated countless times. In their
gigantic aggregation these represent the laborious procese which gives birth to a
collective will with the degree of homogeneity necessary and sufficient to bring about an
action coordinated and simultaneous In time and In the geographical space where the
historical event takes place.12
The remote example of the Sicilian Vespers of 1282 when the population of the
island rose up to expel the French occupiers reveals the breathtaking scope of
Gramsci's historical imagination but it should not distract us from 'similar'
explosions under modern conditions where the formation of a collective will "is
expressed in terms of the party or a coalition of related parties". Indeed, by
presenting itself as a national uprising against Germany's 'subjection' (or indeed
occupation) by the French under the Versailles Treaty - in other words, as "a
nationalist party in a regime of national subjection" - Hitler and the Nazi movement
were not entirely removed from the Sicilian Vespers. Their aim was precisely to
destroy the "external and mechanical obstacles" put in Germany's way by the
12 §8.195. The proposition etc, QCII p.1 057-1058.
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Versailles Treaty.
But what of Marx's famous proposition? What did it have to do with the collective
will now forming in Germany behind Hitler? The sudden expansion of Hitlerism
under conditions of 'catastrophic' economic crisis after 1929 appeared to provide
striking confirmation of 'economistic' interpretations of Marx's theory of the political
superstructures. When Gramsci wrote §7.1 O. Structure and superstructure after the
German elections of September 1930, he argued that the Comintern's current
'revolutionary' line of action was wrong. This depended on essentially economistic
assumptions ( the theory of spontaneity etc) which the election result tended to
prove wrong: the relatively sluggish increase in the Communist vote was evidence
for this. On the other hand, the sudden expansion of Hitlerism seemed to be striking
proof that 'economistic' interpretations of political movements were valid. But how
could Marx's theory of history be wrong for political movements of the Left but right
for political movements of the Right? Unless it was valid for both sides, the theory
could not be 'scientific'.
This brings us back to §8.195. The whole emphasis of Gramsci's application of
Marx's proposition in this note is anti-economistic; that is, the expansion of
Hitlerism must be analysed as a process of 'molecular' changes in consciousness
which depended on a vast quantity of books, pamphlets, newspaper articles,
conversations, oral debates etc, etc: these cultural facts are just as integral to
Marx's "material conditions" as economic facts. Purely 'economistic' accounts
were not sufficient to explain the expansion of Hitlerism either.
18.195 [continued]: the Change of Ideological Elemenla
In the last part of this note Gramsci picks up one of the threads which he first
elaborated in his critique of Michels' typology of political parties on the eve of the
German elections of September 1930. This was his historicist explanation of the
mass appeal of the charismatic leader, in which he argued that
the so-called 'charisma' of which Michels speaks always coincides with a primitive phase in the
development of mass parties in which its doctrine appears as something nebulous and incoherent in
the eyes of the masses and needs an infallible pope to interpret and adapt it to circumstances ...These
ideologies are nurtured by feelings and emotions which have still not reached the point of dissolving
because the classes (or the class) which express them, having arrived historically at the point of
dissolution, still have a certain basis and cling to the glories of the past in order to shield themselves
from the future.13
13 §2.75. QCI p. 233.
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If we now move forward in time to §8.195, written during the presidential elections
of 1932, we can see the continuity and change in Gramsci's thinking about
Hitlerism.
The Importance of utopias and of confused and rationalistic Ideologies In the Initial phase
of the historical processes whereby collective wills are formad. Utopias, or abstract
rationalism, are no less Important than the old conceptions of the world elaborated
through the accumulation of successive historical experiences. What matters Is the
critique of this ideological complex by the first representatives of the new historical
phase. The critique Involves a process of differentiation and change In the relative weight
which the elements of the old Ideologies possessad: what was once secondary and
subordinate, or even Incidental, Is now taken to be primary, becoming the nucleus of the
new Ideological and doctrinal complex. The old collective will dissolves Into Its
contradictory elements since the subordinate elements among them are developing
socially etc.
After the formation of the regime of parties - a historical phase connected with the
standardisation of the great masses of the population (communications, newspapers, big
cities etc) - the molecular processes occur much more rapidly than In the past etC.M
If this passage is 'reduced' from the general to the particular - that is, to its "practical
origin" in the current phenomenon of Hitlerism - it poses a number of questions,
although we cannot be 'certain' that they were the questions in Gramsci's mind.
Could the particular utopia he was thinking of be the 'Third Reich'? If so, can this
particular utopia, understood in its racial sense, be considered an expression of
'abstract rationalism' comparable in this respect, let us say, to utopian socialism?
Could the secondary and subordinate, not to say incidental, element of the old
ideological complex be anti-Semitism, now become "the nucleus of the new
ideological and doctrinal complex"? And what of the classes (or class) for whom
this nebulous utopia was so meaningful? Were they moribund classes which "had
reached the point of dissolving" (§2.75) or were they subordinate classes which in
this passage were still "developing socially"? Was he revising his concept of the
German petty-bourgeoisie as a 'dying class'?
The hypothesis that these were the analytical questions in Gramsci's mind is
supported by two contextual considerations. Firstly, from the start the constant focus
of Gramsci's observation of the German crisis was the political and ideological
interplay between the old and the new Right. He particularly wanted to understand
the rise of Hitlerism in relation to the traditional (or 'crystallised') intellectuals and
their dying ideology. The presidential contest between Hindenburg and Hitler
'dramatised' this question more than ever before. Moreover, it is worth noting that
the traditionalist Hugenburg backed Hitler in preference to Hindenburg on the
14 §8.19S. The proposition etc, QCII p. 1058.
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second ballot. This would explain Gramsci's assertion that the new 'collective will'
could take the form of "a party or a coalition of parties". It also laid the basis for an
eventual 'fusion' between the old and the new.
Secondly, the exchange of letters with Tatiana and Piero at this time on the
question of anti-Semitism suggests that Gramsci saw this as the key to the change
in the relative weight of the elements of German nationalism. This perception may
have been strengthened by what Gramsci was reading in his reviews at this time.
An article on the presidential contest in the March issue of Gerarchia , for example,
sought to explain and, to some extent, to 'mediate' Nazi anti-Semitism for an Italian
fascist readership as this was perceived to be the incomprehensible 'foreign'
element in German fascism. The article concluded that once the Nazis came to
power, "we can assume that common sense and reason will prevail in this question
over the fanaticism of the few" .15 Despite this attempt to put the element of anti-
semitism 'in proportion' and to marginalise the 'fanatical few', the article provided
timely evidence for Piero's suggestion that the attitude of the State towards the
Jews in Italy since the Concordat may be "coloured by the example of foreign
countries, especially by the Nazis and similar movements" .16
A further insight into Gramsci's perception of the changing relation of elements in
German nationalism is provided by §9.39. Cultural arguments. Elements of French
political life written a few months later. This note extends his reflections on "the
monarchist party in a republican regime, or the nationalist party in a regime of
national subjection". In particular, Gramsci shows how the anti-republican element
of monarchist ideology relates to the nationalist element. As usual he starts from
the elements of French political life, but it is German political life which makes the
analysis current.
The monarchla. have conatructed the hlatorlcal-polltlcal doctrine (which they aeek to
popularlae) according to which the Empire and the Republic have up to now meant Invaalon
of French national territory. Two Invaalona connected with the politics of Napoleon I (In
1814 and In 1815), one with the polltlca of Napoleon III (1870-71) and one with the politic.
of the Third Republic (1914) provide the material used for agitation. The republicans make
uae of the aame materlala but their atandpolnt, of course, la not the aame aa the
monarchla.. The latter can even aeem defeatlat lnaofar aa the causea of Invaalon ar.
rooted In French Instltutlona and not, aa the republlcana argue, In the hereditary eneml..
of France and In the flrat place Pruaala (rather than Germany: thla dlatlnctlon la of 80me
Importance becauae It dependa on the tendency of French policy to laolate Prusala and to
make Bavaria and the aouthern Germana, Including the Austrlana, alllea of France). Thl.
mode of praaentlng the quaatlon to the popular ma.... by all the varloua natlonall.t
tendenclea la far from being Ineffective. But la It hlatorlcally accurate? How many tim..
15GiuseppeRenzetti:'Hindenburge Hitler',GER, March1932.
16 Piero Sraffa to Tatiana, 1 March 1932, In Lettere a Tania per Gramsci, p. 53.
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has Germany been invaded by the French? (It would be necessary to count the occupation
of the Ruhr in 1923 as a French invasion). And how many times has Italy been Invaded by
the French? And how many times has France been Invaded by the Engllsh? .....But after
1870 the nationalistic myth of the Prussian danger has almost completely absorbed the
attention of the propagandists of the Right and has created the climate of foreign policy
which Is suffocating France.17
When Gramsci asks 'How many times has Germany been invaded by the French?'
and includes in this the French invasion of the Ruhr in 1923, the possibility of
applying this analysis to the propaganda of the German Right becomes apparent.
Was not the German Republic also associated by the Right with defeat and
occupation by the French? The popular appeal of Nazi propaganda suggested that
this combination of the anti-republican with the nationalist element was particularly
'effective'. Moreover, this analysis is connected with the claim of the traditional or
'crystallised'· intellectuals to represent the "uninterrupted continuity" of the nation's
history.
§8.187, §8.55, §8.81, §9.21, §9.88:
The Ascendancy of the Bureaucratic Caste
During the transition from parliamentary to presidential rule in Germany in 1930
Gramsci described a historical tendency whereby lithe bureaucracy became
estranged from the country and via its administrative positions became a true
political party, the worst of all, because the bureaucratic hierarchy replaced the
intellectual and political hierarchy. The bureaucracy became precisely the State-
Bonapartist party" .18 He was talking about Italy but referred to Weber's wartime
critique of bureaucratic leadership for evidence of "a 'similar' state of affairs in the
Kaiser's Germany". The continuity between past and present in his thinking can be
traced in his observations on what had happened in the elections in Germany in
1930 and in Britain in 1931. This was when classes broke away from their
traditional political parties and leaders. When a crisis of parties like this arises, "it
cannot but be reflected in the State, where the power of the bureaucracy (in a
broad sense, military and civil) is consequently strengthened to a formidable
degree".19
17 §9.39, QCII p.1118-1119.
18§3.119, QCI p. 388.
19 §4.69, QCl p. 513.
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The theme of bureaucracy became a central thread in Gramsci's thinking in 1932
and we find many notes on the question in Notebooks 8 and 9. Gramsci brings to
this question two 'organising' perspectives which we may call structural and
superstructural. The structural perspective is outlined in §8.108. [Machiavelli] The
Bureaucracy in which he suggests that the problem of the bureaucracy and the
functionaries must be seen not just in terms of the concept of the State but "in a
much wider framework, ie, the framework of social 'passivity' [or] relative passivity,
and understood from the standpoint of the production of material goods·. The
superstructural perspective is indicated in §9.21. Machiavelli. History of the
bureaucracy where he observes that "this problem partly coincides with the
problem of the intellectuals". Thus, when he began redrafting his notes on the
intellectuals at this time (ie, from February 1932) he describes them as "the
functionaries of the superstructures".2O
What was the practical origin of these notes on bureaucracy? To be sure, their
theoretical scope goes far beyond one country, but there is an explicit 'German'
thread running through them. This was connected with the pivotal position in
German politics in 1932 of President Hindenburg and the intrigues of the
presidential circle. Gramsci's main source of German news in the first six months of
1932 was the Corriere della Sera. A notable feature of the Corriere 's reporting of
the German crisis was the privileged access or inside information it seemed to
have about the intrigues of the presidential circle. To some extent Gramsci's
comments in the notes on the "caste" mentality of the bureaucracy bear the imprint
of this source. But the most imaginative aspect of his perspective is the connection
between past and present.. In February 1932 Gramsci began rewriting his notes on
the intellectuals in Notebook 12 in parallel with writing those on bureaucracy: the
most interesting additions to these second drafts relate to this theme. In particular,
the pivotal position of the Hindenburg circle in German politics in the first half of
1932 brought sharply into contemporary focus his historical perspective on
Germany's "traditional intellectuals", ie, the Prussian Junkers.
20 §12.01, OCIII p.1518.
210
§8.187, §12.01. The Spirit 0' Caste
The 'German' thread running through these notes on bureaucracy can be traced
back via Max Weber to Germany's 'classical' philosopher, Hegel.
18.187. Intellectuals. The position assigned by Hegel to the Intellectuals should be
accurately studied. It has had enormous Importance not only In the conception of political
science but In the whole conception of cultural and spiritual life. With Hegel thinking In
terms of the castes or the 'estates' begins to give way to thinking In terms of the 'State' ,
whose 'aristocracy' are precisely the Intellectuals. The 'patrimonial' conception of the
State ( which Is the mode of thinking In terms of 'castes' ) Is the conception which Hegel
Immediately had to destroy (scornful and sarcastic polemics against von Hailer). It Is
Impossible to understand anything (historically) about modern Idealism and Its social
roots without this 'validation' of the Intellectuals by Hegel.21
According to this interpretation of Hegel, those who claim to see in his philosophy
of the State a rationale for 'Prussianism' have picked the wrong thread. They
should look to von Haller's patrimonial conception based on lithe mode of thinking
in terms of castes", not to the theory of the modern constitutional State elaborated
by Hegel in polemical contrast to von Haller. In effect Gramsci was denying that the
heirs of classical German philosophy were the reactionary Right. The mentality of
Germany's traditional lntellectuals, the Prussian Junkers, had more in common with
von Haller's conception. Gramsci reminds us of this "caste" mentality when he
redrafted his notes on the inte"ectuals at this time. Moreover, it is worth noting that
the reference to Weber's critique of the political leadership of the high bureaucracy
in imperial Germany is now united with his account of the traditional intellectuals,
The Prussian Junkers resemble a priestly-military caste, with a virtual monopoly of
directive-organisational functions In political society, but possessing at the same time an
economic base of Its own and so not exclusively dependent on the liberality ot the
dominant economic group. Furthermore, unlike the English landowning aristocracy, the
Junkers constituted the officer class of a large standing army, which gave them solid
organisational cadres favouring the preservation of an esprit de corpa and of their
political monopoly.
[In Max Weber's book Parliament and Government In the Ne.. Order In Germany ean be
tound many elements showing how the political monopoly of the nobility Impeded the
elaboration ot an extensive and experienced bourgeois political personnel and how It Is at
the root of the continual parliamentary crises and of the fragmentation of the liberal and
democratic parties. Hence the Importance of the Catholic Centre and SOCial Democracy
which succeeded during the Imperial period In building up to a considerable extent their
own parliamentary and directiVe strata etc).22
21 §8.187, QCII p.1054.
22 §12.01, QCIII p. 1526-1527.
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§8.55, §8.81. The Corporate-Military Spirit
The German thread can be traced in other notes written at this time. In the first
Gramsci pursued the differences of mentality of the English and Prussian
aristocracy. His account is reminiscent of Max Weber's analysis of this difference
which hinged on the fact that the English aristocracy was a genuine rentier class
whereas the Prussian Junkers were not. The terminal crisis facing the estates of the
Junkers after 1929, which necessitated huge subsidies known as Osthiffe , was a
timely reminder that the Junkers were producers not rentiers. It is probable that
Gramsci was mindful of this economic basis of the crisis of hegemony in Germany
even though he writes regrettably little about it.
t8.55. Encyclopaedic Ideas. Self-Government and Bureaucracy. Self-government I. an
Institution or political-administrative custom which presupposes quite specific conditions:
the existence of a social stratum which lives off rent, which ha. long experience of public
affairs, and enjoys a certain pre.tlge among the popular ma.... for Ita rectitude and
Impartiality (and also for certain psychological qualltlea such a. It. ability to exerel.e
authority with dignified flrmne.. but without haughtiness or arrogant detachment). It la
understandable therefore that self-government has only been possible In England where
the class of landowners, In addition to Ita condition of economic Independence, had never
been In savage conflict with the population (as happened In France) and had not had great
corporate-military traditions (as In Germany), with the separateness and authoritarian
attitude which derive from them.
Change of meaning of .elf-government In non-Anglo-Saxon countries: struggle agaln.t the
centralism of the high bureaucracy, but Institutions entrusted to a bureaucracy directly
controlled from below. Bureaucracy become nece.slty: the question must be ral.ed of
forming an honest and Impartial bureaucracy which does not abuse It. function to make
ltaelf Independent of the control of the representative system. It can be said that every
form of .oclety has Ita own approach or solution to the problem of bureaucracy, and no
two can be the .ame.Zi
Written during the presidential elections in 1932, the currency of this analysis
becomes apparent. Was not Hindenburg the very embodiment of Germany's "great
corporate-military traditions with the separateness and authoritarian attitude which
derived from them"? Was not the transition from parliamentary to presidential rule
in Germany driven by the tendency of the high bureaucracy "to make itself
independent of control of the representative system"?
The psychological and moral attitudes deriving from these corporate-military
traditions were not confined to "the priestly-military caste" embodied by President
Hindenburg and the political generals in his Circle, but were shared by the ex-
officers belonging to the para-military aSSOCiationsof post-war Germany. By 1932
23 §8.55. cell p.974. [Translated in SPN p.186 note).
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the largest of these "delinquent associations", as Gramsci calls them, was Hitler's
Storm Troops. Moreover, these psychological and moral attitudes were not cultural
'constants' but were subject to 'degeneration'.
This is the theme of §8.81. Encyclopaedic Ideas. The corporate spirit [Lo spirito di
corpo]. Gramsci's reflections in this note are typically 'opaque'. This was probably
because he was so close to the particular events which immediately suggested
them that he 'overdid' the effort to generalise from them. As near as we can tell,
this note was suggested by the events immediately after the second ballot of the
presidential election, namely, the controversial ban on Hitler's Storm Troops
imposed by presidential decree on 13 April. Hitler's public response to this ban as
reported in the Corriere della Sera provided evidence of what Gramsci meant by
the degenerate corporate spirit . His practise was to publicly defend members of
the SA found guilty of criminal acts, including murder: now that the SA was banned,
Hitler said, he could not be responsible for their conduct.
Let them dissolve my units. This will not change the minds of their members who as long as they have
hearts and minds will remain faithful to me. Besides, since I can no longer lead and supervise their
activity I cannot take responsibility for the 400,000 members of the banned formations and I cannot
answer for their conduct.
Do not lose confidence and faith in our people and in the victory of our idea, which serves the
greatness of the Nation. Iwill give all my strength to this struggle. Notwithstanding General Groener, as
long as you live you will belong to me and Iwill belong to you. 24
In the best sense of the term It (Ie, the corporate spirit) can mean the concord of purpose
and will, the solid moral unity for which the priority Is to get things done In the Interests of
the one and only whole, whether It Is done by one or other component of the whole being
unimportant. However, corporate spirit usually has a negative meaning, Ie, 'defence' of
the whole against the punishments for wrongdoing of single Individuals. It Is possible to
understand the origin of this degeneration: It lies In the false conception of what
constitutes the 'whole'. The 'whole' Is assumed to be only a fraction ot It, a subordinate
fraction, clearly, which tends to and tries to use the 'torce' deriving trom the corporate
spirit to Impose Itself (subordinate though It Is) on the whole, In order to exercise an
Indirect power (It direct power Is not possible) and to obtain privileges. Further analysis
Indicates that at the root ot this corporate spirit Is the ambition of a person or a small
group of persons (which we then call a 'taction', 'clique', 'gang', 'cabal' ete). The
bureaucratic element, the civil but especially the military element, has the strongest
tendencies towards the corporate spirit, which leads to the tormatlon ot 'ca8tes'. The
strongest psychological and moral element of the corporate spirit Is the point of honour,
that Is to say corporate honour, which creates the most misguided and degenerate
passions. The struggle against the degenerate corporate spirit Is the struggle ot the whole
against the ambitions of single Individuals and against privileges, of the State against the
castes and the 'delinquent a8soclatlons':;6
24 Quoted in 'La scioglimento dei reparti social-nazionali ordlnato con decreto di Hindenburg', CdS,
14 April 1932.
25 §8.81, QCII p.986-987.
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The meaning of this opaque note becomes transparent as soon as its precise
context is established. On this view the interests of the whole, the State, were
threatened not only by "a clearly subordinate part" (ie, Hitler's movement) but also
by the military-bureaucratic clique in charge of the State itself (ie, Hindenburg'S
circle). Hence the State ( the 'whole') must struggle against the degenerate
corporate spirit of both the delinquent associations and the castes.
19.68. Bureaucratic Centralism
The 'German' thread in his 'superstructural' analysis of bureaucracy can be further
traced in §9.68. Machiavelli. Organic centralism and democratic centralism in
which Gramsci discusses 'organic centralism', a term which he then corrected to
'bureaucratic centralism'. His purpose in writing this note was to differentiate clearly
between the centralism of the nationalist and fascist Right, which in one way or
another was bureaucratic, and the centralism of the communist Left, which should
be democratic. But as always there is the 'scientific' possibility that the two sides
may be reversed since the bureaucratic centralism of the Right may give the
appearance of being democratic just as the democratic centralism of the Left may
(as Trotsky had warned) degenerate into being bureaucratic.
In his original definition of 'organic centralism' Gramsci started, as always, from an
element of French political experience. It referred to the doctrines of Maurras and to
the mode of selecting a leading political group (ie, Action Francaise) by means of
'coopting' members around one who is 'the possessor of the truth'. The reference
to Maurras helps to make partial sense of Gramsci's frankly abstruse account of the
theories of organic centralism since one of these theories, which he describes as
expressing a purely sectarian or fanatical position on the part of intellectuals, was
surely meant to correspond to the original Maurras 'model'.
Meanwhile, In the theories of organic centralism It Is necessary to distinguish between two
kinds: those which conceal a precise political programme of real predominanceof one PIIrt
over the whole (whether this part consists of a stratum such as the Intellectuals or 0' a
privileged territorial group) and those which amount to a purely on.slded poSition (alao on
the part 0' Intellectuals), Ie, an Immediately sectarian or fanatical poSition, which al.o
conceals a programme0' predominancealthough as a conscious political aim It Is .es.
obvlou•.
The more exact name Is bureaucratic centralism since only democratic centralism can be
organic. The latter Is precisely a 'centralism In movement' so to speak, Ie, a contlnuou.
adaptation of the organisation to the real historical movement. It Is organic precisely
because It takes Into account the movement, the organic mode In which historical resilly
reveals Itsel', and also because It takes into account something which Is relatively stable
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and permanent or at least which moves In an easily predictable direction. In States this
element of stability Is embodied In the organic development of the leading group Just as In
parties It Is embodied In the organic development of the hegemonic social group.
In States bureaucratic centralism means that a narrowly privileged group has been formed
which tends to perpetuate Its privileges by controlling and even stifling the birth of
oppositional forces at the base,even If the Interests of these forces are homogeneous
with the dominant Interests (for example In the struggle of protectionism against free
trade). In parties representing subaltern social groups, the element of stability consists
In the organic necessity of ensuring that hegemony Is not exercised by privileged groups
but by progressive social forces - organically progressive In comparison with others
which, although allied, are mixed forces which waver between the old and the new.as
The two kinds of organic centralism theorised in this passage - in the State and in
the party - bear the 'imprint' of the German situation in the summer of 1932 when
the passage was written. In the Reichstag elections of 31 July, support for Hitler
and the National Socialists reached a peak: with 37% of the popular vote and 230
seats they were now the largest party in the Reichstag. The President was not
impressed. Hindenburg rejected Hitler's 'democratic' claim to the Chancellorship
and stood by his favourite von Papen and the unelected "cabinet of the barons".
Gramsci's first 'theory' of organic centralism corresponded to Papen's
"cabinet of the barons". This was the 'caste' conception of the State theorised by
von Haller. The representative principle played no part whatsoever. Its members
were chosen by the President from a privileged territorial group, the Junkers, their
chief qualification being their aristocratic background and the fact that they had no
connection with the parliamentary parties and with the democratic processes of the
republic. Papen's 'presidential'cabinet was an example of bureaucratic centralism
in the State where a narrowly privileged group seeks to perpetuate its privileges by
denying power to new oppositional forces at the base, ie, the Hitlerites, even
though these new forces had the same fundamental interests as those of the
dominant group.
The second 'theory' of organic centralism describes the leading intellectuals of
Hitler's party who stood for "a purely one-sided, ie, immediately sectarian or
fanatical position". The principle of election played no part in forming this group
either. Like the intellectual group around Maurras, they were chosen by cooption
around "one who is the possessor of the truth". In this sense, the centralism of
Hitler's party was no less 'bureaucratic' than the centralism of Papen's cabinet.
However, the electoral victory of Hitler gave his "plan to predominate" a democratic
26 §9.68, 0011 p.1139.
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disguise which Papen's completely lacked. Although this was Hitler's real political
aim, the democratic disguise made it less 'apparent' than Papen's.
§9.61. The Law of Fixed Proportions applied to the Structure:
(I) The Coefficient 'Organic-Cyclical' Crisis
Gramsci's thinking about the German crisis in 1932 converged on two notes written
in August in Notebook 9: these were §9.61. Past and Present. England and
Germany and §9.62. The Theorem of Fixed Proportions. The timing of these notes
depended on new data becoming available to him through the periodicals, ie, the
German unemployment figures for the first half of 1932 and the results of the
Reichstag elections of 31 JUly.27 The first provided a 'snapshot' of the economic
structure of Germany in 1932, the second gave a snapshot of the political
superstructures. In each case the use of serial data afforded Gramsci an insight
into the movement of the German crisis at both levels, although the relation
between the two levels remained indistinct.
Past and Present
Gramsci's first attempt to analyse the crisis of 1929, ie, §6.123. Observations on the
crisis, 1929-30-?, was written at the time of the financial crisis of 1931 when
occasional or 'conjunctural' movements of the structure were very apparent.
Moreover, as the question mark indicated he was careful to avoid making
'predictive' assumptions about the duration of the crisis. This was consistent with
the cautionary principle put forward in §7.24.Structure and Superstructure:
The difficulty of identifying the structure statically (like an instantaneous photographic image) at any
one time. In fact, politics is sometimes the reflection of tendencies in the development of the
structure, but this does not mean that such tendencies will necessarily produce a result. A structural
phase can only be studied and analysed after it has completed its entire process of development, not
during the process itself: in the latter case the only method is to proceed by hypotheses and by
making it perfectly clear that they are only hypotheses.28
In notes written in early 1932, however, Gramsci was convinced that recovery was
far from imminent and began to put more emphasis on the permanent or 'organic'
features of the crisis. This was probably due to the powerful impression made on
27Bruno Biagi: 'Aspetti e problemi della disoccupazione', NA, 16 August 1932. For reports of the
German election results of 31 July, see above (historical background to 1932).The main analysis was
GiseppeAenzetti: Aspetti della situazione politica tedesca', GER, August 1932.
28 §7.24. Structure and Superstructure, ocu p.872. .
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him by the rising levels of unemployment throughout the industrialised countries.
The change of emphasis can be seen in his sharp attack on Luigi Einaudi's
sanguine perspective on the crisis.
Einaudi's articles on the crisis, especially those in Riforma Sociale of January-February 1932, are
often jokes for the feeble-minded. He prints extracts from economists of a century ago without
appreciating that the 'market' has changed ..... lntemational production has developed on such a scale
and the market has become so complex that certain arguments appear literally infantile What
Einaudi says to explain why past crises have been overcome is correct in general terms But he
takes no account of the fact that economic life hinges increasingly on a series of large-scale mass
productions which are now in crisis; controlling this crisis is impossible precisely because of its extent
and depth which have reached such proportions that quantity becomes quality, ie, no longer
conjunctural but organic crisis. Einaudi presents arguments which apply to conjunctural crises
because he wants to deny that there is an organic crisis; but this is 'immediate politics' not scientific
analysis, it is the 'will to believe', 'medicine for the souls' - administered, what is more, in a puerile and
comical way. 211
Gramsci also followed the articles in Corriere della Sera at this time written under
the pseudonym 'Metron' who offered the same reassuring perspective: where
Einaudi provided "medicine for the souls", Metron offered "the opium of misery". In
an article of 15 March the author reported the results of a study published during
the World Energy Conference in Berlin in 1930 which calculated the total amount of
mechanical energy used by humanity in a single year. From this the author
reckoned that for every year of work done by "a man of flesh and bone", twelve
times that amount was done by "metallic men" (ie, machines). If mechanical energy
continued to be harnassed at this rate, the author looked forward to the realisation
of "an ideal form of idleness which civilises rather than brutalises, when man will no
longer need to work with his muscles but solely with his brain - the most most noble
and desirable form of work". Gramsci was less than impressed by the rainbow at
the end of Metron's projection of technological unemployment and dispelled it in a
tone of acerbic realism.
This is written in 1932 when precisely in the countries where the 'metallic men' work for the other men
in infinitely higher proportion than the world average, there exists the most terrible crisis of enforced
idleness and degrading misery. This is the opium of misery yet again IS)
If the rising levels of unemployment in the industrialised countries by early 1932
convinced him that the crisis was "no longer conjunctural but organic", Gramsci
was no nearer to solving the original problem of finding the dialectical relation
29 §8.216. Short Notes on Economics. Ugo Spirito and Co., QCII p. 10n-1078. Gramsci's italics.
30 §8.90. Encyclopaedic Ideas. The Machine, QCII p.994-995. Gramsci refers to the article by Metron:
'La diffusione della macchina', Corriere della Sera 15 March 1932.
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between these two kinds of structural movement - the relatively 'occasional' and
the relatively 'permanent'. This was not purely and simply a problem of analysing
the structure but of analysing the relation between structure-superstructure Since
structural analysis was subordinate to the primary aim of the 'philosophy of praxis'
which was to make practical, ie, pOlitical judgements.
*
In §9.61.Past and Present. England and Germany, written in the summer of 1932,
Gramsci found the formula he was looking for: he called it 'the coefficient cyclical-
organic crisis'. In August he read in Nuova Antologia a serial set of unemployment
figures taken from the League of Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. In the table
of sixteen countries (excluding the United States) the figures for England and
Germany were as follows:
January February March April
5,739,070
2,204,740
May
Germany
England
6,041,910
2,354,044
6,128,429
2,317,784
6,034,100
2,233,425
5,582,620
2,183,683
The writer noted that the fall in unemployment (which was particularly sharp in
Germany) was seasonal and that the economic situation "has worsened in these
last few months".31 Nevertheless, the figures provided Gramsci with a 'snapshot' of
the structures of Britain and Germany which enabled him to form a hypothesis
about their prospects of recovery.
A comparleon between the effacta on the two countrl.. of the crlala of 1929 and the
following depre.. lon. Thla analyala ahould bring out the r.. 1 atructure of .. ch country.
Moreover, It should ahow the reciprocal function of each In the world economy - an a.pact
of the atructure which la not uaually observed very carefully. The atartlng-polnt of thl.
analyala can be the phenomenonof unemployment. Do the maaa.. of unemployed In
England and Germany have the same significance? Does the theorem of 'fixed proportlona"
as applied In analysing the Internal division of labour produce the .. me picture In both
countrl.. ? It can be aald that Engllah unemployment, although numerically lower than
German unemployment, Indlcat.. that the coefficient 'organic crlala' la higher In England
than In Germany where the coefficient 'cyclical crisis' la more Important Conaequently, In
the event of a 'cyclical' recovery unemploymentwould be absorbed more .. aUy In
Germany than In England.
Which element of the structure glv.. rlae to thla difference? The anawer la that commerc.
la more Important relative to Induatrlal production In England. There exlsta In England a
larger ma.a of 'proletarians' employed In the commercial aector wher.. a In Germany the
ma.. employed In Industry Is gr.. ter. Composition of the working population and It.
31Bruno Biagi: 'Aspetti e Problemi della Disoccupazione', NA, 16 August, p. 446.
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distribution among the different sectors. The numerous commercial people (bankers,
stock brokers, representatives etc) require large numbers of staff to carry out their day-
to-day services: they constitute a commercial aristocracy more rich and powerful than In
Germany. There Is a larger number of 'ritual parasites' - people who are not employed
directly In production but In distribution and the (personal) services of the propertied
classes.3i!
The "coefficient" cyclical-organic crisis was probably the most satisfactory formula
invented by Gramsci in the notes to express the relation between relatively
occasional and relatively permanent crises of the structure in each country.
However, Gramsci's conception of the structure itself was changing by this time as
the national economy was integrated into the international economy: this
adjustment is indicated by his reference to "the reciprocal function of each country
in the world economy - an aspect of the structure which is not usually observed
very carefully".33 The 'coefficient' was clearly meant to apply to the crisis of the
national economy, but the change in the conception of the structure suggests that
Gramsci was inclined to conceive the 'coefficient' in international terms, with
'cyclical' crisis pertaining to one national economy and 'organic' crisis to another.
Past and Present
This picture of the English economy in §9.61 confirms that the link between organic
crisis, 'parasitic' classes, and consumption of 'savings' was a persistent thread in
Gramsci's thinking about the European states. In his analysis of Americanism in
§1.61 (1929) he first thinks of these parasitic classes - "pensioners of economic
history" as he calls them - as 'old' classes left over by Europe's centuries-long
'tradition'. In his critique of Arias in §6.123 (1931), however, the 'historical' element
appears to be of more recent origin and is 'quantitatively' a phenomenon of the
post-war period:
Arias neglects a 'historical' element of some importance: in the distribution of national income,
especially via commerce and the stock exchange, isn't it true to say that a category of 'withdrawers'
has appeared in the post-war period [(or at least increased in comparison with the preceding period»)
which does not have any necessary and indispensable productive function yet absorbs a
considerable quota of income? .
32 §9.61, QCII p. 1131-1132.
33See also §9.32. National Economy, CCII p.111S. "The entire economic activity of a country can
only be judged in relation to the international market; it 'exists' and must be evaluated only in the
context of an international unity ......A purely national 'balance' of the economy doesn't exist, either in
its totality or for a particular activity" etc.
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The category of unproductive parasites, in both the absolute and relative sense, has grown
enormously in the post-war period and this is the category which devours savings. In European
countries it is even greater than in America etc Society creates its own poisons by having to
provide a living for masses of the population (not only unemployed wage earners) who impede
savings and thus break the dynamic equilibrium.34
The historical perspective presented here, where a structural tendency observable
in the pre-war period is greatly intensified in the post-war period, corresponds
closely to the picture of the English industrial crisis which emerges from §5.86.
England (1930). This was based on another 'snapshot' of the English structure:
the balance of payments.
For about 50 years before the war the English trade balance was already changing its internal
structure. The proportion made up by the export of goods was relatively decreasing and the balance
was based increasingly on the so-called invisible exports, ie, the interests on capital investments
abroad, the insurances on the merchant marine, and the earnings realised by London as an
international financial centre. After the war competition from other countries has increased the
importance of the invisible exports still further. This explains the concern of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer and the Bank of England to restore the pound to the gold standard and thus restore Its
position as an international currency. This objective was achieved but at the expense of an increase in
the cost of industrial production, which has lost ground in foreign markets.
But was this the cause (or at least the most important element) of the English industrial Crisis? To what
extent did the government sacrifice the interests of the industrialists to those of the financiers, those
who lend money abroad and organise the world financial market based on london? Alternatively, the
restoration of the value of sterling could have anticipated the crisis instead of being the cause of it,
since all the countries, including those which kept a fluctuating exchange rate for some time and
stabilised it at a lower value than the original, have undergone and are undergoing the crisis. It could
be said that by anticipating the crisis the English industrialists ought to have been the first to seek
remedy and therefore to recover before other countries and to restore their world hegemony.
Besides, the immediate return to the gold standard meant that the social crises caused by the
transfers of property and by the lightning decline of the petty-bourgeois middle classes have been
avoided in England. In a traditionalist, conservative country like England with its ossified social
structure, what would have been the results of the phenomena of inflation, fluctuation, and
devaluation of the currency? Much more serious than in other countries to be sure.
In any event, it would be necessary to establish precisely the relation between the exports of goods
and the invisible exports, between the industrial fact and the financial fact: this would help to explain
the relative lack of political importance of the workers and the ambiguous character of the labour
Party, as well as the scarcity of stimuli to its differentiation and development.,
The increasing weight of invisible exports in the English trade balance and the
growing political weight of the commercial-financial aristocracy centred on LOndon
would explain why Gramsci drew attention in §9.61 to the international aspect of
the national structure, its function in the world economy, and why he asserted that
"there is no purely 'national' balance of the economy, neither as a whole nor for a
particular activity". The implications of this perspective for his concept of
34 §6.123, QCII p.793.
...- .. ;-,' ......~
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'parasitism' in the national economy are far from clear. Can the commercial-
financial aristocracy of the city of London be described as 'parasitic' in view of the
'invisible earnings' from its services? This may explain Gramsci's cautionary
principle that the theorem of fixed proportions should not be applied mechanically
or "sociologically" since (as the example of England's commercial-financial sector
would show) "every country has its own optimum principle of fixed proportions".
What then of Gramsci's argument about the role of 'parasitic classes' in
organic crisis? From the start Gramsci acknowledged that "statistics of these social
elements are very difficult to work out because it is very hard to find the 'heading'
which can cover them all".35 The difficulty can be studied in §6. 123 where he
searches for a general 'heading' which would cover all these parasitic elements.
For one thing, the heading would have to cover both 'old' and 'new' elements. The
image of England in §5.86 as "a traditionalist, conservative country with its ossified
social structure", for example, suggests that Gramsci was still thinking of these
parasitic elements as 'old' classes left over by the European 'tradition'. But these
'residues' would hardly account for the enormous growth of unproductive parasites
in the post-war period, unless he was thinking of the large number of "ritual
parasites" (Veblen?) employed in the service of the old classes. The simplest
heading, which covered both old and new parasites and yielded a single set of
statistics, was adopted in §S.10S. Bureaucracy (March 1932).
What is the distribution of the population of a given society with respect to 'goods' and to 'services'
(Goods being understood in the restricted sense of material goods whose 'space and volume' can be
physically consumed)? It is certain that the more extensive the 'services' sector, the worse the society
is organised. One of the aims of 'rationalisation' is certainly to restrict the sphere of the services to the
bare necessity. Parasitism develops especially in this sector to which commerce and distribution in
general belong. 'Productive' unemployment causes 'inflation' of services (multiplication of small
business) .311
It was this distinction between 'goods' and 'services' which led Gramsci to apply
the theorem of fixed proportions in §9.61 in analysing the internal division of labour
in England and Germany. The statistics he was searching for show, in fact, that he
was right in thinking that the services sector had grown "enormously" in the post-
war period: it was in fact the single most important 'structural' change of the post-
war years.a7 In the United Kingdom it grew by 15% in the decade 1920-30: by the
35 §1.61. Amercianism, QCI p.70.
36 §B.1 oe. QCII p. 1004.
37 The figures are in Harold James: The German Slump. Politics and Economics 1924-1936 (Oxford,
1987) Table XVIII p.208.
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end of the decade 10.9 million were employed in services compared to 10 million
in industry. In Germany employment in services in the same decade also grew by
15%: by the end of the decade industry remained much the bigger sector
employing 13.3 million as against 9.7 million in services, but where employment in
services had grown rapidly- since the war employment in industry had remained
stagnant. In Italy the growth of the services sector was even more phenomenal. The
general heading of 'services' would thus 'cover' the huge mass of "unproductive
parasites" which had come into existence everywhere since the war.
How did Gramsci see his thesis on 'parasitic classes' applying to Germany
where the internal division of labour was apparently more 'rational' than in
England? The notes offer very few clues to the answer. The statistics on the rapid
rate of growth of the services sector in Germany show that an 'organic' problem (in
Gramsci's sense) was developing but the numbers still employed in industry in
1932 tended to confirm his judgement that "the coefficient 'cyclical crisis' was more
importanf in Germany. Nevertheless, the formula of the 'coefficient' implied that
Gramsci must have thought about how his thesis 'parasitic classes-organic crisis'
might apply to Germany.
One clue to the German 'translation' of this thesis lies in the rather odd title he
chose for §S.1 OS, ie, Bureaucracy, where a term usually associated with the
'superstructure' is examined from the standpoint of the 'structure', ie, in terms of the
distribution of employment between goods and services. Gramsci's dialectical
usage serves to remind us of the two-dimensional way in which the relation
'structure-superstructure' is usually conceived by Marxists, not to mention their
critiCS. Moreover, in the absense of statistics Gramsci used the evidence presented
by the real world. He was writing in August 1932, the year of virtually continuous
elections in Germany, when the inflation of the 'services sector' was only too
apparent in Germany at the level of the 'superstructures', ie, of the parties and the
State.
A further clue to the direction of Gramsci's thinking in 1932 is his assertion in §9.21
that the problem of the bureaucracy partly coincides with the problem of the
intellectuals. This new connection is explained further in his notes on the
intellectuals. As Gramsci redrafted these notes from February 1932 onwards, he
inserted an entirely new passage on "the democratic-bureaucratic social system".
The spectacle presented by Germany at the time closely corresponded to the
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'hybrid' system which Gramsci describes. But the purpose of describing the social
system in these terms was to convey the 'parasitic' weight of the political
'superstructures' .
In the modern world the category of mtellecniats, understood in this sense, has undergone an
unprecedented expansion. The democratic-bureaucratic social system has spawned huge masses of
them, some justifying their existence more by the political necessities of the dominant fundamental
group than by the social necessities of production. Hence Loria's conception of the unproductive
'worker' (but unproductive in relation to whom and to what mode of production?), which could be
justified to an extent if one takes account of the fact that these masses exploit their position to take for
themselves huge cuts of the national income ..... :11
In Germany the organic growth of 'parasitism' was most apparent to Gramsci in the
political superstructures, in the growing mass of "unproductive workers" employed
by State and party administrations. Moreover, statistics confirm Gramsci's
insistence on the huge proportion of national income devoured by these new
parasites both before and after the Nazis came to power. As Harold James notes:
The really startling increases in investment in National Socialist Germany were classed as investments
in public administration: in 1928 this accounted for 19.3 per cent of German investment; in 1932, 25.9
per cent, and in 1934, 35.7 per cent. These figures reflected the number of jobs in state and party
bureaucracy created as part of 'Hitler's social revolution'. 39
§9.62. The Law of Fixed Proportions applied to the Superstructures:
(II) how a movement becomes a party
This reading of Gramsci's 'thread' is confirmed by the following note. Having
applied the theorem of fixed proportions to the English structure, in the next note he
applies it to the German superstructures. In §9.62 he asks how many of these
'unproductive workers' (ie, intellectuals) do political parties need (and therefore
how many are surplus to need)? This could be calculated by studying the
sequence of German election results in the first half 1932 - the presidential (March-
April), state (April), and Reichstag (July) elections. By retracing Gramsci's reading
we can see how he arrived at this kind of analysis.
Sometime in April or May 1932 Gramsci reread Matteo Pantaleoni's Principles of
Pure Economics. 40 This gave him "the law of fixed proportions" which was defined
in §9.62 as follows:
38 §12.01, com p.1520 (Translated in SPN p. 13].
39 Harold James cit., p.414.
40 See the reference to the new edition of 1931 of Pantaleoni's Principles of Pure Economics in
§10.30, QCII p.1268. ·On re-reading Pantaleoni's book ... : etc.
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The law of fixed proportions Is stated by Pantaleonl In his Principles of Pure Economics
a. follows: 'Bodies combine chemically only In fixed proportions, and any quantity of an
element In excess of the quantity needed tor a combination with other elements, remalM
free ; If the quantity of one element Is Insufficient In proportion to the quantltl.. of the
other elements present, the combination only occurs to the extent to which the quantity of
that element, pre.ent In .maller qUllntlty than the others, su"lcles'.41
Gramsci says that this principle could be used in the study of politics and indicates
a series of problems to which it could be applied - "to the analysis of situations, of
the relations of force etc, to the problem of the intellectuals". He is careful to stress
that in politics its explanatory value was 'metaphorical'; it cannot be applied
mechanically as if it were a universal ('sociological') law, since every organisation
has its own 'optimum' principle of fixed proportions. "Nevertheless, the science of
organisation especially should refer to this principle".
How did he think of applying this principle to politics and what particular problem
did he have in mind? A clue to the answer can be found in some rough calculations
he did in the same notebook on the results of the elections in Prussia in April
1932.42 Gramsci recorded the number of seats won by each party and, in brackets,
the number won in the previous election in 1928. The Prusslan figures were
particularly useful in testing empirically one of the first principles in studying the
structure-superstructure relation, ie, that "politics is sometimes in fact the reflection
of tendencies in the development of the structure, but this does not mean that such
tendencies will necessarily produce a result". 43 Since the previous elections in
Prussia were held in 1928, ie, before the onset of the 1929 criSis, the election
would clearly show what political 'result' the structural cnsts was having. Gramsci
had this principle in mind in §9.62 where he restated it as follows: "Given a certain
premiss an automatic historical movement will follow; but its potential has to be
harnessed politically by parties and by men with the necessary 'capacity': if these
are absent or deficient (in quantity and quality) the automatic process will prove
'sterile'; the premiss exists but its potential consequences are not realised".44
Below the list of gains and losses made by each party in Prussia,
Gramsci made some hasty calculations for the main parties of the Left and the
Right, taking into account the recent reform of the Prussian electoral law which
increased the quota of votes needed to elect one deputy from 40,000 to 50,000.
41 §9.62. Machiavelli, QCII p.1133.
42 See the summary description of the figures in QCIV p.2401. I am grateful to Professor Gerratana for
providing me with a copy of Gramsci's original.
43 §7.24. Structure and Superstructure, QCII p.872.
44 §9.62, QCII p. 1133.
224
Social Democrats 130 x 40,000 = 5,200,000
Now 93 x 50,000 = 4,650,000 Loss of votes 1,450,000 [sic]
Communists 45 x 40,000 = 1,800,000
Now 57 x SO,ooo = 2,850,000 Increase 1,050,000
German Nationals 81 x 40,000 = 3,240,000
Now 31 x SO,Ooo = 1,550,000 Loss 1,685,000 [sic]
National Socialists 6 x 40,000= 240,000
Now 162 x SO,ooo = 7,860,000 Increase 7,860,0001
On the face of it these rough calculations were simply intended by Gramsci to
measure the latest change in the relations of force between Left and Right in
Germany but they also raised the problem of the intellectuals in a particular way
where 'intellectuals' meant functionaries of the parties in "the democratic-
bureaucratic social system". How many functionaries did a political party need at a
given level? An answer to this question was suggested by the law of
proportionality used in the Prussian elections. The fixed quota of 50,000 votes to
elect one deputy gave Gramsci the idea of leaders being a 'function' of a given
mass. The number of leaders or 'functionaries' needed would therefore be related
the size of the social mass the party sought to organise and lead.
The democratic principle of proportionality led Gramsci to the scientific
principle of fixed proportions as a metaphor for studying party organisation. It was
no accident that Gramsci recurred at this point to one of the fundamental laws of
chemistry in view of his interest in the democratic ideology of AntOine Lavoisier,
the founder of modern chemistry, who was guillotined during the Terror.45 The law
of chemical combination could thus be seen as a further example of French history
providing Gramsci with an 'element of politics' for which he then found a
corresponding element in German experience. The law offered above aU a
metaphor for the process by which the masses moved from one party to another.
The primary purpose of his arithmetic on the Prussian elections, in fact, was to
calculate the movement from one party to the other on the Right and the Left.
This process was the theme of an article commenting on the German elections in
the May issue of Nuova Antologia . The faSCist standpoint of its author did not
prevent Gramsci from extracting the point of 'scientific' substance from the familiar
45 See Gramsci's observations on Lavoisier in §4.45. Structure and Superstructure, QCI p.472.
[Translated in SPN p.406].
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fascist rhetoric. This point concerned the process of "chemical fusion" going on
between the parties of the German Right. The author suggested that the elections
showed that the Nationalists and National Socialists were in the process of 'fusing'.
This was similar to what had happened in Italy where the Nationalists had merged
with the Fascists after 1922 and had disbanded as separate party, except that in
Germany the fusion was happening "from below", in spite of the Nationalist leaders.
whereas in Italy it happened "from above".
It [the process of fusion] seems to be greatly assisted by the infallible instinct of the people since the
mass of their voters in all the partial and local elections held since September 1930 have continued to
transfer from the old party to the new. This was most apparent in the second ballot of the presidential
election when the supporters of the German Nationalists, left a free vote, cast their votes almost en
masse for the National Socialists. It seems therefore that the Italian-style transformation of German
Nationalism into National Socialism is likewise happening from below and despite the
incomprehension of the party's general staff whose querulous resistance is no more than the
superficial effervescence which sometimes accompanies complete and profound chemical fusions.48
The mass movement from Nationalist to National Socialist leadership in successive
elections was evidence of the failure of the Nationalists to offer effective leadership
at the corresponding levels. In §9.62 Gramsci suggests that this failure ean be
expressed in organisational terms, ie, as reflecting a deficiency in the quantity and
quality of a party's 'cadres' at different levels.
Thla law [of fixed proportlona] may aerve a. a metaphorto explain how a 'movement'
becomesa party, le, a political force which la more or I.. a effective depending on the
'Ieadera' It has at the various levels and on the 'capacity' of the.. leadera. Given certain
conditions an automatic historical movementwill follow; but Ita potential haa to be
harneaaedpolitically by partl.. and by men with the nec.... ry 'capacity': It th... ar.
abaent or Inaufflclent (In quantity and In quality), the automatic proc... produc.. no
r.. ult. The premlaa exlats but Its potential consequenceaare not realised. H.nce It can
be said that It la the taak 01 partl.. to produce I.. d..... They ar. lunctlona 01 the .... __ •
aervlng to select, train, and multiply the leadera necessary to transform a particular ma..
(which la a 'lIxed' quantity Insolar aa the numbara In a given aoclal group can ba
e.tabllahed beforehand)from a condition of turbulence and chao. Into an articulate
political army prepared for the hl.torlcal moment.
When the total vote for a particular party wavera betweenaeemlngly arbitrary maximum
and minimum limits In aucc.. alve electlona, whether at the same level or at different
levels (In Germany,for example: elections for the Pre.ldent of the Republic, for the stat.
Landtaga,for the Relchatag,for the communalcounclla, and 80 on right down to factory
committees), It can be deduced that the party'. cadr.. are InaUfflclent In quantity and In
quality, or In quantity and not In quality (relatively). or In quality and not In quantity. A
party which wlna a lot 01 votes at trade union level and fewer at political level lack.
leaders of sufficient quality: It haa numerouaor at leut .utllclent Junior cad,.., but It
lacka the proportionate number. of cadre. at higher level.. Thl. type of analy.I., which
ha. already been mentioned In other not.. , I. poaalble.41
46 Giuseppe Piazza: 'Le Elezioni in Germanis', NA, 1 May 1932, p.55.
47 §9.62, 0011 p.1133.
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This way of analysing party organisation was 'scientific' because it could apply to
the parties of both sides. In his rough calculations on the Prussian elections
Gramsci selected and paired the main parties of the Left and Right precisely to see
how the same principle applied to both sides. The fluctuations in the mass vote
of the two competing parties of the Left and Right are seen as a function of the
relative strength and weakness of their 'cadres', ie, of the quantity and quality of
their 'leaders' at different levels of the party hierarchy. By this test the capacity of
the Nazis to produce 'leaders', and therefore to harness the political potential of the
'automatic' movement which began in 1929, proved much greater than that of the
Communists. Indeed, Gramsci may have been struck by the fact that the theory of
the 'united front from below' invented by the Communists proved singularly
effective as practiced by the NaziS, for the Nazis were much more successful in
wresting leadership of their particular 'mass' from the Nationalists than the
Communists were from their rivals the Social Democrats. It is true that Nazi
initiatives at factory council and trade union level failed to make much headway.
The article in Nuova Antologia included some rare data on factory council
elections in Germany which Gramsci must have taken into account in writing §9.62
where all levels are mentioned, "right down to factory committees"
~ is difficult if not impossible to be clear how far the National Socialists have got in conquering strategic
positions in this field. According to the statistics of the free Trade Unions (Social Democratic) it
emerges that 83.6 % of the Factory Councils elected during1931 are theirs (and the figure goes up to
91.5 % together with the Christian unions) as against only 0.5 % which are National Socialist, rising by
a further 4 % together with the German Nationals and others. 3.4% are Communist. According to other
statistics, however, the figures stand at: 85% belonging to the Socialist and Christian unions
combined, 5.2% to the National Socialists combined with other right-wing groups, and 9.4%
to the Communists. Whatever the case, it would appear from these figures that at union level the
National Socialist conquest of the Factory Councils has scarcely begun.48
The failure of the Nazis to take over leadership in the factories, however, must be
set against their success in penetrating the branches of the Farmers Association
(Landbund) where the left-wing parties never set foot. Rather than attempting to
build a new rival organisation of their own, the Nazis typically concentrated on
infiltration (G/eichschaltung ) of the existing organisation and taking it over in tact.
This involved agitating to detach their members from the traditional Junker
leadership of the Landbund and their party, the Nationalists. In this case the
Communist tactic of the 'united front from below' worked with complete success for
48 Giuseppe Piazza cit., p. 61.
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Nazi control of the Farmers Association was virtually complete by 1932. This aspect
of the Nazis' 'leadership capacity' seemed to escape the kind of analysis
developed in this note, however, where Gramsci seems more interested in
developing new structures rather than in infiltrating old ones.
*
When Gramsci set out in §9.62 to explain "how a movement becomes a party" the
context suggests that he was thinking in the first place of the expansion of the Nazi
Party rather than the Communist Party after 1929. This was by far the most
significant political result of the 'automatic' movement started by the economic
crisis. The type of analysis developed in §9.62 focusses attention on the
'organisational' response of the party to the crisis. To see how the type of analysis
suggested by Gramsci could be elaborated or 'corrected', it is useful to compare it
briefly with the findings of modern historians on this aspect.
The crisiS of 1929 saw the start of a massive growth in the number of full-time,
salaried functionaries employed by the party.49 The opening in the summer of
1930 of the new national headquarters in Munich, the Brown House, symbolised
the expansion of the party's corps of professional functionaries. After the election of
September that year there was an influx of technocrats, the so-called 'New
Functionaries', most of them university-educated and from upper middle-class and
aristocratic backgrounds.50 The rapid growth of staff of the Reich Leadership
(Reichsleitung) was paralleled by a similar expansion of staff of the thirty-seven
Gaus. As far as quantity is concerned, the number of full-time staff employed by
each Gau rose to over a thousand by the start of 1932.
In 1931 the Reich Leadership took steps to integrate and rationalise the local party
organisations whose development had "lagged far behind" the expansion of staff at
Gau and district levels. At the same time efforts to improve the quality of the lower
party cadres were stepped up, if by quality is meant their effectiveness as
'persuaders'. The party provided a series of two-week intensive training courses in
public speaking for local militants. The massive vote for Hitler in the second round
of the presidential election in 1932 owed much to "the incredible feats of political
49The following is based on Dietrich Orlow: The History of the Nazi Party, Vol.1,1919-1933 (David
and Charles, 1971), especially chapters six and seven, p.185-298.
50 On the SCH:aIled 'New Functionaries' see Michael H. Kater: The Nazi Party. A Social Profile of
Members and Leaders, 1919-1945 (Basil Blackwell, 1983) p. 176-189.
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mobilisation" performed by the local organisations. 51
After the elections of early 1932 a complete rationalisation of the party's
administrative structure began in order to rescue it from "the amoeba-like
aimlessness of its organisational development". 52 This was the so-called Strasser
Plan which was implemented with Hitler's support at two meetings of the
leadership in June that year. The plan divided the vertical organisation of the Gau
into a series of levels each headed by a 'leader', from the Gau leader (Gauleiter)
downwards. The Gau and district leaders were full-time professionals and their
offices had a fully-developed staff structure by 1932. Together with senior officers of
the SA they headed the lists of party candidates at elections and many sat as
members of the Reichstag and state Landtags. Below these levels were the local,
section, cell, and block leaders - the political equivalent of NCOs "whose
importance is greater than is generally recognised" (Gramsci). Their main task was
to recruit, 'encadre', and mobilise the mass of new members who joined the party
during the crisis, so that "there exists no party member who does not in some way
work for the party". 53
However, the Strasser Plan did not stop sharp fluctuations in the party's mass vote.
When Gramsci wrote §9.62, after the Reichstag elections of July 1932, the Nazi
vote reached a peak of 37%. The possibility that this rapid expansion was a
'cyclical' phenomenon, a short-term superstructural 'boom', probably did not
escape him. The Reichstag elections in November 1932, when tha Nazi vote fall to
33%, a loss of almost 2 million votes in three months, tanded to confirm this.
According to Gramsci's law of fixed proportions, "if the total vote for a party wavers
between apparently arbitrary maximum and minimum limits in successive
elections it can be deduced that the party's cadres are insufficient in quantity
and quality" ate. If tha Nazi party's expansion was a 'cyclical' phenomenon, we
might also infer that the deficiency was more likely to ba one of quality than of
quantity.
51 Dietrich OrIow cit., p.252.
52 ibid. p. 255. On the organisational reforms of Gregor Strasser, see QrIow cit., p.256 passim.
53 ibid. p. 221.
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§9.69. Number and Quality In Representative Regimes
The image of the political party presented in §9.62 is that of a political elite. The
imprint of the communist concept of the party as the vanguard of the masses is
visible, especially in the attention given to the party's 'cadres', only Gramsci meant
to describe political parties generally. To the extent that these "are functions of the
masses, serving to select, train, and multiply the necessary leaders", Gramsci's
communist party did not differ essentially from other parties. The elitist angle came
with the special emphasis on developing the 'capacity' of the leaders, but this
meant their capacity to win the support of the masses in the context of a democratiC,
pluralist political system. The question of whether these leaders were
representative of the masses was not addressed. Did they represent all of the
masses, a majority of the masses, a minority of the masses, or none at all? This
depended on "the elective principle".
A typical comment in Critics Fascista on the result of the Reichstag election on 31
July led Gramsci to examine this principle in §9.69. The interest of this note lies in
his passing comment that the fascist criticism of parliamentary democracy was
"oligarchic in origin". What did he mean? The clue lies in the passage from
democracy to dictatorship in Italy in 1922-25 when the Fascists found their path to
power blocked by the system of proportional representation in much the same way
that the Nazis, despite winning 37% of the vote, were now frustrated by a similar
system in Germany. The commentator of Critica Fascista, alluding to the way the
Fascists had got over this obstacle, shared the obvious sense of frustration at the
failure
on the part of Hitler's movement or the bloc of nationalist parties to achieve the absolute majority of
votes, the 51% of par1iamentary seats, which in accordance with parliamentary etiquette gives a
political party the right to take over power undisturbed for at least the entire term of a parliament -
assuming that the party in question is not shrewd enough, by making timely adjustments to the
bureaucratic and the electoral machines, to secure for itself all those interests and all those legal
procedures necessary to obtain another solid and, in theory, possibly perpetual parliamentary
majority .
Naturally I am using strictly democratic jargon which is the most appropriate in commenting on an
election held in accordance with the rules of the most complicated, systematic, and therefore the most
democratic law, that of proportional representation. For anyone who is free from doctrinal prejudices
can see that the law of number is supreme and that the opinion of any idiot who can read and write
carries exactly the same weight in determining the political future of the State as that of someone who
dedicates his best energies to the State and the Nation. Anyone can see that the premiss for a
change of direction in Germany exists and has done for some time. If you want to find its official date Of
birth_ ...you need go no further back than the month of September 1930 when Hitler's movement.
which up till then had been considered a collection of malcontent, ambitious or unstable
demagogues, gathered in the ballot boxes democratically distributed in every electoral district of the
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Reich for the purpose of electing a new Reichstag something like six and a half million votes and thus
became numerically the second biggest party in Germany .....
The votes for the National Socialists indicated that an idea, which had been maturing in the German
spirit and which Hitler was the first express in an explicit form and to put into the programme of his
movement, had started to spread among the masses and transform their spirit. And God knows how
contagious ideas are, especially new ideas which answer to needs felt in a dim and confused way. This
is why regardless of numerical considerations it was already possible to declare, as Italian journalists
immediately did: hie incipit vita nuova 54
Gramsci responded to this criticism of abstract democracy using the weapons of
Fascist ideology itself which claimed that the life of the State was decisively shaped
by "the active minorities, the elites, the avant-gardes etc etc". The opinions of these
would-be elites did effectively 'count' for more, especially if they were backed by
unlimited material resources.
One of the most banal commonplaceswhich gets repeated against the elective system of
forming the organs of State I. that 'number Is the .upreme law' and that 'the opinion of any
Idiot who can write (and even of an illiterate, In certain countries) ha. exactly the same
weight In determining the political future of the State a. the opinion of one who dedicate.
his best energlee to the State and the Nation' etc. (There are many forma of this, some
even more felicitous than this one by Marlo da Sliva In Critic. F•• cl.t. of 15 Augu.t
1932, but the content Is always the same). It Is certainly not true that number Is the
supreme law nor that the opinions of all voters have 'exactly' the same weight. In this
case too, numbers are nothing more than simply an Instrumental value which give a
measureand relation. So what, than, Is being measured?What I. maasured I. precl.ely
the effectlvenes., the expanslva and persua.lva capacity, of the opinion. of tha faw, the
active minorities, tha elites, the avant-garda. etc etc: that I., their rationality or
historicity or concrete functionality. In other words, It Is untrua that the opinions of every
Individual have exactly the .ame walght. Ideas and opinion. are not 'born' spontaneously
In each Individual brain: they have had a centre of Irradiation and dlffualon, a group of
men and even a single Individual who has elaboratedand presented them In the political
form of current reality. The counting of 'votes' Is merely the final act of a long process In
which It I. precisely those who 'dedicate their be.t energies (when .uch they are) to the
State and the Nation' who have the mo.t Influenee. If tho.. who are .uppoaadly the beat,
notwithstanding the unlimited material resources at their dlspo.al, fall to get the coneent
of the maJority,they must be Judgedas lneompetentor as unrepresentativeof the
'national' Interest which cannot help being the decisive Influence In directing will. In one
way or another. 'Regrettably' everyone tends to confuse hi. own particular Interest with
the national Interest and therefore to find It dreadful etc that the 'law of numbers' decldae
the outcome. Thus It Is not a question of he who 'ha. much' feeling reduced to the level of
Just anybody, but precl.ely of he who 'has mUCh'wanting to deprive thl. anybody of the
tiniest fraction of power he has to decide the future life of the Stata.
These banal assertion. have been extended from a critique (of oligarchic origin) of the
parliamentary regime (which really ought to be criticised, lnatead, becau.. the 'historical
rationality' of numerical consent I. systematically falsified) to a critique of all
rapresentatlve systams, Including tho.. which are not parliamentary and not fashioned
according to the canon. of abstract democracy. They are even Ie•• accurate when applied
to the".55
54Marioda Silva: 'Sipario su Weimar', CF, 15 August 1932, p.303.
55 §9.69. Machiavelli, QCII p.1140-1141.
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If we return these observations to their German origin, ie, the result of the Reichstag
election of 31 July, the nature of Gramsci's argument can be established
concretely. The expansion of Nazi ideas had nothing to do with the mysterious
workings of the German spirit but is explained in a 'realistic' way, in terms of the
capacity of the would-be 'elite' constituted by Hitler and the Nazi Party, which is the
'centre of irradiation and diffusion' of their ideas. But didn't their popular appeal at
the polls prove the "rationality" of these ideas? Gramsci's answer would be that the
abstract rationality of numerical consent was "systematically falsified" by the
unlimited material resources at the disposal of the parties of the German Right. If
they still failed to obtain the consent of the majority with all these resources, it can
only be concluded that these parties did not represent the 'national' interest.
Did this mean that Gramsci 'objectively' agreed with Fascism's claim to be a
'revolution' in which a new 'elite' took over the State? Gramsci must have been
aware that this claim was common to 'both sides'? Didn't the Communists with their
'vanguard' theory of the revolutionary party make a 'similar' claim? The clue to
Gramsci's distinction between the elitist claims of Fascism and Communism lies in
his comment in parenthesis that the fascist critique of the parliamentary system was
"oligarchic in origin" . This implied a certain perspective on Fascism in the context
of Italian history and politics which emphasised its fundamentally conservative,
traditionalist character. Gramsci was inclined to see Nazism in a similar light.
Paat and Pre•• nt:
the Conservative Roots of Fascism
Since the 'science' of elites originated in Italy with Mosca and Pareto, a cultural
language already existed into which Gramsci's communist 'elite' could be
translated. Gramsci had familiarised himself with this scientific language by
rereading the key works of Mosca in 1932. However, since this native science of
elites was claimed by the FasciSts, especially the explicitly anti-democratic verSion
of Pareto, any attempt to translate the communist elite into the scientific language
used in Italy had to be highly discriminating. Gramsci seems to have taken the view
that the Fascists' claim to be a new ruling elite had no 'scientific' basis and was
merely rhetorical. This was because they openly repudiated "the elective principle-
as a method of constituting either the party or the State.
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Gramsci's 'translation' started from the critique of Mosca's "political class", although
he did not exclude the possibility of assimilating Pareto's "elite". By recasting these
concepts in terms of the 'superstructural' concept of the intellectuals, - ie, as "the
intellectual category of the dominant social group" - Gramsci left no doubt that the
Marxist translation would be on his terms.
§8.24. History of the intellectuals. Mosca's Elementi di scienza politica (new enlarged edition of
1923) is to be examined under this heading. Mosca's so-called 'political class' is nothing other than the
intellectual category of the dominant social group: Mosca's concept of the 'political class' should be
linked to Pareto's concept of the elite which is another attempt to interpret the historical phenomenon
of the intellectuals and their function in the life of the State and society. Mosca's book is an enormous
hotch-potch of a sociological and positivist character, plus the tendentiousness of immediate politics
which makes it more digestible and gives it a livelier literary styIe.50
The main deficiency of Mosca's Elementi was that it did not deal with "the whole
question of the political party". The indeterminate character of his concept of the
"political class" reflected the fact that this class lacked a solid organisational base
in the political parties. Indeed, going by Gramsci's explanation of the historic
weakness of the political parties in Italy in an earlier note, §3.119, this political
class deliberately governed in such a way as to weaken the parliamentary parties
and cause their disintegration. The discourse of Gramsci's Modern Prince started,
therefore, from the deficiency of Mosca's Elementi : the modern political party.
§8.S2. Machiavelli. The Modern Prince. The question of the political class (see the books of Gaetano
Mosca). But Mosca formulates the question in an unsatisfactory way: his notion of the political class is
so wavering and elastic that one cannot even understand precisely what he means by it. It seems to
embrace all of the propertied classes, the entire middle class; but what then is the function of the
upper class? At other times it seems to refer only to the political aristocracy, the 'political personnel' of
a State, and furthermore to that part of it which operates 'freely' within the representative system: that
is, to the exclusion of the bureaucracy, including also its upper stratum, which Mosca thinks should be
controlled and directed by the political class. Mosca's deficiency is apparent in the fact that he does
not deal with the whole question of the 'political party' and given the character of his books, especially
the Element; di scienza politica , one can understand why. Mosca's interest wavers between the
'objective' and disinterested position of the scientist and an impassioned, immediately partisan
position of someone who sees events developing which distress him and which he wants to react to.
The two parts of the book were written at two typical moments in the political-social history of Italy, in
1895 and 1923, when the political class is disintegrating and cannot find any solid organisational
ground.57
The publication dates of Mosca's books were important in locating Fascism's
relationship to this strand of the Italian 'elitist' tradition. According to Gramsci's
notes on the Risorgimento, Mosca's books were typical of the conservative
56 §8.24, OCII p.956.
57 §8.52, OCII p.972.
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literature which resulted from the fall of the Right in 1876, the coming to power of
the Left, and the reform of the parliamentary regime (in 1882 the suffrage was
significantly extended). "For the most part they are lamentations, recriminations,
pessimistic and catastrophic judgements on the Italian situation". 58 This
conservative literature written in the spirit of an 'aristocratic' contempt and fear of
parliamentary democracy came back into vogue in the years before 1914 when the
suffrage was made universal. In the postwar period Mosca's books contributed to
the intellectual climate in which parliamentary government in Italy disintegrated
completely.
In 1919 Mosca was elevated to the Senate and in 1922, on the eve of the March on
Rome, appointed Professor of Public Law at the University of Rome. The reissuing
of his books could not have come at more critical moments. The second edition c1
the Elementi di scienza politics was published in 1923, the same year in which
the Acerbo Law was passed reforming the system of proportional representation in,
order to give Mussolini's government a permanent majority and to render it
effectively irremovable by parliamentary vote. The Elementi was perfectly attuned
to a regressive electoral reform which tended to restore government by a self-
perpetuating oligarchy 'similar' to the political class described by its author. For
it was in the definition of parliamentary oligarchies that he excelled. His Teorica and his Element;
presented in persuasive form a view of the political process as managed by narrow and seIf-
perpetuating cliques - a situation in which the presumed representative of the 'the people' was not in
fact elected by his constituents but "had himself elected" by imposing his own candidacy". 59
The publication of a new edition of Mosca's Teorics dei governi e governo
par/amentare in 1925, the year in which Mussolini announced the introduction of
the dictatorship, was even more irresponsible. Whether or not senator Mosca
consciously intended It, the reissuing of this book at such a moment tended to lend
support to Mussolini's project of liquidating the parliamentary regime completely
and forever freeing the "Oligarchy" from dependence on the elective principle.
The books of the Mosca- Turiello group started to come back into vogue in the years before the
war .....Mosca's book was reprinted in 1925 with a few notes by the author recalling that the book is
about his ideas in 1883 and that the author no longer agrees in 1925 with the twenty-four year old
writer of 1883. The reprinting of Mosca's book is one of the numerous episodes of the Uberals'
political obtuseness and dilettantism in the first and second postwar years In 1925 Mosca had
58 §9.89, QCII p.1154.
59 H. Stuart-Hughes: Consciousness and Society. The Reorientation of European Social Thought,
1890-1930 (London, 1967) p. 255.
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changed his standpoints and perspectives, nevertheless he reprints his book out of literary vanity,
thinking to immunise it with a few brief notes of retraction ...... 60
The Fascist criticism of the parliamentary regime was "oligarchic in origin" because
the tendency of the Fascists to dispense with parliamentary democracy and to
restore oligarchical rule in Italy was stengthened at a critical juncture by Mosca's
works. While Senator Mosca later regretted the disappearance of the
representative regime in Italy, his books contained little justification for retaining it,
least of all in its democratic form. The abolition of the elective principle in forming
the organs of the State was extended to the Fascist Party itself in 1926 when
election to offices within the party was abolished.
§9.133, §9.136. Caeaarlam
In the Reichstag election of November 1932 the National Socialists lost votes to the
Nationalists and the Communists won votes from the Social Democrats. The
overall relation of forces between the parties of the Right and the Left remained
unchanged, although the further advance of the Communists could be exploited by
the Right "psychologically" by seeming to bring the "catastrophe" a step nearer. The
result of the election confirmed the deepening state of deadlock or "static
equilibrium" between the forces in conflict - a state of affairs in which, according to
earlier notes, the 'charismatic' man emerges. In these notes we see the
metamorphosis of the charismatic man of earlier notes into the "heroic personality"
or Caesar, except that Gramsci's main concern is to analyse the situation which
produces a Caesar rather than the qualities of the 'hero' himself, god-given or
otherwise.
It was against this background that the Reichswehr minister, General von
Schleicher, was appointed Chancellor on 2 December. One observer noticed that
this was the same date as the coup d'etat of Louis Bonaparte in France on 2
December 1851 and posed the question whether Schleicher's appointment
marked the advent of a 'Bonapartist' regime in Germany.61 The appointment of
Schleicher gave Gramsci the 'occasion' to write two long notes on Caesarism near
the end of Notebook 9. These must have been written sometime during
Schleicher's short term of office from the start of December 1932 to the end of
January 1933, ie, before Hitler came to power. A further note on Caesarism written
60 §9.S9, cit., p.1155-1156.
61Werner von Schulenberg: 'E Schleicher?' I GER, December 1932.
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after Hitler succeeded Schleicher on 30 January 1933, helps to 'situate' these
earlier notes quite precisely. In §14.23 he added a third variety of Caesarism to the
two examined in the earlier notes - ie, "whether progressive, reactionary, or of an
intermediate and episodic character" 62 : this third variety plausibly describes the
short period of Schleicher's chancellorship which in Gramsci's terms of analysis
would have marked an intermediate "degree" of Caesarism. In fact, Gramsci gives
no hint in these notes of their immediate 'German' significance and restricts himself
to analysing forms of Caesarism in the remote or recent past, but this is in order to
better define the nature of contemporary Caesarism (Caesarism "in the modern
world" ) and to better understand what was happening and likely to happen here
and now in Germany.
The terms of Gramsci's analysis as set out in these notes are fourfold: (a) the
concept of "Caesarism without a Caesar" (b) the non-military character of
contemporary Caesarism (c) the possibility of intervention from outside, by a
foreign Caesar (d) the problem of historical significance, ie, of progressive and
reactionary forms of Caesarism, and the concept of the two combined, ie, "the
dialectic of revolution-restoration". This first analysis was meant to be prOviSional
and further analysis of the problem, as one might expect, led Gramsci to make
some corrections to this first schematic 'approximation'.
(a) Gaesarism without a Caesar
The emergence out of the shadows of the presidential circle of the relatively
unknown and less than charismatic figure of General von Schleicher as a possible
candidate for the role of a German Caesar probably gave Gramsci the idea of
Caesarism without a Caesar, ie, "without a great 'heroic' and representative
personality". Gramsci observes that the phenomenon of Caesarism is "more a
polemical-ideological formula than a historical-political one": to change the one
formula into the other it was necessary to 'depersonalise' the phenomenon, to
focus not on the personality of the hero but on the nature of the political process.
This in turn 189 to the notion of 'degrees' of Caesarism where what is measured is
not the personal stature of the leader but the degree of his executive power. The
advent of Caesarism can therefore happen by degrees, which make up what he
calls lithe Caesarist phase". Gramsci gives two examples to illustrate how the
62 §14.23. Machiavelli. Caesarism and 'Catastrophic' Equilibrium of the Political-8ocial Forces, OCIllp
1680. •
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successive degrees of Caesarism can be plotted.
There can be a 'Caesarlst solution' without a Caesar, Ie, without a great 'heroic' and
representative personality. The parliamentary system has provided the mechanism for
such compromise solutions. The 'Labour' governments of MacDonald were, to a certain
degree, solutions of this kind: the degree of Caesarlsm Increased when the government
was formed headed by MacDonald as prime minister with a Conservative maJority. Similarly
In Italy from October 1922 until the defection of the Popolarl, then by stages until 3
January 1925, and then until November 1926, there was a political-historical movement In
which various degrees of Caesarlsm succeeded one another until a purer, more permanent
form was reached - although even this was not static or Immobile. Every coalition
government Is a first stage of Caesarlsm, which mayor may not advance to more
significant stages.1IB
Apart from anything else, this can be read as an intelligent piece of guesswork on
Gramsci's part. He seems to have chosen examples from other countries which
illustrated the different possibilities of how the Caesarist phase might develop in
Germany after Schleicher. The English example culminated in a coalition, the
National Government, the Italian example progressed from coalition to a purer form
of Caesarism, the Fascist dictatorship. This is how the Caesarist phase in Germany
developed, in fact, from the nationalist coalition with Hitler as Chancellor formed in
January 1933 to the 'pure' dictatorship six months later.
This aspect of Gramsci's analysis of Caesarism is to be related to something he
says about the question of constitutional legality in one of the early notes in
Notebook 14, which was started around this time (ie, the turn of 1932-33). In §14.11
Gramsci recommends an analysis of constitutions based on the model of Marx's
account of the Spanish constitution of 1812. This should bring out, among other
things, those points which 'legalise' the transition from democracy to dictatorship.
This important aspect of modern Caesarism is usually neglected.
A historical and critical reconstruction of the political reglm.s of Stat.. which hav. a
declslv. function In world affairs. Th. mo.t Int.restlng point appeara to be thl.: how the
wrltt.n constitution I. adapted (h.. been adapted) to changing political conJunctur .. ,
.speclally those unf.vourabl. to the domlnsnt cl...... An obJectlv., .nalytlc.1
exposition of the constitUtion and of all the org.nlc law. I. therefore nec.... ry, but thl.
description must be based on the mod.1 of the .nalysls w. have of the Spanish
constitution of 1812 ...•... ln .v.ry constitution .tt.ntlon should be paid to the point.
which permit the leg. I pas.ag. from the constitutlon.l-parll.mentary regime to a
dictatorship: for example, Article 48 of the Welm.r Con.tltutlon which has been .0
Important In recent Germ.n hl.tory.et
The reference to "recent German history" can be taken to mean the whole phase of
government by presidential decree under Article 48 of the constiMion, ie, from the
63 §9.133. Machiavelli. Csesarism, 0011 p.119S.
64 §14.11. Arguments about Culture. The Great World Powers, QCIII p.166S.
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appointment of Bruning in March 1930 onwards, which would therefore mark the
start of the 'Caesarist phase'. But Gramsci was probably thinking back to more
recent events. From the reports of Hitler's meeting with Hindenburg in August 1932
fol1()Wrngthe Reichstag election, Gramsci knew of Hitler's demand to be given, as
Chancellor, the same power to rule by decree under Article 48 as his predecessors
Bruning and Papan. This demand was refused on the ground that Hitler could not
be trusted not to use these powers to create a dictatorship. It was in view of this
possibility that one percipient fascist commentator anticipated "further successive
'legal' or constitutional steps in the crisis". He thought that the best way to resolve
the political deadlock was to utilise the "wreckage" of the defunct Weimar
constitution in order to bring Hitler to power, "since even in the case of constitutions
in ruin there are some points worth clinging on to in times of crisis and general
disorientation" .65
These observations on the 'constitutional' passage from democracy to dictatorship
shed further light on the phenomenon of Caesarism. In modern Caesarism the
legality of the Caesarist regime is much more important than it was at the time of
Louis Bonaparte's illegal military coup d'etat, especially if it was to forestall a
groundswell of public opposition. The public revulsion following the murder of
Matteotti in 1924, for example, showed how a careless disregard for legality could
endanger the progress of the whole Caesarist project. The tactic of the German
Communist party in 1933 was based, in fact, on the expectation of a widespread
and rapid popular reaction against the Nazis once they came to power: reading
between the lines Gramsci did not think much of this fatalistic tactic, which was a
case of the politics of "so much the worse, so much the better" (/a politica del
peggio ).66 But this upsurge of oppositional forces during the "catastrophic phase-
never materialised. The potential opposition to Hitler's government remained
passive partly because it exercised power legally.
(b) Modem Caesar1sm as a Police not a Military System
The appointment of a general as Chancellor raised the theoretical possibility that
the state of deadlock in Germany might be resolved by a military coup d'etat In the
'classic' style of Louis Bonaparte. According to Gramsci this 'technique' was now
65 Giuseppe Piazza: 'La Germania tra una AiYOlUZione e una Aestaurazione', NA, 16 October 1932.
66 See the reference to "certi casi della politica del peggio" In §15.06, 00111p.1760.
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out of date.
In the modern world with Its big economic-trade union and party-political coalitions, the
mechanism of the Caesarlst phenomenon Is different from what It was up to the time of
Napoleon III. In the period up to Napoleon III the regular military forces or soldiers of the
line were a decisive element In the advent of Caesarlsm which came about through quite
meticulous coups d'etat, through military actions etc. In the modern world trade union and
political forces, and small groups of citizens with unlimited financial resources at their
disposal, complicate the phenomenon: the functionaries of the parties and the economic
unions can be corrupted or terrorised without any need for military action In the grand
style, of the Caesar- or 18 Brumalre-type. The same situation arises In this flald as was
studied In connection with tha Jacobln-1848st formula of tha so-callad 'permanent
revolution'. Modern political 'technique' completely changed after 1848 - aftar the
axpanslon of parllamentarlsm, of tha raglme of union and party associations, of tha
formation of vast State and 'privata' buraaucraclas (la, thosa of parties and trada unions,
henca private-political); and aftar the transformations In tha organisation of tha police In
the broad sensa, la, not only of tha public service dedicated to tha raprasslon of crime but
of the totality of forces organised by the State and by private Individuals to safeguard tha
[political and economic] domination of the ruling class. In this .an.a, entire so-called
'political' parties and other organl.atlons of an economic or 80me other type must be
regarded as organs of political police, of a 'repressive' and 'Invastlgatlva' characterJl1
Placed in its historical-political context, this passage can be read as an analysis of
the advent of Caesarism in Germany written on the eve of Hitler coming to power
on 30 January 1933. Of the two alternative techniques to military action, the Nazis
chose to terrorise rather than corrupt their opponents on the Left. The terror was
aimed particularly at the functionaries of the Communist and Social Democratic
organisat~ns. The instrument of this terror was the police forces, including the
'private' police organisation of the Nazi Party - the Storm Troops. The fact that the
Storm Troops were enrolled as special police during the 'emergency' following the
Reichstag Fire and given official police powers of search and arrest confirmed
Gramsci's analysis of the 'technique' of Caesarism more precisely than he could
have foreseen at the time of writing this note. However, the extension of 'official'
police powers to the Storm Troops was consistent with his analysis in §14.11 of the
importance of maintaining the formal semblance of 'legality' during the transition to
the dictatorship.
One reason why repression rather than corruption is the preferred technique of
modern Caesarism is because in the modern world, Gramsci maintains, the
opposition between the rival forces is "historically incurable" and ultimately leaves
no room for compromise.
In tha modern world Caesarlst phenomena are quite dlffarent from those of the progressive
CaasarlNapoelon I type and from thosa of the Napoleon III type, although they tend to
resamble the latter. In the modern world, the equilibrium with catastrophic prospects
occur. not between opposing force. which could In the last analysis fuse and unite. albeit
67 §9.133 cit., QCII p.119S.
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after a wearying and bloody process, but between forces whose opposition Is historically
Incurable and Indeed becomes especially acute with the advent of Caesarlst forms.
Nevertheless, caesarlsm stili has some margin - greater or smaller depending on the
particular country and Its Importance In the global context - because a social form
'always' has marginal possibilities for further development and organisational
Improvement. In particular, It can count on the relative weakness of the rival progressive
force arising from Its character and way of life. Modern Caesarlsm Is more a pollee than a
military sy.tem.m
In stating that the fundamental conflict in modern Caesarism is "historically
incurable" Gramsci was probably generalising from observation rather than from
dogma. The impossibility of some kind of "fusion" between the conflicting forces
was supported by his observation of Schleicher's failure to resolve the pOlitical
deadlock in Germany in the winter of 1932-33. Gramsci was probably thinking of
the failure of Schleicher's attempted "opening to the Left" which sought to enlist the
cooperation in the government's programme of elements from both the Left and the
Right. In particular, Schleicher's proposal for agrarian reform mobilised the
opposition of the big landowners whose hysterical cry of "agrarian Bolshevism"
sufficiently impressed Hindenburg to persuade him to dismiss the Chancellor
forthwith. The opposition to Scheicher's programme within the dominant bloc
demonstrated the intransigence of the 'reactionary' forces and confirmed that the
opposition of the rival forces was indeed "incurable". However, by using the police
to repress the progressive force, whose relative weakness was due to the fact that
they could not afford private police organs of their own, the Caesarist regime, once
in power, could still create "marginal possibilities" for further development of the
existing social form.
In spite of the material resources needed to maintain these private organs of police,
it was still cheaper for the Caesarist regime to use terror rather than corruption
against its opponents. In §15.07. Machiavelli. Elections, Gramsci puts the whole
question of 'technique' into perspective. Written during the reign of terror which
accompanied the election campaign of February-March 1933, he laconically
observed that "often these big shots are recruited for a few lire a day, in other
words, often 'shooting' is more economical than 'voting' - that's the nub of it. After
the introduction of universal suffrage, corrupting the voter has become too dear:
twenty lire and a rifle is enough to get rid of twenty voters".69
68 §9. 136. Machiavelli. Caesarism, QCII p.1198.
69 §15.07. Machiavelli. Elections. QCIII p. 1761.
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(c) Caesarism as Foreign Intervention
In Gramsci's first 'scheme' of Caesarism or Bonapartism, the catastrophic
equilibrium was resolved by intervention from outside. The connection between the
internal-external aspects of the Caesarist situation is a rather indistinct aspect of his
-analysls, but it is worth eliciting since the external relations of Caesarism are
seldom discussed. Gramsci refers to cases of outside intervention in the remote
Italian past, such as the French invasion of 1494 shortly after the death of Lorenzo
de' MediCi, but these should not divert our attention from the immediate German
present which suggested this relation to him in the first place.
eaesarlsm or Bonapartlsm can be said to express a situation In which the forces In
conflict balance each other In a catastrophic manner; that Is to say, they balance each
other In such a way that a continuation of the conflict can only terminate In their mutual
destructlon~-Whentheprogresslve force A struggles with the reactionary force B, not only
may A defeat B or B defeat A, but It may happen that neither A nor B defeats the other -
that they bleed each other mutually and then a third force C Intervenes from outside and
subjugates what Is left of A and B. In Italy this Is precisely what happened after the death
of Lorenzo the Magnifico and In the ancient world with the barbarian Invaslons.1O
The possibility of outside intervention threads its way through Gramsci's notes on
the German crisis from the start. This is because the focus of his observation
was the politics of the German Right, although it was also a possibility in the polltics
of the German Left. In fact, the 'internal-external' relation as Gramsci saw it
presented two possibilities: there was the real possibility of French intervention as
a factor in the politics of the Nationalist Right and the theoretical possibility of
Soviet intervention as a factor in the politics of the Communist Left.
Given the regime imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles and the
necessity to ensure her compliance, the possibility of French intervention was a
permanent feature of the German 'situation'. It was also the fundamental
determinant of nationalist politics in Germany, whether they were the politics of
legal compliance with the Treaty ('Fulfilment') or illegal defiance in one form or
another. In the notes Gramsci comments on this 'internal-external' relation in
different ways at different times. For example, in the discussion of 'underground
warfare' in §1.134 he speculated on the possibility that an attempted coup d'etat by
the German Nationalist Right, by exposing their illegal military preparations, would
give the French a timely excuse to invade.71 In §8.37 he discusses a situation in
which the immediate economic life of a nation is subordinated to international
70§9.133cit.. p.1194.
71§1.134(1929-30).QCI p.123.
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relations and how this subordination is exploited by the most nationalistic party to
gain advantage over its rivals.72 The example of Germany comes immediately to
mind for the Nazis' exploitation of the issue of reparations payments or "debt
slavery" answered precisely to the state of economic subordination he describes.
Gramsci therefore suggests, paradoxically, that the so-called "party of the foreigner"
is the most nationalistic party itself, not the party which it usually accuses of this (ie,
the communist party). In §9.39 the 'internal-external' relation is seen from the
French angle. To contradict the propaganda of the French monarchiSts, who
associated the republic with German invasions of French territory, Gramsci asked
how many times has German territory been invaded by the French - "(the
occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 should be counted among the French invasions)".78
The point was that there was a similar link in the propaganda of the German
monarchists between its 'internal' and 'external' elements, the anti-republican
element being closely connected with the nationalistic element.
There is no hint of this Franco-German relation in the notes on Caesarism, but we
know that Gramsci was studying it closely at the time they were written. The
evidence for this is §14.03 in which he recommends "the study of German and
French politics in the winter of 1932-33 ".74 This would provide "a mass of material
for the purposes of researCh", particularly research into "the interrelation between
foreign and internal policy (where the assumption is that it is always the internal
policy of a particular country which decides things: it is clear in fact that the initiative
of a country due to internal reasons, will become "foreign" for the country which
undergoes this initiative)".75 The possibility that the advent of a nationalist
government led by Hitler openly defying the Versailles Treaty might provoke
France into intervening was discussed in Gramsci's press reports of the time, but
the analysis of Caesarism suggests that this would only become a serious
possibility in the event of a bloody civil war in Germany which left both force A and
force B mutually exhausted.
The other possibility of outside intervention in the German "catastrophe" was
theoretical, or rather was a theoretical mistake: this was the unrealistic hope of
intervention by the Soviet Union. Gramsci alludes to this in §14.68, the only note in
72 §8.37 (1932). cell p.964-965.
73 §9.39 (1932). cell p.1118-1119.
74§14.03 (1933). oom p.1657.
751bid.
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the notebooks to refer to Stalin (ie, Giuseppe Bessarione). This note was written
shortly after the catastrophe had happened - namely, the destruction of the
German Left in the Nazi reign of terror in February-March 1933. Gramsci describes
two historical-political phases which ended in "a state of passivity and inertia". 76 In
the second and worst of these, the passivity and inertia of the movement was
explained by the fact that everyone "is waiting for a form of 'Napoleonism',which is
anachronistic and mechanical (since historical phases seldom repeat themselves
in the same form)".n The context suggests that Gramsci was referring to the false
expectation by the German Communists (lithe party of the foreigner") that the Red
Army would come to their aid at the crucial moment and thus impose a
'Napoleonist' or Caesarist solution from outside. The necessity of intervention by
the Red Army was in fact urged by Trotsky in his articles on Germany in 1933 in
which he reminded everyone of the advice he gave eighteen months earlier,
namely, that "it should be axiomatic for every revolutionary worker that the attempt
of the faSCists to seize power in Germany must lead to the mobilisation of the Red
Arm'l.78 Gramsci may have known of Trotsky's 'axiomatic' advice to the
revolutionary workers of Germany which, judging by their passivity and inertia in
1933, was more successful than even he could have imagined. For the false
expectation of a 'Napoleonic' intervention by the Red Army was attributed by
Gramsci to "the general theory of permanent revolution, which is nothing more than
a general forecast presented as a dogma and which collapses by itself because it
doesn't in fact come true". 79 The question remained (which cannot be analysed at
this point): how did the false assumptions of the dogma of permanent revolution
come to be accepted by the orthodox leaders of the German Communist party?
76§14.68 (1933), ocm p. 1730.
nibid.
78 This advice was first given in 'Germany, the Key to the International Situation' (26 November 1931)
and Trotsky's reminder of it was in 'Hitler and the Red Army' (21 March 1933): see Leon Trotsky: The
Struggle against Fascism in Germany (1971) p. 95 and p. 395.
79§14.68 cit., p.1730.
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(d) The Historical Significance of Caesarist Regimes
The historical significance of Caesarist (or Sonapartist) regimes is the most difficult
question raised by Gramsci's analysis. The difficulty partly arises from the fact that
he deliberately starts from a schematic formula - "progressive force A v. reactionary
force S" - even though the whole tendency of his thinking was anti-schematic:
"there can be progressive and reactionary forms of Caesarism: the exact historical
significance of each form can only be reconstructed in the last analysis from
concrete history, not from any sociological schema". His main concern in these
notes was to define the rules of the Caesarist phenomenon but the rules were to
be applied in the flexible and 'comprehensive' spirit of the historian rather than the
sociologist.
Although ea.. arl.m alway•• xpr..... the eolutlon In which a great per.onallty I. made
the 'arblt.r' of a hl.torlcal-polltlcal .Ituatlon characterl.ed by an .qulllbrium of force.
heading for cata.troph., It do.. not have the .am. hl.torlcal .Ignlflcanc. In all ca ....
Ther. can be progr••• lv. and r.actlonary form. of Ca.. arl.m: the .•xact hl.torlcal
.Ignlflcance of .. ch form can only be recon.tructed, In the final analy.I., from concrete
hl.tory and not from any .oclologlcal .chema. ea.. arl.m I. progr••• lv. when It.
Interv.ntlon help. the progr ... lve force to triumph even though It. victory la limited by
certain comproml.... It I. r.actlonary when Ita Intervention help. the reactionary force to
win; thl. ca•• al.o Involv•• c.rtaln comproml ... and limitation. although the.. have a
different valu., .xt.nt, and .Ignlflcance from the form.r. Ca.. ar and Napoleon I ar.
exempl.. of prograaaive Ca.. arl.m, Napol.on III (and al.o BI.marck) of r.actlonary
Ca•• arl.m. The problem I. to 188 wh.ther In the dialectic 'revolutlon-re.toratlon' It la the
.I.m.nt of revolution or r.. toratlon which predomlnat .. , for It I. certain that In the
movem.nt of hl.tory there I. no turning back and there are no luch thing. a. restoratlona
In totO.1II
Gramsci's concern for the rules of Caesarism partly stemmed from the implications
of Croce's revision of historical materialism. In the second draft of this note he
denies that the formula of Caesarism is merely "a canon of historical
interpretation"81 even though his recommendation for the study of concrete cases
seems to imply precisely this. The implication of Croce's revision was to dissolve
the a priori concepts of historical materialism whilst acknowledging its value in
"drawing attention" of historians to the facts economic and social history. Gramsci
agreed with the anti-positivist side of Croce's interpretation: historical materialism
80 §9.133. QCII p.1194.
81The second draft is §13.27. QCIII p.1619-1622.For the Interpretation of historical materialism as -a
canon of historical Interpretation· • see Benedetto Croce: Materialismo storico eel economics mandsta
(1961). p. 80-81: "This canon advises us to tum our attention to the so-called economic substratum of
societies In order to understand better their configurations and episodes. The concept of 'canon'
should not encounter any difficulties especially if it is remembered that it implies no anticipation of
results but Is only an aid in seeking them and is entirely for empirical use-.
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was not to be regarded as a universal 'sociological' schema which is then applied
mechanically to the study of history. But it was possible to heed Croce's anti-
positivist warning without surrendering the concept of dynamic class struggle on
which the materialist conception of history was based, especially if this concept
was properly understood in the dialectical sense of the founder. Such was the
difference between Caesarism asconcept and ascanon .
Gramsci's approach to Caesarism pivots on this tension between concept and
canon. If anything, the difficulty of his analysis is not due to 'schematism' but to the
absence of it since when it comes to concrete history Gramsci chc~.ngesand even
breaks the rules if necessary. The possibility of 'Caesarism without Caesar', for
example, seems to bend the rules to breaking point but such flexibility is imposed
by the concrete facts he is thinking of: few would disagree with his view of Ramsey
MacDonald as a less than heroic personality, but this goes to show how the
method of 'approximating' ever more closely to concrete facts can result in
illuminating corrections to the rules of the original schema which, it can be argued,
stop short of reducing it to a mere 'canon'.
In assessing the historical significance of Caesarist regimes, the flexibility of the
rules is evident in two main ways. His use of deliberately generic terms to describe
the forces in conflict - 'progressive' and 'reactionary' - is because he knows full well
that the static equilibrium which gives rise to Caesarism may not correspond
straightforwardly to the fundamental class divisions, but this was no reason to
abandon the rules of class struggle altogether. The most original of Gramsci's
innovations to the rules, however, is "the dialectic of revolution-restoration". As a
criterion of historical comprehension and judgement, this allowed him to see
Caesarist regimes as progressive and reactionary at the same time. This dialectic
and one of its variants, the concept of "passive revolution", occupied his thinking a
good deal in the notes of 1933 as the nature of the new Caesarist regime in
Germany began to reveal itself.
Meanwhile, between the first and second of these notes Gramsci hastened to
modify the 'SOCiological' schema so that it 'approximated' more closely to the facts.
By differentiating between the fractions of the dominant bloc. he starts to break
down the mechanical division between the progressive force A and the reactionary
force B. The starting-point. as always, is French history, but we should not lose
sight of the shadowy forms of German politics lurking in the immediate background.
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This Is one element of closer approximation. Another such element is the following: the
cataltrophlc phale may be brought about by a [momentary) political deficiency of the
traditional dominant force and not by any organic deficiency which Is neceslarlly
Insuperable. This Is precisely what happenedIn the case of Napoleon III. The dominant
force In France from 1815 to 1848wal Ipllt politically Into four fractions: legitimist.,
Orleanlsts, Bonapartllts, and Jacobln republicans. Such was the Internal factional
Itruggle that It wal poilible for the rival (progressive) force B to advance In a
'precoclous' form. However, the existing social form had not yet exhausted Its
possibilities of development, as subsequent history proved abundantly In fact. Napoleon
III represented (In his own way, Ie, as fitted the stature of the man, which was not great)
these latent or Immanent possibilities. His caesarlsm Is therefore, once again, of a
particular type. It Is objectively progresalve, though not like that of Caesar or Napoleon
I.The Csesarlsm of the latter was, so to speak, of a qualitative-quantitative character, I.,
It represented the historical phase during which the passage from one type of State to
another occured - a passageIn which the Innovations were so numerous and of such a
nature that they represented a complete revolution. The Csesarlsm of Napoleon III w••
merely, and to a limited extent, quantitative: there wa. no passage from one type of State
to another but only 'evolution' of the same type along an unbroken IIne.82
Thus, after describing the Caesarism of Napoleon III as a "reactionary" form, he
now says it was "objectively progressive" (although this amendment is dropped in
the second draft). In spite of repressing the progressive force A, which had
advanced "precociously" in the 1848 revolution, the Caesarism of Napoleon III was
"objectively progressive" because it enabled the still latent potential of the existing
social form to develop. Thus, the traditional dominant force B, or rather a particular
fraction of it, by demonstrating that its deficiency was momentary rather than
organic, subsequently turned out to be a progressive force. This in turn leads
Gramsci to differentiate between forms of Caesarism which represent
Irevolutionary' and 'evolutlonarv' progress.
Does this analysiS of the facts of French history break the rules of Caesarism? By
interpreting the rules dialectically not mechanically, that is to say, by understanding
Caesarism as Caesarism in movement, as a historical phenomenon, Gramsci is
able to judge its significance as far as "the dominant force" is concerned in a more
differentiated way. The so-called dialectic of revolution-restoration was designed
mainly to capture Caesarism as movement; the terms of the movement remain
deliberately categorical- "revolution-restoration" - and seem to leave no room for
compromise, although the observation that in history "there are no such things as
restorations in toto" comes into play here. The notion of Ilobjectively progressive"
was not simply a momentary equivocation on Gramsci's part, however: it implied a
significant change in the rules, in which "progress" now pertained more to the
social than to the political form. The change of emphasis corresponded to the new
"phase" of Caesarism, the post-catastrophic phase, after the advent of the
82 §9.136, OCII p.1198.
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Caesarist regime has saved the dominant force (8) from catastrophe. Accordingly,
in the course of 1933 the thread of Gramsci's thinking moves on since, strictly
speaking, once the Caesarist regime is safely installed the "Caesarist phase"
comes to an end. From the analysis of Caesarism during the phase of impending
catastrophe Gramsci begins to elaborate the formula of "passive
revolution" in which there is "objective progress" without the active participation of
the progressive force (A) itself - indeed, in which the progressive force is actively
supressed by its rival. This movement of Gramsci's mind was dictated by the
movement of real events. From the reflections on Caesarism at the turn of 1932-33
to those on passive revolution in the first half of 1933, Gramsci's notes are like a
mirror in which we see reflected the shadowy forms of German politics. In his
analysis of the fractions of the dominant bloc in France on the eve of 1848, for
example, we can see reflected the "momentary deficiency" caused by 'similar' splits
within the dominant bloc in Germany on the eve of 1933. However, the demands of
thinking creatively were related to the process of reality itself. This process
developed so rapidly in 1933 that Gramsci did not have time to dwell on whether or
not his thinking was obeying the rules.
Postscript: Was Bismarck's Caeaarlsm 'Reactionary'?
The question of historical significance is posed particularly sharply by Gramsci's
description of Bismarck's regime in these notes as a "reactionary" form of
Caesarism. Although it is no more than a passing reference, Gramsci retained it in
the second draft. It is worth trying to clarify what he meant by this for two reasons:
firstly, because his description of Bismarck's regime has been specifically rejected
by historical materialists otherwise sympathetic to his political theory; secondly,
because the timing of this reference coincided with the reappearance of Caesarist
forms in Germany - specifically with the "intermediate" form represented by
Schleicher - and therefore implied a particular continuity between past and present
in Gramsci's thinking about German politics.
The concept of Caesarism or Bonapartism has been applied by German historians
to Bismarck's regime quite independently of Gramsci's notes on the subject, most
notably by Hans-Ulrich Wehler whose work onThe German Empire 1871-1918
(1973) defined for a certain time the main historiographical paradigm of imperial
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Germany.83 The similarity between Wehler's concept of Bonapartism and
Gramsci's was noted by David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley in their paradigm-
smashing bookThe Peculiarities of German History (1984).84 However, in
challenging the dominant paradigm the latter found themselves having to reject
Gramsci's description of Bismarck's regime as a reactionary form of Caesarism in
spite of their attempt to use other elements of his political theory such as the
concept of civil society to support their reinterpretation. Gramsci's concept of
Caesarism was "very schematic" and, as far as Bismarck's regime was concerned,
"certainly does not correspond to the analysis of revolution from above advanced
in this essay".
As we saw, Gramsci's sociological'schema' was meant to be a first 'approximation'
to concrete history. Further analysis of Caesarist forms was expected to result in a
more differentiated judgement of their historical significance which "the dialectic of
revolution-restoration" was meant to accommodate. In many ways, Wehler's
analysis of the combination of old and new elements in Bismarck's Bonapartism Is
consistent with this dialectiC, but in the final analysis the element of 'restoration' still
predominates:
In Wehler's case the main effect of this '80napartist' definition of the state is certainly to acknowledge
the new importance of industrial capital within the German social formation in the period after
unification. But this is expressed in such a way as to leave the 'aristocratic' or 'Junkerist' definition
intact. Industrial capital has arrived, but its interests are accommodated within a 'traditional' power
structure of a basically unreformed kind.8s
Whereas in Wehler's interpretation of Bismarck's regime the element of
'restoration' predominates (always remembering Gramsci's rule that "in the
movement of history there is no turning back and no such things as restorations in
toto "), in Blackbourn and Eley's the predominant element is 'revolution'. But for the
latter defining the State in imperial Germany was not simply a matter of emphasis .
In fact, the two authors gave a detailed description of the institutional forms of the
aristocratic State in imperial Germany which would fully justify defining it as
backward, not to say "reactionary".
83 For his account of Bismarck's 8onapartism •.see Hans-Ulrich Wehler: The German Empire 1871- _
1918 (Berg, 1985) p. 55-62, especially p.57-58.
84 David Blackboum and Geoff Eley: The Peculiarnies of German History (Oxford, 1991) p. 129-130
and noteS.
85 ibid.
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This is the definition that should be most familiar to us after the preceding discussions in this essay.
The twin characteristics of backwardness and aristocratic dominance are thought to have been
expressed in a number of institutional ways: the executive power of the King-Kaiser, the autonomy of
the military, the preferential recruitment of the officer corps and the bureaucracy from the aristocracy,
the limited powers of the Reichstag, the transmuted seigneurial character of local government east of
the River Elbe, the effective immunities of the landowners from certain kinds of taxation in the same
region, and of course the special qualities of the Prussian as opposed to the Reich Constitution. Now,
at one level these factors amply justify an 'aristocratic' description of the state. But for that description
to acquire theoretical status the State-SOCiety relation must be addressed, and in existing discussions
the relationship of the Junkers (as a social class) to the State (as an ensemble of political institutions) is
left regrettably unclear. Be
Do Gramsci's notes throw any light of this society-State relation? The passing
reference to Bismarck's reactionary Caesarism in §9.133 was organically
connected in fact to other notes, especially those on the traditional intellectuals in
Germany. When these are taken into account, we see that his judgement of
Bismarck's regime formed part of a wider conception of German history which was
anything but schematic. Indeed, his comparative analysis of the function of the
English and German aristocracy brought out a number of German ·peculiarities'.
It [the English landowning class] loses its economic supremacy but for a long time maintains its
political-intellectual supremacy and is assimilated by the new power group as its 'traditional
intellectuals' and its ruling stratum. The old landed aristocracy is joined to the industrialists by a kind of
suture which is precisely how the traditional intellectuals join up with the new dominant classes in
other countries.
The English phenomenon also appears in Germany but is complicated by other historical and
traditional elements The development of industry took place within a semi-feudal framework
which lasted up until November 1918 and the Junkers preserved a political-intellectual supremacy
to a much greater extent than the corresponding English group. They have been the traditional
intellectuals of the German industrialists, but with special privileges and a strong consciousness of
being an independent social group based on the fact that they retained considerable economic
power over the land, which was more 'productive' than in England. The Prussian Junkers resemble a
priestly-military caste, with a virtual monopoly of directive-organlsational functions in political society
but possessing at the same time an economic base of its own and so not exclusively dependent on
the liberality of the dominant economic group. Furthermore, unlike the English landowning aristocracy
the Junkers constituted the officer class of a large standing army which gave them solid organisational
cadres favouring the preservation of an esprit de corps and their political monopoly.
(In Max Weber's book Parliament and Government in the New Order in Germany many elements can
be found showing how the political monopoly of the nobles impeded the elaboration of an extensive
and experienced bourgeois political personnel and is at the root ot the continual parliamentary crises
and of the fragmentation of the liberal and democratic parties. Hence the Importance of the Catholic
Centre and of Social Democracy which during the imperial period managed to build up quite
considerable parliamentary and directive strata of their own}.87
86 Ibid. p.128.
87 §12.01, ocm p. 1526-1527.
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This brilliant synopsis of German history, written before 1933, poses a number of
questions for empirical research which cannot be pursued here. Its main features
are now familiar to German historians seeking explanations of 1933 in terms of the
'deep' continuities of German history. Arguably, it offers a closer 'approximation' by
a Marxist thinker to the concrete relation between State and society in imperial
Germany than any number of circular abstractions about the relative autonomy of
the State, the State as instrument, the State as arbiter etc. The 'dominance' of
industry in the German social formation is clearly acknowledged but so is the virtual
'monopoly' of higher political leadership by the aristocracy. However, Gramsci's
analysis of the function of these traditional intellectuals is not purely
'superstructural': if it were so, its theoretical status as far as historical materialism is
concerned would remain in doubt. In fact, the relation between structure-
superstructure is conceptualised in very deliberate terms. As we see, Gramsci is
quite clear that the independent social consciousness of the Prussian Junkers
"ultimately" depends on preserving an economic base of their own. The
preservation of this economic base, however, appears in his analysis to be a matter
of military as well as economic necessity, the aristocratic character of the officer
corps being closely related to the territorial basis of the standing army. To convey
the aristocracy's sense of itS own exclusiveness, Gramsci speaks of the suture
between the dominant group and their ruling stratum, preferring this to the term
fusion in which the specifically 'aristocratic' character of the dominant or ruling
ideas might disappear altogether. Morever, the suture suggests that the joining
together of the industrialists and the aristocracy was a deliberate act of intervention
rather than a slow organic process. What particular 'surgery' did Gramsci have in
mind?
This brings us to Bismarck. Gramsci acknowledges the influence on his thinking Of
Weber's powerful critique of the legacy of Bismarck's 'Caesarist' regime in
Parliament and Government in the New Order in Germany. His description of
Bismarck's regime as a "reactionary Caesarism", in fact, owed as much to Weber
as to Marx. Weber illustrated its reactionary character by analysing Bismarck's
deliberate act of dividing the National Uberals by introducing protective tariffs in
1879. This divided the German bourgeoisie and brought about a realignment of
social forces by forging an alliance between heavy industry and the agrarians ('iron
and rye') on the basis of protectionism and the anti-SOCialistlaw. This was
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Gramsci's "suture". Bismarck deliberately divided the main political party of the
bourgeoisie in order to make his own political monopoly complete, but the legacy
to his successors was to give a permanent monopoly of the function of higher
political leadership to a social group completely lacking in the specifically 'political'
(as distinct from bureaucratic) capacity needed for this role. To this extent, the
historical significance of Bismarck's Caesarism could be said to be more like a
'restoration' than a 'revolution' from above.
This analysis of Bismarck's Caesarism clarifies the relation between past and
present in Gramsci's thinking. The continuities are both explicit and implicit. We
have seen that he first referred to Weber's critique of the imperial system during the
early months of Bruning's chancellorship in 1930 when the transition from
parliamentary to presidential government took place. Gramsci appears to have
seen this as a regression to the post-Bismarckian system of 'Caesarism without
Caesar' in which the function of political leadership is carried out not by party
leaders responsible to parliament but by "a force of non-party men linked to the
government by paternalistic ties of a Bonapartist-Caesarist type" (§3. 119). This
description approximated quite closely, in fact, to the relation between the new
chancellor and his PreSident, who is the power behind this "State-Bonapartist
party" as Gramsci calls it.
The second element of continuity was linked in Gramsci's mind to the first, although
whether he saw this as a relation of 'cause and effect' is not clear. When he again
referred to Weber's critique in 1932, it was in the light of the Reichstag and other
elections since 1930. The results were seen by Gramsci as confirming thehistorical
weakness of the liberal and democratic parties which virtually disintegrated in
these elections. They also confirmed the historical strengths of the Catholic Centre
and Social Democracy whose popular vote remained remarkably solid. The
disintegration of the bourgeois parties of the 'middle' thus coincided in Gramsci's
mind with the regression to traditional Caesarist forms of rule in Germany although,
as we said, the relation of cause and effect is far from clear.
The third element of continuity is implicit. In his account of Germany's traditional
intellectuals, Gramsci said that the Junkers' consciousness of being an
independent social group ultimately depended on preserving an economic base of
their own. The most 'reactionary' aspect of Bismarck's Caesarism as Gramsci saw it
may have been his determination to preserve this economic base by a host of
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"anti-historical" measures of which protective tariffs were the most obvious but not
necessarily the most important.68 Whatever the case, the main 'structural' question
raised by Gramsci's version of imperial Germany is the dynamic relation between
the rapid progress of big industry and the gradual decline of big agriculture. He
was enough of a historical materialist to know that this relation was crucial to any
analysis of the superstructures, which remained his primary interest. The question
is: what point did he think the decline of big agriculture had reached by 1929, or
rather, what prospect did he think the Prussian aristocracy had of preserving their
economic base in the crisis of 1929? In the first draft of 1930 he says that "it is not
difficult to imagine that the difference in the situation of the English and the
Prussian nobility will even out with the passing of time"89 - which presumably
meant that the 'productive' function of the Prussian nobility WOUld, in the course of
time, decline in importance to the English level. But in the second draft of 1932 he
drops this rather sanguine perspective altogether. Did this mean that he thought
that the eastern estates were now facing 'terminal' decline? After all, this poSSibility
was precisely what the Junkers themselves complained of so vociferously, their
outcry against Schleicher's "agrarian Bolshevism" being a case in point.
This 'terminal' hypothesis fits neatly into Gramsci's initial conception of the German
crisis put forward in 1929 as a "crisis of authority", in which the breakdown in all its
forms of the ideology of the traditional intellectuals would coincide with their
economic bankruptcy. However, the course of events by 1933 seemed to have
strengthened rather than weakened his respect for "the force of tradition". A number
of notes written in 1933 referring to "the strength of agarian parties" suggest that if
he ever asked himself the question - have the Prussian Junkers now come to the
end of the road? - his answer was no. The threat to the very survival of their
economic base seemed only to increase their determination to preserve it by any
political means possible, even if it meant bringing Hitler to power. By saving the
traditional order in the East, the new Caesarist regime could thus be seen as a
kind of 'restoration'.
68 An important element of continuity before and after 1918 neglected by historians appears 10be
the mortage-credit operations of the Prussian Landschaften which accounted for the massive
accumulated debt-structure of the Junker estates. Gramsci's thesis on the relative and absolute
parasitism of the old classes left over by the European 'tradition' can be related to this.
8914.49,QCI p. 480-481.
Chapter 4
The Catastrophic Phase: 30 January-14 July1933
From the Appointment of Hitler to the Suppression of Parties
The Letter.
"I sometimes think my whole life has been a big mistake •
The "catastrophic phase" in the breakdown of Gramsci's health came to a climax in
the early months of 1933.1 On the morning of 7 March he collapsed getting out of
bed and was left temporarily paralysed. Two weeks later on 20 March Professor
Arcangeli, the doctor chosen by Tatiana, examined him in prison. Arcangeli's
medical certificate stated: "Gramsci cannot survive for long under the present
conditions. I consider his transference to a hospital or clinic absolutely necessary,
unless he can be granted conditional freedom".2 Arcangeli wanted the certificate to
include a request for a pardon but Gramsci opposed this. It took another eight
agonising months before he was transferred from Turi to Civitavecchia, and thence
to the 'secure' clinic at Formia near Rome, but by this time his physical breakdown
had passed the point of no return.
The climax in the breakdown of Gramsci's health came at exactly the same moment
in the political crisis in Germany when the equilibrium "with catastrophic prospects"
was resolved by the new 'Caesar', Hitler. Between the Reichstag Fire on 27
February and the Reichstag election on 5 March, the Nazis launched a wave of
terror which completely destroyed the organisations and cadres of the German Left,
starting with the Communist Party.3 Gramsci followed this Climactic phase of the
German crisis as closely as he could through his periodicals, particularly the
Rassegna settimanale della stampa estera. 4 The "practical origin" of many
notes in Notebooks 14 and15 can be traced to the German situation in the early
months of 1933. In retrospect, it can be argued that the whole project of
international revolution born in Russia in October 1917 definitively ended in
Germany in March 1933. Although Gramsci understood the significance of the
1 "The truth is that some time ago, about a year and a half, I entered a phase of my life which without
exaggeration I can only define as catastrophiC. I cannot react against my physical illness any more and I
feel my strength ebbing away all the time". To Tatiana, 13 February 1933, LC II p. 683. His letter to
Teresina the following week, 20 February, makes it clear that this catastrophic phase began with his
haemorrhage of 3 August 1931. LC II p.687.
2 Quoted in G.Fiori: Antonio Gramsci. Ufe of a Revolutionary (1970) p. 278.
3 The whole momentous atmosphere of the time, including the terror, is dramatically evoked in Philip
Metcalfe's riveting 1933 (Black Swan, 1990).
4 Professor Gerratana notes that Gramsci relied on this periodical particularly In theearly months of
1933: see OCIV p.2941.
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German defeat, he never regarded it as final or 'epochal': but this was more an act
of faith than of intellect on his part. The German defeat confirmed what he wrote
soon after the German elections of 1930, ie, that after 1917 a new 'period' had
begun in which the war of movement in politics was superseded by the war of
position. The only glimmer of light in the descending darkness in 1933 lay in
"passive revolution", a concept which Gramsci now linked with the war of position
and which occupied many of the notes written in 1933. It was a Marxist variant of
Vico's "cunning of providence" - an expression of faith in the ultimately rational
workings of history at a moment which the forces of reason appear to have been
completely vanquished. In the meantime, the only consolation for communists of
Gramsci's generation was to accept philosophically, as he did, that they were the
"manure of history".5
1933: the Year of Candide
Gramsci was fond of quoting Romain Rolland's motto - "pessimism of the intellect.
optimism of the will" - as the guiding principle of his existence. It is worth recalling
what it means since we are presented on the face it with a contradiction in terms:
"I am a pessimist of the intellect and an optimist of the will. In every circumstance I
think of the worst possible scenario and then mobilise all my reserves of willpower
to defeat the obstacle ahead of me. I never entertain illusions or suffer from
delusions. Above all, my strength has always been an infinite patience, a patience
which is neither passive nor inert but animated by a spirit of perseverance".Slt
would never be more difficult to live by this motto than in 1933. Gramsci greeted the
new year with the pessimism which it deserved, but this merely served to
strengthen his will to resist:
If the y.. r 1932wa. tough, 1933 look. to me to be even wor... I am completely exhauated
and at the .am. tim. thing. ar. getting harder to bear. The relation between my
dl.poaabl. .trength and the effort d.manded ha. woreened.Stili, I am far from being
demorallHd. In fact. my willpower I•• trengthened precl.. ly by the reall.m with which I
analy.. the .Iementa of my exl.tenee and my re.l.tance. I embrace you affectlonatelY.7
The first test of his willpower related to a very immediate matter. His struggle to cut
down on his smoking was partially successful. He reported that he was consuming
only a fraction of the tobacco he was smoking when he was free: "It's still too much ,
5 The expression Is used In the -dialogue- In §9.53 (summer 1932). 0011 p.1128.
STo carto, 19 December 1929, In Le I p. 298.
7 To Tatlana, 2 January 1933, in Le II p. 662.
254
in my view, but believe me it's very difficult to completely extirpate such an
inveterate and deeply-rooted habit".B
On 30 January 1933 (the same day coincidentally that Hitler was made German
ChanCellor) Gramsci took up Tatiana's well-intentioned advice "to be of good
humour". For this he turned to Voltaire'sCandide , which covered all the worst
possibilities of life.
Your recommendationla very uaeful, I think, but difficult to apply, at leaat as a
predeterminedprogramme.It might be neeeaaryto compile a complete treatise on good
humour, possibly extracted from Voltaire's CIIndlde and suitably arranged to cover all the
disagreeablepossibilities In life. It Is a real pity that Voltaire's works (as far as I know)
are forbidden In prison and It Is particularly unpleasantto have to spend one's whole IIf.
narrowly confined Inllde four walls without any of the dlverslonl which stimulate good
humour. In any ca.e, you're right. It all dependson comparing one's own life with
lomethlng even worse and conlollng oneself with the relativity of human fortunes II
Writing as someone who "had known only the ugliest side of life", Gramsci then
tested Tatiana's advice by recollecting a concrete episode from his Sardinian
boyhood but this was so horrifying that it was impossible to extract from it any
feeling of "good humour". Nevertheless, Voltaire's hero is mentioned in the
notebooks on several occasions in 1933. Candide's naive and fatuous optimism
which always concluded from the most terrible experiences that "all is for the best
in the best of all possible worlds" must have seemed to Gramsci a humorous
parody of his own brand of pessimism of the intellect.
In February his insomnia got much worse and he began to fear that his physical
suffering could overcome his remaining powers of resistance. The 'contradiction' at
the heart of his existential motto now grew sharper. For once his stoical composure
cracked and he confessed that physical suffering reduced him to crying like a child.
It'. true, for some time now, roughly a year and a half ago, I .tarted a pha•• of my life
which without exaggeretlon I can only call eata.trophlc. I can no longer react against my
phYllcal lllne.. and faal my .trength ebbing away all the time. Besld•• , I don't want to
give In to the proc... , I don't want to neglect anything which even theoretically might
contain the poaalbillty of ending thl•• ufferlng. I think to neglect anything would, In a
e.rtaln .ense, be tantamount to .ulclde. Admittedly I may have become full of
contradiction. but not to the extent of not understanding .Iementary thing. Ilk. th.......
DearTania, there are tim.. when I'm lust like a child: I fael 80 tired out that I .tart crying
and fear thet I am failing Into a delirium. I neYer realised that one'. phy.lcal condition
could dominateone's moral .trength to .uch an extent, but then I mu.t heYe
over.. tlmated my own reserv... Whet'. more, you mu.t not be too .urprlaad by thl.: I
cannot hide this .tate of affair. any longer. I a.. ure you that I stili drsw a little strength
from the thought that I have responalbllltl.. toward. Julca and the boys; otherwl•• , I
BToTatiana. 9January 1933. in LC II p. 665.
9To Tatiana. 30January 1933. in LC II p.673.
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would give up the Itruggle Iince living hal become 10 bureensome and odious for me. I
embrace you tenderly ... 10
It was against this increasingly desperate background that Gramsci made the
"decision" reported in the letter to Tatiana of 27 February.11This is one of the most
important letters as far as revealing the 'political' motives of his resistance are
concerned, although these cannot be disentangled from the 'personal' motives
alluded to above. No attempt has been made to decode this "decision", which he
needed to disguise from the prison censor. This decision was not what one might
expect from the growing desperation apparent in his preceding letters to Tatiana:
rather, Gramsci remained true to his existential motto - "pessimism of the intellect,
optimism of the will" - and decided to continue his resistance even though he was
assailed by intense doubts about whether it served any further political purpose.
In the first place, Gramsci was convinced - rightly or wrongly - that for reasons of
political expediency he had been abandoned by his own side. He told Tatiana that
he had not simply been condemned by the Special Tribunal but by "a much wider
organism". This wider organism or "invisible tribunal" as he once called it , included
his wife Julia who had "unconsciously" condemned him, and "a series of other
people" who had condemned him "less unconsciously ". Who were these "other
people"? The only answer is the Communist leadership in Moscow which, he
believed, had reasons of its own to 'condemn' him. In his thinking, these reasons
probably had to do with what were perceived to be his "oscillations" in the letter to
the Russian Central Committee of 1926 on the internal party struggle. They may
also have been connected with his disagreement with the current international
tactic revealed in the 'political conversations' of 1930, news of which had circulated
through the prison system and beyond. Whatever the case, Gramsci could see Why
the leadership in Moscow might find it politically expedient to leave such an
independent-minded communist leader to languish in a fascist prison.
Gramscl's doubts about the tactic of the so-called 'third period' were now fully
justified by the development of the political situation in Germany which he had
followed closely through his periodicals since the start of the year. It must have
been about this time (the letter of 27 February 1933 was written, coincidentally, on
the day of the Reichstag Fire) that Gramsci wrote §15.07 in connection with the
German elections appointed for 5 March. This was based on a comment in the
10To Tatlana, 13 February 1933, LC II p.683-684.
11See LC II p.690.
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Gazeta Po/ska reported in the Rassegna settimana/e della stampa estera "for the
end of January or the start of February", and clearly anticipated the Nazi reign of
terror against German Communism launched after the Reichstag Fire.12 The paint
is that the victory of fascism in Germany must have contributed to the "doubts"
which assailed Gramsci at this point about the whole purpose and direction of
Russian leadership of the Communist International. The doubts in Gramsci's mind
can be formulated as follows: what was the point of continuing his resistance to the
faSCist regime if it was true that the communist leadership in Moscow had
abandoned him to his fate? What was the point of continuing the international
struggle atter the German defeat, which demonstrated (according to Gramsci's
notes of early 1933) a "criminal" neglect or ignorance on the part of Moscow of the
European situation? Finally, what was the point of continuing to struggle for the
sake of Julia and the boys in Moscow if it was true that she also had 'condemned'
him, albeit "unconsclously. Such were the elements of 'pessimism of the intellect'
which led up to the "decision" announced by Gramsci on 27 February.
I thought It I ought to write to you becauae I think I have arrived at a decl.lve turning-
point In my life when It 18 nece.sary without further delay. to make a declalon. This
decision Is taken. The line of conduct which I Indicated to you In the laat conversations
and In the recent letter. Is only a conditional part of theae decl.lon.. Sometlmea I think
my whole life ha. been a big mistake (big for me at I.. at) or mlaadventure. The only thing
that atlll perauadea me that thla la not entirely true la your attitude and eapeclally that of
the lawyer. (Don't be offended If I put the lawyer before you: there are plausible r.. eon.
for this which should not offend you and which you yourself can understand). But thl. Is
not sufficient. 13
What, then, was this "decision" or "decisions"? To judge from his subsequent line of
conduct in which he refused to ask for clemency in spite of his doctor's wishes
but would continue to press for conditional liberty on legal grounds, the first
decision was to continue his resistance to the Fascist regime. The second decision,
which was connected with the first, was to maintain "communist discipline" in spite
of his doubts about the intentions towards him of the leadership in MOSCOW.14 This
renewed spirit of communist discipline is apparent in the notes written in March-
April 1933, particularly in the 'apologetiC' §14.68 in which Gramsci appears to
12 The context of §15.07 is discussed below. The comment in Gazeta PoIska was In fact reported In
the issue of RSE for 14 February 1933. See QCIV p.2942.
13 Le II p. 690.
14 The decision to maintain ·communist discipline" might also be related in some way to the release
on medical grounds of Athas Usa, whose famous report to the party centre in exile on Gramsci's
attitude to the international tactic was dated 22 March 1933. See A. Usa: Memorie p.9S.
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defend Stalin's leadership at the very moment of its greatest disaster.15 However,
no amount of communist self-discipline could stop him from having doubts on this
score, doubts which break through in the notes at several points. Finally, the third
decision, which was intimately connected with the second, was to maintain contact
with Julia and the boys even though the whole relationship had become fraught
with misunderstanding. In short, having stared the worst possible scenario in the
face, Gramsci now mobilised his final reserves of willpower.
For the time being Gramsci's decision remained "conditional" on the outcome of his
lawyer's application for conditional liberty on legal grounds. He makes this clear in
his letter to Tatiana of 6 March written the day before he collapsed in his cell. In this
letter the 'contradiction' on which his moral resistance was based found its most
extreme expression. Gramsci uses the metaphor of one who is shipwrecked and is
driven by hunger to contemplate what was normally unthinkable: cannibalism. Are
we dealing with the same personality or have the material circumstances and the
"molecular changes" they had wrought in him given birth to a different personality
who no longer contemplates cannibalism with the same abhorrence?
W.II, a. I .ald to you, a .Imllar chang. I. happeningIn m. (cannlball.m apart). The mo.t
•• rlou. thing In c.... Ilk. thl. I. that the personality dlvld.. In two: on. part obeerv..
the proc.... the oth.r und.rgo.. It. But the ob.. rvlng part (a. long as this exl.t. It
mean. th.re Is •• It-control and the chanc. 0' recov.ry) ,.. Is an the precarlousn.. s of Its
own position, I., It for..... a point at which Ita function will disappear,when .. If-control
will vanish. and the whole personality b. swanowedup by a n.w 'Individual' with Impul... ,
action., mode. of thought different from the on.. befor•. Well, this Is the situation I am
In.·
This letter is related to the 'Autobiographical Notes' in §15.09 which must have
been written at virtually the same time.17 Here Gramsci records how he "had begun
to judge catastophes of character with greater indulgence. by experiencing the
process through which such catastophes happen". Towards the end of his analYSiS,
Gramsci suggests that such catastophes can be viewed from a collective as well as
an individual point of View. Everyone trusts that he will have the strength to react
against the 'invisible' process which leads to disaster, but the majority find
themselves in the Situation where the process has already gone beyond the point
at which they are capable of reacting to it. He then concludes his analysis with the
following cryptic paragraph:
15 §14.68 Is discussed below.
16 Le II p.693.
17 §15.09. Autobiographical notes, ocm p. 1762-1764.
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Today's manifestations of this fact should be studied. This Is not to say that this fact
did not happen In the past, but It Is certain that In the present It has assumed a spacial
and voluntary form: that Is, today It Is calculated that the event will happen and It Is
systematically prepared, which did not happen In the past (systematically means 'en
masse' therefore, without excluding naturally the particular 'attentions' paid to
Individuals). It Is certain that today a 'terroristic' element has crept In, an element of
material and also moral terrorism, which Is far from negligible. This aggravates the
responsibility of those who, whether through Inexperience, negligence, or even perverse
will, did not try to prevent certain ordeals from having to happen even though they were
able to. [Against this anti-moralistic way of seeing things there Is the falsely heroic,
rhetorical, phrase-making conception, the struggle against which Is virtually pointless] 18
The timing and content of this cryptic paragraph, especially the reference to the
"terroristic element", strongly suggest that Gramsci is referring to the collective
disaster suffered by the German Communist Party at that very moment - 6 March
1933 - and to the responsibility of the leaders who had failed to prevent it. For was
It not the case that the tactic of the German Communist Party - what Gramsci
elseware called "the politics of so much the worse, so much the better" (la politics
del peggi0)19 - had led the German proletariat, or at least a substantial section of
it, precisely to the point when it was too late to react against the collective disaster
which Hitler had systematically prepared from the moment he came to power?
In another note written about this time also inspired by the German disaster,
Gramsci applied the logic of Voltaire's Candide - that all is for the best in the best
of all possible worlds - and asked what lessons could be learned by those who
"had stared hell in the face":
Those who dominate cannot resolve the crisis but they have the power (to prevent) others
from resolving It - that Is to say, they hava the power merely to prolong the crisis Ita.lf.
candida perhaps might say that this Is precisely what Is needed for the alamants of the
real solution to prepare and develop themselvas, given that the crisis Is so sarlous and
demands such axceptlonal means that only he who has stared hell In the 'ace can decide
to use them without trepidation or hesitation ZI
The Physical Collapse of 7 March 1933
By an extraordinary coincidence it was at this moment that disaster struck Gramsci
himself but his physical collapse on 7 March 1933 did not lead to the 'moral'
disaster he most feared. Gramsci reported the bare facts of what had happened to
Tatiana a week later, but it was not until he was examined by an outside doctor on
18 Ibid p.1764.
19See §15.06, OClllp.1760.
20OCIII, p.1718.
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20 March that the poor state of Gramsci's health was officially attested. Professor
Arcangeli reported:
Antonio Gramscl, prisoner at Turl, Is suffering from Pott's DI.... e; he ha. tubercular
lesions In the upper lobe of the right lung which have cau.ed two dl.charges of blood; one
of these discharges was copIOus,and accompaniedby tever lasting several days. He I.
also suffering trom arterlo-.clerosls, with hypertension of the arteries. He ha. suffered
collapses, with loss of consciousness and partial aphasia lasting several days. Since
October 1932 he has lost 7 kilos (over a stone) In weight; he .uner. trom Insomnia and I.
unable to write as he used to. Gramacl cannot survive long under present conditions. I
consider his transfer to a hospital or clinic to be necessary: that Is, If It Is not considered
pos.lble to grant him conditional liberty 21
The collapse of 7 March must have interrupted his work on the notebooks although
it is hard to establish for how long. The fact that he was able to write letters to
Tatiana on 14 and 21 March indicates that he did not lose the use of his hands
completely, although as Arcangeli indicated "he was unable to write as he used to".
The variation in handwriting towards the end of Notebook 14 (which also affected
the three notes inserted at the start of this notebook) suggests that these notes
were written after 7 March, although it is difficult to tell how long after.22 Moreover,
it is probable that Gramsci had started Notebook 15 before 7 March and that it was
then interrupted for a while, although again it is hard to say for how long. 23 An
interesting indication of the possible length Of the interruption is the Zulu saying
recorded early on in the notebook in §15.12:
The wladom of the Zulus producedthis maxim reported by an Engll.h review: 'It I. better to
advanceand die than to atop and die' 1M
The quotation was taken from the issue of Rsssegns settimsnsle della stamps
esters for 25 April 1933 - more than seven weeks after Gramsci's collapse.25 It was
Gramscl's 'epitaph' on the fate of the German Communist Party which no longer
existed.
A month after the crisis, on 10 April. Gramsci reported that he still found it very
difficult to write: "My hands are still invariably painful and have no strength to hold
even small weights. If I try to make a small effort as a test, I lose control of
21Le II p.696-697. [Translated in HH p.255].
22 For the variation in handwriting see the description of Notebook 14 In OOIV p.2412. The three
notes inserted at the start of the notebook included §14.03. MachiaVelli. Centre which gives the
most direct indication of his thinking about the German crisis at this time.
23 The first notes In Notebook 15 use sources dated January-February 1933. See QCIV p.2413.
24 §15.12. 00111p.1769.
25 See OOIV p.2944.
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the movement again" 26. Nevertheless, he was still able to write letters, including a
short one to his boys full of interesting suggestions:
Dearelt Delio, I've received your letter of 28 March with newl of the goldfllh, the rose and
primrose, the beanl and the llons. What sort of lions were the ones you law? Were they
African 1I0ni or lions from Turkeltan? Old they have manal, or wal the hair round their
neckl Ihort and Imooth? And were the bears like the ones you saw In Rome? 'D
Judging from his letters it is probable that by the second half of April - about five or
six weeks after the crisis - Gramsci had recovered sufficiently to be able to write
notes again. His recovery continued into the first half of May. On 8 May he reported:
I received Ludwlg'l Colloqul In due course and have read them already. I can't study a. I
did In the palt (although even then the Itudylng wal very relative), but atlll I can't
manage to do completely nothing a
However, Gramsci then found out something which completely upset his
precarious recovery. We cannot be sure what this was but in the letter to Tatiana of
16 May, where his change of mood is first registered, he clearly states that his
exasperation was due to the fact that his instructions to Tatiana concerning "the
management of affairs regarding my physiological existence itself' had been
ignored. 29 This indication tends to support the hypothesis that what Gramsci now
learned was that the text of the medical certificate written by Arcangeli after
examining him on 20 March had been published by the organ of the French
Communist Party, L 'Humanite , on 8 Mayas part of a campaign organised by the
Italian Communist Party in exile to secure conditional liberty for Gramsci.30 The
medical certificate touched precisely on what Gramscl, with deliberate emphasis,
called "my physiological existence itself'. He must have realised that this act would
make his legal application for conditional liberty much less likely to succeed.
Togliatti disclaimed any responsibility for the act and recognised that it was a "big
mistake" .31
If this was indeed the reason for Gramsci's sudden change of mood, as seems
most likely, his harsh words to Tatiana were perfectly understandable. What
exasperated him most was to see his life being treated as "the toy of impulsive and
26ToTatiana, 10April 1933, Le II p.702.
27 To Delio, 10 Apri11933, Le IIp.703. [Translated in HH p.259].
28 To T&tiana, 8 May 1933, Le II p.710.
29 To T&tian&, 16 May 1933, Le II p.712.
30See Aldo Natoli: Antigone e il prigioniero, p.157.
31 Ibid., p.157.
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unreasoned decisions" and to see his carefully thought-out instructions being
"simply overridden by hair-brained initiatives, which take no account even of the
repercussions they will have on me".32 Moreover, Gramsci was far from sharing
the "absurdly optimistic" state of mind which he detected in the letters of both
Tatiana and Julia, who may have been buoyed up by news of the international
campaign on his behalf which had now started. It seems that the humour which
Gramsci hoped in January to find in the absurd optimism of Voltaire'sCandide now
evaporated as he suffered the consequences at first-hand of the "absurd optimism"
of his nearest and dearest. To have collaborated in maintaining their optimism now
seemed to him "criminal". Given the complex political and legal nature of Gramsci's
Situation, the good intentions of his relatives and friends were not enough.
"Goodwill which is disarmed, incautious, inexpert, and obtuse is not goodwill at all:
it is stupid naivety and merely causes disasters".33Moreover, Gramsci could no
longer live by his existential motto nowmat his.final reserves of willpower were
nearly exhausted.
Until some time ago I was, so to speak, a peaslmlst by Intelligence and an optimist by will.
That Is, although I could ... perfectly clearly all the condition. which were unfavourable
and extremely unfavourable to any Improvement In my situation (whather In general terms
as far a. my legal po.ltlon Is concerned,or In particular terms, to do with my Immediate
phYllcal health), I nevertheless thought that by making a rationally calculated enort It
wa. posllble to get a reault of .ome kind. If the enort was conducted with patience and
acumen,without neglecting to organise the few favourable elements and trying to
neutralise the numerous unfavourableones, It was polslble to get a result of some value
If only to be able to live phy.lcally, to halt the terrifying wa.te of vital energies which Is '
progr.. slvely wearing me down. Today, I don't think this any more. This doel not mean
that I have decided to lurrender, so to speak: It meansthat I no longer see a concrete
way out and I no longer have any reserves of Itrength to rely on.84
The months of June-July 1933 were the hardest of Gramsci's imprisonment.
Already reduced to a physical wreck by this time, he was now tormented again by
constant insomnia and migraine. The letters of these months testify to his desperate
struggle to survive without "surrendering" (ie, without asking for clemency). His
reserves of willpower were not completely exhausted. He was angered by the
criminal neglect of his health by the administration, particularly the Ministry of
Justice and the General Directorate of Prisons, who continued to delay transferring
him to a hospital in Spite of Arcangeli's medical report that "Gramsci cannot SUrvive
32To Tatiana, 16 May 1933, LC II p.712-713.
33To Tatiana, 29 May 1933, LC II p.717.
34 Ibid., p.717.
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long under present conditions". This gave him the willpower to make a last
"rationally calculated effort". On 6 July he wrote an "extraordinary" letter to Tatiana
instructing her to press the authorities to transfer him as a matter of urgency.35 He
was convinced that the obstruction could only be removed by Mussolini himself
(who was probably the reason for it). It was necessary to petition him directly and
even to seek a personal interview with him .
...1 remain convinced that anything ot any Importance to do with me will never be resolved
without a decision by the Head ot Government. So the petition, I think, Is Indispensable. I
think It would be very useful If, as you said to me, you could possibly have an audience
(udlenza ) accompanied by a female trlend of some standing. In any ca.e, you should try
to ensure that your written statement precedes the audience. If you were to give In writing
an exposition of the facta as you know them In a lucid and persua.lve way, It I. not
Impo.slble that the Head of Government will decide to take the measure. required, and
you could say that I would be able to make a detailed statement (CM 10potrel 'a,. una
memorl. clrconat.nz/.ta ). The truth la that I am exasperated by the thought that I have
been permanently disabled by arterlo-sclerosls at my age and that this should have gone
unpunished. Since It Is possible to demonstrate that the condltlona In which this ha.
happened are covered and sanctioned by the general prison regulation and since on
Innumerable occaslona the Governors ot the Prison at Turl have made arrangement. to
remedy these condltlona, It Is not difficult to Identify those who are admlnl.tratlvely
responslble.311
The content of this letter, proposing a petition and interview with Mussolini, was
carefully calculated to ensure that the prison governor of Turi would bring it to the
attention of the General Directorate of Prisons. The latter might then have to answer
to the Head of Government for neglecting its statutory duty towards Gramsci who
was entitled under the prison regulation to medical treatment. It is probable that
"the facts" which Tatiana was to bring to Mussolini's attention backed up by
Gramsci's "detailed statemenr, would bear directly on this point and amount to an
indictment of the General Directorate for neglect of duty.This rationally calculated
effort produced a result of some value: an inspector of prisons visited Turi almost
immediately and arranged for Gramsci to be transferred to a new cell on the ground
floor "away from the infernal noises", where he could at least get some sleep. As a
result he reported that he was feeling "a bit better" on 24 JUly.37
35To Tatiana, 6July 1933, LCII p.725-728.
36ToTatiana, 10July 1933, LC II p.729.
37 To Tatiana, 24 July 1933, LC II p.734. After asking Sraffa's advice, Tatiana dropped the proposal to
seek a personal interview with MussolinI. See the exchange of letters between them on 14 and 18
July 1933 in Piero Sraffa: Letterea Taniaper Grsmsci, p.131-132
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The Business of the Reviews
With the exception of a series of notes at the end of Notebook 15, Gramsci did very
little new work on the notebooks during the summer of 1933. 38 liThe summer has
always laid me low, even in the absence of other unfavourable conditions .
(Besides, I still haven't regained easy use of my hands)".39 Throughout July he still
found it difficult to use his hands and "if I want to write I have to use printed
handwriting". 40 His normal pattern of reading reviews and writing notes was further
interrupted by the fact that he received no periodicals in the month of August at
all.41 The August issues, which carried the news of the Reich Concordat signed on
20 July, arrived late together with those for September. Although he tried to get
back to routine work in the autumn and wrote a series of new notes in Notebook 17
42, the issues for October did not arrive either 43 and he received no further reviews
before his transfer out of Turi on 19 November 1933. It is possible that this
combination of circumstances caused Gramsci temporarily to lose the thread of
current events in Germany in the summer of 1933 and that he did not pick it up
again until he reestablished himself and resumed work at Formia in the early
months of 1934.
38The last notes in Notebook 15, from §15.54 to §15.75, appear to bathe only new notes (Btaxts)
written in these months. Gramsci used sources dated June and July 1933. aclV p. 2953-2957. He
may have done some work on Notebook 13 during these months but this consisted almost entirely of
second drafts (C texts) of earlier notes.
39 To Tatlana, 29 May 1933, LC" p.718.
40 To Tatiana, 17 July 1933, LC " p.731-732.
41 To Tatlana, 3 September 1933, LC" p.743.
42 The first notes in Notebook 17, from §17.01 to §17.33, were new notes (Btexts) using sources
dated August and September 1933. aclV p.2966-2974. All the notes in Notebook 16 with one
exception were second drafts of earlier notes (C texts).
43 To Tatlana, 12 November 1933, LC" p.754-755.
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The Periodicals
Hitler's new year message
In his new year message to the Brown Shirts for 1933, Hitler used the rhetoric of
the providential man orsuperman. 1 The protagonist of "the German catastrophe"
presented himself in 1933 as the only man who could prevent it. The rhetoric
evoked an apocalytic vision of Germany's fate and the providential appearance of
a superman who alone could save her from it. "Passing on to his predictions for
1933, Hitler affirmed that the decadence of Germany's political and cultural values
was simultaneously leading to economic ruin. It is only a question of time, but
collapse is inevitable". Only the intervention of a providential man could prevent
this. He cited the example of Italy to prove that the miraculous appearance of such
a man was not impossible:
The terrible consequences for European civilisation of the chaos and regression which will follow
were foreseen and confronted by only one people in Europe. Thanks to one of those exceptional
men in the history of the world, to whom whole generations are linked by a duty of gratitude, the Italian
people found in Fascism the ideal which dominates it and reshapes its whole life'.
The new year was a time for predictions and since he was the instrument of
destiny Hitler's 'predictions' always proved infallibly correct. His prediction that
Papen's attempts to save the German people from misery by means of government
decrees would fail had come true: he now predicted that Schleicher's attempts
would fail even more completely. The point was that providence would not be
satisfied by such" intermediate solutions", nor would it be tricked by manoeuvres or
diverted by compromises. The failure of Schleicher's government will prove this.
'It will then be proved that the manoeuvres to prevent the victory of National Socialism by means of
intermediate solutions, which are national only in appearance, shatter against this ineluctable, fateful
development'. Hitler concluded by reaffirming that 'as long as he has strength he will oppose all
compromises, in the certainty that forgiveness does not make a friend out of an irreconcilable enemy,
who Invites the National Socialists to partiCipate in government not In order to bring them to power but
in order to suffocate them' .
The Hitler-Papan Talks
Under cover of this uncompromising rhetoric, Hitler was now eager to reach a
compromise. His movement was in the throes of a crisis which momentarily
1 Hitler's new year message was reported In RSE, 17 January 1933, p.121-122. All the following
quotations are from this source.
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threatened his own leadership. By sticking to his demand for nothing less than the
Chancellorship backed by the presidential powers, his strategy to win power now
appeared to threaten the unity of the National Socialist Party itself. If Hindenburg
had refused to give in to this demand after the party's spectacular success in the
July elections, he was even less likely to after its heavy losses in the November
elections. Doubts within the party about Hitler's strategy came to a head in
December with the resignation of Gregor Strasser as head of the party apparatus.2
These doubts then turned into an incipient threat to Hitler's very position as leader
when Schleicher invited the disaffected Strasser to secret talks. By offering
Strasser a post in the cabinet and a programme attractive to the 'socialist' tendency
within the party he represented, Schleicher apparently hoped to win the backing Of
the whole party and thus to outmanoeuvre and isolate Hitler.3 We can judge how
seriously Hitler took this threat to his leadership by the fact that both Schleicher and
Strasser were to be murdered in the 'Night of the Long Knives' in June 1934.4
Schleicher's enemies now united against him and began plotting his
downfall. On 5 January the Berlin paperTagliche Rundschau leaked the news of
secret talks in Cologne between Hitler and Papan, who still remained close to
Hindenburg.sPapen's intrigues also attracted the interest of Hugenburg's party
which had its own reasons for dissatisfaction with Schleicher.
It seems that these intrigues of von Papan at this moment have coincided and tallied with the
prejudices and preoccupations of the German Nationalist Right at the so-called 'social' policy of
Chancellor von Schleicher and In the final analysis opposition to Schleicher has provided the bridge
which has led to Hitler. 'It would appear highly unlikely that Hitler could come to terms with Papen
whom he has fought for months on end in a form which should have ruled out personal contacts of
this kind. However, it seems that the hostility of the National Socialist leader against Schleicher provec:l
decisive. Above all, Hitler was Increasingly convinced of the urgency of achieving power in order to
get full command of the internal difficulties of his party.s
2 The 'Strasser case' was reported in RSE, 3-10 January 1933, p.3Q-31.
3Schleicher's programme was reported in ASE, 3-10 January and 17 January1933. See also the
rublic Case StraniBre in CC, 7 January 1933, and the issue of EF for February 1933.
4 Hitler apparently panicked and threatened to commit suicide unless the party supported him
although, of course, this was not reported at the time. See Henry Ashby Turner: Hitler's Thirty Days to
Power: January 1933 (1996),p.24-29.
SThe Hitler-Papen talks In Cologne talks were reported in RSE, 17 January, p.122, and 24 January,
p. 180. They are analysed by Turner, Ibid., p.42-52.
6ASE, 17 January 1933, p.122.
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By the middle of January the German press was speculating on the kind of
government which might succeed Schleicher. The forecast of the Hamburger
Nachrichten turned out to be more or less right:
There is always the possibility of entrusting power to the National Socialists and to the representat-
ives of the national movement in general on an openly authoritarian basis. The Head of State ideally
wants a national government summoned and backed by him. An openly authoritarian government of
this type, with almost half the votes in Parliament, would guarantee national reconstruction and would
at the same time be sufficiently strong to deter the trade unions from calling general strikes, which
have become customary since Papen's resignation. Any further attempt to reshuffle the government
would be nothing more than a waste of time, making political differences deeper and economic
distress harsher. This is the Gordian Knot which must now be cut. If the differences in the nationalist
camp can be overcome, the attempt will be successful.7
The Splits in the Dominant Bloc:
the agitation of the Agrarian League
It was the agitation of the Agrarian League, however, which destroyed the
President's confidence in Schleicher and sealed the fate of his government. The
leaders of the League used their privileged access to Hindenburg, who was
particularly sympathetic to the interests of agriculture, to complain that Schleicher
was not doing enough to protect German farmers from foreign imports or from
foreclosures. On 11 January Schleicher was summoned by the President to listen
to the complaints of the Agrarian leaders in his presence. However, the tactics of
the League on this occasion prevented Schleicher from accommodating their
demands:
In addition to everything else, a conflict broke out between the Reichslandbund (the National
Association of Farmers in Germany) on one side and the government and industry on the other .....
The leaders of the Reichslandbund were received by Hindenburg to whom they intended to present
their demands. At the same time as this visit was happening, however, they published a document
which was considered unprecedented in government political circles in which the government on one
side and industry on the other were vilified on account of their resistance to the schemes to protect
agriculture. Schleicher declared that he wanted no further dealings with the leaders of the
Reichslandbund and the directorate of the national association of industry headed by Bohle Krupp
responded proudly to these insults saying that German industry would have been prepared to make
sacrifices to relieve the plight of agriculture but this unexpected act of hostility by the Reichslandbund
had changed all this.
Meanwhile the government was preparing Its own programme for the reconstruction of agriculture
which included protective measures such as an increase In tariffs and quotas on foreign agricultural
products. These measures would be put Into effect as soon as the commercial agreements with some
of the countries which exported agricultural products like Jugoslavia and Sweden expired, although
the commercial agreements with the latter had already been broken.
The conflict between the government and the Agrarian League was aggravated, however, by the fact
7 RSE, 24 January 1933, p.179.
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that it was becoming increasingly political in character insofar as the actions of the agrarians were
openly supported by the National Socialists who were now strongly represented in the presidency of
the League. This is hardly surprising since Hitler had already - on 3 January to be precise - put forward
his own view to the fifth agrarian conference held at the Brown House.8
The demogogic tactics of the !'grarian League at this critical moment reflected the
extent to which the National Socialists had penetrated its leadership and branch
organisations.9 As well as making the usual private representations to the
President on behalf of agriculture, the League took the unusual step - under
National Socialist influence - of attacking Schleicher's cabinet publicly. This
brought the conflict of interest between agriculture and industry into the open
where the National Socialists could exploit it more effectively and thus open the
door to Hitler who promised to eliminate such 'class' conflicts. The explanation of
the conflict in the Volkischer Beobachter condemned this "class struggle carried on
from above by the old bourgeoisie" and claimed that the National Socialists were
the only party which understood the solidarity of interest between German workers
and peasants.
The conflict between the Agrarian League and the Schleicher cabinet has many causes. Up to now
this struggle has been seen as a conflict of interests; the gigantic economic organisations of the
various federations consider themselves to be in competition with each other and in their short-
sighted way are convinced that the interests of some of them can only be safeguarded by destroying
the welfare of the others. This way of seeing things is downright marxist in conception according 10
which class struggle, and in tum class dictatorship, is the premiss of political and economic activity.
These conflicts between big industry and the representatives of agriculture Originate from the class
struggle carried on from above by the old bourgeoisie, so it is important to bear in mind the general
political situation .....
We support the peasant not in order to gain advantages for the nationalist movement but because we
recognise perfectly clearly that the prosperity of all the classes depends upon him. If the peasant encts
up producing too Imle, hunger in the real sense of the word will be the result for everyone. At the
present time the big anti-German capitalists are seeking to achieve their plans by gradually
expropriating for ridiculous sums, accepted under pressure, the whole territory of Germany for the
purposes of stock-market speculation. In this event big Jewish finance would have in its control the
entire food-supply of the nation. The 'meaning of world history' marked out in November 1918 would
thus be realised.
It is not easy to assume the leadership of the rural population in face of the millions of impoverished
indMduals In the big cities who, under the influence of liberal-marxist propaganda, must regard the
peasant as their natural enemy. Hitler therefore has the historic credit of having boldly declared himself
a National Socialist among the peasants and then of having revived the honour of the German
SRSE, 24January 1933, p.182.
9 National Socialist penetration of the Agrarian League Is discussed In Horst Gles: 'The NSDAP and
Agrarian Organisations In the Anal Phase of the Weimar Republic' in Nazism and the Third Reich
(1972) edited by Henry A. Turner, and in J.E.Farquharson: The Plough and the Swastika. The
NSDAP and Agriculture in Germany 1928-45 (1976) p.33-35.
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peasants in the capital after being ignored for a decade. Today the National Socialist peasants know
that the poor German workers have also struggled for their farms, have shed their blood and in many
cases have even been murdered for their sake. The peasant must not and never will forget this
struggle of the big cities on their behalf. Our intervention in support of the current action of the
Agrarian League therefore has nothing to do with any interest or speculation but represents a
struggle for blood and for soil, to secure the supply of bread to the big cities. If we are all to live, the
peasant must not die. 10
The Fall of Schleicher
The first news of Schleicher's resignation and the appointment of Hitler as
Chancellor was carried in the Rassegna settimanale della stampa estera of 31
January. The same issue also gave details of the composition of Hitler's cabinet:
apart from two National Socialists - Frick and Goring - the cabinet was dominated
by members of the traditional ruling elite obviously in deference to Hindenburg's
wishes.11 There was more extensive press comment on the downfall of Schleicher
in the following issue of 7 February. The editorial considered that the opposition of
Papen and Hugenburg had been decisive:
The cabinet's difficulties, already aggravated by the hostility between the agrarians and industrialists,
were multiplied by the growing lack of confidence of the right-wing parties in both the political and the
social/economic policies of Schleicher which aroused the suspicion that he was intent on abandoning
the principle of authority revived by Hindenburg when he summoned von Papan to power and on
adopting syndical concepts which were in essence international in character. The party of Hugenburg
was sufficiently convinced of this that it adopted a resolution decisively opposed to Schleicher which
stated: 'The economic policy of the government is once again sliding towards socialist and
international ideas. Meanwhile there is a serious danger in the splits which exist in the agrarian field
and which create the threat of rural Bolshevism'.12
The review went on to report foreign reactions to the fall of Schleicher, especially
that of the French press. The Journal des Debats , for instance, drew attention to
the hostility of heavy industry to Schleicher's social programme:
Although Schleicher is a general, he has broader ideas than the men of the extreme Right. In fact, his
aim was to win over the popular elements and he even thought of coming to terms with the trade
unions. The old Prussians and the magnates of the iron industry wanted to bring about his downfall at
any price. On the other hand Hitler, who had recently contributed to the fall of von Papan, was the
10RSE, 24January 1933, pp's 182-183.
11 See RSE, 31 January 1933, p.233. Further reports on the nomination of Hitler as German
Chancellor and on the new 'national coalition' were in RSE, 7, 14 February 1933; in Cronacapo/itica,
NA, 16 February; in Case straniere, CC, 18 February. See also Rasssgna politics, POL, February-
April, although this issue did not appear until August of that year.
12RSE, 7 February 1933, p.281-282.
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mortal enemy of General von Schleicher because he had attempted to weaken his party.ts
It was far from clear at the time that Hindenburg would appoint Hitler in succession
to Schleicher. The democratic Berliner Tageblatt , for instance, said that the
dismissal of Schleicher would 110t be a national misfortune "if it were not for the
danger that his place will be taken by a purely reactionary regime of a kind that
Germany had not seen until now". The linchpin of this purely reactionary regime,
however, was not Hitler but the combination of Papen-Hugenburg:
'Hindenburg has charged Papan with negotiating to find a solution to the crisis and has therefore
designated him as the future Chancellor, This indicates how the President wants the solution to
unfold', The paper observed how 'Papen's mandate is accompanied by the limitation of seeking a
solution within the framework of the constitution and with the agreement of the Reichstag' but was
doubtfuL'whether PQn wm~_@Ie tQ_in1~lPret_!his_mand_~tein the same sense in which the maJority
of the people understands constitutionality or whether he will seek fo enlarge it in line with the
prescriptions of Hugenburg', It then added that 'there can be no talk of stable leadership or economic
security at the moment when the champions of constitutional experiments are preparing to come to
power'.1.4
Similarly, the Vossische Zeitung observed that "the President has decided, as we
thought, against Schleicher's cabinet and received Papen immediately after the
Chancellor departed". However, it doubted whether "the negotiations conducted
until now between the National Socialists and the German Nationalists correspond
to the lines indicated by the presidential mandate". The paper was sceptical
whether Hitler would be included in or be prepared to support the next government.
the inference being that this made an 'authoritarian' solution of the crisis which
Hindenburg was thought to favour more not less likely. The impression that a
"purely reactionary regime" ,not including Hitler, was in preparation was
strengthened by the report in the Borsen Courier :
As regards the projects for a dictatorship, which Schleicher had advised against, the paper added that
the ex-Chancellor had Informed Hindenburg that such a dictatorship would provoke a presidential
crisis. He added that other prominent political personalities were of the same view and urged
Hlndenburg to listen to them, but the President had refused to do SO. Hi
13 Ibid. p.286. The fall of Schleicher is analysed in depth by Henry Ashby Tumer in Hitler's Thirty DayS
to Power: January 1933 (1996)
14 RSE, 7 February 1933, p.282.
15 Ibid. p.282.
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Hitler and the 'National Coalition'
One of the premisses of the appointment of Hitler's cabinet was to put an end to the
open conflict between agrarians and industrialists. It was with this end in view that
the Nationalist leader Hugenburg combined the posts of Minister of Economies and
Agriculture in the new cabinet. The 'vestiges' of the imperial past were
unmistakable. In particular, the cabinet appeared to be an attempt to restore the old
imperial 'solidarity bloc' of iron and rye on the basis of general protective tariffs.
The traditionalist elements - the symbols of national 'continuity' - dominated the
new 'national coalition' to such an extent that it was widely characterised in the
press not as the government of Hitler but of Hitler-Papen-Hugenburg.16 There was
much speculation about who were the 'masters' in the new coalition and it was
easy to mistake appearance for reality, especially if reality was perceived through
Marxist lenses. Did Hitler serve the interests of the dominant classes in an
'instrumental' sense or was he their 'master' in the Bonapartist sense? The
consensus of the press reports carried in the Rassegna settimanale della stampa
estera was that Hitler would be a 'prisoner' of his cabinet in both an ideological
and practical sense. It was obvious to the Bayerische Kurier , for example, "that
from the day the new cabinet was formed, Hitler set himself to follow the ideas of
Hugenburg". The Munchner Zeitung did not doubt that Hitler's cabinet would tackle
the great problems of the day but observed:
It remains to be seen, however, what will be done and with what speed. If the cabinet had consisted
solely of National Socialists, it would be hard to avoid the suspicion of dramatic coups in Germany's
internal life. But examining the list of Hitler's colleagues we find, apart from Frick and Goring, other
people like Hugenburg and Papan who are certainly not disposed to support experiments against the
so-called 'Princes of the Banks' ..... Indeed, It is obvious from this, and from the fact that in any case the
Minister of War is not a National Socialist, that Hitler does not have a free hand.17
TheRegensburger Anzeiger had to admit that Hitler was not at ease in the
company of Hugenburg. Indeed,
Hitler may realise that he is perceived to be the slave of Hugenburg-Seldte who, with all their
sociological, economic, and financial forces and connections, are not only the co-proprietors of Hitler's
powers but also like wedges of respectability put there to prevent the reforming thoughts of the
National Socialists from taking flight, particularly in the field of economic and social P01iCY.11J
16ParticUlarly in RSE ,7 and 14 February 1933.
17 RSE, 14 February p.339
18 ·b·d 3I I .,p. 39-340
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The Schlesische Volkszeitung considered the new cabinet to be "a German-
National governmenr' in which "the personality who will set the tone is Hugenburg".
Not only in Prussia but also in the Reich
the National Socialists have surrendered themselves too quickly to the guidance of Hugenburg-
Papen. They have thus linked their destiny to a party which no longer has any roots in the people and
will not have in future as long as a Hugenburg remains its leader.19
The last word goes to the authoritativeFrankfurter Zeitung .The paper welcomed
the intention of the new cabinet "to promote the middle stratum (ceto media) of the
rural and urban population in order to preserve the forces of individualism lying
dormant there", but feared that the interests of big capital would for the time being
prevail. While stressing the likely influence of Hugenburg and Papen on the
policies of the new government, however, it could foresee a time when the National
Socialists would emancipate themselves from their ideas:
A decisive factor in shaping the economic policy 01 the cabinet is the fact that far too much power is
concentrated In the hands of privy coucillor Hugenburg , with the result that all urgent matters of
economic and social policy will fall within his competence. The further elaboration of social policy wilt be
based on the ideas set out by Papan. The possibility that commercial policy will be a further
development of the Idea of autarky cannot, at the very least, be ruled out.
To sum up: the Hugenburg tendency in economic policy will prevail. The National Socialists have not
won any strategic gains in this field. However, If they want to spend their time in forming a programme
and to put the necessary thought into It, this programme will soon emancipate itself from the influen~
of Hugenburg. Whenever it comes to implementing such a programme, which will certainly pay more
attention to the middle class than to big capitalism, differences over economic policy are bound to
arise at the very heart 01 the new ministry. 20
Hugenburg's economic Measures
One of the priorities of Hitler's government was to satisy the demands of the
agrarians whose agitation had played a key role in bringing down Schleicher.
Another was to cover up the split in the dominant agrarian-industrial bloc which
had 'scandalously' become public under Schleicher. The open split testified to the
"political deficiency" of the traditional ruling caste, although Gramsci was wrong in
supposing that this deficiency was "momentary"21 . It was to deal with these
priorities that the Nationalist leader Hugenburg was appointed Minister of
Economics in the new cabinet responsible for both agriculture and industry. In
19 Ibid .• p.340.
20 ASE. 14 February 1933, p.341. (I have consolidated five short paragraphs into two here.)
21§9.136.QCII p. 1198.
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February Hugenburg announced a series of measures to support agriculture
which included a general increase in tariffs on imported foodstuffs, further
subsidies to maintain grain prices, and a moratorium on foreclosures of bankrupt
farms and estates22 . The increase in protective tariffs on food was officially justified
on the grounds that "internal production is more than sufficient to meet national
requirements and so there is no need for imports"23. At the same time Hugenburg
announced the repeal of the commercial agreement with France concluded by
Schleicher's government. According to the press reports Gramsci read:
The government's decision "to repeal with effect from 1 March next a number of the tariff
arrangements with France covering a series of agricultural and industrial products" was noted not only
for its commercial but also its political significance. The rider to the convention of 28 December last
gave the contracting parties the right -to repeal at 14 days notice single provisions of the commercial
treaties-. The announcement added that "the government's intention was to avoid as far as possible
any disturbance to Franco-German trade and therefore limited the repeal to cases in which it was
indispensable in view of the particular situation of certain branches of the German economy" 204
The unilateral repeal of the French commercial agreement was the prime example
of what Gramsci called "the aggravation of the nationalistic (State-nationalistic)
element of the economy"25.
Meanwhile, Hugenburg's measures to protect agriculture did nothing to reassure
industry. The press, still to be "coordinated" by the new regime, was free to speak
its mind. The organ of heavy industry, the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung , blamed
the record fall in exports in January on Schleicher's policy of import quotas. It now
appeared from the commitment to autarky that Hitler's government was even more
indifferent to foreign trade than his predecessor. The paper warned against a
doctrinaire approach in economic policy, citing the example of flexibility set by
Mussolini in Italy.
"The figures are the lowest ever recorded; they show that at last Germany must adopt a commercial
policy which enables It to maintain Its place in world markets and to gain new ones. This Is only
possible if it offers something to its most important customers instead of adopting narrow and often
inappropriate measures which make it impossible for them to do business In German markets. This
does not mean flooding Germany with foreign goods: the aim must be to intensify trade with all those
countries which are prepared to accept German products on good terms. Hence the principle of only
allowing into the country what It does not produce itself is absolutely wrong and must disappear. Such
22 RSE, 7 March 1933, p.513.
23 ibid., p.S12.
24 ·b·dI I .•p.512-513.
25 §1S.05, OCIII p, 1756.
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a policy of isolation is not national, and Mussolini would never dream of saying that protectionism and
free trade, most favoured nation and preferential systems are anything more than economic
instruments which must be considered case by case in order to increase foreign trade, certainly not to
reduce it".
The article went on to say that "it is incomprehensible how an increase in agricultural production at the
expense of industrial production can serve the interests of agriculture. Already in January we have
paid for the mistakes made by the policy of quotas. In the summer we will have to suffer the
consequences of this contempt for exports, whereas we ought tobe following a policy for the good of
the whole economy "26.
The policy of autarky announced by the new German government also caught the
attention of the foreign press. A Polish paper, the Kurjer Warszawski , pointed out
the dangers of this 'experiment', notably the pressures it created to remove the
barriers to German rearmament.
"Germany is embarking ohanexpetimentln-economic self-sufficiency which will result in a sudden
increase in the prices of agricultural products and livestock. To appreciate the danger of this
experiment we have only to examine the German trade balance for the month of January which
dropped from 391,000,000 to 23,000,000 marks. Even more noteworthy is the fact that exports have
fallen particularly to those countries whose imports into the Reich are limited by tariff barriers. BesIdes,
there is no doubt that economiC autarky is not in the interests of industry which means that we must
expect further experiments to satisfy the industrialists. These must consist above all in a greater
exploitation of the Internal market, only the situation is complicated because the purchasing power of
the German citizen, who Is burdened by taxes, is constantly in decline.
The threat of a storm could be postponed indefinitely either by the return 01 a favourable conjuncture
or by an immediate solution to the disarmament problem without having to wait for four years as
planned.27
Hitler's Anti-Communist Crusade
Whilst the German press was inclined to think that Hitler would be the prisoner of
the 'traditionalists' in the new cabinet, the French press anticipated the coming
dictatorship of Hitler. This prospect was not entirely unwelcome from the French
standpoint. Although it disclaimed any support for la politica del peggio - the
politics of 'so much the worse, so much the better' - the Journal des Debats
thought that a Hitler dictatorship would at least serve to clarify to the world "the real
situation in Germany"28. The Temps was more specific and foresaw the pOSSibility
of civil war:
It would be no less disconcerting if, under the pretext of gathering together a right-wing parliamentary
majority, It came to establishing a genuine Hitler dictatorship, which could not fail to provoke the
liveliest reactions In Germany on the part of the christian. socialist, and communist workers
organisations. A Hitler cabinet would risk adding the threat of civil war to all the other difficulties Which
26 RSE, 7 March 1933, p.S13.
27 Ibid., p.S13-S14.
28 RSE, 7 February, p.285.
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beset Germany, and it is far from certain that such a government would have the unreserved support
of the Reichswehr, which was the principal guarantee of the stability of Schleicher's cabinet.29
In fact the danger of civil war was deliberately played up by the new regime and
exploited to its advantage. Hitler immediately set about creating the necessary
climate in which the 'preventive' use of force against the Communist Party would
appear to be backed by popular consent. The keynote was struck by the 'manifesto'
which Hitler read at the first meeting of the cabinet on 31 January and then
broadcast by radio to the nation in which he conjured up the spectre of an imminent
communist revolution in Germany: "Fourteen years of Marxism have ruined
Germany: one year of Bolshevism will destroy her. In this hour of anxiety for the
existence and future of the nation, the commander-in-chief during the World War
[Hindenburg] has summoned us to fight under him to save the Reich".3OThe
deliberate fanning of the fear of communism was combined with assurances from
the new Minister of the Interior Frick that "if the Communists continued to agitate for
a general strike ..... the government would take the most energetic measures".31 The
Nazi paper Der Angriff reported that such measures had in fact already been
discussed at the first cabinet meeting on 31 January and would be implemented
immediately. In fully supporting such measures, the paper stretched the credibility
of its rhetoric to breaking-point: "Germany must be cleansed once and for all of the
bloody beast of Moscow's foreign legion".
Meanwhile the French left-wing paper Populaire, in an article of 1 February,
doubted whether Hitler's movement would be satisfied with half-measures against
the German Left. With a clear-sighted view of the danger the German Left now
faced, the paper appealed to the Communists to abandon the tactic imposed by
Stalin and to join forces with the Socialists:
The question now is whether the army of Brown Shirts and the crowds which follow Hitler will stay
within the limits marked out by Hugenburg and Papen with Hitler's agreement. The question is
whether Hitler as Chancellor can get his troops to obey him as he did as leader of the national
opposition. This is doubtful. The mass of elements demoralised by the crisis who are waiting for the
creation of Hitler's 'Third Reich' to put an end to their misery will hardly be satisfied by a laudably
conservative action on the part of their leader. It is probable that sooner or later Hitler will either come
into conflict with his troops or be forced to follow the movement and give his govemment the
character of a real fascist revolution.
29 RSE, 7 February, p.286.
30 RSE, 7 February, p. 291.
31 Ibid, p.290.
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Right from the start his situation was full of contradictions. Will he not be driven into seeking a
restoration of the Hohenzollerns in order to consolidate his government, especially as his partners are
all monarchists? Meanwhile, the German proletariat is in a terrible situation. The only means left to it to
resist the capitalist and fascist reaction is to bring about the unity of the workers. But for this the
support of the communists is necessary. Is there any hope of a change of attitude on their part? Will
they understand the necessity of abandoning the method of divisive and fratricidal struggle? To
achieve this it would be necessary to shake off the tutelage of Stalin.32
On 10 February Hitler opened the election campaign with a speech at the Berlin
Sportspalast declaring war on 'Marxism' in Germany, by which he meant both the
Socialists and the Communists.33 At the same time he summoned the editors of
the German press and told them that "within ten years Marxism will not exist in the
Reich".34 As Minister of the Interior for Prussia, Goring was making full use of his
new police powers to deal preventively with the alleged threat from the Left. The
police were instructed by circular not to hesitate to use their firearms against
"subversive elements". On 24 February he issued a decree creating an auxiliary
pOlice force recruited from the para-military Storm Troops and Steel Helmets, "to
assist the regular forces which have long been considered insufficient for the
task"35 . Hitler's government was therefore well positioned by the actions of Goring
and Frick to take full advantage of the Reichstag Fire on the 27-28 February to
strike against the German Left. The 'war' against Marxism in Germany would take
nearer to ten days than ten years.
The Reichstag Fire and the Nazi Terror
The first news of the burning of the Reichstag was carried in the issue of the
Rassegna settimanale of 7 March:
On the evening of the 27 February, apparently with the complicity of some Communist deputies,
subversive elements SUCC~ed in setting fire at a various points to the Reichstag palace. Despite the
prompt intervention of the fire services, the flames destroyed the inside of the building almost
completely. .
In official circles the fire was deSCribed as the most frightful act of terrorism ever committed in Germany
by the bolsheviks. "'han~s to the prompt and efficient work of the police in searching the
predominantly com~Unlst q~arter known as 'Uebknecht House', convincing proof was found of a far-
reaching attempt at In~n:ection against the legal authorities, the start of which would be Signalled by
the destruction of tt'le e~Chstagand other public buildings.
On 28 February the~~e~ldent, Marshall Hindenburg, signed a decree intended to deal with the
communist danger IC temporarily abrogated certain articles of the Constitution. The mass arrests In
32 RSE, 14 FebrUary· P·344-345.
33RSE, 14 February 1933 P.410.
34 Ibid., p. 409.
35 RSE, 7 March p.508.
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Berlin, Prussia, and the rest of Germany bear witness to the Government's resolve to enforce the law
and to confront every eventuality.
The event itself, and even more the projected red revolution, made a big impression not only in the
press but also on public opinion which unanimously supported and universally approved the
energetic measures of repression taken by the government. 36
Goring's ruthless police action (which aimed in the first instance to destoy the left-
wing press) was 'counter-balanced' by Goebbels' intimidation of the press whose
editors were warned that they were no longer free to criticise the government. They
therefore had little choice but to report the official line that the Reichstag Fire was
an act of "communist terror". However, the foreign press was largely beyond the
reach of such intimidation and free to analyse the event more objectively. The
reaction of the French press, which immediately speculated that the Fire may have
been the work of agents provocateurs working for the government, proved
particularly irksome. The right-wing Action Francaise wasted no time in
speculating about the likely perpetrators:
It is not important to know whether the Reichstag was set on fire by the terrorists of the Third
International or by all too efficient agents provocateurs of the Hitler government. If this fire had fallen
from heaven, the effect would have been the same. It has given Hitler the opportunity to place
Marxism beyond the law. The struggle against Marxism is his raison d'etre: without Communism and
Social Democracy there would be no National Socialist movement.
The burning of the Reichstag has provided Hitler with the classic pretext for repression. The
Constitution is suspended prior to being abrogated. The guarantees of Individual liberty have been
abolished, so the bad tremble and the good rest assured. It is the familiar prelude to the creation of all
authoritarian regimes. This was Hitler's sole aim: he had no other significance nor could he do anything
else. And Germany has made no mistake 37
The Temps invited its readers to regard the claims to have discovered documentary
proof of preparation for a revolutionary coup d'etat with "great reserve", especially
as these claims were obviously designed to produce a reaction on the part of the
masses in favour of the governing right-wing parties on the eve of the election. It
also observed that actions taken in the name of suppressing the Communists were,
in fact, directed equally against the Social Democrats and all the opposition
parties. Hitler was obviously intent on creating a dictatorship by copying - though
not very subtly - the example of Mussolini.
Hitler's racist movement proceeds from the same principles and by the same methods as Italian
Fascism. The fuhrer has invented nothing. He is content to copy Mussolini, taking the model of
Fascism and adapting it to the German temperament. Whereas the Duce after the March on Rome
36 RSE, 7 March p.S11.
37RSE, 14 March p.564.
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combined subtlety with boldness, the fuhrer believes that all he needs is Prussian brutality. The
National Socialists aim to reduce their enemies to silence, to crush them with violence, to impose
themselves as absolute masters of the State, to govern by and for their party. 38
Not surprisingly for a fascist publication, the reports in the Rassegna settimanale
contained no details of the sordid and frightful brutalities perpetrated by the Storm
Troops at this moment, although the imaginative reference in the Echo de Paris to
Germany's "permanent night of St. Bartholomew" was sufficiently close to reality to
provoke an official denial by the Wolff Bureau, the German press agency, on 2
March: "The foreign press has published news claiming that a night of St.
Bartholomew has been organised for the end of this week . It also claims that
members of the National Socialist assault sections and other extremist elements
intend to massacre the communist, marxist, and Israelite leaders. The news has
already been described by various correspondents of foreign newspapers as
absurd" .39 In fact, the violence of the Storm Troops was so indiscriminate (as Temps
had alleged) that on 10 March Hitler issued a manifesto which called upon them to
exercise 'discipline' by concentrating on the main task - "the annihilation of
Marxism".4O In a radio broadcast two days later Hitler called off the bloodhounds
altogether.
As your leader, and in the name of the government of the national revolution, I exhort you to uphold
the honour as well as the dignity of the new regime to ensure that these go down in history. From
today, when all the executive power passes finally into the hands of the new national Germany both in
fact and symbolically, the second phase of our struggle begins. From today onwards, the task of
purifying and reordering the Reich will be conducted from above, according to a definite plan: from
today onwards Iorder you to observe the strictest discipline. All isolated action must stop absolutely
immediatelY·41
The Relchstag Election, 5March
The Nazis continued to mix terror with propaganda right up to the eve of the
election. Their campaign came to a climax on 2 March when Hitler gave another
speech at the Berlin Sportspalast on "the world danger of Bolshevism" which was
greeted with hysterical applause. He concluded by reminding his audience of his
'prediction' fourteen years before that the Marxist programme would fail: "by
38 Ibid., p.564
39 RSE, 14 March 1933, p.566.
40 The manifesto was reported in RSE, 28 March p.699. The same issue carried a report of Frick's
speech to a rally of Brown Shirts at Frankfurt on 15March that the Communists would be put to work in
·concentration camps".
41 RSE, 28 March 1933, p.7oo.
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starting from the class struggle as its chosen method of political action, this
programme served only to weaken the nation, to the detriment of all its members
whether workers or not" .42
The first news of the election results - the percentages of the popular vote gained
by the major parties - were reported in the Rassegna settimanale of the 7 March
followed by further details of the distribution of seats in the next issue.
In the new Reichstag the National Socialists will have 288 seats compared to 196 in the previous
Reichstag, the 'red-white-black fighting front' [ie, the Nationalists and Steel Helmets] will have 52 seats
against the previous 51, the Centre 71 against 70, the Bavarian Populists 20 against 20, the Social
Democrats 120 against the previous 120, the Communists 79 against the previous 100.43
The extensive reports in the Rassegna settimanale of the foreign press reaction to
the German election results included on this occasion a brief resume of Moscow's
initial response as set out in Pravda and Isvestiya. Not surprisingly these were
presented in a tone which questioned their credibility, but on this occasion the
scepticism was justified. For whilst the relatively modest losses of the German
Communists hardly added up to the 'annihilation' promised by Hitler, neither did
they amount to a 'victory' as the Soviet press claimed.
The Soviet press In its usual preconceived way tried to minimise and even deny the Hitlerite victory.
In fact, Pravda considered the results of the elections in Germany as a great political victory for the
German Communist Party. After speaking of 'provocations, repressions, arrests etc' the paper came to
the conclusion that 'German fascism has mobilised all its forces for a frontal attack on the German
proletariat. But this attack has been repulsed. The results of the electoral struggle, in which all the
advantages were on the side of the class enemies of the proletariat and on the side of reaction, prove
that the German Communist Party has held all the positions conquered in recent years (?). The greater
number of votes obtained by the National Socialists can be partly explained by the increase in the
number of voters gOing to the polls.
In an article published in Isvestia Radek even thought that the election results were like 'the German
fascists' defeat of the Marne. Just as in 1914 when the imperialist German army decided that In order
to achieve the lightning destruction 01 France it would go through Belgium, which therefore worsened
Germany's international situation, today Fascism has decided to take measures to destroy the German
working class whose only effect has been to worsen its international situation. 44
Although the popular vote of the German Communists held up remarkably well
under conditions of terror, the fact remained that the party's cadres had been
42 RSE, 14 March 1933, p.566-567.
43 RSE 7 March p.512, 14 March 1933, p.567. The results were also reported under the rubric
Cronaca Politics in NA ,16 March 1933; under the rubric Case Straniere inCC, 18 March 1933; and In
the otherwise worthless article by Werner von Schulenberg: 'Socialismo e Comunismo in Germania',
GER, March 1933.
44 RSE, 14 March 1933, p.573.
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effectively destroyed. Who was responsible for this disaster? As long as Moscow
talked of 'victory' there could be no question of examining its responsibility for the
defeat. The most immediate question, however, arose from Moscow's suggestion
that the Nazi repression of the German Communist Party would worsen the
"international situation". It was far from clear what this meant, but Hitler was keen to
emphasise to Stalin that there was no reason why the destruction of the German
Communist Party should have any effect on either German or Soviet raisons d'etat.
On the contrary, now that there was no Communist Party in Germany "to play the
foreigner's game", whether the foreigner be Paris or Moscow, relations between
Germany and Soviet Russia could only improve. This point was already circulating
in the German press: "Still with regard to the repercussions of the elections abroad,
the Deutsche Allegemeine Zeitung wrote that 'the distancing between Berlin and
Moscow which counts for so much in Paris will not happen because as long as the
eastern questions have not been regulated no German government can abandon
collaboration with Moscow. The struggle of annihilation against Communism can
only be to the advantage of these. relations".45 The same point was emphasised by
Hitler in his speech at the ceremonial opening of the new Reichstag on 23 March,
when the newly reelected Communist deputies were conspicuous by their
absence. There was no reason why the destruction of German Communism should
lead to a worsening of relations with Moscow, still less to Soviet intervention in
some form or another:
As regards Soviet Russia he [Hitler) predicted that 'friendly mutual relations should be of benefit to
them both'. As far as the anti-communist struggle is concerned, he said that 'this is an absolutely
internal question in which Germany will not accept any interference on the part of anyone' .oM
Potsdam Day, 21 March
On 21 March the opening of the new Reichstag was staged with solemn ritual at the
Garrison Church in Potsdam, the burial place of Frederick the Great. The site was
specially chosen by Hitler and bore testimony to his instinct for historical myth-
making and for the emotional impact of such myths on the public mind. A full report
of the event was carried in the Rassegna settimana/e including the texts of
President Hindenburg's message to the German people and of Hitler's speech:
45 RSE, 14 March p.570.
46 RSE, 11 April p.808.
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'Fortunately, as the country moved towards the precipice, a group of men decided to oppose this
ruinous drift; out of this group arose the movement whose task it was to promote the rebirth of the
new Germany and on the 30 January 1933 you, Herr Marshal, generously saw fit to entrust the
country's destinies to this new Germany. Fully convinced that the German people must also express
its support for the new order, we, as representatives of the national government, addressed the final
appeal to the Nation. The people replied on 5 March, the great majority giving us their support. In an
awakening unique of its kind, the people have rejuvenated the national honour in a matter of weeks
and thanks to its profound lntumon, Herr President, has brought about the marriage between the
symbol of the old greatness and of the new energies' .
In conclusion Hitler stated that 'through the will of divine Providence, the national awakening has
happened under the auspices of Hindenburg, the national hero, whose life is the symbol of the
indestructable energy of the German nation'.
After Hitler's speech was finished, the Marshall President descended into the crypt below to place a
crown in the Prussian colours on the tomb of Frederick the Great. Outside once more, Hindenburg
reviewed the march-past of the troops and the national storm troopers 47
The context and significance of this event is perceptively analysed by Ian Kershaw
who notes particulary the symbolic interplay between Hitler and Hindenburg:
The stage-management of the 'Day of Potsdam' succeeded brilliantly in exploiting the authority and
charisma of the revered Reich President in the interests of the new Nazi rulers. Especially during the
first months of the regime, the mutual respect and admiration of Chancellor and Reich President were
constantly emphasised. Already during the election campaign the NSDAP had produced posters
showing the venerable Reich President and the 'youthful', dynamic Chancellor standing together
beneath the slogan: 'The Marshal and the Corporal: Fight with Us for Peace and Equal Rights'.
The intended association of old and new, of the traditional authority of Hindenburg with the
plebiscitary mandate of Hitler, was obvious. Such propaganda doubtless helped In transposing to
Hitler some of the trust in Hindenburg as the embodiment of German national values. Hitler's
exaggeratedly humble obeisance before the aged Field Marshal and his 'blessing' of the 'new
Germany' embodied by the Chancellor in the Potsdam Garrison Church above the tomb of Frederick
the Great, given massive coverage in press and newsreel, was in this respect a masterpiece of
suggestive propaganda. But although Hindenburg continued to be incorporated into Nazi imagery
until his death in 1934, there could be no doubt that the intended hero of the Image-builders was not
the old Reich President, who for more than seven years had represented the hated Republic, but the
'People's Chancellor', Hitler, whose star was clearly in the ascendant. And following the promulgation
of the Enabling Act on 24 March 1933, his dominance as Chancellor, now no longer reliant on the
President's 'emergency decree' powers, was also institutionally secured. 48
Revolution or Restoration?
As Gramsci was recovering from the paralysis which struck him on 7 March, the
reviews for April 1933 arrived. They were dominated by articles on the so-called
unational revolution" in Germany now being speedily carried through by Hitler and
the Nazis. But what kind of 'revolution' was it which freely appropriated the
47 RSE, 11 April p.806-808. See also the report in CC, 1 April 1933, and the article by Giuseppe
Piazza: 'Primo Tempo Nazionalsoclalista in Germania' in NA , 1 April 1933. [The Potsdam ceremony
was also reported in POL, February-April, not published until August].
48lan Kershaw: The Hitler 'Myth'. Image and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford, 1989) p.55-56.
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'revolutionary' rhetoric of Marxism whilst ruthlessly destroying the Marxist parties?
The fascist reviews passed over the Nazi terror let loose on the night of the
Reichstag Fire without reporting the brutal details, but the chilling finality of the
commentaries left no doubt about the fate of the German Left.
The effective disappearance of the forces of the Marxist Left Is not contradicted or attenuated by the
fact that the elections of 5 March were still very far from giving anything like total power to the forces of
the national Right, which achieved little more than the bare majority strictly needed to govern. Even if
the election results of 5 March still show that seven million votes were cast for the Social Democrats
and over four million for the Communists, it remains no less true that the bare majority achieved by the
nationalists is effectively and irresistably a totalitarian majority which puts a definitive end to a period of
history. It is neither possible nor imaginable to tum back. We can be calm and confident in the
knowledge that both, Communism and Social Democracy, even if they have still not materially died out
or disappeared, have no further possibility of life in Germany; they have been cut out of the life of the
country and are destined to perish or quickly wither away in the new national climate where they
cannot possibly draw breath. 49
Again, what kind of 'revolution' was it which associated itself so closely with the
past and claimed to be restoring the spirit enshrined at Potsdam? The chief
intermediary between the Italian and German movements, Giuseppe Renzetti,
passed the night of 30 January 1933 in the circle of the new chancellor. His
commentary faithfully projected the 'historic' image of Hitler which Nazi
propaganda promoted with particular intensity at this moment:
During the night a flood of people made up of militants of the Brown Shirts and of the Steel Helmets In
grey filed for six hours without interruption below the windows of the two adjacent palaces on the
Wilhelmstrasse where the old Reid Marshall, head of the royal and imperial armed forces, the victor of
Tannenberg, and the young Chancellor of the people, the wounded and decorated corporal, the
leader of the revolution, stood. They were saluting in both men not only the interpreters and actors of
an Inevitable and inexorable German historical necessity, but also the new Germany which wants to
renew itself by means of a new idea linked to the noble traditions of Germany. Hindenburg and Hitler _
two sides (as we have written In past) of a single face, finally reconciled on that memorable night _
renewed the promise to their people to guide and lead it towards the high destinies to which it rightly
aspires. 50
The political interest of fascist commentators centred on the question of how
relations between the coalition partners, the Nazis and the Nationalists, would
develop. Gerarchia kept its options open by voicing the posmons of both the
radicals and conservatives: while Renzetti observed that Hitler's partners would
"retard the forward march of the reVOlUtion",Schulenburg wanted to stengthen the
relations between the 'left-wing' and the 'right-wing' tendencies by "reinforcing the
49 Giuseppe Piazza: 'Primo Tempo Nazionalsocialista in Germania', NA, 1 April 1933, p. 375.
50 Giuseppe Renzetti: 'La Rlvoluzione Nazionale in Germanla', GER, ApriI1933, p.281.
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righf'.51 Schulenberg associated the 'revolutionary' tendency of the Nazis with
their fanaticism in the Jewish question, but he thought he detected the first signs of
restraint: they had begun to distinguish between Jewish immigrants from the East,
the "wandering Jews" who were linked with the Communists, and German Jews
who were "bourgeois and conservative". There was no truth in the stories of
atrocities against the Jews. Like the atrocity propaganda of the First World War,
they were pure inventions designed to blacken Germany's reputation abroad.
In Nuova Antologia Giuseppe Piazza saw the national coalition in terms of
the dialectic 'revolution-restoration'. For Piazza the 'revolutionary' character of the
Nazis was bound up with the "socialist" side of their programme. This contained
"the specifically fascist concept" of overcoming the Marxist class struggle, but this
could not be achieved until the Nazis had absorbed the NationaliSts who clung to
the class consciousness of the past.
Now this populism of the National Socialists, which is rooted in the social or ·sociallsr programme
which is alluded to in the second part of their name, ie, the specifically fascist conception of
overcoming the class struggle, is what divides them from their partners in government, the German
Nationals, who have no social conception except the negative one, which still belongs to Manchester
economics; that is, they refuse purely and simply to recognise the class struggle and thus assume that
they have overcome it, but this very negation puts them right back into the historical climate of class in
exactly the same way as their marxist opponents, although from the other side. In this respect, the
whole dialectical interest of the work of reconstruction which is under way today Is rooted in the
political composition of the government in this first phase of the new regime, ie, in the fortunes of the
present coalition or union of the two national parties in government, the National SOCialists and the
German Nationals. There is no doubt that the union is very solid and based on serious, well-founded
reasons, but it cannot and must not be confused with fusion; we are not only authorised but also
obliged to affirm the clear distinction between the two partners and the separate character which they
inevitably presented to the voter in the recent struggle for electoral legitimacy even though they were
already partners in government. For those like us who have never doubted for a moment the certainty
that National Socialism would come to power in Germany, as part of the unstoppable drive to renew
the civilisation of the European state which was started by Fascism in Italy, even when others thought
it was irredeemably lost in the byways of legality or in the bog of parliamentarlsm: we affirm this without
fear of raising doubts about the advent to power of the coalition or about the goodwill and legitimacy
on which the union between the two is based. On the contrary, we argue, as we have always argued,
that the necessary condition for the work of renewal of National Socialism is the complete fusion, in
Italian style, with the old Nationalism of the German Nationals, a fusion which we believe is in progress
and virtually a fact in the present governing alliance which, it should be noted, far from being an old-
style coalition based on compromises over programmes, is based in the 'first hour' on establishing the
priorities of the whole programme. 52
51 Werner von der Schulenburg: 'La Rivoluzione Tedesca', GER, April1933, p. 287-288.
52 Giuseppe Piazza, cit., p. 378.
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The advent to power of the Nazis meant the admission of a "new political class into
the structures of the State" but whether this was the start of a revolution (ie, the
creation of a really new State) or a restoration remained to be seen.
Meanwhile, the union has served above all to introduce the new political class into the structures of
the State, to strengthening the basis of an administration which has been purified and corrected in
certain institutions, which is necessary for the long-term work to be completed in the future; and lastly,
in contact with the agrarianism of the German-Nationals, to the ruralisation of National Socialism which
is essential to the equilibrium of the programme of economic and social reconstruction. This last point
is extremely important and fundamental since it is perhaps the principal justification for the presence in
government of the German Nationals (not to speak of the legitimate presence of the fighting-front of
the Steel Helmets which speaks for itself) or of their influence which is so disproportionate to their
modest numerical strength.
National Socialism's work of reconstruction of the State in Germany is enormously helped by the fact
that there already exists an ancient tradition of the State consolidated over the centuries which is part
of the political and moral consciousness of the Nation. If the republican scenario of Weimar, which was
in truth quite artificial, has suddenly crumbled and collapsed, the scenario of Potsdam now comes to
the fore resonating at every step with the echoes of former greatness and glory, from those of
Frederick to those of Bismarck This is the recurring value of the symbol of Potsdam for the first
majority assembly of the national renewal and this, in the last analysis, is the profound inSpiration
behind the presence and influence in the government, out of all proportion to its number, of the
German-National phalanx, which represents still intact and unchanged the old 'class State' which
sustained the Empire until the last moment. Italian Fascism did not have the inestimable advantage Of
having an ancient, tried-and-tested State tradition at its disposal; in overthrowing the liberal State It
overthrew whatever State tradition existed in Italy and had to create the State ex-novo, relying solely
on the inventive genius of the race. Having overthrown the liberal-social democratic State, the
National Socialist Revolution had instead the benefit of the old State tradition in Germany which it
came face to face with and could embrace. But just as the maximum advantage is always paid for in life
by the greatest of risks, the revolutionary will risks competing with the ambition to restoration and
remaining in certain points, perhaps in many points, impaired and reduced in strength and eventUally
diverted or falsified. For this reason we said at the start that the whole interest of the present sitUation
rests on the internal dialectical fortunes of the two partners in the governing coalition; and we believe
that the degree of success of the German revolution will depend on the extent to which it can create
stili on the basis of the native tradition, a really new State,ie, on the point on the scale at which It fix_
the correlation between Revolution and Restoration. 63
In Gersrchia Vittorio Profuni, referring to the mood of "messianic expectation-
prevailing in Germany, sought to explain the meaning of the 'Third Reich'
according to its several theorists.
The doctrine is formulated quite simply. Returning to the glories of the Germanic past, to its virtuous
traditions, the theorists justify the name 'Third Reich' from a historical point of view. The first Reich was
in fact the most glorious Holy Roman Empire, a manifestly feudal institution which dominated the
world In its time; the second was the Prussian empire of Frederick the Great, the founder of modem
German power, which was the archetypal or model empire whose last representatives were the
Hohenzollems. And the Third Reich? This Is to be inaugurated very shortIY.54
53 Ibid., p.378. 382
54 Vittorio Profuml: 'II Terzo Regno', GER, ApriI1933, p. 290.
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Profumi could make little sense of the 'Third Reich' as a political, social or
economic 'system': on this level it did not stand up to critical analysis. It was
essentially a mystical aspiration, a utopia founded on the myth of Nordic blood - the
myth of the twentieth century according to Rosenberg. The utopia was more
reactionary than revolutionary in character - a violent reaction against everything
foreign and everything modern in the world of politics, CIatotalitarian return to
tradition" as he called it. As for its alleged affinity to Fascism, "nothing could be
more wrong. The fascist revolution was different. ..." .55 Fascism was not based on
rigid doctrinal schemes and precise theoretical formulae; it was more pragmatic
and born out of everyday experience. The Fascist regime respected tradition,
especially that of imperial Rome, but abounded in the newest inventions and had
never lost itself in nostalgic longing for the past. Profumi warned that the super-
nationalism behind the idea of the Third Reich could lead to great harm, including
for Italy. CIAsupernationalism supported by the myth of Nordic blood ought to lead
logically, and as an inevitable consequence, in an anti-Roman direction. With their
Third Reich the Teutons have to dominate the world".56
It was left to Sergio Panunzio to voice the predominantly triumphalist view of the
German events which showed the primacy and universality of Italy's own fascist
revolution.
When one then reflects on what is happening at this moment in Germany, for which the political
experience of the fascist regime serves as a model and a firm pomtot reference, the picture is
complete. Every Italian can feel proud of our country, the 'morning' nation of Europe as Bertrand
Spaventa elegantly called it, which has been the precursor of all ideas and all institutions ever since
the Renaissance. Until October 1922 it was a slave to foreign imitation, the unsuccessful imitator of
the political institutions of England, France, and Belgium: today it provides anxious and confused
peoples with the fully-fledged example and the paradigm of the new institutions and the new political
regime.57
For Panunzio the German revolution provided further proof that the "end of
parliamentarism" was a universal phenomenon. The first signs of constitutional
transformation could be detected even in republican France where the supporters
of parliamentary government were thoroughly demoralised. Judging from "the
55 ibid., p.294.
56 ibid., p.297.
57 Sergio Panunzio: 'La Fine del Parliamentarismo e l'Accentramento delle Responslbillta', GER. April
1933. p.300.
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melancholic, desperate, and tearful devotees and believers in parliamentary
institutions, France can hardly be said to represent the exception to the rule: the
conclusion must be that the rule is truly universal and without exceptions of any
sort". 58
From the Enabling Act to the Suppression of Parties
(March-July 1933)
The Rassegna settimanale and other periodicals continued to carry reports and
articles on pOlitical developments in Germany in the first half of 1933, including the
passing of the Enabling Act in March 59, the boycott of the Jews in April 50, the
suppression of trade unions in May 61, the public burning of books in Berlin 62, the
resignation of Hugenburg 63, the decree suppressing political parties in July64 I
including the Nationalist and Centre parties, and the Concordat with the Vatican
the same month. 65 A discursive article on "the new revolutionary generation in
Germany" in the issue of Critics Fascista for 1 July 1933 66 , which was probably
the source of §15.66, indicates that Gramsci did not lose interest in German affairs,
but the movement of events was so fast that it was difficult to follow the thread. The
interruption to his reviews did not help: Gramsci received no reviews for August
1933 and the missing issues did not arrive until September.67 There was a further
interruption in October pending his transfer from Turi in November.68 Consequently
after the passing of the Enabling Act in March there is little trace of German events
in Gramsci's notes of 1933. In §13.37 (written in the autumn or winter of 1933) he
refers to "the defeat of Hugenburg in Germany" as though it was a forecast when it
58 ibid., p.305.
59 RSE, 11 April 1933; under the rubric Cose Straniere in CC, 1 April1933
60 RSE, 11 ApriI1933.
61 RSE, 23 May 1933
62 Mario da Silva: 'Lettera della Germania: II Rogo di Piazza dell'Opera', CF, 1 July 1933.
63 RSE, 18 July 1933 ; the rubric Case Straniere in CC, 15 July 1933
64 RSE, 18 July 1933.
65 Raffaele lacuzio: 'II Concordato fra la Santa Sede eel iI Reich Germanico', GER, August 1933. See
also RSE, 24 August 1933; the rubric Politics Estera: 'II Concordato fra iI Reich e la Santa Sede', EF
August-September 1933; the rubric CoseStraniere in CC, 5 August 1933. •
66 Gustav Glaesser: 'La nuova generazione rivoluzionaria tedesca', CF, 1 July 1933.
67 Letter to Tatiana, 3 September 1933, LCI! p.743.
68Letter to Tatiana, 12 November 1933, LCII p. 754-755.
286
was already an accomplished fact. This important development was reported in the
reviews, but Gramsci may have missed it. This supposition is supported by his
silence in the notes of 1933 about another important development: the Reich
Concordat signed in July. The first reference to it is in §16.11 which was written in
1934. It seems that it was not until Gramsci resumed his studies at Formia in the
early months of 1934 that he caught up with the thread of German events which he
had temporarily lost track of in the summer of 1933.
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Notebooks 13-15
§14.04, §14.27, §14.30. The Racist Origins of the 'Superman'
In the early months of 1932 (at the time of the presidential elections in Germany)
Gramsci asked: "Do we have to accept as 'revolutionary' all those movements
which try to dignify and to justify themselves by calling themselves 'revolutions'?",
and went on to observe: "The fact that so many Nietzscheans masquerading as
rebels against existing reality and social conventions etc have ended up
stomaching them, and have thus emptied certain attitudes of any serious content, is
perfectly true, but this is no reason to allow one's judgement to be guided by
charlatans of this SOrt".1 The year 1932 was the tenth anniversary of the Fascist
"revolution". Gramsci suggests that in spite of the Nietzschean postures struck by
Mussolini, which were more theatrical than anything else, the past ten years had
proved that the Fascists were far from being rebels against existing SOCial
conventions. The Concordat with the Catholic Church in 1929, for example,
revealed how conventional these WOUld-be Nietzscheans really were. It was a
timely observation in view of the rise of a new Nietzschean 'superman' in Germany
and a concrete way of putting the similar 'revolutionary' claims of the Nazis into
some kind of perspective.
At the turn of 1932-33 Gramsci began a series of notes on the popular origins of the
'superman'2 which questioned the fascist claims to Nietzsche. His argument was
that admirers of the 'superman' were influenced more by the heroes of French
serial novels than by the study of Zarathustra.
Every time we come upon some admirer of Nietzsche, It la worth trying to find out If hla
'auperman' Ideaa, agalnat conventional morality etc etc, are of genuine Nleztachean
origin. In other warda, are they the reault of a process of thought located In the aphere at
'high culture' or do they have much more modeat origins? Are they connected, for
example, to aerial literature? (But waa Nletzache himself entirely uninfluenced by French
a.rlal novela? It ahould be remembered that thla literature, now relegated to the
caretakera and the servanta' quartera, waa once very popular among the Intellectuala, at
leaat until 1870, Just aa the 'thriller' la today). In any caae, It aeema posalble to aay that
much of the WOUld-beNletzachean 'aupermanlsm' has Ita source and 'doctrinal' model only
In .•... The Count 0' AfonteCrlsto by A.Dumla. In Dumla, la tlr II I ean lee, the
Montecrllto type WII represented In more wlYs than one: It can be aeen In Athol In The
Three Musketeera, for eXlmple, and In Joaeph Balaamo, although It could poaalbly be
1 §8.210. History and Anti-History, QCII p.1.068.
2 §14.04. Popular Literature, OCIII p.1657-1659; §14.27. Popular Literature. Popular (popolsresche)
Origins of the 'Superman', QCIII pJ685; §14.30. Popular Literaturs. Popular Origins of ths
Superman ,OCIII p.1688.
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found in other novels as well.3
Apart from their immediate polemical intent, the 'superman' notes were an
exploration of the cultural matrix of petty-bourgeois psychology, particularly that of
the 'petty intellectuals' attracted to fascism.4 Gramsci makes this clear in the
second draft written a year later in early 1934:
(The petty bourgeoisie and the petty intellectuals are particularly influenced by such novelistic
images, which are their 'opium', their 'artificial paradise', in contrast to the narrowness and pinched
circumstances of their immediate life). From this comes the popularity of certain sayings like 'It is better
to live one day as a lion than a hundred years as a sheep', particularly successful among those who are
really and irremediably sheep. How many of these 'sheep' say: Ohl If only I had power even just for
one day, etc; the desire to be an implacable 'executioner' is the aspiration of someone who feels the
influence of Monte-Cristo.s
One of Gramsci's sources for these notes was an article by the French journalist
Louis Gillet 6 recounting in 'romantic' language worthy of The Count of Monte
Cristo his first meeting with the 'superman' Mussolini: Gramsci recommended it for
studying "the relation between late romanticism and some aspects of modern life". 7
However, by "some aspects of modern life" he did not simply mean the personality
cult of Mussolini for another 'superman' had now come to power who cast the same
kind of 'romantic' spell. In his new year message to the Brown Shirts for 1933 Hitler
evoked what had been done to save 'European civilisation' by one providential
man, Mussolini.
Passing to the predictions for 1933, Hitler affirmed that the decadence of Germany's political and
cultural values runs parallel to its economic ruin. The collapse will come; it is only a question of time.
'The terrible consequences for European civilisation of the chaos and regression which will follow
were foreseen and confronted by only one people in Europe. Thanks to one of those exceptional
men in the history of the world, to whom whole generations are linked by a duty of gratitude, the Italian
3 §14.04, cit., p.1657.
4 Gramsci had explored this theme before, notably in an article of 1924 on the influence of the French
novel in shaping "the romantic side of the fascist movement, of fascists like Mario GiocIa, Massimo
Rocca, Curzio Suckert [Malaparte), Roberto Farinacci etc, etc: an unbalanced imagination, a quivering
of heroic fury, a psychological restlessness which have na intellectual content other than the
sentiments found in the serial novel of French romanticism around 1848 The historical
conjuncture has allowed these romantics to become a 'ruling class' and has turned the whole of Italy
into a serial novel (CPC, p.369 and sew p.346 note).The new element in the prison nates was the
'German' Neitzsche. With the expansion of German faSCism, Italian fascists increasingly claimed
Neitzsche as a source of 'revolutionary' inspiration.
S §16.13. Popular Origin of the 'Superman', celli p.1880. A translation of the second draft can be
found in SCW p.355-359.
6 Reported in RSE, 15 December 1932. See Professor Gerratana's note to §14.30 in celV p.2928-
2929.
7 §14.30, ocu p.1688.
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people found in Fascism the ideal which dominates it and reshapes its whole life'.B
Hitler cast himself in the role of the German 'superman' in the mirror image of
Mussolini, and in the image of the 'superman' the Brown Shirts saw dimly
reflected the image of themselves. Gramsci perceived that the Brown Shirts saw
themselves as an "an association of supermen" (§14.18). For 'scientific' purposes
he compared them to the "active minority" of Italy's Risorgimento, Garibaldi's Red
Shirts, only to conclude that the popular-national 'spirit' of the Red Shirts was
qualitatively different from the 'spirit' of the brown-shirted superman.9 The day of
the German 'supermen' was now at hand. The Brown Shirts' fantasy of 'having
power for just one day', their longing to be 'implacable executioners', was about to
become a reality ~
The German origin of these 'superman' notes is confirmed by a further line of
inquiry suggested in §14.27, but the cultural matrix to be investigated in this case
had an entirely different 'romantic' flavour.
For the Neltzschean 'superman', apart from the romantic Influence of Stendhal (and of the
cult of Napoleon I generally), It Is nacaasary to examine the racist tendencies which
culminated In Goblnaau and thence In Chamberlain and In Pan-Germanism(Treltachke and
the theorlaa of power).l11
Gramsci was surprisingly accurate in suggesting that the French novel, especially
Stendhal, was a significant influence on Nietzsche. However, Nietzsche's
'superman' was not a racist concept in spite of his friendship with Wagner. If the
concept had any political significance at all, which is questionable, it might be
more accurate to describe it as '80napartist' (or 'Caesarist') rather than racist and
to relate it to Nietzsche's worship of heroes (including Caesar) which he shared
with Wagner. In this sense, Gramsci's 'superman' notes were linked with the notes
8 Reported under the rubric Gennania in RSE, 17 January 1933, p.121.
9 However Gramsci distinguished two forms of 'Garibaldism' at this point depending on the relation
betWeen the active minority and the masses. Thus in §14.18. Machiavelli. Volunteerism and
Garibaldlsm, he writes: UA distinction must be made: on the one hand there is volunteerism or
Garibaldism which theorises itself as an organic form of historical-political activity and exalts itself by
phrases which are nothing more than a transposition of the language of the individual superman to an
association of 'supermen' (exaltation of the active minorities as such etc) : on the other hand there Is
the volunteerism or Garibaldlsm conceived as the initial moment of an organic period to be prepared
and developed in which the organic whole, as a historical bloc, fully participates. The 'vanguards'
without supporting army, the 'shock troops' without infantry and artillery, are themselves
transpositions of the language of rhetorical heroism: this is not true of the vanguards and shock troops
as specialised functions of complex and regular organisms. The same applies to the elites of
Intellectuals without masses but not of the intellectuals who feel organically linked with the national-
popular masses-. QCIII p.1675-1676. My italics.
10 §14.27 cit., p.1685.
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on Caesarism which he was writing at the same time (see §14.23 below). However,
it is likely that the inquiry into the relation between the Nietzchean 'superman' and
the racist tendencies was immediately suggested to Gramsci by the coming to
power of Hitler and the Nazis in January 1933. Although neither Hitler nor
Rosenberg made much of Nietzsche's ideas, the fact remains that "the will to
power", the "superman", "masters and slaves" etc were readily vulgarised by the
petty intellectuals of the Nazi movement who thus spared themselves the need to
read Nietzsche himself .11 The key 'moment' in the Nazi vulgarisation of the
'superman' was precisely its assimilation to the "racist tendencies" (Gobineau,
Chamberlain, etc) from which the Nazi movement more recognisably drew
inspiration. This was a relatively simple task since the 'aristocratic' Nietzsche's
aversion to Wagner's anti-semitism seemed to be based on little more than its
'vulgarity'.
Whilst the racist tendencies mentioned by Gramsci could properly be described as
a current of late romanticism, the interesting point is that they did not find
expression in popular novels. Gramsci recognised this in the later draft of this note
in which he suggested that racist thought was "feudal in origin", whereas the
French serial novel was essentially a "democratic" cultural form: "But perhaps the
popular 'superman' of Dumas should really be considered as a 'democratic'
reaction to the concept of racism which is feudal in origin, and should be put
alongside the glorification of 'Gallicism' in the novels of Eugene Sue".12 Gramsci's
suggestion invites inquiry into the dissemination of these racist (ie, superman-
'Aryan') tendencies among the petty intellectuals attracted to Nazism. How did they
come to captivate and shape the Nazi "imagination"? As we will see, in later notes
on 'Lorianism' Gramsci recognises the role of racial 'science' in preparing the
cultural climate for Nazism (see §28.01 below), but the question posed by these
'superman' notes has more to do with the racial "imagination". In this connection, it
is interesting to note that in Gramsci's conception the predominant 'language' of a
11 Elizabeth Nietzsche had the Nietzsche-Archiv sent to Mussolini on the occasion of his fiftieth
birthday in 1933 with the telegram: -To the noblest disciple of Zarathustra, whom Nietzsche had
dreamed of, the inspired reawakener of aristocratic values in Nietzsche's sense, the Nietzsche-Archiv
sends in deepest respect and admiration the warmest good wishes" . The Nazi appropriation of
Nietzsche is analysed in Steven E.Aschheim: The Neitzsche Legeacyin Germany, 1890-1990
(Berkeley, 1992)
12 §16.13. Papular Origin ot tn« 'Superman', aC11Ip.1881-1882 [Translated in SCW p. 358].
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national culture may be musical rather than literary and that the dissemination of
'romantic' conceptions of life may owe more to the opera than to the novel. This
conception of cultural language could apply to Italy and Germany in
contradistinction to France (and England), although the imprint left by Verdi, of
course, was entirely different from that left by Wagner. It is fair to say that the Nazis
demonstrated that the impact made by Wagner on German (or 'Germanic') culture
was 'incalculable'. The inquiry begun by Gramsci in 1933 relates generally to the
influence of romantic fiction in politics, but this includes the possibility that music
may be a more influential source than literature in awakening a nation's
"imagination". In the fictional struggle between Aryans and Jews which now began
in Germany, Wagner was a vital source of the central fiction on which the Nazi
State was founded.
Further Thoughts on Ca.aarlam:
114.23. Spllta In the Dominant Bloc
The movement of the Brown Shirts led Gramsci to explore the function in national
politics of the "active minority", the "men of action". As we said, to analyse this
element of politics scientifically, he boldly compared Hitler's Brown Shirts with a
movement which could not have been more different, Garibaldi Red Shirts, and
called the general phenomenon 'Garibaldism' (or 'volunteerism'). The same
dialectical turn of mind can be found in §14.23 (January 1933) where it resulted in
an even more improbable syntheSiS of opposites, between the Nazi movement in
Germany and its ideological antithesis, the Dreyfus movement in France. GramSCi
says that "there are other modern historical-political movements of the Dreyfus
typel!: the context and timing of this note strongly suggests that he meant the Nazis
even though he does not say so explicitly. The reference back to the Dreyfus
movement is further evidence that French experience was the primary source of
'political elements' in the conceptual laboratory of the notebooks. But what did he
mean by movements of the Dreyfus-type? What was the 'objective' content of this
concept?
Starting from the original 'sOCiological' schema of Caesarism (§9.133/136) GramSCi
proceeded to make an 'elliptical comparison', that is, to see how far it
'approximated' to reality. The procedure was indicated in §9.136 where he
analysed the splits in the dominant bloc in France leading to the Caesarist regime
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of Napoleon III.
This is one element of closer approximation. Another such element is this: the catastrophic phase may
be brought about by a [momentary] political deficiency of the traditional dominant force and not by any
organic deficiency which is necessarily insuperable. This is precisely what happened in the case of
Napoleon III.
The same procedure of 'approximating' ever more closely to reality was at work in
§14.23. Here Gramsci analyses the splits in the traditional dominant bloc on the
eve of Hitler coming to power in Germany. These splits were particularly apparent
in the last days of Schleicher's chancellorship in January 1933 when the
government and its supporters in industry were openly attacked by the Agrarian
League on account of the its 'Bolshevist' plans for eastern agriculture. The agitation
was fermented by the Nazis who had penetrated the eastern branches of the
Agrarian League (one of the 'technical-economic' organisations referred to in
§14.23) and now claimed to speak for the rural as well as urban masses. Its
intervention was deCisive in bringing about the fall of Schleicher and in reconciling
the 'Junker' Hindenburg to the urban demogogue, Hitler.
This was the immediate political background to Gramsci's further reflections on
Caesarism in §14.23. He probably wrote this note on learning of the fall of
Schleicher, who thus represented an "intermediate and episodic" form of
Caesarism. Hitler came to power against the background of splits in the dominant
bloc in Germany 'similar' to the political circumstances which had brought Louis
Bonaparte to power in France. The chancellorship of Schleicher had revealed "the
political deficiency of the traditional dominant bloc", but the succession of Hitler
proved that this deficiency was only "momentary".
114.23. Machiavelli. Caeaar/am and 'cataatophlc' equilibrium of the polltlca/-aoc/al force&
It would be a m.thodologlcal error (an aspect of mechanical aoclology) to think that In
Ca•• arlsm - wh.th.r progr••• lv., reactionary, or of an Intermedlat. and epl.odlc
charact.r - the new hl.torlcal ph.nomenon I•• ntlrely due to the equilibrium of the
'fundamental' forc... It I. al.o nec... ary to .ee the Int.rplay ot r.latlon. betw.en the
principal group. (ot varlou. kind., seele-eccnemle and technlcal-economlc) ot the
fundam.ntal cia•••• and the auxiliary fore.. dlr.cted by or subjected to th.lr hegemonic
Influence. Thus It would be Impo•• lble to und.r.tand the coup d'etat of 2 Dec.mber
without .tudylng the function of the military groups and the Fr.nch pe8Hntry.
A very Important hl.torlcal epl.od. from thl. point of vl.w I. the so-called Dr.yfu.
movement In Franc.. Thl. too belong. 10 lhe pr••• nl •• rl.. ot obs.rvallons, nol because
II led 10 'Ca •• arl.m' but precl.ely for Ih. oppo.lte r.a.on: becau.. II pr.vented the
adv.nt ot a Ca.sarlsm In ge.latlon, ot a clearly r.acllonary nalur.. Neverth.l.s., the
Dr.yfu. movem.nt I. charact.rlltlc .Inc. It was a ca•• In which .Iem.nta of Ih. domlnanl
.oclal bloc thwarted the Caelarllm of the mo.t reactionary part ot that sam. bloc. And
th.y did Ihls by r.lylng for IUPPOrtnot on the peasanlry and Ih. counlryslde bul on Ih.
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subordinate strata of the towns under the leadership of reforist socialists (though they did
In fact draw support from the most advanced part of the peasantryas well).
We can find other modern historical-political movementsof the Dreyfus type, which are
certainly not revolutions but which are not entirely reactionary either - at least In the
sense that they also shatter stifling and oaslfled State structures In the dominant camp
and Introduce Into State life and aoclal activity a different and more numerous personnel.
These movemenla too can-have a relatively 'progressive' contentta the extent that they
Indicate that there were effective forces - albalt 'marginal' forcea - stili latent In the old
society which the old leadersdid not know how to exploit, but such forces cannot ba
absolutely progressive In the sense that they are not 'epoch-making'. They are rendered
historically effective by their adversary's Inability to construct, not by an Inherent force
of their own. Hence they are connected with a particular situation of equilibrium batween
the conflicting forces - both of which are Incapable In their respective campa of
summoning up an autonomouswill to bring about reconstruction.a
If by "other modern historical-political movements of the Dreyfus type" Gramsci
meant the Nazi movement, as the context suggests, then his analysis makes us
think about the coming to power of Hitler in an unfamiliar way. The simple solution
would be to dismiss Gramsci's improbable synthesis of oPPOsites - Dreyfus
movement-Nazi movement - as evidence that he was losing his grip on reality by
the start of 1933, but the comparison is more interesting than that. The most
obvious mistake from a conventional marxist perspective was to think of Hitler's
movement as being 'counter-Caesarist' in tendency, but this was only insofar as it
thwarted the ambitions of Schleicher who, it seemed to Gramsci, represented "a
Caesarism in gestation, of a clearly reactionary nature". It is the impression he
gives of Hitler, not of Schleicher, which appears mistaken. The 'reactionary'
Schleicher was seen by Gramsci as a 'traditional intellectual' in the German
tradition: by comparison Hitler appeared 'if not a revolutionary, not entirely
reactionary either'. His advent to power was seen as 'shattering the stifling and
ossified State structures in the dominant camp and introducing into State life a
different, more numerous personnel'. As a description of the so-called 'national
revolution' of 1933, this was objectively true: if anything, in trying to judge the
advent of Hitler 'objectively' Gramsci overstated the extent to which the influx of the
new intellectuals into the existing State structures displaced the traditional
intellectuals.14 Arguably his mistake was to think of this as an 'objectively
progressive' phenomenon which is hard to justify in view of the bureaucratic jungle
of the Nazi State. For all its rational niceties, Gramsci's subtle historiCist dialectic-
13 §14.23. Machiavelli. Caesarism and 'catastrophic' equilibrium of ths political-SOCial forcss. OCIII
p.1680-1681. [Translated in SPN p. 222-223, starting from "It would be an error of method ..... "].
14 See David Schoenbaum's Hitler's Social Revolution (Norton, New York-London, second edition
1980), especially the percentage change in State personnel after 1933, p.195-196.
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'reactionary-progressive', 'restoration-revolution' etc - ultimately failed to capture
the dynamics of Hitlerism. The element of intellectual and moral 'shock' we find in
his last notes on Hitlerism in 1935 suggested that the new phenomenon
overwhelmed this kind of rational analysis. Strictly speaking, the relatively short-
lived duration of the new regime proved Gramsci correct, but is this sufficient to say
that it was not "epoch-making"?
Further Thought. on Cae.arl.m:
§14.34. Political Partie. a. Police Agencle.
The composition of Hitler's cabinet announced on 31 January 1933 included only
two Nazi ministers apart from Hitler: Frick the Minister of the Interior and Goring the
Minister for Prussia. It may not have escaped Gramsci's attention that these two
appointments gave the Nazis complete control of all the police forces and a
monopoly of police powers throughout the Reich. Judging from its timing as well as
its content, this circumstance was reflected in another note written at this point,
§14.34. Machiavelli. Political Parties and Police Functions. Here Gramsci
continues the observation made at the end of §9.136 that "modern Caesarism is
more a police than a military system". The first function of Caesarism is to maintain
the rival progressive force in a permanent state of weakness, which under modern
conditions is done by police rather than by military methods. But just as there are
reactionary and progressive forms of Caesarism, so the police function of political
parties can be exercised "in a repressive or expansive sense".
It I. hard to rule out the po•• lblilty that any political party (not only of the dominant but
al.o of the .ubordlnate group.) may carry out a police function, Ie, a. guardians of a
particular political and legal order. If thl. were to be proved unconditionally, the que.tlon
might be put In different term. and .hould be about the method. and purpo.es with which
aueh a function I. exercl.ed. I. It exercl.ed In a repressive or expansive (dmus/vo )
sen.. , I. It reactionary or progre•• lve In character? 0088 the particular party exercise Its
policing function In order to preserve a purely extrinsic, outward order which .hackles the
living forces of history, or doe. It exercl.e It In .uch a way as to ral.. the people to a new
level of clvlll.ation whose political and legal order Is expressed In Its programme? In fact,
a law Is broken by someone belonging to one of the following: (1) the resctlonary .oclal
elements whom the law ha. deprived of power; (2) the progres.lve elements who are
con.tralned by the law; (3) the elements which have not attained the level of ciVilisation
which the law can represent. A party's policing function can therefore be progr ... lve and
reactionary: It Is progre.. lve when It tends to keep within the orbit of legality the
reactionary, dl.po ..... ed force. and when It raises up the backward ma.... to the level
of a new legality. It I. reactionary when It tends to constrain the living forc .. of history
and to preserve an anti-historical legality which has been superseded and become
extrinsic. Moreover, the way the particular party functions provides criteria with which to
discriminate: when the party Is progressive It functions 'democratically' (In the sen.. of a
democratic centralism), when the party Is reactionary It functions 'bureaucratically' (In
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the sense of a bureaucratic centralism). In the latter case the party Is not deliberative but
purely executive: In this case It Is technically a police agency and to call Itself a political
party Is purely metaphorical and flctltlous.15
As we suggested, the 'practical origin' of this note was probably the role given to
the Nazi ministers in Hitler's cabinet as guardians of the legal order in Germany.
This is probably what Gramsci meant by saying that politlcal parties of "subordinate
groups" may also exercise a police function. The 'objective' element of the analysis
consisted in comparing the ways in which fascist and communist parties exercise
this function, the presumption being that the former was 'repressive' and the latter
'expansive'. Interestingly enough, the dialectic leaves open the reverse possibility
that communist parties may also become 'bureaucratic' not 'democratic'
central isms and thus function more as police agencies than political parties. After
all, the very terms 'democratic v. bureaucratic centralism' originated from
communist debates. They were connected with Trotsky's early criticisms of the
growth of bureaucratic centralism which had become the defining feature of
'Stalinism' by the early 1930s. To assume that Gramsci would never entertain the
idea that communist parties might function as police agencies applying the same
kind of bureaucratic repression as fascist parties fails to appreciate his dialectical
capacity for 'objectivity'. Meanwhile, Gramsci had no illusions that the Nazis would
exercise their police function 'repressively': the role assigned to them in the new
cabinet strengthened the impression that the Nazi party was more than anything
else a police agency.
114.53, 115.02. Agrarian and Industrial Partlea
Gramsci's perspective on the coming to power of Hitler on 30 January 1933 was
both historical and comparative. His historicism made him more disposed to
emphasise the elements of historical continuity than change. The link between
past and present was defined by his earlier account (restated in §15.1816 ) of the
function of the "traditional intellectuals" in the bourgeois revolutions in England and
Germany. This described the union ('suture') between the landowners and the
industrialists which enabled the former to maintain their function of political-
intellectual leadership long after losing their dominant economic role. Given this
perspective, Gramsci saw the Nationalists (the 'historical' party of §14.03: see
15 §14.34. Machiavelli. PolilicalPartiesand Police Functions, QCIII p.1691-1692.
16 §15.18. Past and Present, ocm p.1n5-1776.
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below), not the Nazis, as the big players in the new 'national' coalition. The split
between agrarians and industrialists which had openly appeared under Schleicher
and which "was considered unprecedented in German political circles"17 meant
that it was imperative for the new chancellor to strengthen the traditional solidarity
bloc of the two groups. This was the political significance of making the Nationalist
leader Hugenburg responsible for both industry and agriculture in the new cabinet.
To reconcile the 'Junker' Hindenburg the traditional intellectuals were over-
represented in the cabinet which was widely characterised in the press not as the
government of Hitler but of Hitler-Hugenburg or Hitler-Papen. There was much
speculation about who were the 'masters' in the coalition and appearances were
deceptive, especially if perceived through marxist lenses. Was Hitler the instrument
of the dominant classes or their Caesarist master? It was difficult to have it both
ways, although Gramsci was a dialectical master of such difficulties. At first sight
Hitler appeared more the servant than the master, especially in view of his
dependency on the presidential powers. Gramsci's historicism led him at first to
overestimate the political weight of the Germantradition . In reality the coming of
Hitler proved that the leadership function of Germany's traditional intellectuals was
about as extinct as Hindenburg himself, but it also proved that tradition (as the
Nazis 'reinvented' it) was a more potent political myth than ever.
For a comparative perspective on the new German government, Gramsci turned
not to Italy (as one might expect) but to England, the other "preeminently industrial
country" (§14.53) where the political influence of the agrarians persisted beyond
their natural life. The turning-point of the German crisis in 1933 brought to mind the
decisive moment of the British crisis in 1931 (§15.02) when the Conservatives,
standing as 'national' candidates, won a landslide victory in the general election.
On 31 January Hitler immediately called for further Reichstag elections to obtain
popular endorsement of his government and Gramsci probably anticipated that the
new 'national' government would win a sweeping victory at the polls as it had done
in Britain. Of course, the comparison with Britain only 'approximated' to the
German Situation (which is probably why Gramsci did not make it explicit) but the
experience of the two countries suggested to him that at the deciSive moment
agrarians and industrialists fused into a 'national' bloc under the political
leadership of the agrarians. The process was marked by the disappearance of the
17 According to the report in RSE, 24 January 1933, p.179, quoted above.
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"intermediate parties" (§14.53) including what Gramsci calls" 'industrial' parties"
(§15.02). These were useful to the industrialists in 'normal' times but in extreme
situations they turned to the agrarian party for political leadership. Meanwhile the
"manoeuvrable" rank-and-file of these intermediate parties passed over to what he
calls the "demagogic" parties (§15.02). A further feature was the introduction of
general protectionism to consolidate the dominant power bloc. This had happened
in Britain where the Conservatives, in spite of the protests of their partners the free-
trade Uberals, had introduced general protection in the course of 1932. Industrial
and agricultural tariffs (the 'anti-historical policies' of §14.53) were, so to speak, the
stitches of the 'suture'.
This line of argument is elaborated in two complementary notes written in different
notebooks sometime in February 1933. The first discusses agrarian parties, the
second industrial parties. As we see, Gramsci chose to illustrate his argument by
referring to the recent history of Britain, but the date of these notes points to the
ghostly presence of Germany behind his generalisations.
114.53. "'achiavelll. The Strength of Agrarian Parties. A typical phenomenonof the
modern epoch Is this: that the agrarian parties are (relatively) stronger In the parll.menta.
or at lea.t In a aerl.. of them, than their hl.torlcal, .oclal and economic function.
warrant. Thl. I. dua to the fact that In rur.1 .rea. all the elements Involved In agrlcultur.'
production continua to form a bloc which Is often under the leader.hlp of the moat
reactionary of these elements.On the other hand, there I. no auch bloc In the Cities and
In urban-typepopulations: It dl•• olved generation. ago If In fact It ever exl.ted (alnce It
could not exllt al long al the franchl.e was not enlarged). It therefore happenl that In
preeminently Industrial countries the agrarians, now that the Intermediate parties have
broken up, have the 'parliamentary' upper hand and Impose 'antl-hl.torlcal' policies. It I.
nece•• ary to eatabll.h why thl. happen. and to determinewhether or not the urban
parties, due to their corporatism or narrow-mindedeconoml.m, are to blame.•
115.02. "'achiavelll. Do the big Industrlall.ts, It can be a.ked, have a permanent political
party of their own? The an.wer, It .eem. to me, must be 'no'. The big Industrl.lI.ts m.ke
use of all the exl.tlng partlea at one time or another but they do not have their own party.
Thl. do.. not meanthat they are In any way 'agno.tlc' or 'apolitical': their Intere.t lie. In
keepinga given equilibrium and they en.ure thl. precl.ely by u.lng the mean. at their
dl.po.al to .trengthen, at one time or another, thl. or that party on the ever-changing
political che.sboard. (The only exception, of course, I. the party In oppo.ltlon to them
which must not be .trengthened In any way, not even a. a tactical ploy). But If thl. I. what
happens In 'normal' clrcum.tances, there I. no doubt that In extreme .Ituatlons, which ....
the ones that count (when national life I. engulfed In war, for example).the big
Indu.trlall.ts turn to the party of the agrarians who, In contrast, do have th.lr own
perman.nt party.
Thl. argum.nt I. lIIu.trated by England wh.r. the Con•• rvatlv. Party ha. d.voured the
Liberal. who traditionally claimed to be the party of the Industrlall.ts. Thl. I. due to the
English situation which I. characterised by It. big trade union.. In Engl.nd It I. true to
say th.re I. no formal oppo.ltlon party In the grand .tyl. to the Indu.trlall.ts, but th....
ar. nev.rth.le •• organl.atlon. of the working rna.... which (a•• xperl.nc•• how.) .t
18 §14.53. The Strength of Agrarian Parties. QCIJI p. 1712.
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certain moments, precisely when It counts, turn themselves constitutionally upside down
and burst open the bureaucratic envelope (In 1919 and 1926 for example).
Moreover there are permanent Interests binding agrarians and Industrialists together
(especially now that there Is general protectionism, both agrarian and Industrial) and there
Is no denying that the agrarians are much better organisers 'politically' than the
Industrialists. They exert more attraction on the Intellectuals and are more 'long-term' In
their alms.
The fate of the traditional 'Industrial' parties like the English 'Liberal-Radical' Party and
the French Radical party (the latter, though, always very different from the former) Is
Interesting (so Is that of the Italian Radical Party of not so long ago). What exactly do
they represent? They represent a nexus of big classes and small classes, not a single big
class: this explains why they appear and disappear at various times. The 'manoeuvrable'
rank-and-file was supplied by the small class whose situation In the coalition was forever
changing until the point when It was completely transformed. Today It supplies the rank-
and-file of the 'demagogic' parties and one can see why.
In general, It can be stated that In a history of parties such as this, the key to
understanding most about the original causes of the transformation of parties lies In
comparing the various countries. The polemics between parties In the 'traditionalist'
countries where 'vestiges' of the whole historical 'catalogue' are represented, are equally
lIIumlnatlng.1II
We said that the agenda of these notes was suggested by the political conjuncture
in Germany after Hitler's call for a new round of Reichstag elections on 5 March.
The disappearance of the "intermediate parties" (including an 'industrial' party like
the German People's Party), and the passage of their rank-and-file to the
"demagogic parties", was one of the most striking aspects of the elections in
Germany between 1929-33. In the forthcoming election Gramsci expected these
parties to be swept away as the Liberal party in Britain had been in the 'national'
landslide in 1931. Moreover, notwithstanding Snowden's radio broadcast
describing Labour's manifesto in 1931 as 'Bolshevism run mad', the communist
threat in Britain was merely a 'spectre'. In Germany where a "formal opposition
party in the grand style to the industrialists" (the German Communist Party) did
exist, it was a tangible presence. The opportunity for "demagogic parties" to
manipulate the fears of the "small classes" was much greater. Indeed, Hitler's radio
broadcast on 31 January presented the whole election campaign as a national
crusade to save Germany from 'Russian' Bolshevism.20
114.03, 115.08. The 'Symblosls' of Parties and Ideologies
This brings us to §14.03, one of the most puzzling of all the prison notes. Although
it refers directly to Hitler and German politics in early 1933 and is therefore of
obvious interest. it has been left untranslated. This is probably because it seems to
19 §1S.02. Oathe bigindistrialists have a permanent political party of their own?, QCIII p.1750-1751.
20See the report of the broadcast in RSE, 7February 1933, p.291. quoted above.
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contain an unaccountable misjudgement of Hitler on Gramsci's part which his
translators have discreetly passed over in silence. But are we dealing with a
mistaken conception or, more likely, one which we have failed to grasp?
The "intermediate" parties (§14.53), including the "industrial" parties (§15.02),
reappear in §14.03 as "centre" parties. Gramsci's "centre" covers the widest
possible spectrum but when he describes the Nazis as a party of the "centre" (as he
unmistakably does) and their partners the Nationalists as the "extremists", he
seems to empty the term "centre" of any meaning. When he further refers to
Hugenburg's (not Hitler's) party as the "demogogic" party, we are inclined to think
that Gramsci has completely lost the plot of German politics at this point.
§14. 03. Machiavelli. Centre. An accurate study of parties of the centre, understood In the
broad sense, would be exceptionally Instructive. The exact meaning of the term,
extensions of Its meaning, historical changes In Ita meaning and In Its accepted sen...
For example, the Jacobina were an extreme party: today they are a typical party of the
centre. So are the CatholiCS(In their masl); so are the Soclallsta, and so on. An analysl.
of centre parties, I believe, II an Important aspect of contemporary history.
And don't be misled by the words or by the palt: for example, the RUSSian'nlhlllsta' are
certainly to be _regardedas a party of the centre, and the same applies even to the
modern-day 'anarchists'. The question Is whether, by symbiosis, a party of the centre may
serve the Interests of a 'historical' party: for example, Hitler's party (of the centre)
serving the Interesta of Hugenburg and Papen (extremists: Ie, extremists In a certain
sense, agrarians and partly Industrialist., given the particular German historical
background). Centre parties and 'demogoglc' or bourgeols-demogoglc partlel.
The study of Germanand French politic. In the winter of 1932-33provide. a mas. of
material for this line of research. So does the contrast between foreign and domestic
policy (where It Is understood that the domestic policy of a particular country Invariably
decides matters: It II clear In fact that one country's action, Inspired by domestic
rea.on., becomes 'foreign' for the country which undergoes Ita elfects).
(QC'" p.1656-1657).
How are we to explain this puzzle? Gramsci's health was certainly in extremis
when he wrote this note. On 27 February he told Tatiana that in addition to his
chronic physical condition, "I also feel that my intellectual powers themselves are
breakling up and you must have got this impression yourself from some of my
letters". The breakdown of 7 March 1933 left him partially paralysed for about two
weeks. According to the doctor who visited him on 20 March, his condition included
arteria-sclerosis with hypertension of the arteries, so that "he is unable to write as
he used to". This would explain the variation in the handwriting of this note which
was squeezed into the front page of Notebook 14 after he had filled the rest of the
notebook, and would suggest that it was written shortly after the crisis of 7 March.
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Should we therefore consider this note as evidence of his failing intellectual
powers and charitably disregard it, or is there more to Gramsci's conception of
Hitler than we have recognised?
In fact, Gramsci's description of the Nazis as a party of the "centre" is the least
puzzling aspect of §14.03. It will come as no surprise to political scientists familiar
with the influential interpretation of Hitler as an "extremist of the centre" .21 Not to be
misled by all the extremist rhetoric of the "national revolution", Gramsci applied the
axiom that political parties are the 'nomenclature' of social classes. To determine
the real nature of Hitler's party, Gramsci asked himself who supported it. The most
striking feature of the German election figures available to him was precisely the
disappearance of the "intermediate parties", notably the German People's Party
(OVP), the German Democratic Party (OOP), and the Wirtschaftspartei. The
passage of the rank-and-file of these parties to Hitler's party in the elections of
1930-33 led Gramsci to characterise it as a party of the centre. But Gramsci's
"centre" was not simply political nomenclature for the "middle class" (or
Mittelstand). If the socialists were a party of the centre, the concept embraced both
left-of-centre and right-of-centre parties and was meant to describe a nexus
between classes rather than a single class. In fact, Gramsci's "centre" meant
something similar to the relation described in §15.02 where the intermediate (ie,
centre) parties are said to represent "a nexus between small classes and big
classes". This nexus breaks up in times of grave national crisis, the intermediate
parties disappear, and their "manoeuvrable rank-and-file" passes over to the
"demogogic" parties.
The real puzzle is why Gramsci characterises Hugenburg's party as the
"demogogic party" when the obvious candidate for this description was Hitler's.
However, §14.03 is only one piece of the puzzle. Other pieces can be found in
§15.06, where Gramsci again mentions the "symbiosis" of parties, and §15.07
where he refers to "the law of the turncoat". These pieces help to 'integrate' the
conception contained in §14.03.
21 See in particular the analysis of Hitler as an 'extremist of the centre' (p.137) in the chapter 'Fascism -
Left, Right, and Centre' in Seymour Martin Upset: Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics
(Heineman, seoond edition, 1983) and the critique of Upset's interpretation as reviewed by Ian
Kershaw in The Nazi Dictatorship. Probelms and Perspectives of Interpretation (second edition,
1989) p.29-30 where, interestingly enough, Upset's interpretation is classified as 'non-maodst".
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Like his opposite Maurras in France, Hugenburg was a "demogogue who does not
know how to be one".22 In the autumn of 1929 he joined forces with Hitler who
supplied the talents of the demogogue which he himself lacked. Hugenburg
needed Hitler as much as Hitler needed Hugenburg: the instrumentality was
mutual, or "symbiotic". The collaboration of the Nationalists and the Nazis in the
anti- Young Plan campaign in 1929-30, the plebiscitary campaign in Prussia in
1931, the Harzburg Front, the second ballot of the presidential election in 1932, the
national coalition of January 1933 - all this bore witness to the "symbiotic" relation
of the two parties throughout the crisis. As usual, the historicist Gramsci employs an
organic metaphor - "symbiosis" - to convey the idea of "process", ie, the continuity
between history and politics, past and present. We learn more about this concept in
§15.06 where the specific example of Hitler's party (§14.03), which is the "practical
origin" of Gramsci's theorising, disappears behind generalisations which purport to
be valid for parties of both the Left and the Right.
t15.08. Machiavelli.ConceptloM of the world and prectlcal IntentIons, of •
comprehensive (to,.II"rl ) and penial character. A basic criterion In Judgingboth
conceptions of the world .nd, .. pecl.lly, practical Intentions I. this: c.n the conception
of the world or the pr.ctlc.1 Intention be thought of .s 'standing by ltaelf', as
'Independent',.s shoulderingon It. own the whole responsibility for collective life? Or la
thl. Impo.slble? can It only be conceived of as somethingwhich 'Integrat.. ', or perfecta,
or counter-balanc•• another conception of the world or pr.ctlc.1 Intention? It Is cle.r on
reflection that this Is a key criterion In the theoretical a..... m.nt of Ideological and
pr.ctlc.1 Initiatives (mot/), and Its pr.ctlc.1 Impllc.tlon Is obvlou.ly of .ome Importance.
One of the commone.t superstitions I. the belief that everything that exl.t. I. 'natur.I'
and that things cannot be otherwise; th.t .11one's .ttempts to reform thing., no matter
how badly they go, will not .Iter the w.y thing. are becau.. the tr.dltlonal forcea .re atlll
.t work precisely to make .ure thing. do not change.There Is cert.lnly .ome truth In thla
way of seeingthings .nd It would be dl... troua If there w.sn't. But If It goes too far, thla
w.y of thinking ean becomed.ngerous (certain c.... of the politics of '.0 much the
wor.e, so much the better'). In .ny ca.. , the .bov.mentloned criterion In m.klng
phllo.ophlc.l, polltlc.1 .nd hlstorlc.1 Judgement. remains valid.
Ther. I. no doubt that some movementa,If ex.mlned clo•• ly, think of themselv.. aa
margln.1 In char.cterj that I., they pre.uppo.e • m.ln movement.nd graft them.elv..
onto It In order to reform certain of Ita pr.. umedor .ctual Imperfectlon•.Certaln
mov.ments, In • word, .re pur.ly reforml.t. Thl. principle Is Important politically becau..
the theoretical truth that every cia.. ha. only one party I. demon.tr.ted at crucl.1
turning-points by the f.ct that v.rlous f.ctlon., who until then had pr.. entad them.. lv..
•• 'Ind.pendent' partl.. , come tog.ther to form a .Ingle bloc. The multiplicity which
exl.ted beforehandw.s only reforml.t, to do with partl.1 I.su.. , .nd constituted In a
sen.e a dlvl.lon of political labour (quite u.eful In Ita way). But each part presupposed
the other, .0 much .0 that at the crucial moments,precisely when the m.ln I.. u.. come
Into play, they Joinedforc.. to form a bloc.
22 Gramsci describes Maurras in these terms In §1.48, written in late 1929, but it is an even better
description 01Hugenburg at that moment. The comparison Maurras-Hugenburg, however, is not
made explicit by Gramscl until much later in §13.37 (QCIII p.1646), probably written in the second half
011933.
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The conclusion Is that in building a party, it must be given a 'monolithic' foundation and
should not be built on the basis of secondary questions. Careful scrutiny Is therefore
needed to ensure homogeneity between the leadership and the rank-and-flle, between the
leaders and their mass following. If the leaders at the crucial moments cross over to their
'true party', the masses are beheaded and left paralysed and Ineffectual.
It can be stated that no real movement becomes conscious of Its global Importance ( la
,ua totalltar/eta) all at once but step by step through experience. It learn. from the facts
that nothing that exists Is natural (In the Irrational sense of the word) but exists because
certain conditions exist and that, If these disappear, It must have consequences. In this
way the movement perfects Itself, shedding Its arbitrary, 'symbiotic' features; It becomes
genuinely Independent In the sense that If It wants certain results, It creates the
necessary preconditions - Indeed, It commits all Its forces to the Job of creating them.ID
Given that the immediate "practical origin" of these generalisations was the
formation of the national government in Germany on 30 January 1933, it should be
possible to make sense of them in concrete terms. One reading of them would be
this. By symbiosis Gramsci meant that the Nazis had "grafted themselves onto" the
historical stem, the Nationalists, who represented the German "tradition". As the
"historical" party (§14.03) Gramsci considered the Nationalists to be the "main
movement", A further feature of their "symbiosis" was ideological. The differences in
ideology between the two parties were partial not total in character: in particular,
the "soctausr element in the Nazi programme made up for a glaring deficiency of
the traditional nationalists who had no social programme to deal with the crisis.
Applying to the Right a set of terms borrowed from the Left, Gramsci thus saw the
Nazis as a "reformist" not a "revolutionary" party. The coalescence of the two
nationalist parties was based on a world-view which was essentially the same,
especially in its anti-French (and anti-Russian) orientation. Gramsci reminds us of
this by recommending "the study of German and French politics in the winter of
1932-33" (§14.03), which referred to reactions in France to the new nationalist
government in Germany. The anti-French orientation of Nazi ideology stemmed, of
course, from the regime imposed on a defeated Germany by the Versailles Treaty,
just as the anti-Russian accent stemmed from the Bolshevik Revolution. The fact
remains that both were perfectly attuned to the older, pre-war "tradition" of an
encircled Germany.
Gramsci regarded the Nazis and Nationalists, in fact, not as two "independenr
parties but as "fractions" of a single bloc. Their coming together at the decisive
moment of the German crisis - 30 January 1933 - demonstrated the axiom that
23 §15.06, 00111, p. 1759-1761. See also SPN p.157-158. I have changed the paragraphing, using
five instead of Gramsci's two, to make this more readable.
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"every class has only one party". Furthermore, Gramsci took the view that on
achieving power the demagogue Hitler would desert the "small classes" (§15.02)
from which he came and "cross over to his 'true' party", the "demagogic" party
representing the interests of the "big classes". He thus obeyed the basic law of the
demogogue, "the law of the turncoat" (§15.07). However, Gramsci envisages a
time when Hitler's movement will free itself from dependency on the 'historical'
party of Hugenburg-Papen, shed its "arbitrary, symbiotic features", and become
fully independent and self-determining.
115.07 (I) The 'Law of the Turncoat'
The 'law of the turncoat' (§15.07) was connected with Gramsci's earlier
observations on demagogy in §6.97. These were written in August 1931 in the
context of the Nazis' plebiscitary campaign in Prussia at the time. Gramsci
distinguished between inferior and superior types of demagogy. The inferior type
"regarded the masses as a servile instrument, useful in achieving one's own ends
and then to be discarded". This type corresponded to Michels' "charismatic leader".
The superior type aims to achieve "organic political ends". His ambition was to
raise the political capacity of the masses themselves by selecting and educating,
through the mechanism of the party, leaders who will be his potential 'competitors' _
the reverse of the personal ambition of the charismatic leader. This higher type of
leadership must preserve the political party itself at all costs, ensuring that it does
"not disintegrate as a result of the death or disappearance of the individual leader ,
leaving the mass to sink back into chaos and primitive powerlessness". GramSCi
concluded §6.97 by stating the same axiom which he invoked in §15.06:
If it is true that every party is the party of one class only, the leader must base himself on this class and
develop from it a general staff and an entire hierarchy. If the leader is 'charismatic' in origin, he must
repudiate his origin and wor1<to make the task of leadership organic, with the characteristics of
permanency and continuity.24
Gramsci anticipated in 1931 that the 'charismatic' Hitler would "repudiate his origin"
if he ever came to power. He would discard the "small classes", the servile
instrument of his petty ambition, and consolidate his leadership by pursuing
policies "organically" in the interests of the "big classes". But what did he mean by
saying that the movement would, in time, shed its "arbitrary, 'symbiotic' features"
24 §6.97.Past and Present Great Ambition and Petty Ambitionsr cell p.n2.
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(§15.06)?
A possible 'dialectical' reading would be this. In time the Nazis would learn to do
without their partners the Nationalists because the existence of this "historical
party" - the party of the agrarians - depended on conditions (§14.53) which were
disappearing. The Nazis would then shed the arbitrary, symbiotic features of their
ideology. Gramsci was probably thinking of the "socialist" elements of National
Socialism which appealed especially to the "small classes". Their function was to
"integrate", or "counter-balance", the ideology of the traditional nationalists: this is
what he means by the "division of political labour (quite useful in its way)" between
the two parties. These elements served the 'demagogic' purpose of Hitler during
the social crisis of 1929-33 but once he had freed himself from dependency on the
historical party and had consolidated his leadership, these elements were no
longer needed. This putative reading of §15.06 is consistent with the several
elements of Gramsci's conception found in other notes, including the "law of the
turncoat" mentioned in §15.07.
115.07 (II) The Day of the 'Big Uen'
In §15.07 Gramsci made a sardonic comment on a Polish press report (which he
read in the issue of Rassegna settimanale of 14 February) about the new round of
Reichstag elections due on 5 March. The blend of stoical realism and mature
sarcasm suggested that in spite of the appalling state of his health his marxist
political intelligence was as sharp as ever. Unravelling the Polish statement,
Gramsci came up with a fresh analysis of the combination of 'force and consent'
which characterises the transition from a parliamentary to a fascist regime.
115.07. Machiavelli. Electlona. A Pollah paper (the Gazeta Polaka It the end of Jlnuary
or the atart of February) carried the following statement: 'Power la always conquered by
meana of a great plebiscite. The method of voting la either by ballot or by ahootlng. The
flrat la quantitative, the aecond qualitative. In the flrat you have to rely on the majority of
amall people, In the aecond you rely on the minority of 'big ahots' (grandl carafterl )'.
There'a a grain of truth In all thla muddle. Why ahould the 'ahootlng' alway. coincide with
the big men? Why ahould the one who pulla the trigger alwlY. be a big min? Theae big men
are often hired for a few lire a day - the point being, In other worda, that 'ahootlng' I. often
more economicil than an election. Now that one man one vote haa been Introduced, the
coat of corrupting the voter la prohibitive: twenty lire and a rifle la enough to get rid of
twenty vote,.. The 'big ahots' of which the Gazeta Po/ska apeaka are also aubJect to the
law of the turncoat.m
25 §15.07.Machiavelli. Elections,OCIII p.1761. The quotation from the GazBla PoIslca was reported in
RSE, 14 February 1933, p.346: see Professor Gerratana's note in QCIV p.2942.
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As we saw from §14.03, Gramsci was also studying French as well as Polish press
reactions to the new regime in Germany. In the same issue of Rassegna
settimana/e which reported theGazeta Po/ska, he read an appeal to the German
Communists by the French left-wing paper Popu/airs. It was full of foreboding at
the "terrible situation" facing the German proletariat as Hitler's Storm Troops
strained at the leash. It blamed Stalin for putting the German workers in this
position.
The question is whether Hitler as Chancellor can get his troops to obey him as he did as leader of the
national opposition. This is doubtful. The mass of elements demoralised by the crisis are waiting for
the creation of Hitler's 'Third Reich' to put an end to their misery and will hardly be impressed if their
leader acts conservatively. It is probable that sooner or later Hitler will either come into conflict with his
troops or be forced to follow the movement and give his government the character of a real fascist
revolution .
. Meanwhile. the German proletariat is in a terrible situation. The only means left to it to resist the
capitalist and fascist reaction is to bring about the unity of the workers. But for this the support of the
communists is necessary. Is there any hope of a change of attitude on their part? Will they understand
the necessity of abandoning the method of divisive and fratricidal struggle? To achieve this it would be
necessary to shake off the tutelage of Stalin.a
The Nazi reign of terror was let loose on the night of the Reichstag Fire, 27-28
February, a week before election day. Its first target was the cadres of the German
Communist party, which were destroyed with lightning speed. In view of the pivotal
role of the German party in the whole revolutionary project in the 'West', the
implications of the event were not lost on Gramsci. Even though the defeat was
foreseeable, it must have come as a hard blow to his morale. Far from losing his
head, he set about rationally analysing the lessons of the defeat. His preferred
image of Prometheus not as the tragic hero at war with the gods but as homo faber
in his workshop comes to mind at this point. Nevertheless, it was not entirely
coincidental that Gramsci questioned the point of his own resistance at this
moment. On 27 February, the same day as the Reichstag Fire, he wrote to Tatiana:
"Sometimes I think my whole life has been a big mistake (big for me anyway) "1
In fact, Gramsci did not surrender to this thought but for once in his moral nfe he
26 RSE, 14 February 1933, p.344-345.
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needed other people to convince him that he was wrong.27
Gramsci must have written §15.07 in the second half of February or the first half of
March 1933. Whether he wrote it before the Reichstag Fire on 27-28 February, in
anticipation of the Nazi terror, or after the election on 5 March when the results of
the terror had become apparent, is hard to say. Certainly, the combination of
'voting' and 'shooting' closely approximated to the brutal reality of the election.
Moreover, the analysis of "collective (political) disasters" in the preceding §15.04
probably refers to the destruction of the German Communist party and suggests
that this was an accomplished fact by the time he wrote §15.07. In §15.04 Gramsci
already asks who was responsible for the disaster. The reference to the German
disaster is disguised for prudential reasons behind the familiar mask of
generalisation, but he does not hide his indignation at "the criminal habit of
allowing useless sacrifices through negligence".
115.04. Machiavelli. Elements of Politics [extract]. .
Sinc. the division between rul.r. and ruled al.o exl.t. within the .ame group, certain
principles have to be fixed upon and .trlctly ob.erved. For thla I. the area where the mo.t
.erlou. 'errore' occur, where the mcst criminal weakn••••• and the hard.st to correct ar.
revealed. For when It la a qu.atlon of the same group, the bell.f I. common that obedience
mu.t be automatic; not only must It come about without any need to demon.trate It.
'neces.lty' and rationality, It must be unque.tlonlng. (Some balleve and, what I. wor.e,
act In the ballef that obedience 'will com.' without being .ollclted, without the path which
has to be followed being pOinted out). Thua It Is difficult to cure leader. completely of
'Cadornl.m' or the conviction that a thing will b. done becau•• the leader think. It la right
and rational to do It: If It la not done, the 'blame' I. put on thoae who 'ought to hav.' etc.
Thua It la hard too to root out the criminal habit of allowing us.leas sacrlflc.a through
negllgenc.. Yet common a.nse show. that the majority of collective (political) dlaa.tera
occur becaua. no att.mpt ha. been made to avoid ua.leaa .acrlflce, or becauae
manlf•• tly no account ha. been taken of the .acrlflces or other. who.. lives have been
gambled wlth .....Thl. prlnclpl. extend. to all action. d.mandlng aacrlflcea. Hence after
.v.ry dl... t.r It I. flrat nec.... ry to find out the responalblllty of the lead.r. and to ba
precl•• about It (ter .xampl.: a front I. made up of varloua aectore and each aector haa
It. lead.ra; It I. po•• lbl. that the I.ad.ra or one •• ctor are more re.ponslbl. for a
particular d.r.at than tho•• or anoth.r, but It la a queatlon of degree - nev.r or anybody
b.lng .x.mpt rrom r.apon.lbllltY.3I
27Gramsci'sseveralAutobiographical Notes writtenat this time should also be studied to understand
his 'moral' stateof mindat this point, notably his reflectionson -catastrophesof character" in §15.09 in
whichhesays: -It is certainthat a 'terroristic'elementhascrept in whichwas not there in the past, an
elementof materialaswell as moralterrorism,which is not to be disdained-.QCIII p.1762-1764.
ProfessorGerratana notes the close correlationbetween these Autobiographical Notes and
Gramsci'sletterto Tatiana of 6March1933(QCIVp.2942-2943): to further 'integrate'this crucial
momentinGramsci'slife, however, it is also importantto note the wider historicalmomentwhich
wasdefinedby the catastropheof the GermanCommunistparty In March 1933.
28 §15.04. Machiavelli. Elements of Politics, oelll p.1752-1753.The whole note is translated in SPN
p.144-146.
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No doubt the German disaster confirmed the pessimistic view Gramsci had always
taken of the political ability of the leaders of German Communism, but the blame
was not entirely theirs. For the division between rulers and ruled "within the same
group" ran along national lines, so that the question was this: how far were the
leaders of the German 'sector' responsible, how far the leaders of the RUSSian
'sector'? The responsibility was shared, perhaps not to the same degree, but there
was no question of anybody being exempt - including Cadorna himself, the
commander-in-chief. For according to this analysis, was not the disaster caused by
Cadorna's belief that "obedience must be automatic", "without being solicited"?
When things were not done, were not others blamed for not doing what they "ought
to have" done, leaving Cadorna himself "exempt from responsibility"? The passage
can be read as an analysis of Stalin's relation to German Communism. Uke
Cadorna, Stalin believed that "obedience must be automatic" and, like Cadorna, he
passed the blame off onto others when things went badly. Of course, we can never
"prove" the veracity of this reading of §15.04 because of the mask of generalisation
which Gramsci wore to protect himself from the 'inquisition' not only in Rome but
also in Moscow.
Meanwhile Gramsci prefigured future political developments in Germany when he
suggested in §15.07 that the "big shots" of the Gazeta Po/ska were subject to the
law of the turncoat. The "law" began to operate soon after the election as Hitler tried
to regain control of the "national revolution" let loose on the night of the Reichstag
Fire. In his radio broadcast of 12 March Hitler, with barely concealed anxiety, called
off his bloodhounds, the Storm Troops, and ordered them to observe the "strictest
discipline". The "second phase" of the struggle had now begun, but this would be
"conducted from above, according to a definite plan".29 The leader's call to order
did nothing to quench the thirst of the Storm Troops for a "second revolution". The
nature of this "second revolution" was never clearly defined: for some it meant the
takeover of the State by the party, purging it of conservative, upper-class elements·
I
for others it meant nothing less than the expropriation of "big capital". It was a
parody of a 'socialist' revolution fuelled by all the rage of the small classes against
the big classes. The spectre of this "second revolution" was excorcisecJon the Night
of the Long Knives on 30 June 1934 when the turncoat Hitler "beheaded" his own
Storm Troops. It could be argued that this was also the moment when the
movement shed "its arbitrary, symbiotic features" if these are understood to be the
29 Hitler's broadcast of 12 March was reported in RSE, 28 March 1933, p.7oo (see above).
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'socialistic' elements of its ideology. However, Gramsci may not have grasped in
1933 that the 'socialism' in National Socialism was the same thing as its anti-
Semitism (the 'socialism of fools') and that anti-Semitism not socialism was in fact
the permanent source of the movement's "revolutionary" dynamic.
§14.68. Stalin and the German Disaster
In a thought-provoking postscript introducing Gramsci to English readers for the first
time, Professor Stuart-Hughes argued that the crucial difficulty in assessing his
career lay in "his position of party leadership at Russian direction".30 This difficulty
does not appear so "crucial" to us as it did to Stuart-Hughes writing at the height of
the Cold War in the 1950s, but as a historical (as distinct from political) judgement,
he was correct: Russian leadership of the Communist International after Lenin's
death presented Gramsci with real difficulties. This was most apparent in his
suppressed letter to the Russian leaders in 1926 and, again, in his 'tacit'
disagreement with the political line of the 'third period' in 1930. Gramsci recalled
Lenin's self-criticism at the Fourth Congress in 1922 to the effect that international
policy could not be translated into European languages because it was "too
Russian" (§7.02). The tension reached breaking-point in 1933 when the Third
International suffered its worst and, in some ways, its final disaster in Germany. But
having reached breaking-point, Gramsci did not 'break'. Why was this?
On 27 February 1933 Gramsci told Tatiana that he had arrived at a turning-
point in his life and had taken a "decision", or a series of decisions.31 This deciSion
coincided with a decisive turning-point in the international Situation, ie, the advent
to power of Hitler in Germany followed, within weeks, by the destruction of German
Communism. The German disaster would plausibly explain his dramatic statement
in this letter that "sometimes I think my whole life has been a big mistake (big for me
at least), a miscalculation". As suggested earlier, there were three closely related
elements in Gramsci's decision. The first was to continue his resistance to the
Fascist regime in Italy whilst pursuing his legal right to conditional liberty. The
second followed from the first: this was to maintain "communist diSCipline" in spite
of being haunted by doubts about the leadership in Moscow, especially about its
30H.Stuart-Hughes: Consciousness and Society. The reorientation of European social thought
1890-1930 (1958) p.100.
31 To Tatiana 27 February 1933. LeU p.690.
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intentions towards him. The third element was intimately bound up with the second:
this was the decision to stay in touch with his Russian wife Julia and his two sons in
Moscow. Gramsci was in an impossible situation, caught between the visible
tribunal of Fascism and the invisible tribunal of Stalinism. He had only to
contemplate the possibility of open apostasy to realise that it was completely out of
the question. Not only would he give himself up as a hostage to Mussolini's
propaganda machine, his apostasy could have incalculable consequences for his
wife and family living in Stalin's Moscow.
Gramsci 'testified' to the spirit of communist discipline in §14.68. It is the only one of
his notes to refer to Stalin, albeit in a thinly disguised way. Gramsci must have
written it at the time of the destruction of German Communism in the Nazi terror of
February-March 1933.32 The extraordinary thing is that at the moment of the
Comintern's greatest disaster Gramsci writes what appears to be a defence of the
international leader, Stalin. In particular, he now defends Stalin from the
accusation of "nationalism" - the very criticism which he himself had levelled
against him in private conversation with Riboldi in 1931.33 To rekindle the spirit of
communist discipline, it was necessary to return to orthodox positions through "self-
criticism", free from any trace of "hypocrisy".34 It was a difficult exercise in which
pessimism of the intelligence and optimism of the will struggled with each other for
mastery.
114.88 . .,.chl.valll. Joaeph eeaaarlona'l piece of September 1927 (In questlon-and-
anlwer form) ral ... lome kay polnta of the aclence and art of politics. The point to
develop In my opinion la thla: how lhould the national aapect of the International Iituation
be understood by the phlloaophy of praxll (when exp'HHd In political form)? What
anawer doM Ita founder [Ie, Marx] and, In particular, Ita great .. t recent theorlat [Ie,
Lenin] give to thll queltlon?
Really the 'national' aapect la the rHult (In a certain aenae) of a Iingular, 'original'
combination of clrcumltane .. and It la only by underltandlng and perceiving Ita original
and alngular nature that the national altuatlon ean be dominated and directed.
Undoubtedly the line of development will be towarda Internatlonallam: the perapectlve I.
Intarnatlonal and must be ao. But the ltartlng-polnt II 'national' and one mUlt begin from
thll point. Hence It I. necea.. ry to Itudy accurataly the combination of national forc_
which It II the ta.k of the International cia .. to lead and develop along International 11"-
In accordance with the International perlpectlve and dlrectlvea. The leading cia.. only
leadl If It Interprets thl. combination exactly: thll cia.. ltaelf I. part of the combination
32 Note the theme of the following §14.70. Machiavelli. When it can be said that a party;s formed and
cannot be destroyed by normal means, QCIII p.1732-1735, which was suggested by the destruction
of the German Communist party by abnormal means, ie, by terroristic rather than electoral methods.
33See the GramSCi-Riboldi conversation of 1931 discussed above.
34 The referenc_e is to the problem formulated in the following §14.74.Past and Present. Self-criticism
and the HypoCrisy of Self-criticism, QCIII p.1742-1743. The whole note is translated in SPN p.254-
257.
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and this is precisely why it can lead the movement in a certain direction and with certain
perspectives. In my opinion this Is the fundamental point of disagreement between Leon
Davldovltch and Bessarlone as Interpreter of the majority [Ie, Bolshevik] movement. The
accusations of nationalism are Invalid since they do not get to the heart of the question.
Study of the majority [Ie, Bolshevik] struggle from 1902 to 1917 shows that Its originality
consists In purging Internationalism of any vague, purely Ideological element ('Ideological'
In the perjoratlve sense) and In giving It a politically realistic content.
The whole complex of national needs can be understood In terms of the concept of
hegemony and one can S88 why certain tendencies never mention this concept or only
touch on It. A class which Is International In character must, In a certain sense,
'nationalise' Itself If It Is to guide social strata whose outlook Is narrowly national
(Intellectuals) and often not even national but particularistic and locallstlc (peasants).
Moreover, the sense In which It nationalises Itself cannot be too definitive because the
conditions needed for an economy based on a world plan can only arise after first passing
through multiple phases In which the regional combinations (consisting of groups of
nations) may be variable. BeSides, It must never be forgotten that historical development
Is driven by the laws of necessity until such times as those forces which are aiming to
construct a planned economy based on a peaceful and cooperative division of labour have
decisively gained the Initiative.
Concepts which are not national (Ie, which cannot be applied to each Individual country)
are obviously mistaken and meaningless. They have resulted In a state of passivity and
Inertia In two quite distinct phases: 1) In the first phase no one accepted the
responsibility of making a start believing that, once having started, they would find
themselves Isolated. Everyone waited for everyone to start together and the result In the
meantime was that no one got started and set about organising the movement. 2) the
second phase I. possibly worse because everyone Is waiting for a form of 'Napoleonlsm',
which Is anachronistic and quite unnatural (since not all historical pha... are repeated In
the same form).
The theoretical flaws In this modern version of the old mechanistic mode of thinking are
masked by the general theory of permanent revolution: this Is nothing more than a
forecast of a general type presented as a dogma and which collaps.. automatically by
virtue of the fact that It Is not coming true.35
There is no reason to doubt Gramsci's sincerity in revising the accusations of
nationalism against Stalin which "do not get to the heart of the question", but the
view he expressed to Riboldi in 1931 that "even in the International Stalin is first a
RuSSian, then a Communisr remained unchanged. This is the key to
understanding Gramsci's position in this note. It was based on Lenin's self-criticism
at the Fourth Congress in 1922 (§7.1 0) when he warned that international policy
could not be applied in other countries because it was "too Russian".
What is the relation between past and present in this note? Its immediate "practical
origin" was the German disaster of 1933, but it brings to mind the debate which
arose in the Russian Communist party a decade earlier following the defeat in
Germany in 1923 when Stalin's doctrine of 'socialism in one country' was evolved
in opposition to Trotsky's theory of 'permanent revolution'. Gramsci appears to take
sides. Starting from the premiss that "the starting-point must be national", he
justifies Stalin's doctrine on the grounds that the international class had to
35 §14.68. MachiavelH. QCIII p.1728-1730. Translated in SPN p.240-241.
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"nationalise" itself in order to lead other classes in Russia which do not have an
international character and outlook. At the same time Gramsci resumes his critical
attack on the theory of permanent revolution which (as the latest German disaster
showed) "collapses automatically by virtue of the fact that it is not coming true". The
destruction of German Communism in 1933 made 'socialism in one country' (ie, the
construction of a 'planned economy' currently in progress in Russia) a reality. This
note was a sort of 'act of faith' by Gramsci in the whole project of socialist
construction in the Soviet Union. It was an act of faith in the future of his own
children as much as anything else, but as a statement of communist orthodoxy and
a demonstration of communist discipline he could not have made himself clearer.
Indeed, Gramsci was so successful in this that some writers have gone so far as to
accuse him of "paying homage" to Stalin. The invisible tribunal in Moscow,
therefore, would have no grounds for complaintl
But is it the case that Gramsci simply 'takes sides' in this note? By placing it under
the rubric 'Machiavelli' his intentions were 'scientific', where the essence of
Machiavellism was its 'objective' validity for both sides. But how could he be
'objective' whilst appearing to take sides? The fact was that 1933 was not simply a
return by Gramsci to post-1923 positions as though nothing had changed, since
Stalin had in the meantime 'exchanged' positions with Trotsky in the field of
international policy. Gramsci thought that the offensive tactic adopted in 1929 was
a variety of permanent revolution. This tactic was imposed indiscriminately on all
countries but it could not be applied in Germany (let alone Italy) where it proved to
be "obviously mistaken and meaningless". The imposition of this tactic by Moscow
changes the significance of Gramsci's premiSS, for in Germany (and Italy) the
"starting-poinf was not national but Russian. The international tactic reflected the
needs of the Russian situation at the start of the Five-Year Plan in 1929. GramSCi's
criticisms of permanent revolution testifed to his orthodoxy, to be sure, but they
were meant to apply to the policy of the current international leader, Stalin.
This dialectical CMachiaveliian') interpretation of §14.68 is supported by study of
the collateral notes written at this time which testify to Gramsci's view that as leader
of the International Stalin was "first a RUSSian, then a communisr.
A comment on contemporary Russia in §14.63, for example, provides a revealing
insight into Gramsci's view of the 'national' interests behind Stalin's international
policy. In this note he examines the question of how we study history. He starts from
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an observation by the English historian Seeley to the effect that the 'national'
standpoint of the historian leads him to select and emphasise certain facts in
preference to others which are 'objectively' more important as far as their
consequences are concerned. He goes on to refer to H.G.Welis' A Short History of
the World as a useful corrective to the predominantly 'Eurocentric' perspective on
world history: "reading Wells' books on world history reminds us of this neglect and
indifference. The reality is that up to now we have been interested in European
history and what we have called 'world history' is the history of Europe and its non-
European dependencies". This is because history interests us for national (ie,
political) reasons. It is possible that the cultural influence of Marxism will encourage
greater objectivity in the study of history, but Gramsci could honestly see no sign of
this happening in the first 'Marxist' State.
114.83 (extract) .....
Maybe these Interests are becoming broader under the Influence of the philosophy of
praxis [Ie, Marxism] which tends to persuade us that only knowledgeof an entire historical
process can provide us with an .xplanatlon of the pr.sent time and confirm that our
political forecasts are reasonably plausible and concrete. But we should have no illusions
even on this score. Although there Is a lot of Intereat In Russia In oriental questions, this
Inter.st arls.s from the geopolitical position of RUssiaand not from more universal and
scientific cultural Influenc.s. I must tell the truth (Devo dire I. verlt. ): a lot of people
don't even know the history of Italy to the extent that It explains the present time, even
though It Is necessary, It seams to me, to be familiar with this history bafore any other. A
think-tank on foreign polley which studied In d.pth even the questions of Cochln-Chlna
and Annamwould not displease me Intellectually, therefore: but how many would ba
Interested In Its work?311
Russia's interest in oriental questions was inspired by national interests not
scientific ones. This would hardly be surprising but for the fact that Moscow was not
only the capital of a nation-state but the headquarters of the Communist
International whose mission was to promote world revolution. It was only by
studying the history of other countries 'objectively' that the Comintern could be sure
that its political forecasts were reasonably plausible and concrete. The political
forecast for the 'third period' turned out to be completely mistaken as far as the
countries of Europe were concerned. Nor could it be said that the interest in
oriental questions was a sign that Russia had broken with the Eurocentric view of
world history "since a lot of people do not even know the history of Italy" let alone
that of Cochin-China.
Gramsci continues this 'oriental' theme later in §1S.21. The hero of this note is
Tizio, the Italian equivalent of Tom in 'Tom, Dick, and Harry'. The real identity of
36 §14.63. Arguments about cunure. How to Study History?, aCIII,p.1722-1723.
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Tizio is (and always will bel) unknown, of course: all we know about him is that he
was completely ignorant of foreign languages and spoke only the local dialect. This
presented certain difficulties, especially when it came to studying oriental
questions.
§15.21 . P•• t .nd Pre.ent. If we asked nzlo, who ha. never studied Chl.,..e and only
knows the dialect of hi. own province, to tranalate a paaaageof Chln.. e, he would quite
reasonablybe surprised and take the matter as a Joke; If we then lnal.ted, he would think
he wa. being taken for a ride, get offended and .tart a fight. Well, even without being
asked, this same nzlo thinks he Is authorised to speak about a whole .. rI.. of qu.. tlona
requiring a knowledgeof Chinese even though he I. Ignorant of the technical language,
the historical position, the connection with other questlona, and sometlm.. even the
fundamental and distinctive elementa. All he knows about Chine.. I. that It I. a language
of a given people which Inhablta a given point on the earth: he Is Ignorant of the
Intellectual topography of th.. e qu.. tlons and of the frontle,. which mark their IImlts.v
Let us suppose that the real identity of Tizio is Stalin. Although this supposition ean
never be 'proved', it must be said that Tizio bears a striking resemblance to him.
For in spite of his complete ignorance of foreign languages, did not Stalin as leader
of the Communist International also think he was authorised to speak about a
whole series of questions requiring a knowledge of foreign languages, not
excluding Chinese? Stalin's disastrous policy in the Chinese Revolution in 1927,
for example, was proof that not even Chinese questions were excluded from his
range of international 'expertise'. Of course, those who think that Gramsci 'paid
homage' to Stalin in the notebooks will find it hard to credit him with such a
sarcastically damning critique of Stalin's international leadership. Apart from telling
us about Russia's interest in oriental questions, including presumably Chinese
questions, Gramsci gives no clues to Tizio's identity. Perhaps the most significant
clue lies in the metaphor of "translation" itself. The same metaphor was used by
Lenin in his last speech to the Fourth Congress in 1922 (which Gramsci attended in
person) when he said that we Russians have not been able to "translate" our
language into European languages. As a linguist by training, Gramsci was much
impressed by Lenin's metaphor and the difficulty he alluded to of translating theory
into practice. This difficulty was never overcome because Stalin (like Tizio) had no
capacity for self-criticism and no idea of his cultural limitations.
Although Gramsci decided for compelling reasons to maintain communist
discipline in 1933, there was a significant element of machiavellian 'duplicity' In his
attitude. However we judge his deCiSion,it would be wrong to characterise his
37 §1S.21. Past and Present. QCIII. p.1n9.
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duplicity as 'hypocrisy'. Gramsci used duplicity to tell the truth under impossible
circumstances. Under historical conditions in which the lie reigned supreme on
both sides, to find a way of telling the truth was an achievement in itself.
§14.70. The Problem of 'Playing the Foreigner's Game'
The difficulty raised by Stuart-Hughes of "party leadership at Russian direction"
was analysed objectively by Gramsci himself in §14.70. Machiavelli. When it can
be said that a party is established and cannot be destroyed by normal methods. If
the German Communist party had been destroyed as Gramsci suspected, it was
not by normal means: as the election results of 5 March confirmed, the party was
destroyed by 'shooting' not by 'voting' (§15.07). Nevertheless, the event raised the
general question of what parties must do to prepare for the possibility of their own
destruction. "Since defeat in the struggle must always be envisaged, the
preparation of one's own successors is just as important as what is done to achieve
victory" (§14.70). Gramsci now returned to the study of party cadres started in
§9.62. Machiavelli. The theorem of fixed proportions where he analysed the
strengths and weaknesses, both quantitative and qualitative, of a party's "leaders"
at different levels. In Gramsci's "morphology" the existence of a party depends on
three fundamental elements which he loosely defines as the mass element, the
cohesive element, and the intermediate element. Between these elements there
exists ''fixed proportions" and the party achieves maximum efficiency when these
proportions are achieved. The cohesive element is the most fundamental: without it
the party does not exist.
114.70 [excerpt] •.....•
2) The main cohesive element which centralises nationally and makes effective and
powerful a complex of forces which left to themselves would count for little or nothing.
This element Is endowed with great cohesive, centralising and disciplinary power; perhaps
for this reason It also hal the power of Innovation (Innovation, that Is, In a certain
direction, according to certain lines of force, certain perspectiVes, even certain
preml .. es). It Is allo true that this element alone would not form the party although It
counts for more In this respect than the first element considered. We speak of generals
(capltanl) without an army but In reality It Is easier to form an army than to form generals:
Indeed, an (already existing) army Is destroyed If It 10888 Its generals whereas the
existence of a united group of generals who agr.. among them .. lves and have common
alms will soon form an army even where none exists ••
38 §14. 70. Machiavelli. When it can be said that aparty is formed and cannot be destroyed by normal
means, oelll p.1733. The whole note is translated in SPN p.151-155, starting from: "The problem of
knowing when a party....... .", and ending: -But nobody can prevent speculation from being made".
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Since a party cannot exist without a general staff, they have a responsibility to
anticipate the possibility of their own disappearance. The long-term 'educative'
function of political leadership always present in Gramsci's thinking is the key to
this:
This secondelement can be destroyedall the more easily becauseIt Is small In number,
but In case It Is destroyed It Is necessarythat It leaves behind as Its heritage a ferm.nt
from which It may be recreated.And where could this f.rment bettar be formed and subsist
than In the first and third el.ments, which ar. obviously the neareat In character to the
second? Th. activity of the second element towards creating this ferment Is therefor.
fundamentaland so the criteria by which It should be judged are to be sought In (1) what It
actually does, (2) what provision It mak.. for the possibility of Its own d.. tructlon. Since
defeat In the struggle must always be envisaged, the preparation of on.'s own successora
Is just as Important as what one does to achieveVictory.•
But what if. the leaders are "conceited" enough to think that the party is
indestructable and make no such preparations? The "conceif of the German
leaders consisted in thinking that the party was strong because it could count on
the backing of a foreign State, the Soviet Union, which would not stand by and
allow it to be destroyed. This was a source of weakness not strength. It was not
simply that the propaganda of the German nationalists took advantage of the
party's links with Moscow to accuse it of "playing the foreigner's game": there was
also the danger that in their subservience to Moscow, the leaders did nothing on
their own initiative to prepare for the party's destruction.
With regard to the party's 'conceit' , this may be said to be worse than the national
conc.lt of which Vlco speaks.Why? eec.use a nation cannot help .xlstlng and glv.n the
fact that It .xlsts It Is always possible, albeit with goodwill .nd by soliciting the texts, to
discover that Its existence Is full of destiny .nd me.nlng. On the other hand a party may
not .xlst by virtue of Its own strength. It should never be forgotten that In the struggl.
betweenn.tlons, It Is In the Int.reat of each one of them that the other should be
weakenedby Intern.1 struggles and that the parties are precisely the ... m.nt. of Internal
struggl... H.nc. It Is .Iways possible to rals. the question whether the parties .xlst by
virtue of their own strength, by their own necessity, or exllt Instead only to s.rve the
Interelt of others (In f.ct, thll point II never overlooked In the polemics; Ind.ed, It Is
even. recurring theme,elpeclally when the .nawer II not In doubt - which means, In
oth.r wordl, that It hal taken hold .nd lOWS doubts). Naturally, .nybody who allowed
himself to be torn apart by such doubts would be a fool. Politically the question I. of
purely moment.ry relev.nce. In the history of the so-called prlnclpl. of nationality.
foreign Int.rventlon. In favour of national partl.. which troubl. the Intem.1 order of
enemy State. are Innumer.bl.......... AI we .ee. the 1I.t of ex.mples I. • long on. .nd ao
It Is Mc.... ry to h.ve clear Ide.. on the subject Given that wh.t.ver one does, one I•
• Iways pl.ylng somebody'l g.me, the Important thing Is to try In every w.y to pl.y one'.
own gamesucc.. sfully - In other words, to win outright In any event, party conceit Is to
be scorned .nd repl.ced by concrete deed•. Anyone who substltut.s conceit for concrete
deads, or Indulg.. In the politic. of conceit. Is not to be taken seriously .t .11.It Is
needl.. s to .dd th.t partl.. mu.t avoid giving even the 'Justified' appearanceof playing
somebodyeisa's g.me, especl.lIy If the somebody Is • foreign State. If there Is
39 Ibid.• p.1734.
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speculation, nodody can prevent it.41
The 'objective' implications of this passage are very interesting. A recurring theme
in the polemics of the German nationalists was that the communists were playing
Moscow's game: this was the main theme of the "national revolution" launched by
Hitler on 31 January 1933 and G ramsci acknowledges that the accusation
"has taken hold and sows doubts". But aside from the "momentary" propaganda of
the German nationalists, Gramsci is objective enough to realise that "it should
never be forgotten [least of all by communist leaders] that in the struggle between
nations, it is in the interests of each one that the other should be weakened by
internal struggles and that the parties are precisely the elements of internal
struggles". If Gramsci applied this principle to the relation between the Soviet
Union and the German Communist party as the context suggests, the question
arose of whether the party existed by its own necessity or to serve Russian
interests. Certainly, the Soviet Union had every interest in weakening its capitalist
enemies by promoting internal struggles when its own energies were fully
absorbed in the terrible struggles of collectivisation and industrialisation. Indeed,
seldom was the Soviet interest in weakening its external enemies more compelling
than in the winter of 1932-33 when the Ukraine was gripped by a terrible famine
directly induced by the policy of collectivisation. Gramsci's perception of the Soviet
Union's 'instrumental' use of communist parties in other countries had grown since
the start of the 'third period' in 1929 when the change to 'offensive' tactics by the
Communist International COincided with the launch of the Soviet Five-Year Plan.
These tactics were "obviously mistaken and meaningless" as far as Italy was
concerned and (after the Nazi breakthrough in 1930) the same applied to
Germany. The tactics reflected the Russian situation and served Russian needs. To
use Lenin's phrase, they were "too Russian".
This passage also clarifies what Gramsci meant in §14.68 by saying that
international concepts which could not be applied in practise had resulted "in a
state of passivity and inertia in two distinct phases". What were these phases? The
first phase culminated in the outbreak of war in 1914 which marked, as Gramsci
saw it, the demise of the Second International. The second phase culminated in
the advent of Hitler and the passive destruction of German communism in 1933.
40 ibid .• p.1735.
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For were not the leaders of German Communism (with Trotsky's encouragement)41
"waiting for a form of Napoleonism" in 1933? Was not the false expectation of
intervention by the Red Army part of their fatal "conceif? The logic of Gramsci's
thinking appears to be that 1933 effectively marked the demise of the Third
International. Needless to say, this did not imply that marxist internationalism was
dead: the Spanish Civil War shortly after provided abundant 'practical' proof that it
was not. Gramsci merely implied that the Russian or Stalinist concepts which now
reigned supreme in the Third International had nothing to do with internationalism.
A further implication of Gramsci's objectivity, however, relates to the question
of "communist discipline". For the principle that "in the struggle between nations, it
is in the interest of each one that the other should be weakened by internal
struggles" applied to the SoViet Urifon in the reverse sense. This would explain
Gramsci's reflections on the phenomenon of "black parliamentarism" in §14.74 and
§14.76, which he explicitly extended to the Soviet Union.
It .ppe.... that 'bl.ck' parllamentarlamla • theme to develop more fully If only becaua. It
affords the opportunity to define precl.. ly the political concepts which make up the
'parliamentary' conception. The comparisons with other countrlee are Intereetlng In thl.
regard: was not the liquidation of Leon O.vldovlth, for example, '.Ieo' an episode In the
IIquld.tlon of the 'black' parliament which continued to exlat after the abolition of the
'legal' parllament'IR
The precise context of these last notes in Notebook 14 must be established more
positively before we jump to conclusions about Gramsci's 'position' between
Trotsky and Stalin. His 'position' is usually more 'objective' than the surface of the
notes would lead us to believe and tended to be located at a critical distance from
both sides. Nevertheless, if Gramsci was suggesting that the liquidation of the
Trotskyist Opposition was necessary, this was consistent with his warning that
internal struggles were dangerous because they "played the foreigner's game-. It
was also consistent with his decision in 1933 to maintain "communist discipline"
and with his act of faith in the project of "socialist construction" in the Soviet Union.
41 Leon Trotsky: The Struggle against Fascism in Germany (Penguin, 1975). At the end of 'German
the Key to the International Situation' (26 November 1931) Trotsky stated: -It should be axiomatic forY'
every revolutionary worker that the attempt of the fascists to seize power in Germany must lead to the
mobilisation of the Red Army" (p.95). In 'Hitler and the Red Army' (21 March 1933) Trotsky stated:.A
year and a half ago, we wrote that the Red Army, In its principal mass. ought to tum its face to the West
to acquire the possibility of smashing fascism before it destroys the German proletariat..... (p.395).
42 §14.74. Past and Present. Self-Criticism and the Hypocrisy of SeIf-CritJcIsm, QCIII p.1742-1743
and its continuation in §14.76. Past and Present, QCIII p.1744.
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In spite of Trotsky's vision of the international preconditions of socialism and his
reservations about the tempo of Stalin's 'super-industrialisation', not even he
abandoned hope in this.
114.57, 115.05, 115.16. The Economic Conjuncture,1933
In early 1933 Gramsci attempted a new analysis of the capitalist crisis (§14.57 and
§15.05). The last time he addressed this question was during the financial panic in
Germany in the summer of 1931 (§6.123), although his comparative analysis of the
unemployment figures in England and Germany at their peak in the summer of
1932 (§9.61) showed that he continued to keep a sharp eye on movement of the
structure. 43 Th~ new analysis was probably based on the supposition that the
crisis was entering a new 'conjuncture' at the start of 1933. If so, this had as much
to do with political as economic developments. The "practical origin" of these notes,
written in February-March, was very probably the coming to power of Hitler and the
nationalist government in Germany. This is consistent with Gramsci's conception
that the economic 'conjuncture' was "closely linked to immediate politics" (§6.130)
and with the argument presented in these notes that "one of the most visible
features of the 'current crisis' is the aggravation of the nationalistic (State-
nationalistic) element in the economy" (§15.05). Gramsci was thinking of the first
measures of Hitler's government in economic policy - increased protection for
agriculture, commitment to autarky in foodstuffs, and unilateral repeal of the
commercial quotas recently agreed with France« - although he obviously meant to
describe a general trend rather than a particular case.
Gramsci's starts from the liberal analysis of the 'elements' of the economic crisis as
listed by Einaudi'sLa Riforma Socia Ie at the start of 1933.45 He suggests a
different starting-point more in tune with current political trends than 'classical'
economic theory. "It seems to me that in doing an analysis it is necessary to start by
listing the impediments which national (or nationalistic) policies have put in the way
of the circulation of 1) goods 2) capital 3) men". He argues that since the crisis is
43 See above: §6.123.Past and Present. Observations on the crisis of 1929-30-1, OCli p.792-793,
and §9.61. Past and Present. England and Germany, QCII pl131-1132.
44 See the report on 'The Economic Situation' under the rubric Geimania In RSE, 7 March 1933,
p.512-514.
45See Professor Gerratana's note to §14.57. Past and Present, in OCIV p. 2934.
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not 'conjunctural' (as Einaudi assumed)46 but 'organic', it can only be overcome by
creating a new structure "which will take account of the tendencies built into the old
structure and dominate these through the new premisses on which it is based". By
the 'old structure' Gramsci means the liberal regime with its tendency towards free
(ie, international) Circulation, but the many barriers now being erected to free
circulation were creating a 'new structure'. The new premiss was nationalist rather
than internationalist.
114.57. Pa.t and Pre•• nt .
In this case the major premiss Is nationalism, which does not Simply consist In the attempt
to produce In one's own territory everything consumed there (which means that all 'orces
are directed towards antiCipating the state of war) since this finds expreaslon In
tradltlonal·.tyle protectionism. It also con.lsts In the attempt to fix the main channels of
trade with particular countries either becauae they are alllea (and therefore to aupport or
to shape them In a way more suited to the atate of war) or with the aim of cutting them off
even before military hostllltiea begin (and this new type ot economic policy la the policy ot
'quotas' which I. baaed on the absurd preml.s that between two countrl .. there must be
an 'equal balance' In the exchange ot gooda, not that every country can only balance at
par by trading with all the other countries without dlstlnctlon).41
The thread of economic nationalism was then woven by Gramsci into his main
analysis in §1S.0S except that he now thinks of it as a tendency inherent from the
start in the 'old structure' rather than the premiss of a new one. Further threads from
his earlier notes on the economic crisis are now woven into the larger picture,
notably the conception of the national economy as a dynamic equilibrium between
competing tendencies (§6.123) and the reCiprocal function of different countries in
the international economy (§9.61). Moreover, the "catastrophic phase" starting in
1929 is part of an "organiC" crisis which must be seen in historical perspective.
11 5.05. Pa.t and Pres.nt. The Cri.,.. The atudy of the events which are .ubsumed under
the term 'crl.I.' and which have aa.umed a protracted, cata.trophlc torm trom 1929 to the
pre.ent time merit. apeclal attention.
1) Anyone who trle. to argue that there I. a single Interpretation of theae events, or (and
this amounts to the same thing) to find a single cause or origin. will have to be rebutted.
We are dealing with a proc.. s with many manlfestatlona. In which cau.e. and effecta are
Intertwined and overlap with each other. To simplify means to distort and to
mlsrepre.ent.lt la a complex proc.... theretore, like many other phenomena, not a single
'event' which Is repeated In varlou. form. all originating trom a alngle cau...
2) When did the crl.l. begin? Thl. question Is bound up with the flr.t one. Since we are
dealing with a development not with an event. thla la an Important question. Wa could uy
that there la no .uch thing aa a starting date of the erial. but only of aome of the nolalar
'manifestation.' which are erroneoualy and tendentiously takan to be the erial. lteelf. For
.ome the atart ot the crl.la la the craah of the New York stock exchange In tha autumn of
1929, which for tho.e who want to find the origin and cause of the crlal. In 'Americanism'
46 Gramsci's analysis in §14.S7 recalls his criticism of this assumption in §8.216. Short Notes on
Economics. Ugo Spirito and Co., OCII p.1 076-1 078.
47 §14.S7. Past and Present, OCIII p.1716.
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is understandable.But the events of the autumnof 1929 In America are only one of the
noisy manifestations of the developing crisis, nothing more. The whole postwar period Is
one of crisis, with attempts to obviate It which have been successful now and again In this
or that country, nothing more. For others (and perhaps they are not far wrong) the war
Itself Is a manifestation of the crisiS, not to say the first manifestation: the political and
organisational response of those responsible for the crisis was precisely the war. (This
shows that It Is difficult In analysing the facts to separate the economic from the political,
Ideological crises etc even If this Is possible SCientifically, Ie, by a process of
abstraction).
3) Does the the crisis have Its origin In the technical relations, Ie, In the poSitions of the
respective classes, or In other facts? Legislation, disorders etc? It certainly appears
demonstrable that the crisis has 'technical' origins, Ie, In the respective class relations,
but that at the beginning Its first manifestationsor signs gave rise to conflicts of various
kinds and to legislative Interventions which showed up the 'crisis' Itself or which
Increasedsome of the component factors but did not determine It.
Thesethree points: 1) the crisis Is a complex process; 2) the crisis began at least with
the war, If this was not Its first manifestation; 3) the crisis has Internal origins, In the
modesof production and thus of exchange,and not In political or Juridical facts. These
seem to be the first three points to establish clearly and accurately.
A further point Is not to overlook the simple facts, Ie, the basic contradictions of
contemporarysociety, In favour of apparently complex (but It would be better to say 'far-
fetched') facts. One of the fundamental contradiction. Is this: that whereas
Internationalism, or rather 'cosmolltanlsm', Is the necessary premiss of economic life,
State life has developed Increasingly In the direction of 'nationalism', 'self-sufficiency'
etc. One of the most visible features of the 'current crisis' Is the aggravation of the
natlonall.tlc (State-nationalistic) element of the economy: quots systems, clearing,
re.trlctlons on foreign exchange dealings, balanced trading between only two .tate. etc.
Wecould therefore say - and thl. would be more exact - that the 'crisis' Is really the
quantitative Intensification of certain elements which are neither new nor original, but the
IntenSificationof certain phenomenaIn particular whereas other elements which were
present from the start and acted simultaneously with the first, with the effect of
neutralising them, have become Inoperative or have disappeared entirely. In brief, the
developmentof capitalism has been a 'continuous crisis', so to speak: that Is, an
extremely rapid movement of elements which balancedand neutralised one another. At a
certain point In this movement, some elements have become predominant whilst others
have disappearedor become Irrelevant In the general framework. This Is when events
.uddenly occur which are given the specifiCname 'crisis' and which are more or Ie..
serious depending precisely on whether major or minor elements of equilibrium come Into
play. Given this general framework, the various levels and aspects of the phenomenon
can be .tudled: monetary, finanCial, productive, Internal commerce, International
commerceetc, although this does not exclude the poSSibility - given the International
division 0' labour and of functions - that anyone of these aspects may appear to be the
prevalentor most obvious one In this country or that. But the fundamental problem Is that
of production and the disequilibrium In production between progre.. lve Industries (In
which constant capital has been Increasing) and stagnant Industries (where the Immediate
labour 'orce counts a lot). Since a stratification between progreulve and stagnant
Industrle. al.o occurs In the International field, It Is understandable that the countrle. In
which the progressive Industries are superabundanthave felt the crlsla more etc. Hence
the various illusions arising from the failure to understand the fact that the world Is a
unity whether one likes It or not, and that as long a. certain structural conditions exist all
countries wlli pass through certain 'crises'. (For all these arguments It will be necessary
to consult the literature produced by the Leagueof Nations, Its experts and Its financial
commissionwhich will at least be useful In assemblingali the material on the question; the
sameapplies to the publications of the most Important International Journals and the
Houses of Parliament)••
48 §15.05.Past and Present. The Crisis, QCIII p.1755-1759. A translation of the whole note is in
FSPN p.219-221.
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The idea of 'a stratification between progressive and stagnant (stazionarie )
industries in the international field' appears to be a generalisation from his earlier
analysis of the economic structure of England and Germany in §9.61 (August 1932)
which, he believed, would show "the reciprocal function of each in the world
economy - an aspect of the structure which is not usually observed very carefully".
By comparing the unemployment figures in the two countries, Gramsci had formed
the hypothesis in the summer of 1932 that "English unemployment, although
numerically lower than German unemployment, indicates that the coefficient
'organic crisis' in higher in England than in Germany where the coefficient 'cyclical
crisis' is more important. Consequently, in the event of a 'cyclical' recovery
unemployment would be absorbed more easily in Germany than in England".49
Reading his periodicals in the spring of 1933 Gramsci may have detected the
signs of a cyclical recovery which would put this hypothesis to the test. This would
explain why sometime in April-May 1933 - perhaps in connection with the
preparations for the World Economic Conference at the end of Mayse - Gramsci
produced a second definitior:- Qf the term ·conjuncture·. The first one written in 1931
asked what was the difference between the 'conjuncture' and the economic
'situation' (§6.130): the new one defined the relation of the 'conjuncture' to the
economic 'cycle'.
§15. 16. Enclyclo"..dlc Id.......
ConJunctur •. The conjuncture can be defined as the totality of circumstances which
determine the market In • given ph•••••• long a. these clrcum.tanca. are concalVeda.
being In movamant, la, .ra concalv.d a. I totality which laad. to a proc... of continually
naw comblnatlona. • process which I. the aconomlc cycla. The conjuncture I•• tudled In
ordar to predict and hence .1.0, within cert.ln limit•• to direct the economic cycla In • way
f.vour.bla to busln.... Hence the conJuncturah•• al.o baan daflned •• the osclll.tlon of
the economic .Ituatlon. or tha totality of sueh o.clllatlon •. 51
For Gramsci the diagnosis of economic movement was not an end in itself. of
course. but an indispensable tool in the science and art of politics. The study of the
'conjuncture' was important because "it is more closely linked to immediate politics.
(1931), just as the 'coefficient organic-cyclical' crisis' (1932) was invented by
49§9.61. Past and Present. England and Germany, QCII p.1132.
50 Gramsci was reading the April issues of ASE at the time of writing this brief note (see Professor
Gerratana's note to the preceding §15.12 in QCIV p.2944: the quotation Gramsci cites was taken from
the Economist as reported in ASE, 25 Aprill933, p.932). See 'Studi e commenti suna crisi .
economica mondiale' under the rubric Problemi Politici Generali in ASE, 18 April 1933. and under the
same rubric 'La Conferenza economica mondlale e iI problema del deblti di guerra' in ASE. 25April
1933,p.931-932 -Ie, the same pages from which the quotation in §15.12 was taken.
51 §lS.16.Encyclopaedic Ideas .Congiuntura., QCIII p.ln4.
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Gramsci as a tool of political forecasting. If we contextualise the new definition, we
may say that Gramsci is trying to relate the change of government in Germany in
1933 - the new 'conjuncture' - to the economic cycle, not forgetting that political
change itself was a significant element in "the totality of circumstances which
determine the market in a given phase". If the new definition was an implicit
recognition on his part that an upturn in the economic cycle was under way, the
important question was whether or not the new German government had the ability,
"within certain limits", to direct it in a way favourable to business. The rapid
absorption of unemployment in Germany after 1933 may have proved Gramsci's
hypothesis correct, but this is beside the point. The hypothesis was not an
economic prediction but an element of political judgement. In the perspective of
1933, the future stability of the new regime depended on its ability to direct the
"automatic" economic cycle to its own advantage. Whether it would be able to do
this with the Economics Minister Hugenburg at the helm remained to be seen.
After the Terror.
115.11, 115.15 etc: Nazism as Passive Revolution, or 'Transformlsm'
In discussing 'progressive' and 'reactionary' forms of Caesarism at the turn of
1932-33 Gramsci stated that "the problem is to see whether in the dialectic
'revolution-restoration' it is the element of revolution or restoration which
predominates, for it is certain that in the movement of history there is no turning
back and there are no such things as restorations in toto" (§9.133). As we saw,
after the fall of Schleicher and the appointment of Hitler, Gramsci deliberately
compared Nazism with a movement of the "other side", ie, the Dreyfusard
movement in France: the common factor was that such movements "are certainly
not revolutions but are not entirely reactionary either, at least in the sense that they
also shatter stifling and ossified State structures in the dominant camp and
introduce into State life and social activity a different and more numerous
personnel" (§14.23). By comparison with Hindenburg's reactionary chancellors
Papen and Schleicher, Gramsci considered the advent of Hitler a relatively
'progressive' development although the semantic problems of this term obviously
did not escape him. The dialectic 'revolution-restoration' was a useful way of
interpreting the historical significance of the new Caesarist coalition. Although the
element of 'restoration' in Hitler's cabinet seemed to predominate, the presence of
the Nazis signified that it was not a restoration in toto. But how could the historical
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significance of the new element be explained? To call it a 'revolution' would be
taking the Nazis at their word: "it was certainly not a revolution", therefore. But if it
was "not entirely reactionary either", Gramsci was obviously not comfortable
describing it as "relatively 'proqressive" .52
After the Nazi terror had done its work, he began a new series of notes on the
concept of 'passive revolution'.53 The practical origin of these notes was the new
situation created by the destruction of the German Communist party, which placed
the concept of passive revolution (and its relation to war of position) on Gramsci's
agenda. The notes continued the analysis of 'revolution-restoration' only the
problem is stated slightly differently: " 'Restorations' need to be judged
'dynamically', as a 'cunning of providence' in Vico's sense" (§15.11).
Pa.t and Pra.ant
To understand the whole configuration of Gramsci's thinking about the German
situation in March 1933, we must refer back to a series of notes he wrote a year
earlier in which, so to speak, he prepared 'theoretically' for this moment. It was the
start of 1932, the tenth anniversary of the Fascist "revolution" : Gramsci used the
occasion to elaborate a cluster of concepts which would then shape his thinking
about the Nazi "revolution" of 1933.
The close affinity between 'revolution-restoration' and 'passive revolution' was first
suggested in §8.25.
§8.25. Risorgimento. Find out what Quinet means, and how he justifies, the formula of equivalence
of revolution-restoration In Italian history .....Can Quinet's concept be considered close to Cuoco's
concept of 'passive revolution'? Both Quinet's 'revolution-restoration' and Cuoco's 'passive
revolution' Intend to express the historical fact of the absence of popular initiative in the development
of Italian history, and the fact that 'progress' happens as a reaction on the part of the dominant classes
to the sporadic and disorganic rebelliousness of the popular masses with 'restorations' which include
some recognition of popular needs - hence 'progressive restorations' or 'revolutions-restorations' or
even 'passive revolutions'· etc 64
52 Jeremy Noakes has observed In this context that "to use the term 'revolution' is to enter a semantic
mlnefleld-: see his analysis of the relation between the Nazis and the German elites after 1933ln
'Nazism and Revolution' , in Noel O'Sullivan, ed., Revolutionary Theory and Political Reality (London,
1983) p.73-100.
53 The series Included §15.11,§15.15, §15.17, §15.25,§15.56,§15.59, §15.62.
54 §825, QCII p.957.
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The concept was that progress happens as part of the reaction of the dominant
classes who in order to suppress any further intervention of the popular masses in
politics give some satisfaction to their needs (hence the equivalence of restoration-
revolution). In the following §8.36, Gramsci equates this dialectical process with the
phenomenon known in Italian history as 'transform ism'.
§8.36. Risorgimento. Transformism. Transformism as one of the historical forms of what has already
been noted about 'revolution-restoration' or 'passive revolution' , with respect to the process of
formation of a modem State in Italy. Transformism as a "real historical documenf of the real nature of
the parties which appeared as extremist in the period of militant activity (Party of Action). Two periods
of transformism: 1. from 1860 to 1900 'molecular' transformism, ie, individual political figures formed by
the democratic opposition parties are incorporated individually into the conservative-moderate
'political class' (characterised by its aversion to any intervention of the popular masses into State life,
to any organic reform which would substitute a 'hegemony' for the crude, dictatorial 'dominance'); 2.
from 1900 onwards transform ism of entire groups who pass over from the extreme to the moderate
camp (the first event is the formation of the nationalist party, with ex-syndicalist and anarchist groups,
which culminates in the Libyan war in the first instance and subsequently in interventionism).55
Thus, leaders of the democratic opposition who appeared extreme in the period of
militant activity were subsequently absorbed by the conservative 'political class' (in
Mosca's sense). The passage of time, however, does not alter their lack of
principle. For the the one-time democrats have now joined a 'political class'
opposed to any participation of the popular masses in State life. The would-be
"extremists" were therefore not what they appeared to be. Nevertheless, the fact
remains that the political class is "transformed" by absorbing the democratic
leaders since Gramsci seems to suggest that this is how it becomes conscious of
popular needs. Without this, there would be no "passive revolution".
This analysis formed the background to Gramsci's question in §8.210: "Do we have
to accept as "revolutionary" aU those movements which try to dignify and justify
themselves by calling themselves "revolutions"?56 In the tenth anniversary of its
"revolution", Gramsci was thinking primarily of FaSCism, although he was aware
that Nazism (currently in its period of militant activity) also used 'revolutionary'
nomenclature. In fact, this whole cluster of concepts - 'revolution-restoration',
'passive revolution', 'transform ism' - was an attempt to analyse critically fascism's
claim to be a revolution.
It is important to note that Gramsci saw the origin of Fascism itself as the start of a
process of transformism. Although the interventionist movement of 1915 claimed to
55 §B.36, 0011 p.962-963.
56 §B.210. History and Anti-History, 0011 p.1068.
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be 'revolutionary', it really consisted in the wholescale 'passing over' of the
revolutionary personnel (including ex-syndicalists and anarchists) from the extreme
to the conservative-moderate camp. In view of these beginnings, it was logical that
Gramsci then described fascism as a form of "passive revolution". Commenting in
§8.236 on Croce's History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, which he
describes as an entire treatise on passive revolution, he asks: "Could this treatise
have a current significance? Would not a new 'liberalism' under modern conditions
be precisely 'fascism'? Would not fascism be precisely the form of 'passive
revolution' proper to the twentieth century just as liberalism was in the nineteenth
century? I have mentioned this thesis in another note and the whole thesis should
be examined in depth".57
*
In the notes of 1933 Gramsci "documented" the concept of passive revolution from
the history of the Italian Risorgimento but, significantly, he placed the notes under
the rubric 'Machiavelli' not 'Risorgimento'. The aim was to derive from historical
analysis "some general principle of political science" which could be applied in
analysing contemporary politics. The whole cycle of passive revolution in
nineteenth-century Italy was reviewed in order to take a long view of a 'similar'
process which (in Gramsci's hypothesis) may be starting in Germany now that the
Nazis had come to power. The curious feature of these notes when studied in
context is the way in which analysis of the Risorgimento bears the 'imprint' of
contemporary forms redolent of Germany's "national revolution". Behind the
"visionary apostle" Mazzini, the prophet of Italy's national "mission", or the
"charismatic" Garibaldi, the ghostly presence of Hitler in various guises is almost
tangible; again, behind Garibaldi's Red Shirts, the "revolutionary levy", lies the
shadow of Hitler's men of action, the Storm Troops. Furthermore, Gramsci
compared the 'Thousand' to the levy of reserve officers during the First World War
knowing that this category supplied the leaders of the para-military formations of
post-war politics, Including the Nazi S.A. The use of shock troops, it will be recalled.
was regarded by Gramsci as characteristic of the war of position, not the war of
movement: "the use of shock should not be considered a sign of the general
57 §8.236.Points towards an esssyon Croce, OCII p.1088-1089.
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combativity of the mass of troops but, on the contrary, as a sign of their passivity
and relative demoralisation" (§1.133).
These 'similarities' are intuitive, experimental suggestions which seem extremely
far-fetched at first sight and it would certainly be mistaken to try to pursue them
'systematically'. Nevertheless, they fall into Gramsci's fundamental pattern of
theorising which attempted to synthesise the experience of contrasting political
movements in terms of a common principle of political science. At this point the
hypothesis - "Would not fascism be precisely the form of 'passive revolution' proper
to the twentieth century just as liberalism was in the nineteenth century?" - came
into play. Gramsci analyses the role of the revolutionary forces in the national
movement in Italy in order to assess the contribution of the 'revolutionary' (ie, Nazi)
forces in the national movement in Germany. The 'scientific' principle (in italiCS)
was embedded in the historical analysis
115.11. "'achlavelll. Can the concept 0' 'paaaive revolution' In the senae attributed by
Vlncenzo Cuoco to the flrat period of the Italian Rlaorglmento, be related to the concept 0'
'war of position' In contrast to war of manoeuvre? In other words, did these concepts have
a meaning after the French Revolution and can the twin flgurae 0' Proudhan and Globertl
be explained In terma of the panic created by the Terror 0' 1793, as Soral's Ideas can be
In terms of the panic following the Paris massacres of 1871? In other word., does there
exist an absolute Identity between war 0' polltlon and paaaive revolution? Or at lnat
doae there exllt, or can there be conceived, an entire historical period In which the two
concepta must be considered Identical - until the point at which the war of position once
again becomeaa war 0' manoeuvre?
'Restoratlona' need to be Judged 'dynamically', as a 'cunning of providence' In Vlco's
senle. One problem II the following: In the atruggle Cavour-Mazzlnl,In which Cavour II
the exponent of the passive revolutlon/war of po.ltlon and Mazzlnl of popular
Inltlatlvalwar of manoeuvre, are not both 0' them Indlspen.able to precl.ely the .ame
extent? Vet It has to ba taken Into account that wherea. Cavour waa aware of hi. role (at
leaat up to a certain point) Inasmuch as he underatood the role of Maulnl, the latter doe.
not seem to have been aware 0' hla own or 0' Cavour'•. If, on the contrary, Mazzlnl had
posse•• ed such awaren.. a - In other words, If he had been a rnllatlc politician and not a
visionary apoatle (Ie, If he had not been Mazzlnl) - then the equilibrium which raaulted
from the convergence0' the two men'. activities would have baan different, would have
baan more favourable to Mazzlnlanlam. In other word., the Italian State would have been
con.tltuted on a I..s retrograde and more modern baala. And a/nce almllar a/tuatlona
almoat allilfayaarlae In every hlatorlcal development, one ahould aee If It la not poaalble to
dralilf from thl. aome gene",' prIncIple of political aclence snd srt. One msy apply to the
concept of ps.alve revolution (documentIng It from the It.llan R/aorglmento) the
InterpretatIve crIterIon of molecular changea IIIfhlchIn fact progreaalvely modify the pre-
exlatlng compoaltlon of fore.. , snd hence become the matrIx of nelilf chllngea. Thus, In the
Italian Risorgimento It ha. baan .een how the compo.ltlon 0' the moderate 'orc.. was
prograaaively modified by the paaaing over to Cavourlam (after 1848) 0' ever naw
elementa0' the Action Party, ao that on the one hand neo-Guelphlamwaa liquidated and
on the other the Mazzlnlan movement was Impoverished (Garlbaldl'a oaclllationa etc alao
balong to thl. procaaa). Th/a element la therefore the Inltlsl phil.. of the phenomenon
IIIfhlchI. later called 't",naform/am' and IIIfhoae Import.nce a•• form of hlatorlcsl
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development has not as yet, It seems, been adequately emphasised. liI
In the second of the notes Gramsci's thinking moves on from Mazzini's moment in
1848-49 to Garibaldi's in 1859-60. The movement of thought corresponded to the
transition in the Risorgimento from the 'short' war of movement to the 'long' war of
position. Now that the mass 'tidal wave' of 1848-49 had subsided, the initiative of
the popular-democratic forces passed to the revolutionary 'levy', Garibaldi's Red
Shirts. The 'process' of transition was represented in terms of the organic metaphor
of "molecular changes" which Gramsci regarded as the first stage of "transformism".
After 1848 the passing over of Mazzini's followers to the leadership of Cavour
'transformed' the liberal-conservative party and thus prepared it for the new
changes which came in 1859-60. The focus of Gramsci's analysis now switches
from Cavour-Mazzini to Cavour-Garibaldi.
115.15. "'ach/avelll. Other aspecta of the relation 'pa•• lve revolutlonlwar of po.ltlon' In
the Italian Rllorglm.nto can be studied too. An extr.mely Important on. Is what msy be
called the 'personnal' aspect, another Is that of the 'r.volutlonary levy'. The 'p.r.onn.I'
aspect can be comparedprecls.ly with what happenedIn the FIrst World War In the
relationship betweenthe career officers and r.serve offlc.rs on the the one hand, and
b.tween the conscrlpta and the volunteers/commandoson the oth.r. The career offlc.,.
corresponded In the Risorgimento to the regular, organiC,traditional etc political partl_,
which at the momentfor action (1848) proved to be virtually uael... and In 1848-49 w.r.
overwh.lmed by the popular-democraticMazzlnlan tidal wave. Thl. tidal wave wa. chaotiC,
formI••• , '.xtempore· so to speak; nev.rth.less, und.r Improvised I.ad.r. (or at I t not
belonging to group. form.d befor.hand such al the mod.rat. party), obtained suee .
which w.re undoubtedlygreater than thoae achl.ved by the moderates: the Roman
Republic and Venlc. showed a very notable strength of resistance. In the period aft.r
1848 the relation betweenthe two forces - the regular and 'charismatic' - was organlaed
around Cavour and Garibaldi and produced the greatest result, although thl. reault wa.
lat.r tak.n ov.r (/ncamerato ) by Cavour.
Thl. personnala.pect I. related to the oth.r aspect, the 'I.vy·. It should be obs.rved that
the technical difficulty on which Mazzlnlan Initiatives always came to grief wa. praclHly
that of the 'revolutionary I.vy·.....•ln the .econd period (1859-80) the 'r.volutlonary I.vy',
which I. what Garibaldi'. Thou.. nd wa., was mad. po.. lbl. flratly by the fact that
Garibaldi grafted hlm•• 1f on to the Pledmonte.e national forc.s and •• condly by the fact
that the English fleet .ffectlv.ly protected the landing at Mar.ala and the captur. of
Pal.rmo, neutrall.lng the Bourbon fleet. In Milan aft.r the Flv. Day. and In republican
Rom., Mazzlnl had opportunltlea to aat up recrultm.nt cantrea for an organic I.vy but had
no Intention of doing so. Thl. explains hi. conflict with Garibaldi In Rom. and hi.
Ineffectlven••• In Milan compared with Cattaneo and the Mllaneeed.mocratlc group.
In any ca•• , although the cou,..e of event. In the RllOrglmento revealed the enormo".
Important» of the 'demogog/c' ",... movementwith I,. ,.. de... thrown up by chance,
58 §15.11. CCIII p.1766-1767 and SPN p.108-109. My italics. Gramscl'semphasison the value of
'transformlsm' as a historical-political concept was endorsed by the historian Paul Ginsborg: ·Passive
revolution would also seem an accurate description of certain dynamics of change within the
bourgeoisie itself. Gramscl's subtle analysis of the way In which the italian liberal Moderates absorbed
the major elements of the radical Action Party (and were themselves changed in the process)is
probably his greatest contribution to the history of the Rlsorglmento·: in John A.DaviS,ed., Gramsci
and Italy's Passive Revolution (LDndon, 1979), p. 47.
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Improvised etc, It was absorbed (rlassunto) by the traditional organic forces - In other
words, by the parties of long-standing with rationally-formed lesders etc. The same result
occurs In all political events of this type Slmllarly, In the Rrst World War the old
career onlcers got the upper hand over the reservists etc (cf. notes In other notebooks on
this question). In any case, the absence among the radical-popular forces of any
awareness of the role of the other side prevented them from being fully aware of their own
role either. Hence their weight In the final balance of forces was not proportional to their
enectlve power of Intervention, so that they failed to achieve a more advanced result
along more progressive and modern IInes.5
The general principle remains the same from one note to the other except that
whereas in the first the revolutionary personnel "transform" the pre-existing forces,
in the second they are "absorbed" by them. Translated into the terms of German
poutlos, we may say that Gramsci's historical analysis is an attempt to explore two
questions posed by the German situation in March 1933: the "personnel" question
and the "revolutionary levy" question. How far would the introduction of Hitler and
other leading personnel of the Nazi movement into State life transform (ie,
'revolutionise') the pre-existing forces? In effect, Gramsci had already raised this
question when he suggested that movements of the Dreyfus-type were not entirely
reactionary because "they shatter stifling and ossified State structures in the
dominant camp and introduce into State life and social activity a different and more
numerous personnel" (§14.23). Conversely, how far would Hitler and the other
Nazi leaders, in passing over to the dominant camp, simply be "absorbed"? Did not
the "law of the turncoar (§15.07) imply that as soon as they achieved power Hitler
and the Nazi "big shots" would betray the 'revolutionary' hopes of their followers.
The second question concerned the revolutionary levy. Would the
"reservists" (ie, the Storm Troops) or the "career officers" gain the upper-hand? In
many ways this was the crucial question facing Hitler after March 1933. It was
decided by the "new changes" of 1934, ie, the elimination of Rohm on the 'Night of
Long Knives'. But this was a moment of restoration not revolution. The leaders of
the Storm Troops were stopped from "passing over" into the officer corps so that its
"molecular transformation" through a wholescale change of personnel could not
take place.
Another question, which may appear naive in retrospect, was this: how far was
Hitler conscious of his role? The guiding-thread in the analysis is that neither
Mazzini nor Garibaldi were fully aware of the role of the 'realist' Cavour, and
therefore of their own role, with the result that "their weight in the final balance of
59§15.15. QCIII p.1n2-1n4and SPN p.111-113. My italics.
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forces is not proportional to their effective power of intervention". Gramsci's
explanation lies in the role of 'permanent' political parties. Mazzini and Garibaldi
were "improvised" leaders thrown up "by chance" by the "demogogic" mass
movement, whereas Cavour was the product of "a party of long-standing with
rationally formed leaders". Could something 'similar' be said of Hitler in 1933? Was
he not an improvised leader thrown up by the demogogic mass movement rather
than the product of a permanent party (like the conservatives) with rationally-
formed leaders? Was Hitler aware of the role of his conservative partners, and
therefore of his own role, or was he playing the 'long-term' game of the
conservatives without being fully aware of it? The historical notes on passive
revolution were also an attempt to answer this contemporary political question. Of
course, the question 'hOWfar was Hitler conscious of his role?' appears naive in
view of the speed with which he outmanoeuvred his conservative partners in
government, but Gramsci's analysis raises a deeper question about the political
processes by which the ultimately unrealistic, irrational aims of the charismatic
leader may come to dominate the political (and military) agenda.
As a guide to interpreting the prospects of the German situation in 1933, Gramsci's
analysis of the Risorgimento is misleading in a number of ways.The analysis of
Cavour's role, for example, may have led him to overestimate the political capacity
of the conservatives (the 'traditional intellectuals') in Hitler's coalition. In fact, the
advent of Hitler in 1933 signified that the deficiency of Germany's 'natural' leaders
was not simply "momentary" but permanent (ie, "organic"), unless Hitler himself is
seen as representing a hitherto untapped source of leadership potential in the
dominant camp. But if Gramsci was deceived in this respect, the error was soon
corrected. The value of his analysis lies in the concept of passive revolution in the
established elites - "transform ism" - which remains a potentially useful way of
interpreting the "revolutionary" significance of National Socialism.
Another criterion, which relates to the question of how far 'demogogic' leaders are
conscious of their role compared to 'rationally-formed' leaders, was formulated in
§15.06:
It can be stated that no real movement becomes conscious of its global significance (la sua total/tarieta
) all at once but step by step, through experience. It learns from the facts that nothing that exists Is
natural (in the Irrational sense of the word) but exists because certain conditions exist and that if these
disappear it must have consequences. In this way the movement perfects itself, shedding Its arbitrary,
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'symbiotic' features; it becomes genuinely independent in the sense that if it wants certain results, it
creates the necessary preconditions - indeed, it commits all its forces to the task of creating them.eo
By this criterion the Nazi movement would develop a 'revolutionary' ideology
pragmatically and would learn through the experience of power to free itself from its
'superstitious' respect for the country's 'natural' leaders. This 'pragmatic'
explanation of the Nazis' ideological aims coincides to some extent with the way in
which 'functionalist' historians have explained the growing radicalism of Nazi
policy, especially towards the Jews. But this suggestion brings into focus the
underlying paradox of applying to National Socialism the concept of passive
revolution. For Gramsci understood the concept in Vico's sense as a "cunning of
providence", as if the Nazis were the unwitting instrument of 'Reason' in the
enlightenment sense of the word. His conception that Nazism was 'rational' (and
thus 'revolutionary') to the extent that it freed itself from a superstitious or 'irrational'
respect for tradition showed Gramsci to be a true heir of the Enlightenment. His
metaphysical faith in the rational working of history was heroic under the
circumstances, but it must be said that if the 'cunning of providence' was at work in
Germany after 1933 there was nothing rational about it.
Gramsci concluded the notes on passive revolution in §15.62. This was written
some months later in June-July 1933, by when all political parties in Germany
except the Nazi Party had been suppressed. Significantly Gramsci called it the "first
epilogue" as if to indicate that it was his last word on the theoretical lessons of the
German defeat. Although he still thought that passive revolution was a useful
concept, he now began to have doubts about it "since the whole way of posing the
question may induce some kind of fatalism". For Vico's "cunning of providence"
could easily be invoked to support the same kind of ''fatalism of the divine-right
type" which underpinned the "conceif of the German Communist party and caused
it to go down passively to defeat.
115.62. P.st and Present. Rtst Epilogue. The the.l. of the 'paulv. r.volutlon' ••• n
Int.rpretatlon of tha RI.orglm.nto period .nd of avary .poch char.ct.rlaad by compl.x
hl.torlcal upheaval.. Utility and dangar. of thl. the.I.. Dang.r of hl.torlc.1 dafeatlam, I.,
of Indlff.rantl.m, .Ine. the whol. w.y of po.lng the question may Induc•• bell.f In .oma
kind of fatalism ate. Vat the conc.ptlon r.m.lna a dl.lectlcal one • In other worda, It
pr•• uppo.a., Indeed It po.tul.t •••• nee•••• ry, • vlgorou•• ntlth.al. which pr••• nt.
Intran.lg.ntly .11 Ita pot.ntlalltl .. for d.v.lopm.nt. H.ne. the theory of 'paaaiv.
ravolutlon' und.rstood not ••• programm., •• It was for the ltall.n liberal. In the
Rlaorglmanto, but ••• criterion of Int.rpr.t.tlon In tha .b •• ne. of oth.r .Iamanta which
60 §15.06. Machiavelli. Totalitarian and partial conceptions of the world and practical dispositions, 00111
p.1760-1761.
331
are active In a dominant way. (Hence the struggle against the political morphinism which
emanate. from Croce and hi. hl.torlcl.m) .....
A revl.lon of certain .ectarlan Idea. on the theory of the party which represent precl.ely
a form of fatall.m of the 'divine right' type. Development of the concept. of the mass
party and the .mall elite party and the mediation between the two. (Theoretical and
practical mediation: theoretically, I. It po•• lble for a relatively .mall but .tlll significant
group to exist, let u. .ay .everal thousand .trong, which I. .oclally and Ideologically
homogeneous, without Its very exl.tence being proof of a widespread .tate of analrs and
corresponding state of mind which cannot be expressed on account of purely mechanical,
external, and hence transitory cau.e.?).1I1
In the absence of a "vigorous antithesis" in Germany, Gramsci seems to return to
Lenin's theory of the party inWhat is to be Done? in order to regenerate the
antithesis at a seemingly hopeless juncture.
115.27, 115.48 (I). The 'Third Reich' a. a Sorellan Myth
Hitler's 'national revolution' was welcomed for the most part with uncritical
enthusiasm by fascist intellectuals in Italy, but the occasional echo of discordant,
critical voices could still be heard in Gramsci's periodicals. In a review by the
historian Delio Cantimori in the March issue of Leonardo, Gramsci heard the voice
of Conrad Heiden, the first historian of National Socialism.
115.27. Since the history of German National Soclall.m will tend to be written th.. e day.
for the purpose of paying court (a .copl aullcl ), It will be nec.... ry to remember the
volume by Conrad Heiden, G•• chlcht. d.. Nazlona/soz/allsmU8,die Kar/ere e/ner Id..
(Berlin, Rowohlt, 1932, pp'. 305 (see the review by Delio Cantlmorl In Leonardo, March
1933).112
Gramsci's note is all too brief but if we turn to Cantimori's review we gain some
idea of why he recommended it.
The publishers Rowohlt have added to their political collection an informative history of National
Socialism, a good book which deserves to be mentioned notwithstanding its one-sided approach
and ,occasionally, its excessively corrosive criticism of the personality of Hitler. Heiden combines a
lively realism and a well developed critical sense with an abstract conception of the parties and of the
political forces. This causes him to neglect a number of essential elements and forces in the Hitlerite
movement, although the author probably does not think of them as essential to the movement but
rather as aspects of the general history of Germany in recent years. Heiden's criticism that Hitlerlsm has
no programme could have been transformed into a fruitful principle of interpretation but his polemical
position, which sees no intellectual value in any of the writers of National Socialism (whereas at least
the work of the Strassers Is worth evaluating in doctrinal terms), prevents him from developing this
principle in a useful way.
Heiden is quite clear about the origin of National Socialism: he argues that 'as a spiritual force It is the
work of a few Intellectuals, mostly from northern Germany, during the years 1926-28. As a living
political cell It originated from the gigantic Patriotic Party and from the Pan-German League
61 §15.62, QCIII p.1827 and SPN p.114.
62 §15.27, ocu p.1783.
332
(Fatherland Party, All-German Association) - in short, from the wartime annexationist movement of
1917. Its independent existence begins in 1919. As a political instrument it was prepared by the
Reichswehr in Munich with whose help the figure of Adolf Hitler, a very intelligent man but of
unreliable character, emerged along with captain Ernst Rohm. This was in 1921 '.
The political maxim that it is necessary to avoid having too fixed a programme but to follow the course
of events is derived by Heiden from Marxism and, in general terms, is basically correct. With these
elements and along these lines Heiden develops his interpretation. His pragmatic realism is often
most impressive but it is, perhaps, too sceptical and polemical. He reconstructs the history of the
National Socialist Party internally, as the history of 'this state within the state', and it is therefore
divorced from the history of Germany in the last ten years. The states of mind which have led so many
young people to join the party are not examined, nor are the ideals of the many men who have
inspired it. The two Strasser brothers are considered in terms of their political action and their drive for
power inside the party not for their ideas (which are simply treated as instruments of struggle) or their
efficacy. Indeed, the ideas of these men are not even examined as doctrinal instruments but solely for
their immediate propaganda effect.
Within these limits, the work is written with magisterial command of the first-hand sources, with a sense
of human understanding, and without polemical or apologetic petty-mindedness. Neither an exercise
in apologetiCS nor in propaganda, it remains for the time being the best historical and critical work
which we have on the subject.e3
Gramsci probably had some sympathy with Heiden's 'Marxist' view that Hitler had
no fixed programme and therefore it was not worth taking National Socialist ideas
seriously except as practical "instruments of struggle". This approach coincided to a
large extent with his own analysis of the ideologies characteristic of 'charismatic'
parties, although Gramsci was evidently more interested in explaining why such
ideologies proved so effective.
Moreover, in the modem world the so-called 'charisma' of which Michels speaks always coincides with
a primitive phase in the development of mass parties in which its doctrine appears as something
nebulous and incoherent in the eyes of the masses and needs an infallible pope to interpret and
adapt it to circumstances. The more this happens, the more the party originates and takes shape on
the basis of incoherent and muddled ideologies These ideologies are nurtured by feelings and
emotions which have still not come to the point of dissolving because the classes (or the class) which
express them, having arrived historically at the point of dissolution, still have a certain basis and cling to
the glories of the past in order to shield themselves from the future. 8"
One element of Nazi ideology which Gramsci considered worth studying was the
idea of the 'Third Reich'. In the April issue of Gerarchia he read a critique of "the
new myth, the latest dazzling utopia to be spread and exalted in Germany". The
myth was attributed mainly to Rosenberg, "one of its most accomplished theorists
and advocates" I who gave it a racial twist by relating it to "the myth of blood". The
article was a critical exposition of the idea, an exercise which Heiden had
studiously avoided.
63 Leonardo, March 1933, p.125.
64 §2.75 (I) (1930). R.Mlchels etc, QCI p.233.
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It is obvious from all aspects of daily life in Germany that everybody is in a state of messianic
expectation ...... Nor has the fact that Hitler has become Chancellor diminished the idealistic status and
concrete value of an idea which first appeared a few years ago and has now achieved theoretical
status: the Third Reich (terzo regno).
There is a great deal of discussion and writing about this new political system in Germany and in
Europe, including for some time now in Italy. For the sake of greater clarity it is first necessary to point
out that in the minds of its various theorists the word 'Reich' stands for an epoch or, better still, an era.
The theory is not identified with one party but has penetrated many parties although for obvious
reasons it has had most impact and success among the right-wing parties and the Hitlerites. From the
circles of high culture and from scientific treatises, the theorists have carried the idea into the more
emotive and passionate arenas of politics and journalism .....
The doctrine is formulated quite simply. Its theorists justify the name of the 'Third Reich' by harking
back to Germany's glorious past, to its virtuous traditions. The first Reich in fact is the most glorious
Holy Roman Empire, plainly feudal in character, which dominated the wortd of its time. The second is
the Prussian empire of Frederick the Great, the founder of modern German power. This was the
archetypal, model empire of which the Hohenzollerns were the last representatives. And the Third
Reich? This is the one which is about to be inaugurated.ss
--- -
Although Profumi's article was suprisingly critical of the Nazi myth which he
regarded as reactionary and dangerous, it would not have detained Gramsci for
long. Apart from one or two phrases trying to capture the unique character of the
Nazi 'restoration' ("a totalitarian return to tradition"), it mostly added to the
"asphyxiating" gases (§28.01) given off by fascist intellectuals when discussing
ideology. Nevertheless, Gramsci was obviously impressed by the effectiveness of
this myth in focussing the messianic expectations of the German people.
§15.48. "achiavelll. (1) A study of keyworda like 'Third Reich' uaed by movementsof the
German Right. Hlatorlcal myths like theae are easentlally a concrete and effective way of
presenting the myth of the 'historical mission' of a people. The point to study Is preclaely
thla: why la this form 'concrete and effective', or Just more effective than another? In
Germany the uninterrupted continuity (Ie, not Interrupted by permanent foreign Invaalona)
between the medieval period of the Holy Roman Empire (the flrat Ralch) and the modern
period (from Frederick the Great to 1914) make. the concept of the 'Third Reich'
Immediately comprehenalble. In Italy the concept of the 'Third Italy' during the
Rlaorglmento could not be readily understood by the people becauseof the lack of
historical continuity and homogeneity between ancient Rome and papal Rome (In fact,
even the continuity batween republican and Imperial Rome waa far from perfect). Hence
the relative aucceaa of Mazzlnl'a watchword of 'the people'a Italy' which tended to mean a
complete renewal of popular Initiative In a democratic aense, a new Italian hlatory In
contr.. t to Globertl'a 'prlmato'. The latter tended to present the past In terma of Ita
theoretically posalble continuity with the future, Ie, with a particular political programme
In the here and now presented In a broad historical perspective. But Mazzlnl's myth did
not take root and his successors watered It down and mixed It up with bookish rhetoric.
The medieval Communes,which were an effective and radical historical renewal, might
have aerved Mazzlnl as a precedent but they were exploited Instead by the federallata Ilk.
Cattaneo. [Thl. theme should ba related to the flrat notes written In the special notebook
on Machlavelll].e8
65 Vittorio Profumi: 'II Terzo Regno', GER, April1933, p.290. Note also the article, published six
months earlier, by J.Evola: 'II nuovo mito germanico del 'Terzo Regno', POL, June-August 1932
(published November 1932) in which the 'Third Reich' is seen as an example of a Sorellian 'myth'.
66 §15.48, aCIII,p.1808-1809.
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The ideas of National Socialism, however muddled, should be taken seriously to
the extent that they were "concrete and effective". His reference to the first notes in
the special notebook on Machiavelli suggests that he considered the 'Third Reich'
to be an example of a Sorelian myth, ie, "of a political ideology expressed neither
in the form of a cold utopia nor as learned theorising, but rather as a creation of
concrete fantasy which acts on a dispersed and shattered people to arouse and
organise its collective will" (§13.01). The myth dramatised the coming of Hitler in
1933 as the dawn of a new 'epoch' which would restore Germany to its 'historic'
power and glory. It was made concrete and effective by rituals like Potsdam Day on
21 March in which Hitler paid homage to the Prussian tradition at the tomb of
Frederick the Great. However, in charismatic leadership the myth is embodied not
by a permanent collective organism, a political party, but by a single individual. The
myth of the 'Third Reich' served to magnify Hitler's image as the 'providential' man
of German history. In spite of its long-term 'epoch ..making' claims, however, the
character of the myth was essentially short-term. In charismatic leadership the
element of short-term 'restoration' rather than 'long-term' revolution predominated.
In the modern world. only those historical-politieal actions which are immediate and imminent.
characterised by the necessity for lightning speed. can be incarnated mythically by a concrete
individual. Such speed can only be made necessary by a great and imminent danger. a great danger
whieh precisely fans passion and fanaticism suddenly to white heat. and annihilates the critieal sense
and the corrosive irony whieh are able to destroy the 'charismatic' character of the condottiere (as
happened in the Boulanger adventure). But an improvised action of such a kind. by its very nature.
cannot have a long-term and organic character. It will in almost all cases be appropriate to restoration
and reorganisation. but not to the founding of new States or new national and social structures .... It will
be defensive rather than capable of original creation. Its underlying assumption will be that a collective
will is already in existence but has become nerveless and dispersed. has suffered a collapse which is
dangerous and threatening but not definitive and catastrophic. and that it is necessary to
reconcentrate and reinforce it.. ....81
114.58. 115.66. The Generation Question
We saw from the notes on "the crisis of authority" in 1930 (§1.127,§3.34) that
Gramsci regarded the youth question as a significant aspect of the German crisis.
He showed particular interest in the literary expression of the crisis - the "rebellion
of the sons against the fathers" (§3.03) - , but it also had a pOlitical dimension. Both
the communists and the fascists claimed to represent the rebellion of the younger
generation against the old. These claims were not without substance when the
67 §13.01. The fundamental character of The Prince..... QCIII p.1558 and SPN p.129-130. This first
note in Notebook 13. the special notebook on Machiavelli. was written in early 1932.
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age-composition of their membership is compared to that of the 'historic' parties
ofthe Left and the Right, the Socialists and the Nationalists.
Gramsci's position was that the communists as the leaders of the 'progressive
class' could solve the youth question because only a marxist analysis addressed
the root causes of their rebellion. A typical symptom of the structural crisis was the
permanent unemployment of the intellectuals which was particularly harsh on the
youngest of these, the students, who can see "no future" for themselves (§1.127).
However, a class-based, revolutionary solution was blocked by a number of
factors. One was "political-military pressure" (§1.127), which appears to mean the
action of the para-military forces of the Right against the Communists. Another
factor was ideological, ie, when the rebellion of the young "takes on a national
character" .
When the phenomenon takes on a so-called 'national' character, ie, when the class difference does
not come openly into play, then the question becomes complicated and confused. The 'young' find
themselves in a permanent state of rebellion because the profound causes of their rebellion persist
without the possibility of being analysed, criticised, and resolved The 'old' are dominant In fact but
.... 'apres moi Ie deluge': they fall to educate the young and to prepare them to take over.ea
The youth turned to fascism in the mistaken belief that the causes of their rebellion
were rooted in the 'national question', whilst the communists are prevented by
extrinsic factors from educating them in the class question. The rebellion of the
youth persists as long as they continue to believe in the "fictitious" solution offered
by fascism. For one reason or another, the old of 'both sides' fail in their duty to
educate the young.
In February-March 1933 at the time of the Nazi terror, Gramsci returned to the youth
question. A comment in Critics Fascista led him to ask the question: "why are men
restlessT.69 He observes that restlessness may lead men either to" 'blind' action"
or to Its opposite, "Immobility". If we ask what the "practical origin" of these thought
was, the context would suggest that Gramsci is synthesising Nazi restlessness,
resulting in blind action, and Communist restlessness, producing immobility.
t 14.58 P.. t and Pr ••• nt Why are m.n r•• tl... 1What I. the source of thl.
r.. tl••• n••• 1 BecIU•• th.lr Ictlon I. 'blind', beclus. th.y let for the .ak. 0' acting.
M.anwhlla, It I. not true that r•• tl••• nea. I. confined to the blindly 'actlv.': It can lead to
Immobility In.tMd. When there ar. many, conflicting Impul••• to action, r•• tl••• n...
bacom_ precl•• ly 'Immobility'. It can be .. Id that r.. tl... n... I. due to the fact that
68 §1.127. The Youth Question, QCI p.116.
69 See Professor Gerratana's note to §14.58 which gives the issue of CriticaFascista. 15 February
1933, as a possible source of this note: QCIV p. 2934-2935.
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there Is no Identity between theory and practice, which further Implies that there Is a
double hypocrisy: that Is, when they get down to work they have a theory or Implicit
Justification for their work which they do not want to admit, and they 'admit' or affirm a
theory which does not correspond to practice. This contrast between what Is done and
what Is said produces restlessness • that Is, discontent, dissatisfaction. But there Is a
third hypocrisy: restlessness Is attributed to a fictitious cause which, by failing to Justify
and explain It, does not allow them to see when their restlessness will come to an end. But
this oversimplifies the question: In reality things are more complex.
The common feature of Nazi action and Communist inaction is that theory and
practice do not correspond. There is hypocrisy on both sides, although its nature
differs in each case. The Communists talk of action but in practice are inactive.
They have a theory to justify their inaction, but are embarrassed to admit it.
What they say is in contrast to what they do. The Nazis have no theory to justify
their action, or rather a fictitious theory: either way, their action is blind. This is as far
as Gramsci got in dissecting the moral restlessness of each side before seeming to
lose patience with his own analysis. The argument then takes a new turn.
Meanwhile, It Is neceasary to taka account of tha fact that the men of action do not
coincide with the Intellectuals and, furthermore, of the relatlona which axlst between the
older and younger generations. The Intellectuals, particularly the Intellectuals of the older
generation, bear the greatest responsibilities In this situation. The greatest hypocrisy la
that of the Intallectuals, especially of the older Intellectuals. In the struggle of the young
against the old - whatever chaotic forms It happens to take • we find the reflection of this
moral Indictment, which Is only unjust as far as Its form Is concerned. In reality, It Is the
old who 'lead' life but they pretend not to, they pretend to leave the leadership to the
young, but the 'fiction' Itself Is not without Importance In these matters. The young can
see that the results of their actions are contrary to what they expected, they believe (or
pretend to believe) they are 'leading' and become all the more reatleaa and dlacontented.
What makes the situation worse Is that although there Is a crisis, the elements which can
resolve It are prevented from developing with the necessary speed. Those who dominate
cannot resolve the crisis but have the power (to prevent) others from resolving It - that Is
to say, they have the power merely to prolong the crisis Itself. Perhaps Candide might say
that this Is preclaely what Is needed for the elements of the real solution to prepare and
develop themselves, given that the crisis Is so serious and demands such exceptional
means that only he who has stared hell In the face can decide to use them without
trepidation or healtatlon.1O
The continuity of thought between this analysis of the youth question and the notes
of 1930 is striking. Here the 'intellectuals' tend to coincide with the old, the 'men of
action' with the young - which was another way of describing their action as 'blind'.
The older generation are the biggest hypocrites since they allow the young to
believe that they are leading, especially when the time comes for 'action' - as it did
in March 1933 when Hitler let loose his army of Storm Troops. Hitler's claim to lead
the younger generation was 'fiction', but it had its uses at moments like this.
Meanwhile, the progressive elements 'theoretically' led by the communists hold
70 §14.58. Past and Present. OCIlI. p.1717-1718.
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the real solution in their hands, but are prevented from developing with the
necessary speed. Will the communist theory of "so much the worse, so much the
better" speed things up? It was the logic of Voltaire'sCandide. Perhaps the Nazi
terror will bring about a 'lightning' concentration of the progressive forces? Perhaps
-~ ._.- .-- ...-
now that the Communists "stared hell in the face", they will be stirred into action
and will not hesitate to use exceptional means.
Gramsci returned to the youth question a few months later in §15.66 after reading
another article in Critica Fascists on the ideas of "the new revolutionary generation
in Germany".71 This claimed that the changes now going on in Germany were
driven by "the revolt of the young against the 'gerontocracy' which has dominated
things up to now". "Holding in its hands all the positions of command and
controlling every mechanism, the gerontocracy has been able to lead Germany
until this providential year of 1933 in which the colossus, with its feet of clay, has
noisily collapsed". The article quoted approvingly a German publicist who claimed
that in National Socialism the younger generation had discovered a new sense of
'socialist'mission:
"We are the most radical, the most pure, the most genuine socialists that a nation has ever produced.
Our socialism, however, is entirely new. It is born from the nation and is as far removed from any class-
based socialism of the Marxist type as the heavens are from the earth. We have now learned that
Marxist socialism is not genuine at all but is the worst betrayal of the true sentiment of sociality. Today,
the elements of socialism and nationalism have joined together in a new socialism, the first German
socialism, which is destined to dethrone not only caste and class but also the power of money in order
to remake ourselves as a nation".72
According to Critics Fascists, these prophecies were coming true. The 'Germani
revolution was now under way. In dismantling the Republic the Nazis were ridding
Germany of the rule of the 'gerontocracy'.
The article left Gramsci more worried than ever about the political education of the
younger generation. If these were the ideas of Germany's youth, they proved that
"infantile disorders" in politics could arise on the Right as well as the Left. Now that
the older generation or 'intellectuals' of the German Left had been arrested or
scattered, like those of the Italian Left, they were unable to carry out their duty Of
educating the young. Curing them of this latest disorder was a more difficult task
than ever.
71GustavGlaesser: 'La nuova generazione rivoluzionaria tedesca', CF, 1 July 1933,
p.256-259.
72 ibid., p.259.
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§15.66 Past and Present. In the succession of generations (and Insofar as every
generation expresses the mentality of a historical epoch) It can happen that there is an
older generation with antiquated Ideas and a younger generation with Infantile Ideas. What
Is missing, that Is, Is the Intermediate historical link, the generation which could have
educated the young.
All this Is relative, of course. This Intermediate link Is never missing entirely, but It can be
'quantitatively' very weak and therefore materially quite unable to carry out Its task.
Again: this can happen for one social group and not for another. The phenomenon occurs
[most] frequently and In Its most serious form among the subordinate groups. This Is due
to the difficulty - Inherent In being 'subordinate' - of maintaining an organic continuity of
the leading Intellectual strata, and to the fact that for the few elements whose Intellectual
capacity Is equal to the highest expressions of the historical epoch It Is difficult to
organise what the Americans call 'brains trusts'.73
Gramsci's idea of the missing link contained more than a hint of the "lost
generation" of 1914. If the missing link was not entirely missing, it was
quantitatively very weak since most of the 'educators' had been lost in the First
World War. But the lost generation was also a metaphor for the war of position in
politics, ie, for the grievous defeats of the communists by the fascists. In this sense,
Gramsci himself was one of the lost generation.
115.47, 115.48 (II). The 'End of Parllamentarlsm'
After the Reichstag passed the Enabling Act on 23 March, the fascist Sergio
Panunzio triumphally announced "the end of parliamentarism". 74 Panunzio was
one of the cohort of syndicalist intellectuals who had followed Mussolini into the
interventionist camp in 1915, taking with them Sorel's critique of parliamentary
politics but without its proletarian fervour. He argued that parliamentary
government was in terminal decline and was being succeeded everywhere (not
just in Italy) by authoritarian or dictatorial regimes. The latest 'constitutional'
changes in Germany now provided timely support: "what can we say about the
state of public law in Germany, from the presidential dictatorship of Hindenburg
(1930-32) to the current period of dictatorship by the head of the Brown Shirts?"
The Nazi 'revolution' in Germany encouraged tasctst intellectuals in Italy to inflate
the significance of their own 'epoch-making' revolution. Panunzio now proposed to
revise 'old-fashioned' constitutional theory in the light of the spread of authoritarian
regimes. To the three traditional functions of the State - the administrative,
legislative, and judicial - should be added a fourth, which he called "the 'function of
73 §15.66.Past and Present, QCIII, p.1829-1830.
74 Sergio Panunzio: 'La fine del parlamentarismo e I'accentramento delle responsibilita', GER, April
1933, p. 298-305.
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governing', or determining the political direction". The parliamentary system of
government had failed to address this primary function either in theory or (as post-
war experience showed) in practice.
Gramsci was not impressed. Firstly, Panunzio did not address the question of the
causes of the crisis of the parliamentary system. Secondly, and more importantly,
Panunzio's alternative was far less rational or efficient than the parliamentary
system which he so eagerly consigned to the dustbin of history.
115.47. M.chlavelll In reality. Pununzlothinks In patterns, I., In a formalistiC
manner,which Is actually worse than the old constitutionalists. What h. ought to explain,
as his starting-point, I. why the split and the conflict b.tween parliamentand government
has happ.ned, so that th.s. two Institutions working tog.th.r can no long.r manageto
glv. a perman.nt dlr.ctlon to gov.rnment. this cannot be .xplalned by logical sch.mes,
how.v.r, but only by r.f.renc. to the chang.. which have taken plac. In the political
structur. of the country, Ie, realistically, by means of historical-political analysis. It Is
not a matt.r pur.ly and simply of difficulty, In fact, but of the difficulty of shaping a
p.rman.nt, long-t.rm s.ns. of political direction.
Th. analysis cannot avoid examining: (1) why the political partl.. have multiplied; (2) why
It has becomedifficult to form a perman.nt majority from th... parliamentarypartl.. ;
(3) why, ther.fore, the great traditional partl.. have lost the pow.r to lead, have lost
prestige etc. Is this a purely parllam.ntary fact or Is It the parllam.ntary r.fI.ctlon of
radical chang.. which have tak.n plac. In socl.ty Its.lf, In the function which social
groups have In productlv. IIf. etc? It seemsthat the only way of finding out the origin of
the decline of parliamentaryreglm.s I. this: the rea.on Is to be sought In civil socl.ty,
and there Is no qu.. tlon that In this fl.ld of r.search It Is .... ntlal to study the union
phenom.non; furthermor., not the union ph.nom.non und.rstood In the .Iementary s.ns.
of associationsof all the social groups for whatev.r purpose, but In the typical or
classical s.ns. - I., the newly-form.d union of social .I.ments which were previously
without a 'voice In the capital' and which, through the very fact of becomingunionised,
modify the political structure of socl.ty.1S
This analysis recalls Gramsci's first account in 1929 (§1.48) of the disintegration of
the 'apparatus of hegemony' in the post-war period, except that he now looks more
to the causes than the symptoms of the phenomenon. These must be sought in the
changes in contemporary 'civil society'. The organisation of social elements
previously without a 'voice in the capital' seems to refer to the experience of post-
war Italy, specifically to the inability of the Uberal regime to cope with the impact
made by the entry of the rural masses into civil and political life. The practical origin
of Gramsci's second critiCism, however, was the experience of Germany.
11 5.48. ".chl.velll .
II. It seems that the qu.. tlon posed by Panunzloabout the exl.t.nc. of a 'fourth'
stat. pow.r, that of 'd.termlnlng the political direction', .hould be connectedwith the
probl.ms rals.d by the dlsappearanc.of political partl.. and h.nc. by the .mptylng of
75 §1S.47. Machiavelli, ocm p.1807-1808.
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Parliament. This is a 'bureaucratic' way of posing a problem which previously was resolved
by the normal functioning of national political life, but It Is hard to see how a
'bureaucratic' solution of the problem Is possible. The parties were precisely the
organisms In civil society which not only worked out the various political directions, but
educated and presented the men supposedly qualified to apply them. At the parliamentary
level the various 'directions' worked out - whether total or partial, long-term or Immediate
In character - were challenged, stripped of their particularistic features etc, and one of
them became the 'state' direction Insofar as the parliamentary group of the strongest
party formed the 'government' and guided the government. The fact that as a result of
parliamentary disintegration, the parties have become Incapable of carrying out this task,
has not done away with the task Itself and has not Indicated a new way of solving the
problem; the same appJles to educating and testing out the various personaJltles. The
'bureaucratic' solution, In fact, merely masks a regime of parties of the worst kind Insofar
as they operate hidden from view and without accountability; the parties are replaced by
cliques and by confidential personal Influences, to say nothing of the restricted
possibilities of choice and the deadening of political sensitivity and tactical elasticity. It
WIS Max Weber's opinion, for example, that the difficulties experienced by the German
State In the post-war years were due In large part to the absence of a polltlcal-
parliamentary tradition and of the life of parties before 1914.78
This criticism of the 'bureaucratic' solution was probably based on the presidential
dictatorship in Germany (to which Panunzio referred) rather than the 'charismatic'
dictatorship which was now replacing it. Its most complete expression was Papen's
non-party cabinet of 1932 which answered closely to his description of a regime in
which "the parties are replaced by cliques and by confidential personal influences".
When parliamentary government was superseded by presidential government in
1930, Gramsci had recalled Max Weber's critique of the political system of imperial
Germany (§3.119). The presidential dictatorship seemed to be a regression to the
kind of regime which Weber had criticised in which unelected bureaucrats (both
civil and military) usurped the role of professional politiCians in "determining the
political direction". After the "emptying of parliamenf in March 1933, the Nazis
adopted a different kind of 'bureaucratic solution' in which a host of State and party
agencies competed (in vulgar 'Darwinist' terms) to "determine the political
direction". Whilst Gramsci was invoking the rationality of Weber, Hitler was
introducing the law of the jungle. Functionalist historians of Nazi Germany have
explained just how 'irrational' the consequences of this 'bureaucratic solution'
proved to be.
76§15.48(1I). Machiavelli, QCIII, p.1809.
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Amendments to Notebook 13: Notes on Machiavelli
(I) 113.21. Hltlar and Hlndanburg
During this period Gramsci was filling Notebook 13 (1932-34) with the second
drafts of the notes on Machiavelli. His observation of German politics in 1933 led
him to make one or two significant additions to these second drafts.
One of the threads of the 'German' notes was the importance of studying the
'constitutional' passage from the parliamentary regime to the fascist dictatorship. In
§9.133 he described the successive 'degrees' of Caesarism which led up to the
permanent dictatorship in Italy in 1926; in §14.11 he noted the importance of article
48 of the Weimar constitution which had formed the basis since 1930 of Germany's
'presidential' dlctatorship, The same thread can be traced in §13.21. In the first draft
of this note Gramsci suggested that the traditional function of the monarchy as the
symbol of the unity of the State was taken over by 'totalitarian' parties when they
came to power. Indeed, it was by appropriating the function of the Head of State
that such parties became 'totalitarian'. The thesis was originally an attempt to
synthesise the coming to power of 'totalitarian' parties in Bolshevik Russia and
Fascist Italy. The advent of the Nazis now led Gramsci to add the president of the
republic to his thesis.
113.21. Continuing the 'Naw Prlnca'. It haa already baan aald that tha protagonlat of the
New Prlnca In tha modern apoch could not be a peraonal haro but only the political party;
that Is to say, the particular party which at ona tlma or another, and depending on tha
various Intarnal ralatlona of the dlffarant natlona, haa the aim of establlahlng a new type
of Stata (and which la rationally and hlatorlcally founded for thla purpose).
It ahould be noted that In thoaa regimes which claim to be totalitarian, the traditional
function of the Institution of the Crown Is really takan over by the particular party In
question, which Is totalitarian In fact preclaaly becauae It fulflla thla function. Although
avary party la the expresalon of a social group, and of one social group only, the fact
ramalns that undar given conditions of a certain type particular parties only represent a
single aoclal group Inaofar al they exarclse a balancing and arbitrating function between
tha Intareata of their own group and those of othar groups; and thus succeed In enaurlng
that the development of the group they represent happena with the conaent and with the
help of the allied groups, If not alao with that of definitely holtlle groupa. The
conatltutlonal formula of the king or the president of the republic who 'ralgna but does not
rule' la the Juridical expression of this function of arbitration. Tha preoccupation of the
constitutional parties not to 'expose' the Crown or the PreSident, the formulae atatlng that
reaponslbillty for the actlona of the government lIaa not with the head of State but with hla
mlnlsterl, are the caaulatry behind which lies the general principle of safeguarding the
conception of the unity of the State, and the con.ent of the governed to the action of the
State, whatever personnel are Immediately In govarnmant and whatevar party they belong
to.
With the totalitarian party thasa formulae losa their meaning and consequantly the
Inatltutlons which functioned on the baaI. of auch formulae become leaa Important. But
the function Itaelf I. Incorporated by the party, which will exalt the abstract concept of
the 'State' and seek by varloua means to give tha Impraaslon that It Is working acUvely
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and effectively as an 'impartial force'.71
Gramsci was probably persuaded to include the president of the republic by
observing the way in which the Nazis exploited the authority and prestige of
President Hindenburg in the first months of the new regime. The close association
between Hitler and Hindenburg was a constant theme of Nazi propaganda and
was particularly visible in the brilliant stage-management of Potsdam Day on 21
March which was fully reported in Gramsci's reviews.78 The political significance of
the ceremony consisted in transposing from Hindenburg to Hitler the symbolic
function of the Head of State. In the context of the Nazi terror at that time, it was
crucially important for Hitler to appear to be "working actively and effectively as an
'impartial force'". The Potsdam ceremony was a key moment in the 'subjective'
transition to a 'totalitarian' regime in Germany even though the process was
objectively far from complete at this stage. The curious thing is that the German
events obviously contradicted his prescription that the protagonist of the 'New
Prince' cannot be a personal hero but only a political party", for it was the
charismatic Hitler not the Nazi Party which embodied the 'totalitarian' function he
describes. However, the point is that Gramsci did not regard Hitler as a new or
"modern" Prince. The imagery of Potsdam Day was more about 'restoration'than
'revolution' .
(II) 113.37. Hitler and Hugenburg
When Gramsci reworked his earlier notes on French national life, he included them
in the notebook on Machiavelli (§13.37). His model was Marx's classic analysis of
French history in the years 1848-51 which were a source of key concepts in
political theory notably, of course, 'Bonapartism'. France was the laboratory in
which Gramsci first invented and tested his political concepts, for French history
was considered to be "the richest in political elements" (§1.44). However, the
elaboration of general prinCiples of political science was by nature comparative
and proceeded by analysing the similarities and differences between various
countries and movements. The theoretical value of Gramsci's French notes lies in
his account, based on the French 'model', of the construction of bourgeois
n §13.21. Continuing the 'New Prince', oelll p.1601-1602. My italics.
78 For example in RSE,11 ApriI1933, p.806-808. The event is perceptively analysed by Ian Kershaw
in The 'Hitler Myth '. Image and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford. 1989) p.55-56.
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hegemony in Europe after the 1848 revolutions and its tendency to disintegrate in
the post-war years. The account included a detailed analysis of the main enemy of
the parliamentary system in France, the royalist group Action Francaise led by
Charles Maurras. From a theoretical point of view, however, this was the least
developed part of the account. Perhaps realising this, Gramsci began to develop
the theoretical side more explicitly in the second draft by introducing elements from
the recent political experience of Germany.
Maurras' group was a prime example of an element of politics, ie, "the monarchist
party in a republican regime". As such Gramsci compared it to a similar element in
German politics, the main right-wing party led by the newspaper magnate Alfred
Hugenburg. When Hugenburg took over the party leadership in 1928, he led it into
"opposition in principle" to the German republic, a position similar to that of
Maurras' group in republican France. The failure of the politics of a priori
abstentionism as practiced by these parties of the extreme Right contained a
useful lesson for parties of the extreme Left who had contemplated a similar course
of action (or, as Gramsci saw it, 'inaction') in the past.
The defeat of Maurras Is certain (ao I. Hugenburg'a In Germany). It Is Maurras'
conception which Is false because It Is too polished logically. Besides, Maurras himself
knew he had suffered defeat precisely at the beginning of the polemic with the Vatican,
which coincided (certainly not by aCCident) with the parliamentary crisis In France In 1925.
Whilst the ministries followed one another In rotation, Action Franca/.e declared that It
was ready to assume power and an article appeared which went as far as Inviting C8l11aux
to collaborate despite the fact that It had continually demanded the firing-squad for
Call1aux. The episode Is classic. The rigid, rationalistic politics of Maurras, of a priOri
abstentionism, of the natural 'Iron' laws ruling French society, was doomed to atrophy, to
collapse, to abdication at the decisive moment. When the dec/.'ve moment comes, we can
.ee that the great ma.. of energ/e. aet In motion by the crl.,., f.r from flolllling Into the
re.ervolr. artlfle/.lly cre.ted for them, fo/lollll the chennela traced out In the real world by
re.' politics up to that point and are diverted towarda the part/ea which have alwaya
remained active, or even tho.e which have .prouted like mu.hroom. out of the ground of
the cr/a/. It.e/f. Apart from the feeble-mindedness of believing In 1925 that the republican
regime was about to collapse as a result of a parliamentary crisis (such are the
monomaniacal hallucinations which anti-parliamentary Intellectualism leads to), If
anything collapeed It was the character of Maurras who perhaps will never be shaken out
of his state of apocalyptic illumination, not to mention the collapse of his group which felt
Isolated enough to have to appeal to C8l11aux and companY·711
These additions to §13.37 reflect recent German experience, particularly the mass
expansion of the Nazi Party between 1929-33: this is what he means by the mass
79 §13.37. Notes on French National Life. aclil p.1646-1647. My italics. In the preceding
§13.25. 'Duplicity' and 'Naivety' of Machiavelli, Gramsci cites the issue of the review La Cultura for
October-December 1933. It must be presumed therefore that Gramsci wrote §13.37 after this date.
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of energies flowing towards parties "which had sprouted like mushrooms out of the
ground of the crisis itself". A significant proportion of these energies had been
diverted from the Nationalists to the Nazis. Whereas Hugenburg rigidly abstained
from republican politics in the belief that the course of German history would
inevitably restore the country's 'natural' rulers, Hitler adapted his party's ideology to
the rapidly changing circumstances of the world crisis and the masses followed him
not Hugenburg. Furthermore, Gramsci's comparison 'Maurras-Hugenburg'
illustrated the 'scientific' principle that there is no such thing in politics as an
integral restoration, a restoration in toto, in spite of the 'natural laws' of history
invoked by purely reactionary ideologies of this type.
Postscript: A 'Dialectical Break' In 1933?
The first principle of Gramsci's historicism was that reality in movement and the
concept of that reality must be conceived as an inseparable unity.80 By this
principle it is possible to speak of a 'dialectical break' in Gramsci's theorisation of
the German crisis in 1933 when the movement of his thinking temporarily lost touch
with the movement of reality. The curious aspect of §13.37 is that Gramsci writes
about "the defeat of Hugenburg" as though it was a forecast when it was already
an accomplished fact. He did not appear to realise at the time of writing this note (in
the autumn or winter of 1933) that Hugenburg's defeat had already happened. In
June 1933 Hitler ditched his partners in the national coalition: Hugenburg
resigned from the cabinet and the Nationalist party was dissolved shortly
afterwards. Although this development was reported in his periodicals81 , he may
have lost the thread of German events sometime in the summer of 1933. It seems
that after his transfer from Turi to Formia at the end of 1933, Gramsci caught up with
the German events he had lost track of in mid-1933. The 'break' was partly due to
interruptions to his periodicals in the summer of 1933 82 , although we must not
forget also that his physical condition by this time was becoming unendurable.
80§10 (Part 1I).01,QCU po 1241.
81 For example under the rubric Geimania, 'L'inquadramento del fronte tedesco-nazionale nel
socialnazionalismo e Ie dimissioni di Hugenberg', in RSE, 18 July 1933, p.1576.
82 On 3 September 1933 he reported to Tatiana that he had received no reviews at all for the month of
August. The August issues were sent with those for September. Lell p.743.
Chapter 5
The Formla Period, December 1933-August 1935
The Struggle for the Weltanschauung
Tatlana's Letters
"I must admit Nino's appearance really frightened me : 1
Gramsci left Turi prison on 19 November 1933. The 21 prison notebooks started
there went with him. Gramsci was worried that they would be sequestered by order
of the Ministry of Justice and be impossible to recover, but in the event they were
removed from the prison by a simple ruse. Gramsci went to collect his belongings
from the prison storeroom and engaged the prison officer in conversation while, as
arranged, his cell-mate Gustavo Trombetti simply slipped them into his trunk.2 The
ease with which the notebooks were removed suggests that they were of no
importance to the prison or higher authorities.
There was a last-minute hitch in the transfer to the clinic at Formia. His brother
Carlo had contracted with the clinic's director, Dr.Cusumano, to pay his expenses
(120 lire a day). When Gramsci realised the "huge cost" to his family, he told the
Ministry to cancel the arrangement and he was sent instead to the prison at
Civitavecchia. Sraffa called it a "real disaster". Somehow Gramsci was prevailed
upon to accept the transfer to Formia: Sraffa told Tatiana not to mince her words
and to tell him that "he does not show much respect for you if he thinks you would
prefer to put 120 lire a day in a savings bank at the cost of letting him die".3 When
Tatiana visited him at Civitavecchia on 3 December, she found him in a bad way:
I must confess that Nino's appearance really frightened me. Maybe you can get some idea of his
physical condition if I tell you that his body seems to have shrunk to minimum proportions. Not only
that, his movements are those of someone who will break to pieces if he makes any sudden
movement. lt is alarming to see him using so much caution to sit down or stand up. His face has a very
anxious expression. He has a burning pain in his hands and he has lost a lot more weight. I asked him
about his health. 'What do you want me to tell you?' he replied. I couldn't hide my shock or alarm: 'But
you don't look at all Well'. 'I know' he said.4
At Formia Tatiana visited him every Sunday. The correspondence between them
ends at this point but her letters to Sraffa, to her sister Julia, and to Gramsci's family
1 Tatiana to Srafta, 7 December 1933, ten p.154.
2 Trombetti's testinomy in Gramsci vivo ne/le testimonianze dei suoi contemporanei, a cura di Mimma
Paulesu Quercioli (Feltrinelli, 19n) p.233.
3 Srafta to Tatiana, 17 November 1933, in Lettere a Tania per Gramsci a cura di Valentino Gerratana
(Editori riunitl, 1991) p.150.
4 Tatiana to Srafta, 7 December 1933,lbid., p.154.
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in Sardinia give a good picture of his personal circumstances and state of mind.
Although he was more comfortably accommodated there, he was mainly
concerned that the clinic took no steps to treat his multiple physical ailments.
Mortified at the cost to his family, he was dissatisfied that the clinic was not
providing the medical treatment it was being paid for. In April he asked to be
transferred to a clinic for nervous disorders at Fiesole. Acute insomnia, headache,
and under-eating sapped his morale and made him extremely irritable: "he says he
is tired, extremely tired and as for his health, 'things will end badly"'.5 We know from
Arcangeli's diagnosis after the crisis in March 1933 that he was suffering from Potts
disease. He now revealed that since then he had been urinating blood. 6 He knew
full well that his condition was worsening even though medical tests at the clinic on
his chest and kidneys apparently did not confirm this. In early September he
discussed with Tatiana a further petition to Mussolini pressing for his right to
conditional liberty under article 176 of the penal code. Unless he was transferred
out of Formia immediately, "he was frightened of soon becoming a complete
invalid".7 Just before the petition was sent on 24 September, the tension with the
Cusumano reached breaking-point and the angry director revealed what he really
felt about Gramsci. At the end of her visit Tatiana overheard him shouting that
Gramsci "was even being treated too well, rather better than he ought to be ".8 His
suspicion that the clinic had no real interest in treating him was obviously not far
wrong.
Gramsci did not write to Julia in this period. Tatiana explained that he wanted to
write to her without having to worry about surveillance of his letters by the local
police "who pry into the soul of every political prisoner with particular gusto and
with the definite aim of getting at him psychologically".9 Julia's letters arrived
sporadically and made a tremendous impact: after receiving one in May, he walked
around in a fog, couldn't sleep on account of his thoughts, and next day didn't feel
himself.10 In July Julia sent a new set of photographs of the children including a
5Tatiana to Sraffa, 17 May 1934, ibid., p.160.
6 The same letter quoted in Aida Natoli: Antigone e if prigioniero (Editori riuniti, 1991) p.173.
7 Tatiana to Sraffa, 12 September 1934, ibid., p.165. See also the draft of Gramsci's petition to
Mussolini in September 1934 in OCIV p.2415-2416.
8 ibid., p.166. My italics.
9 Tatiana Schucht, letter to Moscow 15 August 1934, Letters ai fami/ian, a cura di Mimma Paulesu
Quercioli (Editori Riuniti, 1991) p.185.
10Tatiana to Julia, 25 May 1934, ibid., p.171.
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particularly striking one of their younger son Giuliano:
Giuliano is so beautiful because he looks so much like you (ie, Julia): he has your mouth and forehead
and you know how beautiful you are. Such a great blessing. This will bring joy next Sunday - joy,
naturally, mixed with sorrow. Antonio suffers a lot on your account and the children's, he is wounded
in spirit because of his fam ily .11
Gramsci's petition for condition liberty was granted in October. The chief inspector
of police for political affairs arrived from Rome and required him to sign an
undertaking not to exploit the concession of conditional liberty for propaganda
purposes, as a communist v~ctory over the fascist regime. Surveillance of his
conversations with Tatiana now ended, his sleep was no longer interrupted by
night-time patrols, and he was free to leave the clinic and walk into town. However,
he had to remain at Formia and report to the police until his transfer to another
clinic was approved. It was not until August 1935 that he left Formia for the
Quisisana clinic in Rome. We have very few details about his life at Formia from
October 1934 to August 1935 but he went on writing notes until the transfer to
Rome.12 He also wrote short letters to his boys in Moscow, the thought of whom
kept him in touch with the Ufe of the affections: "How sorry I am not to be close to my
dear boys, and not to be able to help them with their school work and help them
forward on their journey in life" .13 Nor had he lost his sense of the magic of
childhood. At Formia he wrote his first letter to his youngest Giuliano:
De.r JuJlk,
You've seen the ... for the flrat time. Write and tell me what you thought about It. Did you
get a good mouthful of .. It water when you went In for a bathe? Have you learnt to awlm?
Old you catch any little fish or any live crabs? I've aeen little boya catching amall flah In
the Ha using a hollow brick to scoop them up. They caught enough to 011 • bucket I
Your Papa [in Russian), Antonlo.14
*
11 Tatiana to Julia, 5 July 1934, ibid., p.178.
12 The latest periodical source traced by Professor Gerratana is the issue of La Cultura , April 1935,
used in writing §29.08 (OCtv p.3034), although the draft of the petition to the General Inspector of
Public Security in Notebook 17 is dated 19 June 1935 (QC1V p.2416). Gramscl was1ransferred on 24
August 1935.
13To Delio, 8 April 1935, LeI! p.763 (Translated in HH p.264)
14To Jutik, undated but presumed to be from Formia, Lell p.766 (Translated in HH p. 279).
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In the first months of 1934 at Formia Gramsci continued to read but not to write.
The subscriptions to the reviews were renewed, he could now read a newspaper
again - the Corriere della Sera, his principal source of political news in this period
- and he started to ask for books. In February Tatiana told Srafta that he "hasn't
written a line since coming to Formia".15 It is hard to be sure when exactly he
resumed writing - probably in March 193416 - but there was a further stoppage in
September when Tatiana reported that "at the moment he can't work any more".1?
It is clear that the demanding regime of simultaneous reading and writing
followed at Turi could not be sustained with the same intensity any longer. The
emphasis now shifted decisively from writing new notes to redrafting earlier ones.
Most of the notes written at Formia were redrafts (C texts)18 of notes written at an
earlier stage. These were regrouped according to theme and redrafted in separate
notebooks with headings more or less corresponding to Gramsci's last plan of
study. This explains why he started so many new notebooks at Formia. Of the 298
notes contained in Notebooks 16-29, only 70 were entirely new (A or B texts) - most
of them in the 'miscellaneous' Notebook 17. To this extent we may say that Gramsci
did not do very much new thinking at Formia. However, redrafting earlier notes
was far from being an entirely mechanical exercise. Gramsci sometimes updated
them by introducing new insights and examples suggested by later reading in
1933-35. There was obviously a kind of 'tension' between the new political facts he
was reading about in 1933-35 and the structures of thought already elaborated in
earlier notes. The question is how far and in what ways did Gramsci incorporate
new facts in the Forrrna notes, especially the most recent German developments. A
series of 'German' notes - two B texts and six C texts - scattered through five of the
Formia notebooks can be identified.
15Tatiana to Sraffa, 16 February 1934: "The first thing to tell you is that Nino has not written a line
since coming to Formia ..... He gets the reviews on subscription and has asked for some books. He
gets the Corriere della Sera and will be getting //Sole as well. The books from Turi have arrived", Piero
Sraffa: Letterea TaniaperGramsci, cit., p.159-160.
16 Note that §17.38 to §17.44 were based on sources for January-March 1934.
1?Tatiana to Sraffa, 12 September 1934, ibid., p.165.
18Professor Gerratana designates the notes as follows: first drafts = A texts; single drafts = B texts;
second drafts =C texts. See QCl p.xxxvi.
349
The Periodicals and Corriere della Sera
The Reich Concordat, July 1933
In 1931 the German bishops had warned Catholics that the ideology of National
Socialism, notably its "religion of race", was irreconcilable with Catholic doctrine. Its
errors were similar to those of another movement of integral nationalism, Action
Francaise ,which Pope Pius XI had condemned in 1926. Although the German
bishops banned Catholic membership of the Nazi Party, the possibility that the
Pope might solemnly condemn National Socialism was illusory. Action Francaise
claimed that the Church's motives in condemning it were political not religious:
otherwise the anathema would be universal and apply to groups in other countries
(notably Fascist Italy) which professed a similar ideology. As Gramsci observed:
"The Pope, and likewise Civilta Cattolica , have in fact steered well clear of
identifying and 'punishing' with these same sanctions those individual persons or
groups in other countries which have the same tendencies as Maurras and make
no secret of them".1 In the event, the Church opted for an 'Italian' not a 'French'
solution to the Nazi problem by signing a Concordat with Nazi Germany in 1933.
As Gerarchia duly noted at the time, "on behalf of all the bishops and archbishops
of Germany, the Cardinal-Archbishop of Breslau marked the occasion by publicly
thanking the Chancellor Hitler'.2
The Fascist view of the Reich Concordat was given by Raffaele lacuzio, the
Director-General of Cults. Although there was no mention of it in the text itself, he
noted that negotiations for the Concordat were closely intertwined with the
dissolution of the Centre party in Germany. The relatively solid base of the Centre
throughout the crisis of 1929-33, including the election of March 1933, testified to
the difficulty the Nazis had in winning over the mass of Catholic voters, especially
in face of the warnings of the bishops. Hitler understood that Catholic 'consent' to
the new regime depended primarily on the direction given by the Vatican to
German Catholicism.3
1 §20.04. Integral Catholics, Jesuits, Modernists, aclll p.2101 (Translated in FSPN p.89). See also
the first draft of this note, with the same title: §S.141, QCI p.671-673.
2 Raffaele lacuzio: 'II Concordato fra La Sante Sede ad II Reich Gerrnanico', GER, August 1933.
3 At the cabinet meeting on 7 March, two days after the Reichstag elections. Hitler expressed the view
that the supporters of the Centre and the Bavarian People's Party could only be won over -if the Curia
dropped both parties·. Guenther Lewy: The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany (Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1964) p.30.
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The special importance assumed (as everyone knows) by the Catholic party in Germany, the Centre,
due to its compact character, must also be considered. The party has been dissolved in agreement
with the ecclesiastical authorities: and 'in view of the legal guarantees contained in the terms of the
Concordat safeguarding the rights and liberties of the Catholic church in the Reich and its states, the
Holy See, in accordance with its traditional teaching, promises to issue instructions excluding the
clergy and the religious from membership of political parties and from activity in support of political
parties .
In addition, the Concordat states that the obligation imposed on the clergy not to undertake any
activity in support of political parties does not imply' limitiation of any sort in teaching and expounding
publicly, as their duty requires, the doctrines and maxims of the Church, not only dogmatic but also
moral'; and that religious education will seek in particular to educate the conscience in patriotic, civil,
and social duties, according to the tenets of the faith and of Christian moral law.
In this way the new regime in Germany, which is founded on the unitary conception of the State,
expects from the Church a cordial collaboration in bringing about the victory of the supreme ideals
which it proposes to realise in the life of the State and the people 4
The "agreemenf' of the Catholic hierarchy to the dissolution of the Centre Party was
not entirely a matter of bowing to the inevitable in view of its willing collaboration in
the outcome, although the two things were far from incompatible. The Church's
retreat from political activity, which in the fascist view was "in accord with its
traditional teaching", was obtained relatively easily. However, the negotiations met
with greater difficulty in the field of civil society where the Church defended its
"trenches" with greater tenacity.
In the field of Catholic action, the protection of the State is recognised and guaranteed not only for
those organisations with exclusively religious, cultural, and charitable aims, but also for those serving
other purposes, including social and professional ones, which are not directly under the control of the
ecclesiastical authorities, although the latter must guarantee to undertake their activity outside any
political party. 5
However, lacuzio acknowledged that "it is not always easy to determine where
social and economic activity ends and political activity begins". The conflict in Italy
in 1931 over Catholic Action, which was accused of forming an embryonic political
party, warned of the difficulties ahead for Catholic Action in Germany.
The question of Catholic Action was examined by Padre Rosa in his official
commentary on the Concordat which appeared in Civilta Cattolica after its
ratification in September 1933.6 Rosa addressed the Catholic critics of the
Concordat, notably in France, with all the intellectual and moral ingenuity for which
4 Raffaele lacuzio, cit., p.649.
5 ibid., p.647.
6 E.Rosa, SJ: 'II Concordato della Santa Sede con la Germania', CC, 18 November 1933. Although
Gramsci's subscriptions were cancelled prior to his transfer out of Turi on 19 November 1933, his
reference to this issue of Givins Cattolica in §17.18 confirms that he eventually received it at Formia
See Professor Gerratana's note to §17.18, OCIV p.2970.
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the Jesuits were legendary. He blithely denied, for example, that the requirement
on Catholic schools in Hitler's Germany to educate the conscience of pupils in their
civic and patriotic duties presented any difficulty: "Nor can it be said that Hitlerism
intrudes with unjust pretensions (as others have written) in the care which it
recommends "to educate the conscience of pupils in patriotic, civic, and religious
duties", for this is indeed well understood by Catholic pedagogy and the Church is
well pleased on every occasion to give support to the civil powers. Likewise, the
latter should always reciprocate with equal good faith 1".7 Nor did the liturgical
prayer for the prosperity of the Reich and the German people at the end of
religious services present any difficulty, even though Rosa betrayed his disbelief in
Hitler's claim that the Third Reich rested on Christian foundations: "Did not the
principles of the Apostles also prescribe prayer for pagan states and their rulers,
and precisely during the first century of persecutions? Nor did this in any way
signify approval of their policiesl".8 On the question of Catholic Action, which was
dealt with in Article 31 of the Concordat, Rosa was concerned that its future was
neither settled nor guaranteed.
However, certain difficulties arise in the mind, at least as regards the practical arrangements, over the
two following articles which deal with the provisions of the concordat or the statutory position
regarding Catholic Action. To be sure, the protection of the Catholic organisations and aSSOCiations
which are devoted exclusively to religious, cultural and charitable ends or to Christian benevolence,
and as such are directly controlled by the ecclesiastical authority, is promised and assured: the same
applies to the others, or to those which serve other purposes including social and professional ones,
only as long as they ensure that they undertake their work outside any political party; the Reich
government and the German episcopate have undertaken to draw up an agreed list of these other
organisations, which could later be incorporated into the State associations serving similar social or
professional purposes.9
As Rosa clearly suggests, the difficulty over Catholic Action was partly rooted in the
fact that not all the Catholic organisations were under direct control of the hierarchy
who alone could 'guarantee' abstention from politics. The Concordat thus afforded
the Vatican the opportunity to centralise control of the lay organisations in Germany
where (as Gramsci observed) the structure of Catholic Action was unusual in being
neither unified nor centralised. As for the promise by the Holy See to order the
exclusion of the German clergy from politics, Rosa's attitude was both more
modernist and more 'flexible' than that of the Fascist Director-General of Cults who
7 ibid., p.340.
8 ibid., p.342.
9 ibid., p.342-343.
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considered political abstention to be "in accord with its traditional teaching". By
contrast Rosa invoked the "civil rights" of the clergy and the "particular
circumstances" of Germany.
This last disposition which seems to restrict the range of civil rights which the clergy and the religious,
as citizens, are equally entitled to under the law, is certainly a serious matter; but it is manifestly
legitimised by the reasons and considerations mentioned above, both by the particular circumstances
of the German Reich and by the timely protection for the rights and liberties of the Catholic Church
which is assured by the present legislation introduced by the Concordat; in all their work and in their
civil and religious conduct, the clergy and the religious must place this protection above anything else.
But the last clause of the 'final protocol' makes clear that abstention from political struggle is not
restricted only to the Catholic clergy but will be imposed on all the ministers of the other non-Catholic
religious confessions who are subject to the same provisions concerning political activity in the
parties.
And lastly it is explicitly stated that abstention from militant or party political activity itself does not in any
way imply restricting the priests and the religious from publicly teaching and expounding, as their duty
requires, the doctrines and maximsof the Church, not only dogmatiC but also moral. It is therefore a
perfectly reasonable and holy abstention, especially under the present conditions. Moreover, it is
abstention from party politics, or so-called political struggle, not abstention from the politics enshrined
in legal justice, ie, the duty to cooperate in the common good by observing and promoting genuine
Christian morality in social and public life itself; because this kind of politics is the essential duty of the
citizen according to the same precepts of rational and Catholic ethics, and it is a duty which cannot be
renounced.re
Rosa concluded by answering the French critics of the Concordat. He was less
bothered by the old French monarchists for whom the Concordat amounted to "the
canonisation of Hitlerism", than by the "modern critics" who warned of the dangers
of failure and the probability of violation, "to the detriment of Catholics and of
religion in Hitlerite Germany". Rosa returned to the 'Jesuitical' position with which
he started. The objections to the Concordat were without substance.
We say this even granted the hypothesis, which is not implausible, that the fears about the future
observance of these conventions which are currently a matter of speculation and are nurtured and
expressed in many quarters, turn out in practice to be true. For, in the same way that rights are not
suppressed by being abused, still more the violation of a law does not render null and void the law
itself, or juridical and moral norms in the social life of peoples.11
We cannot deny, nevertheless, least of all at the present time, that their fears are founded, but we
deny the validity of the arguments which are illogically deduced from these fears to the effect that the
Concordat is useless or, worst still, harmful. Moreover, ever since the first echo of these arguments
reached us we have insisted on this very point, without harbouring 'optimistic' illusions, and our
answer, which is historically and juridically undeniable, can have no reply. In any case, without further
ado let us conclude in the words of our confrere in France that, after taking note of the objections,
"the Holy See has considered them more and better than anyone else, but equally has well-
10 ibid., p.343-344.
11 ibid., p.332.
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grounded, wise, and well-considered reasons for passing over them with a view to the greater
gOOdn•12
The Sterilisation Law, January 1934
Hitlerism has shown that in Germany, under the rule of an apparently serious intellectual group, a
monstrous Lorianism was hatching out which has broken the official mould and has been propagated
as a new 'official' conception and scientific method.13
This was how Gramsci viewed Hitlerism in the last of the 'German' notes written in
1935. How did his reading in 1933-35 lead him to describe Hitlerism as a
"monstrous Lorianism" and what did he mean by this? The 'time-frame' of this final
comment can be defined by two expressions of the "new 'official' conception and
scientific method" of the Nazi State: the sterilisation law which came into effect in
January 1934 (when Gramsci moved to Formia) and the Nuremberg Laws
promulgated in September 1935 (shortly after Gramsci stopped writing the
notebooks).
Before 1933 the racial core of Hitlerism tended to puzzle Italian fascists. Nazi anti-
semitism was not taken very seriously and was regarded at best as an instrument,
at worst as an aberration of Nazi propaganda. However, the actual practice of the
Nazi regime in the course of 1933-34 clarified and 'authenticated' its ideological
aims. In particular, the practical measures immediately taken to begin isolating and
excluding the Jews and the handicapped from the racial community
(Volksgemeinschaft ) demonstrated the basic importance of racial theory in
Hitlerism. Sympathetic or interested fascist observers in Italy were therefore forced
to come to terms with Nazi racial theory even though there was little or nothing in
their own national culture to help them do this. The intellectual reaction to Nazi
racism was reflected in Gramsci's reviews in 1933-34 which contained numerous
articles on this subject. When Gramsci described Hitlerism as a "monstrous
Lorianism", there is no doubt that he was thinking of the racial theory and practice
of the Nazi regime and the 'SCientific' basis it laid claim to.
The racial ideology of the Nazis proved at first to be the main stumbling-block to
Italian fascists looking for affinities between the two movements. While fascist
and/or Catholic intellectuals could explain and even justify the anti-Jewish
measures of 1933 in "common sense" terms - the supposed need to reduce the
12 ibid., p.346.
13 §28.01 (Lorianism), QCIII p.2325. See the analysis of 'Lorianism' below.
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'excessive' Jewish influence in German public life - the possibility that anti-
semitism was the core of a comprehensive racial Weltanschauung was hard to
imagine. Taking their cue from Mussolini himself who in his well-publicised
conversations with the German-Jewish writer Emil Ludwig14 and in other public
pronouncements at the time rejected the Nazi 'obsession' with race, fascist
intellectuals who followed German developments had an uneasy sense of the
potential dangers of this obsession now that it had become the 'official' conception.
The Nuremberg party congress in September 1933, for example, evoked the
following comment from Giuseppe Piazza who wrote
the crude identification of Race with Nation and of Racism with National Socialism which was clearly
expressed at the Nuremberg Congress, can lead to excesses and thus prove to be a hindrance to the
regime rather than, as it would wish, a mobilising and inspirational myth ......This brutal and archaic
identification - the worst, the crassest legacy of the Wilhelmine period· has suprisingly been
borrowed by National SOciaiism ..... lt will be the source of fatal contradictions for National Socialism
because it contains the seeds of the most dangerous and unrestrained degenerations, of a
materialistic and deterministic kind ...... and runs the risk of leading directly to a kind of superstitious and
anti-religious paganism. The concept of Nation cannot be identified with that of Race for the simple
fact that it already contains and supersedes this, transforming it into something new and higher which
is entirely a spiritual reality with nothing of the latter's materialism. 15
Warnings about the potential 'excesses' of Nazi racial theory were confirmed by the
law for the compulsory sterilisation of those suffering from hereditary illnesses
which was approved in July 1933 and came into effect on 1 January 1934.16 In
addition to legal acts excluding the Jews from the Volksgemeinschaft, the Nazi
regime now called upon medical science to serve the goal of racial purification. If
National Socialism as one Nazi official called it in 1934 was nothing but "applied
biology"17, then medical science had a key role to play in engineering the new
14Emil Ludwig: Colloqui con Mussolini (Mondadori, Milan 1932). In a letter to Tatiana on 8 May 1933
Gramsci reported: "I have received Ludwig's Colloqu; and have read them already' (Lell p.710), but
he does not refer to the Colloqui in the prison notes.
15G.Piazza: 'Nazionalsocialismo - Razzismo' ,NA, 16 September 1933, p.182-183.
16The 'Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring' was approved at the same cabinet
meeting on 14 July which approved the Concordat but publication was delayed until26 July, six days
after the Vatican signed Concordat. See Lewy, cit., p.258-259. The basic provisions of the
sterilisation law were reported under the rubric Cose straniere in CC, 1 January 1934, p.111. The
usual editorial practice in this rubric was to report the bare facts, but on this occasion the following
comment was added: "There is no need to emphasise that this ordinance is opposed to the teachings
of the encyclical Casti connubi and therefore to the conscience of Catholics; we will only say that such
an anti-Christian, uncivilised, and inhuman measure is more worthy of the breeders of beasts than the
pastors of peoples· . The secondary literature starts from the seminal article by Jeremy Noakes:
'Nazism and Eugenics: The Background to the Nazi Sterilisation Law of 14 July 1933' , in R.J.Bullen,
H.Pogge von Strandmann, and A.S.Polonsky (eds): Ideas into Politics (LondonlSydney 1984).
17Quoted in Robert Proctor: Racial Hygiene. Medicine under the Nazis (1988) p.64.
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racial utopia. The advent of the new regime thus opened up exciting opportunities
for a whole group of German intellectuals to advance their careers by their
contribution to the 'science' of racial hygiene.
The law listed a series of physical and mental illnesses - including schizophrenia,
-
alcoholism. and manic depression - deemed to be hereditary. Doctors with patients
suffering from any of the scheduled illnesses were legally required to inform the
health authorities and 'hereditary health tribunals' would then decide on the
compulsory sterilisation of the patient. Quite apart from objections from the
standpoint of individual rights and Christian ethics, which were fully articulated by
the Jesuits in Civilta Cattolica, the law rested on highly dubious scientific
foundations. The scientific doubts voiced in Italy bring to mind some of the key
features of 'Lorianism' as Gramsci defined it - "the lack of a systematic critical spirit",
"a negligent approach to scientific activity" etc - and remind us that Lorianism was
far from being merely an Italian phenomenon.
But the supporters of sterilisation appeal to science. A truly heavy responsibility rests upon those men
who in the name of science call loudly for the application to practical life of their theories of heredity.
affirming in their writings and repeating at congresses that the current state of scientific research on
hereditary transmission justified the intervention of the State to prevent the procreation of
'undesirables'. This was the theme most often repeated at the international congresses of the
eugenic societies in order to create among the jurists and still more among the economists a
favourable climate for the law. 18
The writer specifically mentioned Rudin's work on the hereditary transmission of
mental illnesses and questioned the empirical evidence on which it was based. He
quoted from the proceedings of a recent conference on mental health held in Rome
in September 1933 at which one expert, Prof. Sante de Sanctis, stated: "The
empirical basis of Rudin's hereditary prognosis rests upon statistics which are far
too limited to constitute a method and a proof.. ....A cloud of prejudices is necessary
before we can be convinced". He continued:
To see how much truth there is in this decisive statement we have only to look at the list of illnesses
supposedly governed by the law of heredity. Challenging the statistics with other statistics gathered
with scientific rigour and accuracy, Or.Vailejo Najera stated: ·whoever wishes to take into account the
latest researches and experiments must conclude from the facts that the present state of our
knowledge of heredity, allowing for all the difficulties of hereditary prognosis and of clinical diagnosis,
provides absolutely no scientifiC justification for the sterilisation of persons suffering from mental
18 U.Lopez,SJ: 'Oifesa della Razza ed Etica Cristiana' (1), CC, 17 March 1934, p.579. The second
instalment of this article is in CC, 7 ApriI1934. A third article by Lopez: 'Razzismo e Cristianesimo dl
frente ai Malati Ereditari' appeared in CC,S May 1934.
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illnesses, disorders or deficiencies. 19
Outside the Catholic context, the scientific case against eugenic sterilisation was
the subject of two articles by Alfredo Bertagnoni in Corriere della Sera. The writer
suggested that understanding of the laws of heredity had not advanced beyond the
pre-scientific stage since the "fundamental principle of life" had not yet been
discovered and possibly never would be.
However, for all that has been said and is being said about heredity, and no less about evolution, it
must be said that it remains a very mysterious phenomenon. The transmission of physical and mental
characteristics is evidently an undeniable fact but it is equally undeniable that the transmission of
these characteristics is neither universal nor inevitable. We do not know very much about the laws of
heredity despite the very rich literature on the subject. Heredity is part of the great mystery of life and
perhaps we will never know its fundamental principle. Hence to enact laws, to decide on surgery
(mutilazioni) on the basis of uncertain data, on the ground of scientific probabilities or medical
hypotheses: isn't this the height of irresponsibility on the part of organs set up by the 5tate?20
Just as Piazza had warned of "the most dangerous and unrestrained
degenerations" to which Nazi racism could lead, so Bertagnoni warned of the
possible excesses of eugenics. After describing an earlier law passed by the
American state of Indiana which authorised prison doctors to sterilise incorrigible
criminals and the incurably insane, he observed:
This idea leads step by step to the idea of including among those deemed to be unfit for social life all
sorts of undesirables, not only people with moral defects but also those suffering from alcoholism,
tuberculosis or syphilis, the blind, the deaf, the deformed and, in a general way, all those potential
parents of unfit offspring. What is more, it also includes all those who by the fact of belonging to an
inferior race constitute a danger to the superior race. In particular, this is the conception behind the
recent German law for the prevention of defective offspring. Even though this law specifies the
individual defects liable to medical examination, it is no less true that the greatest defects are
considered a priori to be certain psychological attributes of races which are not completely Aryan21 .
In fact the Nazis never applied compulsory sterilisation to the Jews. Although the
Nuremberg Laws of 1935 regarded the Jews as a problem of racial hygiene, they
dealt with the 'problem' by sexual segregation of Aryans and Jews not by
sterilisation. Nevertheless, it is interesting that Bertagnoni could contemplate such
a monstrous possibility in 1934. In fact, the guesswork of Padre Lopez writing in
Civilta Cattolica proved closer to the mark. Lopez contrasted the Catholic
conception of the rights of man and of the family as defined by papal encyclicals,
19 Ibid p.SSO.
20 Alfredo Bertagnoni: 'Eugenica e sterilizzazione' in Corriere della Sera, 18 May 1934 and the same
writer's article 'Le due sterilita' in Corriere della Sera, 6 June 1934.
21 ibid.
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notably Pius Xl's Casti Connubi, with the conception of Alfred Rosenberg for whom
the State was above all the custodian of the race:
These opposite principles logically have opposite consequences. It is clear that in an absolutely
totalitarian conception of the State in which it is the judge of all rights, the State - once having
established the good of the race as the highest norm - assumes by force of this principle the power
not only to impose the sterilisation but even the elimination of those individuals suffering from organic
or mental disorders.22
Prescient though this analysis was, those who expressed forebodings in 1934
about "a catastrophic eugenics"23could not have visualised how catastrophic the
drive for racial 'purification' would prove to be.
The Rosenberg Question, February 1934
Sometime after February 193424 Gramsci collated a set of earlier notes called
Integral Catholics, Jesuits, Modernists in which he added some new remarks
about the development of relations between the Vatican and the Hitler State since
the signing of the Concordat in July 1933. Gramsci found the Vatican's attitude
towards Hitlerism surprising. The anti-Catholic, anti-Christian nature of Hitler's
movement was apparent from Rosenberg's book The Myth of the Twentieth
Century which was published well before the Nazis came to power. Indeed, as
early as 1931 the German bishops had issued "the most solemn warning" to
Catholics that the ideology of National Socialism, particularly its "religion of race",
was irreconcilable with Catholic and Christian doctrine.25 A tenuous distinction was
made between Hitler who avoided attacking the Church in Mein Kampf, and
Rosenberg's "furious hostility against the Church and against any Christian
sentimenf. Nevertheless, the bishops observed that the "errors of the National
Socialist leaders" were obviously similar to those of the French Action Francaise
which Pius XI had condemned in 1926. To this extent Gramsci thought that the
difficulties the Church in Germany now (in 1934) found itself in were "predictable".
22 U.Lopez op. cit, CC, 7 April 1934. The sterilisation law prepared the ground for more radical
'wartime' measures, ie, the euthanasia programme carried out in 1939-41. See in particular Henry
Friedlander's The Origins of Nazi Genocide. From Euthanasia to the Final Solution (1995).
Friedlander's description of the academic scientists who took part In the euthanasia programme
provides a detailed case study of Gramsci's "monstrous Lorianism".
23 The phrase is quoted by Lopez in the third of the articles cited above, in CC, 5 May 1934.
24 The notes were redrafted as §20.04. Gramsci refers directly to Monsignor Umberto Benignl ·who
died In 1934" : Professor Gerratana notes that Benignl died on 26 February 1934 (QCIV p.2994).
25 See the 'historical background' for 1931 above.
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On 24 January 1934 Hitler made Alfred Rosenberg officially responsible for the
ideological indoctrination and training of the Nazi Party. Shortly afterwards
Rosenberg addressed a specially invited audience on "the struggle for the
Weltanschauung ". "If today we were content with only the power of the state, the
National Socialist movement would not have fulfilled its mission The political
revolution in the state has indeed been completed, but the intellectual and spiritual
recasting of men's minds is only just beginning".26 On 9 February the Vatican
placed Rosenberg'sThe Myth of the Twentieth Century on the Index of Forbidden
Books.27 Although the book had first appeared in 1930, the Vatican waited until
now to officially condemn it. The ban appeared to be a response to Rosenberg's
promotion by Hitler to an 'official' role in the Nazi Party, but the Church was still far
from contemplating a ban on Hitler's Mein Kampf.
The reasons for the Vatican's condemnation of Rosenberg's Myth were set out in
the issue ofCivilta Cattolica on 3 February:
The book drags through the mire not only the Catholic Church and Catholics who number a good third
of the population of the Reich, but all those who believe in the Christian religion as God revealed it -
that is to say, the great majority of the Reich - who are treated with suspicion, contempt. and anti-
Christian hatred. And all this in the name of the fatherland and the German nation, in the name of a
new religion promulgated by Rosenberg which is destined to replace Christianity: the religion of race.
It is a fanatical and extremely violent book which sows the seeds of racial and religious hatreds, discord
and rivalry among the sons of this same nation. It is therefore completely opposed to the general aim
of National Socialism itself, which is to unite the German people in order to bring about its national
rebirth. It is completely opposed to the declarations of Hitler that he wishes to establish the Third
Reich' on 'Christian foundations'. Moreover, it is extremely antipathetic to other nations who can hardly
be expected to welcome Rosenberg's exaltation throughout the book of Germanism as the source
and beginning of every civilisation. 28
The Vatican's forthright condemnation of Rosenberg, coming soon after the
sterilisation law came into effect, placed the Concordat under considerable strain.
The Church continued to clutch at the straws offered by Hitler who privately
assured the German hierarchy that he did not like Rosenberg's book and did not
identify with its views. However, it now pressed him to make a public declaration.
26 Quoted in Robert Cecil: The Myth of the Master Race. Alfred Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology
(Batsford, london 1972) p.113. Rosenberg took his cue from Hitler who had spoken some months
earlier of the need "to stamp the National Socialist Weltanschauung on the German people".
27The historical background to the Rosenberg question is discussed in Guenther Lewy: The catholic
Church and Nazi Germany (Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1964) p.151-160.
28 M.Barbara SJ: 'Mito Razzista Anticristiano', CC, 3 February 1934. As Grarnsci pointed out, Pius XI
was "the Jesuits' Pope" and so the views expressed in Civilta Cattolica were particularly 'authoritative'.
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Now, fidelity and objectivity towards National Socialism oblige us to make known Rosenberg's
declaration in his preface of February 1930: 'The ideas and the conclusions set out in this book are my
personal opinions, not programmatic points of the movement to which I belong which cannot
therefore be held responsible for the content of this book'.
Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, Chancellor Hitler himself has solemnly declared since the start of his
coming to power that he wishes to establish the Third Reich on 'Christian foundations'. Well then,
Catholics and indeed all Christian believers in the Gospel have the right to expect that the government
of the Reich, which has done so much to sweep away the atheistic and subversive press of the
communists, will prove beyond doubt that it denies all responsibility for this book and will take the
necessary measures against a book which undermines the very foundations of Religion and of the
Christian State, offends the majority of the nation, and is an extremely pernicious influence on
youth.29
Hitler never publicly repudiated Rosenberg's views, of course, and was never likely
to. The Jesuits' attempt to draw a dividing line between them, or between the
ideology of the party and the official conception of the State, was manifestly
untenable now that Hitler had publicly demonstrated his confidence in Rosenberg.
In any case, the sterilisation law should have destroyed any remaining shred of
credibility in Hitler's claim that the Third Reich was based on 'Christian
foundations'. Indeed, the connection between eugenic sterilisation and the
"religion of race" as preached by its new high priest, Rosenberg, was understOOd
early and with particular clarity by the Jesuits. When Hitler would not disown
Rosenberg's anti-Christian ideas, the Jesuits turned a more critical eye on Hitler's
Main Kampf in order to show without further dubiety just how far the basis of the
Third Reich was from being Christian.
The Struggle for the Weltanschauung
Meanwhile, actions spoke louder than words. During the spring and summer of
1934 the Nazi Party stepped up the pressure to dissolve the Catholic organisations
protected under article 31 of the Reich Concordat and to incorporate them into the
parallel party organisations. In March, for example, the leader of the Hitler Youth,
Baldur von Schirach, who was ideologically close to Rosenberg, contributed to "the
struggle for the Weltanschauung" by launching a membership drive aimed
particularly at members of the Catholic youth organisations.3O The latter were
encouraged to desert their Catholic leaders and to join the rival Nazi organisation.
By imposing a ban on double membership, von Schirach effectively announced
29 Ibid p. 248-249.
30 Guenther Lewy, op. cit., p.121.
360
that it was impossible to be both Catholic and Nazi.
The defence of separate, independent Catholic organisations now became
synonymous with the defence of Christian beliefs and values as such. At Easter the
Pope addressed a special rnessaqe of encouragement to the Catholic youth
associations in Germany for the 'sacrifices' they were making to uphold religious
values, "by resisting the pressure of an alluring propaganda which seeks to draw
you towards a conception of life which is not Christian but pagan".31 Olinour capacity
as your pastor we are anxiously aware of the situation in which Catholic youth in
Germany finds itself and we know that your bishops are also preoccupied by it.
Equally, your associations should know that their cause is our cause". Rosenberg
suggested in the Volkischer Beobachter that the resistance of the Catholic
organisations was being orchestrated by the ex-leaders of the dissolved Centre
Party and that it amounted to a revival of 'political' Catholicism. This implied that the
Catholic organisations had forfeited their legal right to existence which under the
terms of the Concordat was strictly conditional upon their refraining from political
activity of any kind.
The Centre passed unharmed through the Hitlerite revolution. Its leaders are living in Germany
undisturbed. This is the first thing to stress in order to appreciate the impudence of some of the high
ecclesiastical dignitaries who, feeling themselves secure, take the liberty of preventing National
Socialism from preaching its ethic and its political creed. We maintain that with all their protests the
Centre and the Catholic clergy especially are trying to create an atmosphere of martyrdom and
persecution. National Socialism has always recognised and will continue to recognise the right of
religions to exist. However, it will decisively oppose any attempt to substitute the pulpit for the
parliamentary tribune now suppressed 32
The hint of brutality in Rosenberg's observation that the Catholic leaders should
count themselves fortunate in having survived the revolution "unharmed" and that
they were wrong to feel quite so "secure" is significant when we recall that the
massacre of 30 June 1934 claimed two prominent leaders of the Catholic
organisations: Dr. Erich Klausener, the head of CatholiC Action, and Adalbert
Probst, the head of the Catholic sports organisation.33
31 Reported in Comere della Sera, 4 April1934, under the byline 'II Papa contro iI neo-paganismo.
Una lettera ai goivani cattolici tedeschi'. The Pope's message was also reported under the rubric
Germania in RSE, 17 April 1934. The text was published in Germany in the Kolnische Volkzeitung :a
ban on publication was imposed on the other German papers. See the further article in Corriere della
Sera, 7 ApriI1934: 'II Vaticano e iI neo-paganismo nazista. Rielievi della stamps inglese'.
32 'Tensione di rapportl net Reich tra camicie brune e cattolici', Corriere della Sera, 8 April1934.
Rosenberg's article was also reported under the rubric 'Germania' in RSE, 24 April1934
33 Guenther Lewy op cit., p.124.
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The Massacre of 30 June 1934
In §17.51 Gramsci wrote a critical gloss on a quotation from Hitler's Mein Kampf. It
must have been written around September 1934, although the date cannot be
pinned down with complete certainty. Gramsci observed that when a party
becomes a State, it must be reorganised and adapted to the new situation. The
party's 'religion' (ie, ideology) will also have to change: sectarianism, or "the blind,
one-sided fanaticism of 'party' (in this case the fanaticism of a sect, a fraction of a
larger party in which an internal struggle is going on)" must give way to a more
"State-minded" conception. At the end of the note Gramsci refers opaquely to
today's political situation where sectarian fanaticism was much in evidence:
"Political life today provides ample evidence of this narrow- and closed-minded
mentality which, by the way, provokes dramatic struggles because they are
themselves the means by which historical development takes place in practice".
What "dramatic struggles" was Gramsci thinking of? From the reference to Mein
Kampf, it may be supposed that he was thinking of recent German politics, in
particular the 'sectarian' struggle which developed inside the Nazi Party in 1934
which was settled so 'dramatically' by the massacre of the leader of the Storm
Troops, Ernst Rohm, and more than a hundred others on 30 June - the 'Night of
Long Knives'. The event was front-page news for several days in theCorriere della
Sera and was extensively reported in Gramsci's reviews.
*
In Corriere della Sera Gramsci could read the signs of growing tension between
'revolutionary' and 'reactionary' tendencies in the Third Reich. On 18 April Ernst
Rohm, Minister of State and Chief of Staff of the SA, gave an 'unauthorised' speech
to foreign diplomats and journalists in Berlin in which he announced that the
National Socialist 'revolution' was far from over. "We are convinced that the
reaction still lives" he said. It took various forms but included "all those who refuse
to recognise that the Hitler movement is not only nationalist but also socialist". The
audience listened in embarrassed Silence as Rohm told them in brutal street
language what he proposed to do with these 'reactionaries':
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'There are still people today holding official posts who have not breathed so much as a whiff of our
revolution' Rohm declared. 'We don't care about their outdated mentality but we will smash their
heads in if they try to make this counter-revolutionary mentality predominate'. This passage of the
speech was particularly violent. The minister stated at the end that the order and discipline of his units
express the new style of German life and concluded that 'the units themselves are the National
Socialist revolution'. 34
Rohm's speech gave rise to the myth that he was actively plotting a "second
revolution", a myth which Hitler then used to legitimise the mass murder of 30 June.
Meanwhile, Hitler used the anniversary of May Day to enter "the struggle for the
Weltanschauung" himself. In a speech to a gathering of Brown Shirts in Berlin he
explained the purpose of universal labour service. According to the Corriere :
"Virtually the whole of Hitler's speech was devoted to outlining the concept of the
Deutsche Volsgemeinschaft which must strengthen the duty to show popular
sOlidarity".35 The volkisch conception of National 'Socialism' differed from the
classist conception of Rohm although, of course, Hitler's idea of winning the 'battle
of ideas' did not depend on such niceties.
Further evidence of the tensions in the German ruling group surfaced in the
Corriere some weeks later in von Papen's speech at Marburg University on 17
May. Papen complained that the conservatives were being dubbed 'reactionaries'
by the young revolutionaries whose leaders in the Hitler Youth were crying 'the
enemy is on the right'. He observed that there existed a "a dualism between the
party and the State which must be resolved", that "an abyss has opened up
between the intellectual tendency and the practical side of the German revolution".
Instead of attacking the people dubbed reactionaries by Hitler, the new regime
should concentrate on fighting the marxist tendency". Papen now argued that the
question of the Christian foundations of the State was at stake in this struggle.
Referring to the efforts of the new regime to create a single evangelical church, he
observed:
Referring to the religious dissent which the press had hushed up but which was nevertheless still
continuing, Papen exclaimed: 'German citizens who demand that Germanic faith be given a unitary
basis would do well not to forget that the Christian doctrine has been the source of the religious
strength of the whole of Western thought. ....The struggle being fought out will decide whether the
new regime will be Christian or lose itself in a pseudo-religious idealism. The Germans have no right to
withdraw from the ranks of Christian peoples because, if they do, they will not be able to act in the
European context and will cause harm to the idea of the Reich'. 36
34 'Vivace discorso di Roehm contra Ie mene antirivoluzionarie' under the rubric 'Recentissime',
Corriere della Sera, 19 April 1934. Rohm's speech was also reported in RSE, 8May 1934.
35 Corriere de/la Sera, 2 May 1934.
36 'Dissidio ideologico tra von Papan e gli altri membri del Governo' under the rubric 'Recentissime',
Corriere della Sera, 21 June 1934. Papen's speech was also reported in RSE, 26 June 1934.
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Rosenberg's reply to Papen in the Volkischer Beobachter on 20 June further
escalated the tension. He observed that National Socialism was against the ideas
of both the left and the right because it aspired to be 'totalitarian'. "It is therefore a
big mistake to believe, for example, that the so-called right-wing circles had the
same aim as the National Socialists, albeit using a different tactic. It is necessary to
use the word 'reaction' for these circles, which they did not like precisely because it
is true". The Christian tradition invoked by Papen confirmed that the right-wing
wanted a restoration not a revolution.
The revolution of the twentieth century is not only directed against the ideas of 1789 but also seeks to
prevent the forms which were defeated then from returning and informing life here and now. We have
not made a revolution in order that a superannuated epoch,under the guise of a 'conservative
revolution', can proclaim the restoration of a situation as it existed five hundred years ago.
The French revolution broke out because the old wor1d was broken down and decayed. But it had no
great leaders and no great ideas. The subsequent democratic epoch was therefore a confused
transitional form between two representative forces, ie, between medieval universalism and the
rebirth of 'popular' thought in the twentieth century.
Thus the National Socialist movement is not the construction of a system, albeit that of a Single party,
but is the sense of totality in all fields of existence; it is the unshakable foundation of the State; it is the
first National German State. Every citizen must either be a valid and useful member of it or must be set
apart.37
A few days later on 24 June Rosenberg presided at a ceremony which
demonstrated the absurd lengths to which Nazi 'intellectuals' went in their effort to
reinvent the German tradition. Rosenberg placed a wreath on the tomb of the
medieval Saxon king Widukind and gave a speech on the nearby site of a battle in
which the Christian emperor Charlemagne had killed 4500 of his followers:
In the speech delivered by Rosenberg he said that 'the war of Charlemagne against Widukind was the
first thirty years war and Germany is still feeling its effects. Today, all Germans have an intimate feeling
no longer for Charlemagne's side but for that of his defeated adversary ....... Today, after a thousand-
year dominance by the principate which the emperor Charlemagne personified, the idea of the Saxon
leader is once again dominant in Germany ....... we see rising up the three figures which have been
decisive for the past and the present of Germany: Arminius, the victor over the Roman legions;
Wldukind who tragically succumbed 800 years later in the struggle for the blood and the soil; Adolf
Hitler who a thousand years later is the present-day protagonist of the work of these two.38
As 30 June approached the Corriere reported a series of articles by the British
journalist Vernon Bartlett who had just been granted an interview with Hitler. He
argued that Papen's Marburg speech marked the start of a criSis of the Nazi
regime: "Hitler's party, by pushing too far to the left, risks provoking an attempt by
37 See the rubric Germania in the issues of RSE for 26 June and 10 July 1934, the latter carrying the
first reports of the ruthless suppression of the alleged Rohm plot. For the above quotations, see RSE
10 July 1934, p. 1069.
38 ibid., p.1070.
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the right to overthrow him. He must waste no time in energetically purging his party,
much as the Duce did in Italy".39
*
On 30 June 1934 Chief of Staff Rohm together with numerous senior and junior
officers of the SA were murdered by units of Himmler and Heydrich's SS. The
official murder toll given by Hitler in a speech to the Reichstag two weeks later was
77 but the real number probably exceeded 100 including General Schleicher and
many others with no connection with the SA. Rohm was immediately replaced as
Chief of Staff by Lutze with instructions from Hitler to transform the SA into "the
instrument which the government needs and which I wanf'. The change was
warmly welcomed by the Reichswehr Minister von Blomberg who "on behalf of the
German cabinet and the army" thanked the Chancellor for saving the German
people from civil war and affirmed that Hitler had now proved himself to be a great
"statesman and soldier". The cabinet promptly legalised the murders by declaring
them to "legitimate defence of the State". It also amended the law "guaranteeing
the unity of the party and the State" promulgated at the end of 1933 at Rohm's
insistence whereby the SA Chief of Staff was ipso facto a member of the Reich
government.
An official version of these events, full of dramatic detail worthy of a popular crime
thriller and calculated to capture the public imagination, was fed to the German and
foreign press in a series of carefully prepared press releases.4O It centred on a
alleged plot by the SA's homosexual leadership to overthrow Hitler and start a
'second revolution' with the aim of purging the State of 'reactionary' elements.
Goring's press conference, for example, went as follows:
•..... Rohm, a courageous ex-combatant, allowed himself to be drawn by his abnormal tendencies into
company which would prove fatal to him, surrounding himself with men who, atthough tied to him,
would end up compromising him irreparably. Thus, the SA command began to hatch plans for a revolt
aiming to supplant the present regime with a State which would be headed by these sick elements.
Hitler recognised the danger in time. In fact, he delayed acting in order to follow the development of
the SItuation until It was beyond doubt, but the moment it was clear that the SA command intended to
proceed from plans to the grand action, to the so-called 'second revolution', he acted like lightening.
A few days ago he gave me the orders which I executed today and which he himself Implemented in
Bavaria. The poor foot-soldiers were deceived by their leaders; they were alerted and armed without
39Under the rublic 'Recentissime', Corriere della Sera, 29 June 1934.
40The main sources available to Gramsci were Corriere della Sera, 1,3.4.5 July 1934 and RSE, 10 and
17 July 1934. Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on 13 July describing the plot and explaining his action
in suppressing It was carried in Corriere della Sera, 14 July 1934.
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knowing why or against who. They were told: 'March against the reaction!' The SA command. whilst
assembling its forces for a second revolution against the reaction, was itself closely connected to
reactionary elements'. 41
The regime's control of the press made it virtually impossible to sort out fact from
fiction. However, in addition to the official press releases the Carriere reported
comments of the foreign papers which, even if they could not contest the 'facts' of
the affair, were free to speculate about their political meaning. Several papers
observed that Hitler had been forced to choose between the SA and the
Reichswehr. The French paper Temps "recognised that Hitler is still master of the
situation but has sacrificed his troops to ensure the support of the right-wing and
the Reichswehr The reality now is that the Chancellor is only master of the
situation to the extent that the Reichwehr wants him to be. Who can fail to see in
this situation a new fact in the German situation?" .42 For the Austrian Wiener
Zeitung "the plot by the storm toops is an invention. Rohm's only plan was to use
tactics of passive resistance to prevent the dissolution of the storm troops and to
save his position as one of the top leaders. Failing this the Reichswehr had asked
Hitler in the form of an ultimatum to eliminate Rohm and the shock troops. Hitler
had to take account of this". 43
Meanwhile the decapitation of the SA on 30 June was not the only blow struck by
Hitler in the 'battle of ideas' in 1934. A few days later the news that Dr.Klausener,
secretary of state and head of Catholic Action, and other influential Catholics had
been among the victims of the massacre was announced from the pulpit of some
churches in Berlin.44 The fact that the news did not come from official sources might
suggest that these victims could not very credibly be implicated
i
in the alleged plot.
Again, the comments of the Austrian press were particularly poiTlted in their
understanding of Nazi political technique. The Vienna Reichspost observed that
after this Hitler would have a hard job salvaging his moral authority among German
Catholics:
In fact death has not only struck the unworthy leaders of National Socialism. but also men whose
reputation was immaculate and whose memory cannot be denigrated by unproven accusations. We
are speaking of ministerial counseller Klausener and two assistants of Vice-Chancellor von Papen. It
will be very difficult for the Catholics of Germany and with them all the friends of order to forget these
sad facts. Hitler must now reconquer Germany allover again and must do it without storm troops, for It
is now a question of winning the confidence, the ethical convictions. of the population. 45
41 Corriere della Sera, 1 July 1934
42 Corriere della Sera, 3 July 1934.
43 Corriere della Sera, 4 July 1934.
44Corriere della Sera, 4 July 1934.
45 Corriere dBlla Sera, 5 July 1934
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In fact Hitler had already started on the task. As the news of Dr.Klausener's murder
leaked out the official news agency announced that "the negotiations which have
begun between the government of the Reich and the representatives of the
German episcopate regarding the interpretation to be given to article 31 of the
Concordat affecting the rights of the Catholic associations have had favourable
results. The representatives of the episcopate were granted an audience by Hitler
and it is announced that measures will be taken which allow one to hope for a
pacification in this field" .46
The Jesuits' Critique of Nazi Racism
In §20.04. Integral Catholics, Jesuits, Modernists, Gramsci said that it was difficult
to assess the merits of Pius Xl's policy because it followed an "uncertain, timid, and
faltering course due to the immense difficulties which it continually comes up
against". The Church was renowned for its infinite power to adapt and develop but
this was not entirely true.
The eruption of new forms of nationalism .....has not only made it impossible to adapt but has made it
difficult to exist, as one sees in Hitlerite Germany. Moreover, the Pope cannot 'excommunicate'
Hitlerite Germany, at times he must even be supported by it, and this makes it impossible to pursue
with any degree of vigour an upright. positive religious policy. In face of phenomena like Hltlerism,
even broad concessions to modernism would be meaningless by now, but would merely add to the
confusion and imbroglio.
The difficulty of pursuing "an upright, positive religious policy" in Nazi Germany was
reflected in the efforts of the Jesuits of Civilta Cattolica to resist the Nazi 'struggle
for the Weltanschauung' in 1934. The immense difficulty of the Church's position,
however, was brought home by the murder of Catholic leaders, including the head
of Catholic Action in Germany, on 30 June (not to mention the assassination by the
Nazis of the Austrian Chancellor DoJlfuss on 25 July). To be sure, there was
nothing "timid" about the Jesuits' condemnation of the murders, which was quite
unequivocal, but this was accompanied by certain 'intellectual' concessions to anti-
semitism which were anything but upright.
*
46 Carriere della Sera, 4 July 1934.
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Hitler's claim that the Third Reich was founded on Christian foundations was given
the lie in a series of lucid articles in Civilta Cattolica dealing with the Nazi
conception of the State and the new 'religion of race' .47 These were conducted
largely on the basis of Hitler's writings and speeches to remove any equivocation
as to the 'official' conception. The image of Hitler as the friend of Christianity in the
fight against atheistic communism gave way, for the moment, to that of the theorist
of a singularly 'brutal' conception of the State and the infallible pope of a
'monstrous' religion of race.
The first article observed that the doctrine of the State in the various publications of
National Socialism was hard to pin down and was obscured by the nebulous myth
of the Third Reich. Hitler's conception conformed to the model of "the so-called
modern State" which had emerged out of the ruins of the liberal State. This
'revolutionary' conception overthrew the old equilibrium between the needs of the
State and the rights of the individual. The individual is "pushed increasingly into
darkness and nothingness with the result that the State takes on gigantic
proportions, becoming the absolute master and grandiose myth of the new age".
This deification of the State is justified by the principle of the nation. "In fact, most of
today's revolutionary movements call themselves nationalist and claim to be the
sole defenders of the nation which they project into the sphere of the absolute and
transcendent, turning it into a higher reality standing above and absorbing into
itself the individual". 48
But the Nazi theory of the State turned the nation in upon itself. This involution was
"hard to understand after so many centuries of civilisation, which has taught men to
look beyond the national horizon and to embrace all peoples, who all bear the
stamp of nObility". The nation is understood as the "nation-race". This is not a
cultural entity, "the repositary of the traditions, the glories, the spirit, the character
and the language of the people, a sacred heritage which the present generation
must defend and enrich and hand on to future generations". Such a conception
was too rationalistic, too spiritual for the mind of National Socialism. The nation is a
"racial community, a gathering of individuals held together by the naked bond of
blood". According to Hitler, the forces which shape civilisation are racial and so "the
47 In addition to the articles by U.Lopez and M.Barbara mentioned earlier, see A.Messineo, SJ: 'La
Concezione dello Stato nel Terzo Reich', CC, 19 May 1934, and 'La Nuova Religione della Razza', CC
4 August 1934. (Not to be confused with F. Messineo, the Italian translator of Hegel's Philosophy of '
Right published in 1913).
48 ibid., p.347-348.
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State must regard the preservation and elevation of the race as its highest mission,
the precondition for any development of human civilisation" .49 Its primary task was
to preserve and strengthen not the cultural patrimony of the people but the
biological fitness of the race. It must therefore take upon itself the task of
supervising family relations "for the purpose of imposing eugenic conditions of
reproduction". Referring closely to Mein Kampf, the author continues:
As to the choice of means to achieve this end, the racist conception of the nation leads to the most
monstrous consequences. The State must resolutely and ruthlessly influence the lives of individuals
so that infections and contaminations of the blood do not spread. In face of the duty of maintaining the
race the right of personal liberty is of secondary importance; the only human right which exists, which
is at the same time a sacrosanct duty, is to ensure that the blood is kept pure. There must be no
stopping at half-measures such as letting people with incurable illnesses have the freedom to infect
the healthy. The necessity of preventing defective people from reproducing equally defective
elements is accepted by the most clear-minded intelligence and represents the most humane action
of which humanity is capable (Hitler). 50
Referring to Hitler's speech opening the Reichstag on 30 January 1934, the author
observes: "Proof that all this is not merely declaiming from the rostrum is the law for
the sterilisation of the handicapped which has now come into force and which is
defended with such tenacity that it has become the criterion for judging the friends
and enemies of the State". The same brutal conception of the State can be traced
in Hitler's other speeches, which must now be taken more seriously.
Like the legislator of Sparta Hitler, for his part, does not recoil from the thought of suppressing
defective children en masse. At the congress of his party held at Nuremberg on 7 August 1929, he
spoke in these terms: 'If a million children were born annually in Germany and the 700,000 or 800,000
weakest were made to disappear [facesse scomparire), the effect would be an increase In strength'
(VolkischerBeobachter, n.181, 7 August 1929 ).51
The article concluded by remarking on the perversion of ethical values by the
German press. "By a supreme irony these propositions are represented in the
press as the most sacred work on behalf of humanity when, in fact, humanity is
negated and bestiality is deified; as the outcome of the purest reason when, in fact,
reason is stifled by instinct; as the moral renewal of the German people when, in
fact, every affirmation is fundamentally immoral".52
49 'b'dI I ., p.349-350.
50 Ibid p.355-356
51 Ibid p.357
52'b'dI I .,p.357.
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Hitler had stated -in Main Kampf that "the political leader must regard the religious
doctrines and institutions of his people as untouchable, otherwise he should not be
-a-politician- but should become a religious reformer -if he has the makings of"one".
However, the role now assigned to Rosenberg and the pressure on the Catholic
-organisations persuaded the Church to see Hitler as not just a-political leader but a
religious reformer.
This principle seems. nevertheless. to have been forgotten in the new totalitarian State in Germany
-and 1he harsh expertence of the evangelical churches; forced to accept 1he 1amous Aryan paragraph
which is contrary to the universalistic content of their faith. bears witness to this. Moreover. the Fuhrer
-himself at1he congress of his party held at Godesberg on 27 August 1933 announced that it was
necessary to create a new unitary conception for the whole of Germany. which cannot be Christianity
tn its present form. and revealed his intentions by promoting 1he1anaticaJ anti-Christian- Alfred
Rosenberg to the rank of director-general for the education of youth. These words and deeds
demonstrate 1hat Hitler wants-to become a religious reformer andthattogether-with his party he alms
to give Germany a whole new conception of life which will satisfy the absolute postulate of race and
-blood. 53
The author went on to describe the main features of this new conception of life from
the works of Rosenberg and others, but pride of place was given to Hitler's Main
Kampf, now considered the 'bible' of the German people. If Hitler had expressed
admiration for the Catholic Church - for its monolithic unity, its dogma, its dedicated
priesthood etc - this was merely because it provided an instructive model for the
--new religion which would now replace it.
Nor does it lack the supreme pontiff endowed with the gift of infallibility! While Rosenberg abuses the
Roman Pontiff General Goring promotes the Fuhrer In his place: 'To be quite honest'. he says,
'we are fanatics, because without fanaticism nothing really great can be accomplished. What would
have become of Christianity without Its fanatics? Yes, we burn with-fanaticism for our people. In the
same manner in which Catholics consider the Pope infallible in all questions of religion and morality
so we believe with the same deep conviclion-that-the Fuhrer is-infallible-In all matters affecting the '
moral and social Interests of the people. Hitler himself calls the motivating ideas of the party and the
racist conception of1he world a dogma and gives them the same qualities:-'a particular conception of
the world must be organised on the basis of a precise formula; for a political party in formation, the
fundamental principles or-the party are-the equivalent of dogmas for the faith' : 54
Hitler's disclaimer before coming to power that he had no intention of starting a
-religious struggle was thus exposed as a lie. This assumed fresh political
significance since the Nazi leaders in CatholiC Austria in 1934 at that very moment
53 A.Messineo: 'La Nuova Religione della Razza', CC, 4 August 1934, p.228
54 Ibid p. 236
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telling the Austrian people the same lie.55 Quoting the regional inspector of the
Nazi Party in Austria who disclaimed any idea that Nazism was a new religion, the
writer commented:
The political aim of such a declaration, aimed at the Catholics of Austria, cannot be in doubt... ..... If
National Socialism proposes in accordance with Hitler's directives to his party to create a conception of
the world which can reunite the whole of Germany, 'coordinating' the existing confessions; and if this
conception cannot be Christianity in its present form, the necessary coneequencetethat racism must
try to transform Christianity or to suppress it in the event of insurmountable resistance. 56
*
The clarity and rectitude of Messineo's critique of Nazi racism contrasted with the
.analysis of Nazi anti-semitism by Padre Rosa in a two-part article which appeared
under his name later in the year.57 The article was a detailed critique of Theodor
Fritsch's notoriousHandbuch der Judenfrage (35th edition, Leipzig 1933) which
was reissued by the Nazis and "distributed throughout Germany in hundreds of
thousands of copies". Rosa spoke out against the attempts by the Nazi anti-
semities to spread "the most odious calumnies and defamations against the
Church itself and against the Catholics" . Their hostility had passed from words to
deeds, to the most unjust and violent vexations against the Catholic people and
their hierarchy, including "the bloody deeds of the 30 June last, which the history of
modern civilisation will record with horror".
But what exactly were these 'calumnies and defamations'? Referring to the several
contributors to Fritsch'sHandbook , Rosa noted that
they all seek to confuse and condemn in the same terms the Jews and the Catholics or (as they say)
'Juda and Rome'. In fact, with the advent of the Nazis this motto has been adopted by a league of
Protestant fanatics, or rather unbelievers, who call themselves explicitly 'The League against Juda and
Rome' and have their own militant periodical which boasts of being an organ of the National Socialist
party.
The worst and most inexcusable mistake of the anti-semitic writers of the Handbuch ....is their
constant, persistent attempt to involve in the same accusations made against Judaism those who least
deserve them, ie, the Popes and the catholics, indeed catholicism as such.
55 On 25 July 1934 tha Nazis assassinated the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss and attempted
unsuccessfully to sieze power in Austria The reaction in Italy was reported in Corriere della Sera,
26,27,28, 29 July, 1 August 1934.
56 Ibid p.237
57 E. Rosa, SJ: ' 'La Questione Giudaica' e l'Antisemitismo Nazionalsocialista' (I), CC, 20 October
1934, and (It), 3 November 1934. Padre Rosa, the editor of Givilta Gattolica , was the authoritative
voice of the Jesuits and close to Pius XI - MthePope of the Jesuits· (Gramsci).
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Defending the Church from these 'calumnies and defamations', Rosa invoked the
worst tradition of Catholic anti-semitism as 'voiced' by the Jesuits ofCivilta Cattolica
which the contributors to Fritsch's Handbuch had cited more than once with,
approval.
The references given so far reveal the fanaticism, the hatred, and the confusion of ideas by which the
Nazi fantasist equates Juda and Rome, Catholics and Jews, the Catholic Church and Jewish society.
Such excessive fanaticism lessens, without doubt, the practical efficacy of the anti-Jewish movement;
indeed, it stirs up the suspicion of the anti-semitic Nazis against the Catholics rather than against the
Jews and the Masons.
Moreover, the Catholics were the first to warn against and denounce the Jewish danger as far as its
sad reality is concerned. And these same Nazis, in their epilogue, again cite the testimony of Civilta
Gattolica .....which for the past eighty years has been repeating, in an altogether different style and
with greater moderation and precision, the truth contained in the modern-day exaggerations of antI-
semitism.
What did Rosa mean by "the Jewish danger"? He certainly didn't mean this in the
racial-biological sense which defined the Nazi view of the role of the Jews in
history. His perspective on "the Jewish danger" was religious not biological but. in
its own obscure terms. the interpretation of history was just as negative. Rosa
devoted particular attention to "the history of Judaism" as presented by one
contributor to the Handbuch, from the Middle Ages ("or Ghettozeit •as he calls it" )
to modern times. The negative influence of the Jews in modern times was not
limited to the German countries.
And here we can honestly agree with the author in acknowledging and deploring the progress of
'Judaisation' (as he calls it) not only in Berlin but in many other cities and countries outside Germany
itself, such as in France and in Poland, in fact throughout Europe. But the Protestant non-believer
fails to see, or does not want to see, that this 'Judaisation' was one of the victories of the Protestant
revolution and the general spread of unbelief in Europe, with the coming together at first and later the
almost total predominance of the Masonry which, as we know, found such favour among Protestants.
Rosa feared that the Nazi attack on the CatholicChurch might develop into another
Kulturkampf . The editors of the Handbuch summoned the regime to a struggle on
two fronts - against both CatholiCS and Jews. Rather than follow the example of
Bismarck. however. Rosa implied that the Nazis·ought to see the CathOlics as
potential allies not enemies in their struggle against "the Jewish danger".
Moreover. Rosa left no room for misinterpretation in his conclusion.
No one can interpret our words openly condemning this Handbuch of the German anti-semites asa
sort of apology or, worst still, an exaltation of Judaism and the Jews who have always been and, as
they themselves profess, still are the most relentless and irreconcilable enemies (nemici accanlti e
irreconciliabili dl Cristo e del cristianesimo ) of Christ and Christianity, especially of the integral and
sincere Christianity enshrined in the CathoHcism of the Roman Church. But this very hostility, Which is
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the essence of Judaism, causes us to rise up against the calumnies which are repeated throughout
the book and reiterated in the epilogue: that Catholicism or, as it is called here at the end,
'ultramontanism' is close to and in league with Judaism, indeed with rabbinical and Taldmudic Judaism
no lessl
The forthright criticism of the Nazi policy of eugenic sterilisation in the first half of
1934 revealed the 'modernist' face of the Jesuits, insofar this criticism proceeded
from a 'liberal' defence of the rights of the individual and the family against Hitler's
racial State. However, by the end of the year the Jesuits of Civilta Cattolica,
or at least their authoritative spokesman, seemed to take the view that the Church's
best way out of its predicament under the Nazis was to make concessions not to
modernism but to anti-modernism, ie, anti-semitism.
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Notebooks 16-29
The incidence of German politics on the notes written in 1934-35 can be traced in a
a few new notes in Notebook 17 and in significant additions to a number of old
notes which Gramsci reworked at this time, notably those in Notebooks 16, 20,
and28 . They deal with various questions. If any guiding-thread can found in them it
lies in Gramsci's interest in following the practical development of the Nazi
Weltanschauung in the new situation after January 1933. The importance of
racism in German culture "which has had new and unanticipated developments"
(§17.43), is central in these notes, as is Gramsci's difficulty in explaining the
success of this "monstrous" phenomenon (§28. 01) which he obviously regarded
with repugnance and shock. The German events seemed to force themselves on
Gramsci's attention. As Italian Fascists prepared to embrace their kindred spirits in
-Nazi Germany,- Gramsci seemed instinctively to turn away from it as a term of
comparison in elaborating a political theory for his native Italy.
-116.11. The Relch- Concordat:- Capitulation of the State or the Church?
When Gramsci resumed work at Formia in early 1934, one of the first things he
-turned to were his earlier notes on concordats. He inserted a new reference to the
German or 'Reich' Concordat of 1933, but this was to make an abstract juridical
-point which made no difference to his general thesis that concordats represented
"the capitulation of the modern State". Gramsci's thesis was largely based on the
Italian Concordat of 1929, but how far did- it apply to the German Concordat of
19331
The capitulation of the modern State which happens In concordats Is masked by verbally
Identifying concordats -with International treatles.- But a concordat Is not just anoth.r
International treaty: In fact a concordat reaults In Interference In sovereignty In only one
-stat.'s -t.rrltory,- slne.- all 1he artlcl .. - of- a concordat -ref.r -to -the-cltlzens- of only one of
the contracting states ov.r which the lov.r.lgn pow.r of a for.lgn ltat. justlfl.s and
-claims- rlghts- and powers of -jurlldlctlon {albeit- a lpeclal, definite -kind- of -Jurisdiction).
What pow.,. has the Reich acquired over the Vatican City by virtue of the recent
-concordat? .
The concordats undermln. the autonomy which Is the .... ntlal charact.rlstlc of the
-sovereignty of the mod.rn State. Does the State g.t anything In r.turn? Certainly, -but -It
obtains It within Ita own t.rrltory In r.lpect of It. own citizens. Th. State (and In thl. cas.
-It -would be bett.r to say the gov.rnment) mak.. sure that the Church does not hlnd.r -the
.xercl .. of pow.r but, rath.r, favoura and supports It jUlt Ilk. a crutch supports an
..nveHd.in other- word.~ the Church undanak .. fn Telatlon- to a dataTmlnate form- of
government (det.rmlnate from an external standpoint, al the concordat Itself documental
-to- promote the- consent of- one- part- at the- rul.dwhlch the State by- Ita- own- axptlclt
recognition cannot obtain by Its own means. Her.ln II.. the capitulation of the State
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since,in fact,it accepts the tutelage of an external sovereignty and in practice
recognises Its superlorltY.1
The argument was ethical rather than juridical. By the modern state Gramsci meant
the secular state. No state was truly modern which depended on religion in any
form for the consent of its citizens. By this criterion the Fascist regime was not a
modern state. The Concordat of 1929 effectively restored Catholicism as the
established religion of Italy. The State hugely subsidized the Church and accepted
its far-reaching jurisdiction over education, matrimony, and cultural life. In return the
Church instructed Catholics in their duty of civil obedience and patriotic loyalty to
the (FaSCist) State. Mussolini's atheism did not prevent him from using religion as
an "instrument of rule". Fascism and Catholicism entered into a new 'combination'
which was reflected in the regime's policies in the fields of eugenicS, corporativism,
and imperialism.2 By the standard of the 'ethical' State as proclaimed by Gentile
and the neo-idealist supporters of Fascism, the Concordat was a "capitulation". But
referring to this group Gramsci observed: "The ethical nature of a concrete state, of
·a particular state, is defined by its effective ·Iegislation· not by the polemics of the
irregular forces of the world of culture".3 While Hitler was undoubtedly influenced
·by the Italian precedent , the German Concordat can hardly be considered a
"capitulation" on the part of his regime. For Hitler it was little more than a short-term
expedient to obtain the cooperation otthe Vatican in dissolving the Catholic Centre
Party without resistance and in guaranteeing the complete withdrawal of the clergy
from politics: Nor did it imply any ideological concessions to CathOlicism. The
'ethical' nature of the Nazi State was anti-Christian as well as anti-Jewish. The
·compulsory sterilisation law (July 1933), for example, was based on the
consciously anti-Christian 'ethics' of social Darwinism and racial hygiene and it
was precisely in anticipation of Catholic objections that pUblication of the law was
delayed until a week after the Concordat was signed. Moreover, no sooner was the
Concordat ratified In Septemberthan Hitler began "the struggle for the
Weltanschauung" which was directed mainly against the Catholic lay
organisations. If there was any "capitulation", it was on the part of the Catholic
hierarchy. Nor was this entirely a matter of terror, 'persuasive' though this was. The
1OCIII, p.1866-1867. First draft QCI, p.493-494. Translated in FSPN p.61-62.
2Adrian ~yttelton calls it "a hybrid clerico-fascist ideok;>gy'in The Seizure of Power. Fascism in naly
1919-1929 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, second edition 1987) p. 421.
3 §16.11, QCII! p.1868. Translated in FSPN p.63.
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Pope promoted Catholic consent for the Nazi regime by his warm approval of
Hitler's stand against atheistic Bolshevism. Moreover, the struggle for the
'Weltanschauung in 1934, which included the murder of prominent Catholic
laymen on 30 June, was not without its effect on the official mind of the Church. The
extent to which the Catholic hierarchy was prepared to go beyond its 'silence'
about the Jews and to rekindle traditional, religious anti-Semitism is not clear, but
Padre Rosa's long article on 'The Jewish Question' in late 1934 is evidence that
the Church's "capitulation" at the highest level went as far as this.
'117.43. Marxism v. Racism
We saw that with the rise to power of Hitler at the start of 1933 Gramsci began a
series oT-notes orfthe-poputar myth of the 'superman' in which he' mentioned the
need to examine "the racist tendencies that culminated in Gobineau and then in
Chamberlain and Pan-Germanism ....4' Prompted by reviews of a new biography Of
Gobineau, Gramsci now followed this up. In §17.43 he poses the problem of
"accurately reconstructing the history of racist ideas and in establishing their place
in the historical framework of modern culture". Gramsci's focus alters from the
'superman' to the 'master race' - the alleged superiority of the Germanic race -
although the underlying question to which he wants to find an answer remains the
same: why had racism become "a militant and effectual political ideology" in
Germany?
Since Gramsci believed that the historical framework of modern culture was
defined by the Marxist 'syntheSiS' of German philosophy, French politics, and
English classical economy, the problem was to define the relation of racist ideas to
this synthesis. One might have expected him to start from the young Mane's critique
of Bruno Bauer's conception of the Jewish Question with which he was familiar, but
'Gramsci approached the problem from the French not'the German side of 'the
synthesis. The point of contact with racism was found in the great French historians
oftha Restoration, notably in the famous 'controversy of the two races'.5
117.43. Problems of culture. Raclam, Goblneau, and the historical orlgl". of the
'philosophy of praxis. The Ute of Goblneau written by Lorenzo GlglI should be react to ...
If GlglI has succeeded In accurately reconstructing the history of racist Ideaa and In
establishing their place 'In ,the' historical' framework 'of modern' culture. For this 'Itla
4 §14.27, QCIII p.1685.
5 For an account of this controversy, see Leon Poliakov: The Al}'an Myth. A HistOI}' of Racist and
Nationalist Ideas in Europe (1974), p.17-36.
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necessary to go back to the historiographical tendencies in France during the Restoration
and under louis Philippe (Thierry, Mlgnet, Gulzot) and to the conception of French history
as a secular struggle between the Germanic (Frankish) aristocracy and the people of
Gallic or Gallo-Roman origin. The polemic on this question, as has been noted, was not
restricted to the scientific field but- overflowed ·Into ·the· field of tmrnedtate.: mllttant
politics: some aristocrats vindicated the domination of the nobles on the basis of a 'right
of conquest' and some democratic· writers argued ·thatthe French· Revolution· and the
execution of louis XVI were nothing but an Insurrection by the original Gallic element
against the Germanic element· which had superlmposed ttself on their ancient· nationality.
It Is well-known that many of the most popular of Eugene Sue's novels (The Mysterlas of
the· People, The Wandering Jew, etc) dramatised 1Ns s1ruggle and that between
Instalments of The Mysteries of the People Sue addressed letters to his readers
explaining this struggle In a historical-political form ·lIS· only he could.· Newspapers· and
reviews Joined In the polemic (for example, the early Issues of the Revue das deux Mondes
· presented the· question In moderate terms, against 1hefanatlclsm· of some· nobles who
overstepped the mark). The same question was raised In French historiography In
connection· with the relations between Gauls and Romans and ·Julllan's· voluminous ·works
on the history of Gaul are well known.
It Is worth noting that this· discussion gave rise (at least partially)· te two ·tendencles:
1) that of the philosophy of praxis which began to study the two strata of the French
·population not from the· standpoint of 1hetr· different national· origins· but 10r 1helr· economic
and social functIons; 2) that of racism and the superiority of the Germanic race which,
from· being a polemical· element used· by ·the French· aristocracy· to Justify· a' more radical
Restoration, an Integral return to the conditions of the pre-revolutIonary regIme, became
through Goblneau and ChamberlaIn an' element of· German· culture (Imported from ' France)
whIch has had new and unantIcIpated developments.
The questIon could not ·take·hold In Italy because feudalism· of Germanic' orIgIn was
destroyed by the communal revolutions (except for the Mezzoglorno and SIcily) which
·gave· rise to an enUrely new' type· of aristocracy· of· mercantile origin.
Proof that this question Is not merely abstract and bookish but can become a militant and
effectual political Ideology Is demonstrated by the German events.S
The works of the French historians Thierry, Mignet, Guizot and others would thus
have given rise to two divergent conceptions of history: Marx's conception based
on the struggle of classes and Gobineau's on the struggle of races, although it is
important to note that Goblneau's was a/so a struggle of classes. Gramsci's
reconstruction of this neglected moment in the history of ideas was perfectly
accurate. The influence of the French historians on Marx's theory of class struggle
is well documented although it has been investigated in much detail. 7 Moreover,
the controversy about the two races in French historiography was certainly one of
the antecedents of Gobineau's Essai sur I'Inegalite des Races (1853-55) and
.Gramsci was obviously interested to note the French origins 01German racism.
However, the controversy made no impression on Marx and formed no part of
6 §17,43, Qelll p.1943-1944. For the reviews of Gigli's Vita di Gobineau (1933), see Professor
Gerratana's note in OCIV p.2976-2977.
7 "No credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modem society, nor yet the
struggle between them. Long before, the bourgeois historians had described the development of
the class struggle" Marx's letter to Weydemeyer 1852, quoted in David Maclellan: Marx before
Marxism (Macmillan; 1970), p.154.
377
Marx's 'Franco-German' synthesis. He had certainly read Eugene Sue's novels in
the 184Os: Sue's description of the Paris 'underclass' was taken up by the circle of
Young Hegelians in Germany and their attempt to extract high philosophical
meaning from it was satirised in The Holy Family. But the controversy of the two
races and Sue's fictional account of it left no trace in Marx's theory.
The guiding-thread of this note lies in what it tells us about Gramsci's
"dialectic of 'revolution-restoration' in relation to Hitlerism. For while Hitler stole
marxist thunder by claiming that his racism was revolutionary, Gramsci's analysis
of" its historical origins firmly associates it with tendencies to restoration in contrast
to Marxism, the genuinely revolutionary current. However, he was still no nearer to
answering the underlying question of how had these "ideas now become "a militant
and effectual political ideology" in Germany? He is fishing for answers in the
remote polemic about the Franks and Gauls which had "overflowed into" the field of
immediate, militant politics" via the newspapers of the day which had serialised
"Sue's novels. However, in reworking the notes on the 'superman' at this time" he
added that the glorification of 'Gallicism' in Sue's novels could be seen as a
'democratiC' reaction against the 'feudal' conception of racism. "If this was how the
'Gallic' myth entered popular-national feeling in France, how had the 'Aryan' myth -
the myth of Germanic superiority.; 'taken hold' in Germany? In view of "its
'aristocratic' provenance and character, it was hard to see how such a myth could
become a 'popular' ideology'?8
This was not just "a bookish and abstract question, as the German events
"demonstrated". But how 'does his historical analysis help in understanding -these
events? Gramsci's reconstruction provides one or two clues to the possible relation
"between past and present which is always at play· in his historical thinking." The first
lies in his presentation of marxism and racism as opposite tendencies. Hitler won
popular support by stressing"the danger Of communism and vowing to eradicate
'Marxism' from Germany forever. The anti-Marxist crusade created conditions
. favourable to "the expansion of racism." The volkisch ideas of the Nazis became
'meaningful' precisely in the context of the battle against a doctrine which
8 Referring to the late 18908 when the German translation of Gobineau (1898) and Chamberlain's
Foundations of the Nineteenth Century (1899) appeared, Peter Pulzer writes: -Increasingly the
argument of race was invoked to defend a class. Gobineau had already shown how to do this, but for
him it was aristocracy and Aryanism which went together. The popular appeal of such an argument was
" clearly limited and1he new racialists harnassec:l"Aryanism to"the defense of-the"third estate, the
Mittelstand -. The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, revised edition, 1988 p.
231). '
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emphasised the nation's class divisions. A further clue may lie in the 'right of
conquest' invoked by the 'aristocratic' race to justify its domination. In their struggle
against the injustice of the Versailles Treaty and against French hegemony, the
Nazis won popular support by claiming something like a Germanic 'right of
conquest' vis-a-vis the French. Most Germans supported this 'right' when it came to
undoing the Versailles settlement and restoring the lost territories (the Rhineland
etc). but the right of conquest might have unanticipated consequences when
invoked by 'fanatics' who 'overstepped the mark'.
·120.04. Pope Plus XI's German Polley.
In 1934 Gramsci collated and redrafted in Notebook 20, under the double heading
.Catholic Action and Integral Catholics, Modernists, Jesuits, a collection of earlier
notes on the politics of the Catholic Church. He now introduced a new question:
"On the question of 'the merits' of Pius Xl's policy, it is not easy to draw
conclusions, as is shown by the very course of this policy, an uncertain, timid, and
irresolute policy by reason of the immense difficulties it continually has to run up
against".9This new question was suggested by the difficulties of the Church's
position in Nazi Germany afterthe signing of the Reich Concordat in 1933.The
Vatican had cooperated with Hitler's government in dissolving the Centre Party and
withdrawing from political society in the expectation that the existence of Catholic
Action, the network of Catholic organisations in civil society, would be guaranteed.
This bargain contained the essence of Pius Xl's 'pollcy', However, in' order to bring
the negotiations to a speedy concluslon, the legal position of these organisations
.. as had been left undefined. Instead, it was agreed that the Reich' government and
the German bishops would draw up a list of recognised organisations. This task
had not been completed when, at the start of 1934, Hitler made Rosenberg
responsible for the ideological indoctrination of German youth. The Church
signalled its disapproval by placing Rosenberg's Myth on the Index of Forbidden
Books, but this did not deter him from launching the so-called struggle for
. the·WeltansChauung - an all-out assault on the CathOlic youth organisations. What
perspective did Gramsci bring to bear on the Vatican's German policy?
9 §20.04, 00111p.2093. Translated in FSPN p.82
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Past and Present
We saw that Gramsci's notes on German newspapers (§2.26) led him to formulate
the concept of the "ideological front" of the dominant class (§3.49). This was later
reconceived in terms of the famous metaphor of the superstructures or "trench
systems" of civil society (§7.10). The press was "the most conspicuous and
dynarnlc" part of this front, but it extended far beyond this. "The position which the
Church has kept in modern society cannot be explained without knowing the
persistent and patient effort it makes to keep developing its own section of this
material structure of ideOlogy" (§3.49). What efforts did the Church make to defend
and develop its position in civil society?
After'the Reichstag election of September 1930; Gramscl tended to concentrate on
developments in political society in Germany, but there was one element of civil
society· which continued to interest him: this was the network of lay organisations
collectively known as Catholic Action. Gramsci's notes on this provide an
interesting insight into the Vatican's policy towards Germany before and after the
Reich Concordat of 1933. particularly as Catholic Action was the most vexed
.question·in the negotiations. The first notes can be found inNotebook 5 (1930-
31).
§5.22. Catholic Action in Germany. Die Katholische Aktion. Materialien und Alden by Dr.Erhard
Schlund, OPM, Josef Kosel & Friedrich Pustet Verlag, Munich, 1928.
This is a review of Catholic Action in the principal countries and an exposition of papal doctrines on the
subject. CatholiC Action of the usual type does not exist in Germany but is considered to be the
totality of Catholic organisation. (This means that in Germany catholicism is dominated by
. Protestantism and does not dare· to attack it by means of· intense propaganda). This should be ·the
basis for studying how the political base of the 'Centre' Is deployed. (Cf. also Monsignor KaUer's book
Unser Laeienpostulat, Leusterdorfam Rhein, Verlag der Johannesbund, Vot.1; 2nd edition, 1927
p.320). Schlund's book tends to introduce and popularise in Germany a Catholic Action of the Itali~
type; and certainly Pius XI must push in that direction (perhaps cautiously, though, since pressing
this activity too far might reawaken old resentments and struggles) [c.October 1930].10
§S.59. Catholic Action in Germany. On the initiative of the episcopate, German Catholics founded a
'German catholic Peace League' in 1919. On this League and its programme and on subsequent
efforts to develop it, see CMIts Cattollca of 19 January 1929.
In the same issue see Pius Xl's letter to cardinal Bertram, Archbishop of Breslau, on the subject of
catholic Action in Germany, which must be considered a personal intervention by the Pope to give
greater Impetus to the Catholic Action movement which, it seems, does not have very enthusiastic
organisers in Germany. The Pope's letter is a real theoretical-practical programme and Is interesting In
general not just for Germany. Gvilta Gattolica includes a lengthy commentary on the letter and It Is
understoodthatthe commentary is also meant to apply to other countries [c~October 1930-March
1931].11
10 QCI p. 556-557. Translated in FSPN p.109.
11QCI p.S92. Translated in FSPN p.109-110
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Why was Catholic Action not very popular in Germany where the Catholic presence
in civil and political society before 1933 was otherwise so impressive? A key
difference between 'Catholic' Italy and 'Protestant> Germany consisted in the fact
that the German laity had their own political party, the Centre, and were more
lnoependent of the episcopat and papal hierarchy. In terms of the 'ethical' State,
this was a sensitive matter. Bismarck's Kulturkampf had pitted the "religion of the
fatherland" against the religion of Rome. It made 'independence of 'ultramontane'
influence a litmus test of Catholic 'patriotism' and fostered the laity's spirit of
national autonomy. Pius Xl's policy of promoting a Catholic Action in Germany on
the Italian model, ie "under the strict control of the episcopate", implied a
centralising tendency which was not welcome to the pOlitical leaders of German
Catholicism, not least because it ran the risk of "reawakening old resentments and
struggles" .
Gramsci returned to the subject in Notebook 8 (1932) where the tension between
the Centre Party and the papal 'party',' Catholic Action, was brought into Sharper
focus:
§8.129. Catholic Action. The weakness of each national organisation of Catholic Action consists in
1he'factthat its action is limited in scope and continually upset by the necessities of the Holy See's
international and internal policy in each State. To the extent that every national Catholic Action grows
and becomes a mass organisation. it tends to become a genuine and proper party which follows
directions dictated by the internal necessities of the organisation; but this process can never become
organic precisely because of the intervention of the Holy See. This would explain perhaps why
Catholic Action has never been particularly welcome in Germany. The Centre was already so well
'developed as a po1itical-parliamentary force involved in all the internal struggles going onlrt Germany
that any extensive formation of Catholic Action under the strict control of the episcopate would have
compromised its actual power and possibilities of development. One should recall1he conflict
between the Centre and the Vatican when the Vatican wanted the Centre to approve Bismarck's
military laws, to which the Centre wasstrenuouSiy opposed.
There was a similar development in Austria where clericalism has always been politically strong as a
, party and had no need 'of a vast permanent organisation like that of Catholic Action but only of
disorganic electoral flocks under the traditional control of the parish priests [c.March-April 1932].12
'How did the Holy See's policy Impede the organic development otthe lay
organisations in Germany? Gramsci obviously saw the Vatican's intervention in the
,matter of Bismarck's military laws as a significant precedent.' He had already made
a note of this episode earlier in the notebooks:
'§2:20. For the Relations between the German Centre and the Vatican, and therefore for studying
concretely the traditional policy of the Vatican in the various countries and the forms it takes, there is
'an extremely interesting article by Andre Lavedan in the Revue Hebdomadaire summarised'inthe
Rivista d'na/ia for 15 March 1927. Leo XIII asked the Centre to vote for Bismarck's seven-year law
12QCII p.1019. Translated in FSPN p.107-108
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having had assurances that a satisfactory modification of the political-ecclesiastical laws would follow.
Frankestein and Windthorst did not want to go along with the Vatican's invitation. Only seven
, members of the Centre voted for the law:83 abstained [before 16 June 1930l 13
Of course, Bismarck never allowed the "religion of the fatherland" to interfere with
reasons of state (particularly when it came to the military budget) and did not
hesitate to invite Vatican interference in German affairs if it was politically
expedient. Conversely, the leaders of the Centre apparently did not need either
Bismarck or the Pope to tell them where their duty lay: they refused to do the will of
either' by voting for the military budget even at the expense of a relaxation' of the
anti-Catholic laws. Nevertheless, the episode showed the possibility of the Vatican
reaching an accommodation with the Reich' government over the' heads' of the
Centre Party and the Catholic laity.
*
Gramsci's comments on the German policy of Pope Pius XI (1922-39) are set in the
context of an interesting analysis of the internal politics of the Church. He identifies
three tendencies in Catholicism fighting each other for hegemony: the
Integralists, the Jesuits, and the' Modernists. The politics of Pius ·XI conststsd in
weakening the influence of the extreme right, the Integralists, and moving the
Church to the 'centrist' position represented by the Jesuits. Until' 1933 this policy
seemed to be quite resolute, especially as the Pope excommunicated Maurras and
the extreme right-wing Action Francaise in order to isolate the Integralists.
This Is an Important queatlon and can, I think, be resolved In theae terms: the papal
'action against Action Franca'.e 'Is ,the' most visible and reaolute aspect of a wider action
aimed at eliminating a serlea of consequencea of the policy followed by Plua X (In France,
, but 'Indirectly In' other countries, ,too). In' other warda, 'without' mounting' a' frontal' attack' on
them, Plus XI wants to curb the Importance of the Integrallst cathOlics who are openly
reactionary and are' making It nearly 'Impossible to' create a strong CathOlic Action and
democratic-popular party In France able to compete with the radicals. The struggle agaln.t
, modernism had unbalanced catholicism, driving It too far 'to 'the' rlghti' hence the neeeHlty
to 'centra' It afreah on the Jeaults, to endow It with a flexible political form, not
constrained by doctrinally' rigid positions' but allowing a wide-ranging' freedom' of
manoeuvra etc: Plua XI, without a shadow of a doubt, Is the Jeaults' Pope•
. But the battle against the catholiC Integrallsta on an organic' front Is' much' mar. difficult
than the one against the modernists. A more advantageous terrain Is offered by the
, struggle' agalnat Action Franca'" : here the Int&graUata are' fought not ao much aa
Integrallata but Inaofar as they are supporte,. of Maurras.ln other words, an 'extended
formation' type' of battle 18 being waged, Individuals' being' picked out a. not obeying the
Pope and aa hindering the defence of the faith and morals against a confe .. ed pagan and
.. thallt, 'while 1he tendency 'In 'Its enttrety' la' officially 'Igno'red."-
13 QCI p.17S. Translated in FSPN p.108-109.
14 §20.04, ocu p.2092-2093. Translated in FSPN p. 81.
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The condemnation of Maurras and Action Francaise in 1926 was a 'democratic'
moment of a papal policy which was not fundamentally committed to democracy as
a particular political form. The policy was to give Catholicism "a flexible political
form, not constrained by doctrinally rigid positions but allowing a wide-ranging
freedom of manoeuvre". In fact,the greatest success of this policy was the
Concordat with Fascist Italy in 1929. The papal action against Action Francaise
may even have concentrated Mussolini's mind on the need for Italian Fascism to
come to terms with the Papacy. The fact that he was a confessed atheist himself
and that the 'pagan' ideas of Maurras were admired by the conservatives in the
Fascist ruling elite was testimony to the religious as well as the political flexibility of
papal policy. The surprising point is that Gramsci thought that Pius Xl's policy of
promoting Catholic Action aimed to create a popular-democratic Catholic party in
France as an altemative to Action Francaise, since the same Pope did nothing to
save a similar party in Italy, the Popolari. But the Pope supported Catholic Action
because it was a flexible form which gave the Church greater freedom of
manoeuvre in the changing political circumstances of each country. As an element
of civil society, it served as a potential 'base' from which Catholicism could
advance into political society since (as Gramsci observes) the organic tendency of
every national Catholic Action was to grow into a mass organisation and become a
fully-fledged political party. But it was also a base to which Catholicism could
retreat whenever it was expedient to withdraw from political society, as in Fascist
Italy. Catholic political parties were therefore expendable but Catholic Action was
·not.
The Concordat with Hitler's Germany was the most disquieting testimony of the
·Vatican's 'Jesuit' policy of avoiding doctrinally rigid positions. ·The ban on Catholic
membership of the Nazi Party imposed by the German bishops on clear-sighted
doctrinal grounds was now removed: However,the freedom of manoeuvre which
the Church hoped to gain from a policy of doctrinal flexibility proved entirely
Illusory. The difficUlty of the Church's Situation In Hitler's Germany was such that
Gramsci thought its very existence was at stake. This led him to question the
conventional wisdom about the Church'S legendary capacity to survive by adapting
to historical circumstances. The history of the Church was placed in a sweeping
·historical perspective in which shrinking territorial margins and growing doctrinal
rigidity made 'adaptation' increasingly difficult. This evolutionary process
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culminated in the crisis of adaptation presented by "the irruption of new forms of
nationalism" in the twentieth century.
On the question of the 'merits' of Plus' XI's policy, It Is not easy to come to any
conclusions as the very course of this policy shows: It proceeds In an uncertain, timid,
. and 'Irresolute' manner due to the Immense difficulties which tt must continually run up
against. It has been said time and time again that the Church's capacity to adapt and
develop Is Inexhaustible. This Is not altogether accurate. 'A' number' of declstve' paints In
the life of the Church can be fixed:
-the first can be Identified as the schism between East and West. The schism 'was
territorial In character and was between two historical civilisations with few Ideological
'and cultural elements dividing them. It began with the advent' of Charlemagne's' Empire, Ie,
with a renewed attempt at establishing a political and cultural hegemony of the West over
the East. It came' at a' time' when the ecclesiastical forces were' poorly organised' and' got
wider and wider automatically, by the force of events that were Impossible to control, as
'happens 'when' two people who have had no contact for decades'draw further' and' further
away from each other and end up speaking two different languages.
- the second Is the Reformation, -which came' about In quite' different' conditions. Although
It resulted In a territorial separation, It was markedly cultural In character and led to the
Counter-Reformation and ,the' decisions' of the Council of Trent, 'which' put' a' very' strong
curb on the Catholic Church's possibility of adapting.
- the third 'was the French Revolution (a liberal-democratic Reform) 'whlch forced 'the
Church to assume an even more rigid and mummified form, becoming an absolutist and
formalistic' organism nominally headed' by the Pope. He Is 'Invested' with theoretically
'autocratic' powers which, In reality, are very few because the whole system Is held
together' by the' rigidity of 'the paralytic.
The whole society In which the Church moves and can evolve has this tendency to become
'rigid' and leaves 'It 'with 1ew' posslbltltles to adapt,whlch are scarce enough' already
because of the present nature of the Church Itself. The Irruption of new forms of
'natlonaUsmwhlch are,' after' aUithe culmination' of the' historical process 'that' began with
Charlemagne, Ie, with the first renaissance, not only makes adaptation Impossible but
'also'makes the Church's very' existence' difficult, as we see 'In' Hltlerlte Germany.
Moreover, the Pope cannot 'excommunicate' Hltlerlte Germany, he even has to rely on It at
times, 'which' makes It 'Impossible 10' pursue a positive and upright religious' polley' wtth' any
degree of vigour. Faced with phenomena like Hltlerlsm concessions to modernism,
. however' extensive, WOUld'have' no' meaning by now but would onty add 10 the' confUSed' and
tangled state of affairs. Nor can It be said that things are much brighter In France because
the theory' of contraposlng the 'religion' of ,the 1stherland" to the 'Roman" one -was' invented
precisely In Franee and the most likely possibility Is an Increase In patriotiC natlonall.m
'not Roman cosmopolltanllm.15
What did he mean by saying that the irruption of new forms of nationalism in the
,twentieth century was the culmination of a historical process 'that started with
Charlemagne? The process consisted not only in the separation of the secular
from the ecclesiastical power but also in the tendency to invest the secular power
with religious attributes. Did not the myth of the 'Third Reich' claim a direct line of
descent from the Holy Roman Empire of Charlemagne? Gramsci now Offers a
'rational' interpretation of this myth (which he discussed in §15.48). As the first Holy
Roman emperor, Charlemagne had reinvented the cult of the' emperor first adopted
15 OCIII. p.2093-2094. Translated in FSPN p. 82-83.
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in imperial Rome - a cult which invested 'Caesar' with the attributes of divinity. The
rebirth of this classical cult in Christian form was an element of the "first
renaissance". The suggestion seemed to be that the Fuhrer cult, which was
strongly promoted at the time of Hindenburg's death in August 1934, descended
from the cult of the emperor started in Germany by Charlemagne. This
interpretation is consistent with what Gramsci saw as the religious character of the
,new forms of nationalism - the "religion of the fatherland". This was invented by the
French during the revolutionary wars and was now preached in entirely different
circumstances in Hitler's Germany: Moreover, the religious cult of the leader was
connected in Gramsci's mind with his concept of 'Restorations'. In an earlier note
he observed, in relation to the similar cult of the Pope's infallibility, that one' of the
features of restorations was the acceptance of principles which had once been
opposed. Thus, the fact that the new religion of nationalism in Germany was anti-
Catholic and abused the Pope, as Rosenberg did in the struggle for the
Weltanschauung ; did not prevent' it from adopting the' principle' of the infallibility of
its own leader.16
What of the 'merits' of Pius Xl's German policy? As we said, the Concordat with
Hitler's Germany testified to Pius Xl's policy of giving Catholicism "a flexible
political form, not constrained by doctrinally rigid positions". Unable to
'excommunicate' Hitler's Germany, the Pope aimed to establish a modus vivendi
with it. The Vatican readily sacrificed the Centre Party and retreated from political
society but stubbornly defended the Catholic 'trenches' in civil society in the hope
of retaining some margin for manoeuvre. Although the Vatican showed flexibility in
trying to adapt to the new environment of the Third Reich,its policy was far from
flexible in terms of the internal politics of the Church. For the Concordat afforded
the ecclesiastical no less than the secular 'absolutists' the opportunity to centralise
control of their subjects. The Vatican could now realise its ambition of bringing the
Catholic laity in Germany under the leadership of the clerical hierarchy, for they
alone could deliver the promise given in the Concordat to refrain from all activity of
,political parties except 'the Nazi Party.
16 For Gramsci's interesting comments on the cult of the emperor, based on articles by the Jesuit
father G.Messina 'L'apotesosi dell'uomo vivente e iI Cristianesimo' in Gvilta Cattolica for 17 August
and 21 September 1929, see §5.138. 11cuJto degU Imperatori. QCI p.668-669. The note was
interspersed with the first drafts of his notes on Integral Catholics. Jesuits. Modernists.
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Although Gramsci understood the Pope's "immense difficulties" in Germany, his
judgement of papal policy was severe. If the policy of adaptation was not working
out in practice as the events of 1934 confirmed, the Vatican had only itself to' blame
since the difficulties were entirely foreseeable. It would have done better to follow
the lead of the German bishops in 1931 in suggesting that the papal condemnation
of Action Francaise could be extended to the whole Nazi movement whose "errors"
were much the same. This verdict is contained in a further addition to' §20.04.
Gramsci had earlier summarised the results of a study of Action Francaise by a
French bishop which contained a psychologically penetrating analysis of the
categories of people who supported Maurras' movement. He now redrafted this
earlier summary, inserting a new link with Hitler's followers.
Amongst the 'ollowers 0' Maurras and Co., In addition to the conservatives and the
'monarchists, Clvllta' Cattollca 'follows the footsteps'0' 1he'Bishop'0" Agen 'who detects
four other groups: (1) the snobs (attracted especially by Maurras' literary gifts); (2) the
,admirers'0' 'violence' and 1he'strong arm, "wl1h'exaggerations'0" authority -pushed' to the
point of despotism, disguised as resistance to the spirit of Insubordination or social
-subversion of' the contemporary era'; (3) the -'false' mystics', the "naive' betlevera In
prophecies of extraordinary restorations, wonderful conversions or providential missions'
-ascribed' precisely to Maurras and Co; 1hls group,whlch' has remained "undaunted' Since
the time of Plus X, excuses Maurras' unbelief which It attributes to 'the deficiency 0'
,grace', "almost as If sufficient grace for conversion was' not' given 10'everyone;-nor' can
thosa who resist be blamed for failing Into or persisting In sin'; (this group Is semi-
'heretical therefore,.lnce It Justifies.Maurras' by trotting' out Jansenist' oreaMnlst
positions. On this subject, an explanation of Maurras' obstinacy In not wishing to be
-'converted' 'Is' nacesary'since 'this cannot' be' due' only 10 "ethical' and 'Intetlectual integrity
and loyalty', which Is precisely what causes the Jesuits trepidation. The Jesuits
understand that if Maurras' group' captured state' power, the actual-situation 0' French
catholicism would be more difficult than It Is at the moment. Hence the Vatican's attltuel.
towarda' Hltl.,lam, notwlthatandlng the "'ctthat Roaenberg' wrote- hla Myth -before the
ae/zure of power, la surpr/a/ng. True, Rosenberg Is not of the ssme Intellectual atatur. a.
''''aurra.,· but the whole Hlt/erlte' movement -Is Intellectually' baae and -vulgar- and 'what ""a
happened to Cathollcl.m and Christianity waa predictable. f1
Gramsci inserts the parallel with Hitler's movement in the category of "the false
mystics, the naive believers in prophecies of extraordinary restorations, wonderful
conversions or providential missions", as though these were the' "errors" of' Hitler's
followers which bore the most striking similarity to Maurras'. The German bishops
-had painted to the similarity long before they came to power and had unequivocally
condemned Rosenberg's Myth, yet it was not until 1934 - when it was too late -
that the Vatican placed it on the Index of Forbidden Books. Instead of condemning
the whole of Hitler's movement before it came to power and lending its weight to
17 oelll p.2102-2103. My italics. Translated in FSPN p.91.
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the defence of the democratic regime, the Vatican clutched at the straw of
supposing that Hitler was a Christian even if Rosenberg was not. The struggle for
the Weltanschauung in 1934 proved this distinction was illusory.
Moreover, the struggle brought out the weakness of the Jesuit policy of not
.being· constrained by "doctrinally rigid positions", especially with regard to the
'Jewish Question'. In his commentary on the Concordat (October 1933) Padre Rosa
observed that whilst the Catholic clergy promised to renounce pOlitical activity, they
did not and could not renounce their duty to promote Christian morality in public
·Iife. This duty proved more difficult to do than he realised. When the law on
eugenic sterilisation came into effect (January 1934) the Jesuits mounted a
vigorous attack on the anti-Christian, racial conception of the· Nazi State. The
persecution of the Jews, however, was passed over in silence until the
appearance of Rosa's two-part article on the Jewish Question (Octeoer-November
1934). The article was written under the impression of shock made by the murders
of the leaders of Catholic Action on 30June. Rosa blamed the murders on the
tendency of Nazi propagandists to treat Jews and Catholics alike ("Juda and
Rome") as enemies of the state. Although he condemned the murders in forthright
terms, he was at pains to deny the Nazi equation between Catholics and Jews -
even to the extent of invoking the long tradition ofCivilta Cattolica "which for the
past eighty years has been repeating, in an altogether different style and with
greater moderation and preciSion, the truth contained in the modern-day
exaggerations of anti-semitism". The grave 'concessions' to anti-semitism in this
'article may have been brought about by the murders of 30 June, but they confirmed
Gramsci's observation that it was impossible for the Catholic Church in Nazi
Germany "to pursue a positive and upright religious policy with any degree of
vigour".
117.51. The Transition In Nazi 'Mentality'
.At the end of Notebook 17 Gramsci wrote a critical gloss on a quotation from Main
Kampf in which Hitler stated that "the founding or destruction of a religion is an
action of immeasurably greater importance than the founding or destruction of a
State, not to mention a party ..... n. The quotation was particularly apposite to the
situation in 1934 when tneso-caned struggle for the Weltanschauung seemed
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intent on destroying Christianity and replacing it by a new "religion of the
fatherland". The "dramatic struggles" mentioned by Gramsci do not refer to the anti-
.Catholic campaign, however, but to another moment in the development of the
Nazi Weltanschauung: this was the liquidation of Rohm and the "socialist"
tendency in National Socialism.
§17.51. Machiavelli. Hitler writes In Meln Kampf: 'The founding or the destruction of a
religion 'Is an action' of 'Immeasurably greater 'Importance than the' founding or the
destruction of a State: not to speak of a party .•.....'. Superficial and uncritical: the three
'elements - religion (or 'active' conception of the world), State,' party -' are 'Indissolubly
linked, and the real process of historical development necessarily passes from one to the
other.
It Is evident that Machiavelli, using the forms and language of the time, understood that
the three elements were' necessarily' homogeneous and Interrelated. To -lose- one's' soul In
order to save one's country or State Is an element of absolute laicism, of a conception of
.1he'world'whlchls both posltlv&' and:...negatlva.:(contrary_:_toretlglon-or the- dominant
conception).
In the modern world a party Is Integrally a party and not, as happens, lust a fraction of a
-bigger' party, when 'It 'Is conceived, organised,' and led In such- modes- and' such forms that
It develops Integrally Into a State (an Integral State, and not a government In the technical
'sense)' and 'Into a conception of the 'world. The development of the' party 'Into' a' State
reacts upon the party, which has to be continually reorganised and developed. Similarly,
the'development of the party' and the State -Into' a conception of the 'world,le, -Into a total
as well as molecular (Individual) ·transformatlon of the modes of thinking and acting,
reacts' upon the State' and the party, forcing them to continually reorganise and raising
new and original problems to solve. It Is evident that such a conception Is hindered as far
,as Its' practical' development 'Is' concerned by the blind,' ona-slded fanaticism of A party'
(In this case the fanaticism of a sect, a fraction of a larger party where Internal struggle Is
going' on), Ie,' by the lack of either a State-minded conception or' a' conception' of the -world
which has the potential to develop further because It Is historically necessary.
The' political life' of ,today furnishes' plenty of evidence of these' narrow-m1nded and- closed-
minded mentalities which, by the way, provoke dramatic strugglel because they are the
themselves the' means' by which historical development happens 'In practice. But the' past •
Including the Italian past since Machiavelli's time, which Is what we are most Interested In
-Islust as' rich -In experiences; 10r all of' history bears wltness'to the present ••
Gramsci goes back to "first principles" to judge Hitler's statement. The element of
"absolute laicism" in' Machiavelli's conception of the world consisted in sacrificing
religious to political ends. The prince broke the norms of Christian morality and
therefore risked losing his immortal soul for the sake of his State. The example of
Cesare Borgia who murdered his own captains after conquering the Romagna in
order to ensure unrivalled leadership Of the new principality comes to mind.
Whether or not Gramsci was thinking of this 'classic' episode, it is probable that the
, "dramatic struggles" mentioned in this Opaque passage refer to the 'similar' murder
of Rohm and the SA leaders on 30 June 1934.
18 oom p.1947-1948. Translated in SPN 266-267.
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The internal contradictions of the Nazi party and its ideology had sharpened since
the capture of State power in 1933. By now Hitler found it necessary to curb the
party radicals, particularly in the SA, who called for a second revolution against all
the "reactionaries" who "refused to recognise that Hitler's movement was not only
nationalist but also socialisf' (ROhm). Rohm and the leftist tendency of the SA
exhibited what Gramsci calls "the blind, one-sided fanaticism of 'party'''. This had
served a useful purpose in its time but had now become an obstacle to the 'State-
minded' mentality which the ruling party must now develop. Insofar as Hitler's
action was a choice between the SA and the army, the murder of Rohm and the SA
leaders was a practical demonstration of this 'State-minded' mentality. Moreover,
Gramsci was right in thinking that the dramatic events of 30 June marked the start
of a reorganisation of the Nazi Party, although the full extent of the purge of leftist
elements was concealed by the massive display of party unity at the Nuremberg
rally in September.19 In many ways, however, Hitler's choice was not between the
SA and the army, but the SA and the SS. The claims of Rohm and the "old fighters"
to be the standard-bearers of the Nazi Weltanschauung were now taken over by
Himmler and the new elite, the SS, who proved their 'State-minded' credentials by
carrying out mass murder.
The events of 30 June 1934 were a turning-point in the process of "transform ism" in
both the State and the party. The elimination of the SA leaders placated the officer
corps whose exclusive character and status were preserved from the threat of
plebeian transformation through merger with Rohm's SA. However, the officers'
traditional, 'priestly' conception of themselves as the institutional embodiment of
the State remained a potential danger to Hitler's position and could not be left
untouched. Hitler took the opportunity provided by the death of Field Marshall
Hindenburg shortly afterwards to stamp the new conception of the 'State' on the
army by requiring it to swear an oath of personal loyalty to the Fuhrer.
Meanwhile, the real victor of 30 June 1934 was the SS. Although there is no
reference to it in the prison notes, the SS illustrates how Gramsci's concept of
"transform ism" might be applied to German fascism. The traditional elites would not
be 'transformed' by the absorption of new personnel from the plebeian ranks of the
fascists: rather, the personnel of the traditional ruling class, especially the sons of
19The extent of the purge is described by Dietrich Or1ow in The History of the Nazi Party, 1933-1945
(David and Char1es, 1973) Vol.2, chapter 3 'Purges, Struggles, Crises:1934-36', especially p.120-
121. Hitler opened the Nuremberg rally of 1934 by announcing that "the National Socialist revolution
as a revolutionary, power-oriented development had reached its conclusion".
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the fathers, would be absorbed by a new parallel elite, the SS. Gramsci says that
the potential of the new conception of the world depends on the extent to which it is
"historically necessary". This can be judged from David Schoenbaum's description
of the career possibilities which underpinned the ideological potential of the SS:
With the possible exception of the Labour Front, It [the SS] was the Third Reith's outstanding
example of a successful institutional innovation. Confining itself initially to infiltration rather than direct
challenge, and to quasi-conservative elite ideology in sharp and conscious distinction to the populist
egalitarianism of SA and party, the SS succeeded where Its competitors failed. By 1939, when the SA
had·long ceased to have any meaning at all and the functions of1he Party, despite its huge numbers
and vast administrative machine, stagnated in a kind ofquerulous moral rearmament combined with
patronage, the SS had become a real organ of State, ultimately responsible only to Hltler.·1f Himmler's
status as Chief of German Police according to a statute of 1937 ambiguously subordinated him to the
.Ministry of the ·Interior ~he was called -autonomous dep~ - the extension of his police prerogatives
in the form of the Waffen-SS gave him. in effect, parity with the Wehrmacht... ....
. If it was the war itself which brought the potentialities of the SS to their full realisation. the structural
and, above all, the sociological nucleus of its growth was organised at the very beginning. From 1933
on, the SS exploited-Its status as the Nazi e1lteto attract members of the otd social elites into an
institutional identification with the new regime incomparably more attractive than the unwashed
Volksgemeinschaft of Party or SA. WIth- its Ideological predilections and expansive Capacities, the SS
also offered new careers and promotion possibilities for university graduates - particularly in law and
-medicine -1hat could scarcely be matched by any other-institution: Its attraction tor the young could be
seen in the average age - 29.2 in 1938; for the sons of aristocratic families, in the relatively high
concentration of aristocrats in its leadership - 9 per cent, or 58 of 648 with the rank of colonel or higher
in 1938; and for those in liberal professions, in its absolute membership figures. At the end of 1938
nearly 12,000 of these were SS members, including roughly 3000 lawyers and 3000 doctors.20 '
The process by which the SS recruited the sons of aristocratic and bourgeois
families Illustrates Gramsci's principle that "restorations must be judged
'dynamically", in terms of the dialectic of "revolution-restoration". The SS may have
been the outstanding example of institutional innovation by the Nazis, but its
success owed much to its espousal of a "quasi-conservative elite ideology" in
which the principle of"birth and ancestry, understood in racial rather than
aristocratic (ie, class) terms, was 'restored' as the governing criterion of selection.
'23~3eand t28~01:'eeaclanlam and Lorlanlam In German Culture
Although Gramsci drew political lessons from this bloody epiSOde in "the political
-life of today", we can sense his aversion to German developments as he turns
away from Germany to Italy, "which is what interests us mosr. A similar spirit of
20 David Schoenbaum: Hitler's Social Revolution. Class and Status in Nazi Germany 1933-1939
(Norton, 1980) p.227-228.
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aversion, indeed of repugnance, can be detected in the additions to §23.36 in
which he argues that "restorations" are universally repressive in the field of cultural
life, "especially the restorations which take place in the present epoch". He cites as
an example the literature produced in Italy after the defeat of the 1848 revolution,
particularly the novels of the Jesuit father Bresciani. In periods of restoration
cultural life is permeated by the spirit of Bresciani.
The psychology which precedes an Intellectual phenomenon of this sort Is created by
panic, by a cosmic fear of demonic forces which are beyond understanding and so cannot
'be' controlled except by constructing something universally repressive. The memory of
this panic (of Ita acute phase) Is long-lasting and decisively shapes the will and the
feeHngs:' creative freedom and'spontanelty disappear' and what rem.lns 'Is the raneour, the
spirit of vengeance, the stupid blindness - all hidden by a mellifluous and Jesuitical
disguise. Everything Is reduced to the practical (tn the worst sense),' everything la
propaganda, polemic, Implicit negation expressed In a mean, narrow, otten vile snd
repul.'ve form'ss In The Jew ofVeronB.21
Unfortunately, Gramsci does not indicate how he would 'translate' this element of
Italian literary culture .: Bresciani's The Jew of Verona - into equivalent German
terms, but the culture of Nazi Germany provided plenty of evidence of this spirit of
'restoration" and was permeated by similarly "vile and repulsive" forms. We have
only to think of the grotesque stereotypes of the Jew in Nazi propaganda to
appreciate what he means by "a cosmic fear of demonic forces which are beyond
understanding" .
A more complete cultural 'translation' can be found in Notebook 28 where
Gramsci turns his attention from the literature of Padre Bresciani to the social
science of Achille Loria. It was his final word about the German events.
Gramsci once compared himself in self-mocking vein to the Chinese sage Lao-Tee
who was reputed to have been born with the wisdom of an eighty-year-old. The
,strong language of §28.01 (Lorianism] suggests, however, that he was not yet
beyond being shocked by the latest "unanticipated" developments of German
culture.
loria la not an laolated, freakish case: on the contrary, he Is the most rounded and
'complete example' of a series' of representatives of a particular Intellectual stratum In a
definite historical period. I refer generally to that atratum of positivist Intellectuals who
took an 'Interest In the workera question and were more' or leas convinced that they were
fundamentally examining, reViSing, and going beyond the philosophy of praxis [Ie,
Marxism]. 'But 11'should' be noted that' every' period' has 11a' Lorlanlam 'In' a' more' or' I.. s
rounded and perfected state, Juat aa every country has: Hltlerlsm has ahown that In
Germany, under the rule of an apparently serious 1ntetJectuai group, a'monatrous
Lorlanlsm was hatching out which has broken the official mould and ha. been propagated
21 §23.36. Qelll p.2232. The italiCS. which indicate an addition not in the first draft. have been added.
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as a new 'official' conception and scientific method. The fact that Loria could exist, write,
speculate, publish books, and what passed for books, Is not at all strange: there will
always be' discoverers of perpetual motion and parish priests publishing further
Instalments of Jerusalem Liberated. Rather, the fact that he became a pillar of culture, a
'master', .and that he 'spontaneously' found an enormous' public, makes us reflect on the
weakness of the critical barriers - such as they were - even In normal times; but In
.abnormal' tlmel,when palslonl are unleashed, just 'Imaglne how easy It II for the lorlas,
with the support of Interested forces, to break through all the dams and to turn an
environment of Intellectual culture, It III weak and delicate, Into a swamp 'whlch lasts for
decadel.
Only now (1935), after the brutality and unprecedented Ignominy manifested by German
'culture' dominated by' Hltlerlsm,' have' a few 'Intellectuall begun to notice just· how fragile
modern civilisation In all Its contradictory - but necessarily contradictory - expresllons,
was: the civilisation, that 'Is,whlch had Its beginnings 'In the' first renals.ance (after the
Millennium) and became dominant through the French Revolution and the movement of
ideal' known' al 'clailical German phllolophy' and al 'english clasllcal economy'.' Hence
the Impalsloned criticism of Intellectuals like Georges Sorel, like Spengler etc, who fill
the cultural atmolpherewlth asphyxiating and' st8rlllllng' gas8s.22
Buried in Notebook 28, this passage displays some of Gramsci's finest qualities of
mind - the blithely ironic intelligence ("what passed for books"), the vitality of the
metaphors ("asphyxiating and sterilising gases"), the critical bite, the confident
sweep of the historical imagination, the intellectual and moral high-mindedness: all
this bore witness to the renaissance of intellectual culture in Italy at the turn of the
century in which he had participated, but which was now swamped by the rising
tide of 'Lorianism'.
Gramsci's notion of 'Lorianism' had its origin in Croce's essay The Historical
Theories of Professor Loria' (1896).23 Croce observed that Loria enjoyed "a
universal reputation as an original talent and discoverer of 'new horizons'" by virtue
of plagiarising and vulgarising' Marx's theory of history. How was this possible? On
the one hand, Loria's emphasis on 'objective' economic conditions, on the force of
'external' necessity, had 'quietistic' implications which were attractive to
'conservatives of all kinds'. The latter, seeing that his interpretation of Marxism
presented no danger politically, were eager to celebrate Loria and to Shower him
with rewards and honours. On the other hand, Loria's simplistic reduction of
Marxism to a form of iron economic determinism was in tune with the reigning
positivist spirit of the 1890s with its mania for 'scientific' laws. "He [Loria] wanted to
discover the law of laws, as he called it, the law of economic evolution. This
discovery is his glory as a scientist". This simplification of Marxism was attractive to
the socialists Of the time Who, still largely ignorant of the original texts, were
22 00111 p.2325-2326
23 In BenedettoCroce: MsterlaJismo storico ea Economis Msrxists (Laterza, Sari, 1961).
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persuaded that Loria had 'perfected' and developed his theory. The whole edifice
of Loria's brilliant reputation, however, had little to do with the intellectual merits of
his writings. Indeed, Croce traced in detail Loria's 'reworkings' of Marx's theory
which often resulted in "burlesque, not to say downright ridiculous (maccheronici)"
parodies of the original.
This comic element was Gramsci's intuitive criterion in selecting examples of
Lorianism in the thinking of Italian intellectuals. However, Gramsci took such
examples of "bizarre and eccentric" thinking very seriously. They arose from a
whole series of bad habits which, together, resulted in the "degradation" of the
national culture. He defined them as follows:
The comprehensive title 'Lorlanlsm' can be used to describe certain harmful and bizarre
aspeets of the mentality of a group of Italian Intellectuals which are, therefore,
characteristic of the national culture: (Incoherence,lack of a systematic critical sp1rlt, a
negligent approach In developing scientific activity, the absence of a centralised culture,
slackness· and ethical ·Indulgenceln the field of scientific-cultural activity etc which are
not adequately challenged and firmly nailed: they therefore amount to an Irresponsible
.attitude towards the· development of the national culture).1M
These bad habits were not just confined to Italian intellectuals, of course. In
Germany they had given rise to a 'monstrous' form of Lorianism which had become
the 'official' conception of the Nazi State. There is little doubt that Gramsci was
referring to the racial 'science' which underpinned the legislation of the Nazi
regime as he read about it in the course of 1933-35, from the anti-Jewish measures
of 1933 to the compulsory sterilisation law of 1934 (and later the Nuremberg Laws
of 1935) although he invites us to see the official conception of the Nazi State as
the culmination of a process of intellectual 'degradation' which began well before
1933.
How did the degradation of German intellectual culture come about? Gramsci gives
no concrete indications but it is worth putting forward some suggestions. For
example, although its 'incubation' period can be traced back to the social
Darwinism of the late nineteenth century, it was not until the war and post-war
years that the tide of 'German' Lorianism began its irresistable rise. A
representative intellectual of this rising swamp and a worthy candidate as the
German 'Loria", was the racial anthropologist F.K.Gunther who in his Racial
Science of the German People (1922) and a host of other works did more to
24 OCIII p.2321.
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popularise the ideas of racial science in Germany than any other single figure.25 A
'Gramscian' perspective on Gunther's work might attach particular importance to
the backing he received from Germany's leading medical publisher, Julius
Lehmann, and the favourable reviews of his books by 'respectable' figures in the
academic establishment like Eugen Fischer and Alfred Ploetz. Their political
connections to Hitler's movement helped to secure Gunther's appointment to the
new chair of anthropology at Jena in 1932 although the majority of the university
senate were opposed. Hitler signified his approval by personally attending
Gunther's inaugural lecture.26 Thus with the support of interested forces the
German 'Loria' was able to break through all the 'critical barriers'.
25On.meorigins and development et 'racial science' in Germany. see above all Paul Weindling:
Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870-1945 (Cambridge.
1993)
26 Robert N. Proctor: Racial Hygiene. Medicine under the Nazis (Harvard. 1988) p.27.
Conclusion:
Gramscl's Interpretation of the German Crlsls,1929-35
The Storle/ta of the Prison Notes
The task of reconstructing the historical context of the Prison Notebooks (1929-35)
presents many technical difficulties, but what emerges after all that has been
written about his theory is a largely unknown Gramsci. His original intention was to
write something for eternity in the spirit of his former master the philosopher Croce,
but even in prison Gramsci remained very much as he described Machiavelli - "a
man of his time". The quality of eternita was the hallmark of Croce's idealist cast of
mind whereas the essential property of Gramsci's was its storicita. To be sure, if
writing for eternity meant formulating political theory in a 'disinterested' scientific
spirit, Gramsci did this by thinking dialectically about politics and writing in
'machiavellian' terms intended to be valid for "both sides" (§4.04), the Left and the
Right. This explains the constant sensation of ambiguity which the most percipient
readers of the prison notes have noticed. But if writing for eternity meant placing
himself above or outside the immediate political struggles of the day (which was
not an impossible project inside the walls of a remote prison in Bari), this could not
have been more alien to Gramsci's spirit. What strikes us from his letters is his
unbreakable resolve even in the dark days at the turn of 1932-33 not to give up on
life, to resist the inexorable tendency of the prisoner to become "anachronistic" and
to stay in touch with the current of affairs via the periodicals at his disposal. The
new problems posed by the current political struggles were the substance of his
theorising: they provided the "practical origins" of his theory (the "philosophy of
praxis") and were ultimately the source of its freshness and originality. The prison
notebooks testify to the creativity (in contrast to the poverty) of theory because
Gramsci addressed the novel and urgent problems presented by the real world. For
Gramsci theory was "non-definitive". By writing in the form of occasional notes, he
deliberately resisted the closed spirit of 'system' characteristic of idealist thought
and made sure that his thinking 'adhered' as closely as possible to the actual
course of historical events. For all their merits, the many attempts to present the
theory of the prison notebooks in 'systematic' form ignore the fact that it did not
proceed from concept to concept, but from reality to concept: its connecting threads
are located outside the notes themselves, in the process of reality itself between
1929-35.
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Can we speak of a 'Gramscian' interpretation of the German crisis and, if so, what
are its key features? How does it differ from interpretations of the rise of fascism in
Germany by other contemporary marxists? What relation does it have to the later
historiography on the rise of Hitler and the Third Reich?1
*
The Marxist Theory of Fascism
In the last analysis of fascism before his arrest in 1926, Gramsci argued that the
peripheral states of Europe (he mentions Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland) were
particularly vulnerable to fascism.2 This perspective was developed after the
turning-point in Germany in 1923 when "a catastrophic eruption of the economic
elemenf' - the hyperinflation - led not only the communists but also the fascists to
attempt a 'revolution'. The abject failure of Hitler's attempt to imitate the successful
example of a 'fascist revolution' carried out by Mussolini a year earlier seemed to
highlight the differences between the German and Italian 'terrains', and this
difference was a significant influence on Gramsci's theory of the periphery. In
prison Gramsci did not simply abandon his earlier analyses, but the rise of fascism
as a mass movement in Germany, an advanced capitalist state at the heart of
Europe, posed new theoretical challenges demanding the elaboration of new
concepts. Moreover, by the time Gramsci began writing in 1929 the so-called
'fascist revolution' in Italy itself had entered a conservative or 'restorationist' phase
marked by the subjugation of the Fascist party itself, the ascendancy of the
conservative bureaucracy, strict financial orthodoxy, the combination with
Catholicism, and the propagandist cult of the leader. These were new
characteristics which the ongoing analysis of fascism must take account of.
Gramsci's perception of the German crisis after 1929 was organised quite
differently from that of other contemporary marxist interpretations, whether it was
the official prognosis of the Comintern for the 'third period' after 1929 (an
'economistic' prognosis which Gramsci thought was a mistake) or the
interpretations developed by marxists in opposition, notably Thalheimer and
1 I have tried to answer this third question by indicating in the footnotes some of the historical works
listed in the bibliography which relate to the themes of Gramsci's various inquiries.
2 'Un Esame della Situazione Italian a' (August 1926),in La Costruzione del Partito comunista 1923-
1926 (Einaudi, 1971)p. 113-124(translated in SPW p. 400-411).
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Trotsky. The latter tended to interpret fascism rather narrowly in terms of the
concept of 'Bonapartism', an authentically marxist concept derived from the
Eighteenth Brumaire, although they disagreed on whether Hitlerism corresponded
to this torm.a Gramsci deployed the same concept under its Italian name
'Caesarism' but he introduced it at a late stage in the notes - at the turn of 1932-33 -
where it is first used in relation to Schleicher not Hitler. The notes on Caesarism
were a continuation of earlier observations (§2.75i, 1930; §2.75ii, §4.69, 1931) on
the charismatic leader insofar as the essence of the phenomenon was not 'Caesar'
himself (hence the formula of "Caesarism without Caesar, ie, without a 'heroic'
personality") but a specific conjuncture in the class struggle marked by a "static
equilibrium of the conflicting forces tending towards catastrophe". In this sense, the
timing of Gramsci's notes on Caesarism had less to do with the appointment of
Schleicher as Chancellor than with the result of the November elections when the
state of "static equilibrium" was confirmed precisely by the decline in the Nazi vote.
Gramsci's attempt to graft Weber's concept of charismatic leadership onto the
Bonapartist or Caesarist argument is interesting, but these observations were part
a more comprehensive historical conception of the German crisis which did not
start (in late 1929) with the rise of Hitlerism at all.
The distinctive features of Gramsci's interpretation are due to the fact that it was
accompanied by a rethinking of Marxism itself. The clue to this lies in a remark
made by Togliatti in 1925 on the eve of the Lyons congress. Togliatti defended the
leading nucleus of the party from Bordiga's charge that they were "not Marxists at
all but neo-Hegelians, disciples of Benedetto Croce":
We arrived at Marxism by the route followed by Marx" he replied, -that is, by starting from German
idealist philosophy, from Hegel.. ...COmpared to other possible paths to Marxism, ours is the Via
maestra and has all the consequent advantages.4
In the prison notes Gramsci retraced the via maestra through "the study of Marx's
Hegelianism" (§1.152). The route led to the conception of Marxism encapsuled in
the Theses on Feuerbach and found throughout the prison notes as "the
philosophy of praxis", a conception well attuned to the age of Lenin - "the greatest
modern exponent of the philosophy of praxis". Meanwhile, Gramsci's progress
along the via maestra led him to elaborate a number of concepts which could be
applied to the German 'terrain'.
3 David Beetham: Marxists in Face of Fascism (Manchester University Press, 1983), p.26.
4 Paolo Spriano: Storia del Partito comunista italiano. 1. Da Bordiga a Gramsci (Einaudi, 1967) p.4B2.
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The Main Features of Gramsci's Interpretation
The "practical origins" of Gramsci's theory meant that he addressed whatever
questions were randomly posed by the developing crisis in Germany between
1929-34: he never got to the stage of synthesising his ideas and producing an
integrated interpretation of the crisis. Nevertheless, there are a number of
continuous guiding threads or lines of inquiry in his 'German' notes. Initially, we
can single out three main ones which we will call the 'Hegelian' threads.
(I) The Traditional Intellectuals
The crisis of authority. The first thread is historicist. It starts with his account of the
ruling function of the traditional intellectuals in the bourgeois revolution in
Germany from 1848 to 1918 (§1.44, §4.49, §12.01, §15.18). Gramsci's synopsis of
the function and mentality of the Prussian Junkers was set in a comparative
perspective and synthesised the essential elements of structure-superstructure: the
"suture" whereby the aristocracy assumed the function of the bourgeoisie'S ruling
stratum or "intellectuals" was similar to the English experience, but the German
case differed in two respects: firstly, the Prussian aristocracy, unlike the English,
was a producer not a rentier class; secondly, they were more solidly organised and
possessed greater esprit de corps by virtue of constituting the officer corps of the
army.5
The historicist relation between past and present, history and politics, lies in
Gramsci's perception of the crisis of 1929-34 as a global crisis of hegemony, or
"crisis of authority" (§1.48. §3.03, §1.127. §3.34, §4.22). Under the republic the
residual power of the traditional ruling class in both State and civil society (east of
the Elbe, but not only there) was considerable, but its capacity for leadership in the
political and cultural fields was historically exhausted. When the 'catastrophic'
crisis came in 1929, it offered no credible alternative to the parliamentary regime
which it so detested. The cultural symptoms of this orlsis of authority were captured
in Gramsci's notes on the dominant "fathers-and-sons" motif in contemporary
German writingS where he found evidence {in the moral defence of parricide, for
5 A concise history of the Prussian Junkers is F.L.Carsten (1989). Gramsci's perspective is quite
similar to that of his contemporary Eckart Kehr (1977).
S Peter Gay (1974), chapter 5 'The Revolt of the Son' ; Walter Laqueur (1974); Oatlev Peukert
(1991), chapter 111.4.
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example) of "a new kind of intellectual and moral disorder" (§3.03).
Not for the first time personal analysis sets itself against the principle of authority, which is attacked in
all its forms: religious dogma, monarchical power, official teaching, the military State, the marriage
bond, paternal prestige, and above all the system of justice which protects these transitory institutions
and which merely coerces, constrains, and arbitrarily deforms public life and human nature. Man is
unhappy and bad as long as he is shackled by the law, by custom, and by traditional ideas. He must be
freed from all this in order to be saved. The creative virtue of destruction has become an article of faith
(§3.03/1930).
His notes on the state of permanent rebellion of the young and the cultural despair
of the old who abdicated their responsibility as educators and took the attitude of
"apres moi Ie deluge" (§1.127), are related to this theme.
The tradition of bureaucratic rule. His recommendation of Weber's critique of the
tradition of bureaucratic (as distinct from party) rule in imperial Germany is part of
this historicist thread {§3.119, §12.01, §15.48).7 The currency of Weber's critique
stemmed from the fact that the presidential 'dictatorships' starting in 1930 appeared
to Gramsci to be a reversion to the post-Bismarckian tradition of rule by bureaucrats
devoid of any capacity for political leadership which Weber had castigated so
effectively in his articles of 1917-18. Germany was not peculiar in this respect. A
similar custom whereby the high bureaucracy usurped the function of the
parliamentary leaders and formed itself into an independent 'party' ("the State-
Bonapartist party") could be traced in post-Risorgimento Italy. The theme is
continued in the notes written in 1932 when the reelection of Hindenburg
temporarily strengthened the ascendancy of the traditional bureaucratic caste
headed by the political-military clique (§8.81) around the president.8 Gramsci
redrafted his synopsis on the traditional intellectuals at this time (§12.01). The
difference in 'mentalities' of the Prussian and English aristocracy is further explored
in terms of the contrasting administrative customs of English self-government and
Prussian bureaucratic centralism (§8.55), a difference partly due to 'structural'
determinants - again, the English aristocrats were rentiers, the Prussians were not.
Meanwhile, the tradition of bureaucratic rule without political capacity found its
perfected expression in Papen's 'cabinet of the barons' appointed in June 1932.9
The members of Papen's government were not drawn from the political parties but
personally selected by Hindenburg from the remnants of yesterday's men, the
7 Max Weber (1994), Wolfgang Mommsen (1984), chapter 6.2.
8 K.D.Bracher (1970), chapter4: 'Oemocracyin Crisis'; F.LCarsten (1966).
9 Martin Broszat (1993), chapter 3.2.
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Prussian nobles. It was the nearest attempt to solve the crisis by an integral
restoration of the old regime. When Hindenburg refused to dismiss Papen and
appoint Hitler in his place after the Nazi victory in the elections in July, Gramsci
raised the question of "bureaucratic centralism" (§9.68). The suggestion that
Papen's government was a form of this is an interesting example of Gramsci's
'machiavellian' use of a concept originating on the Left (from Trotsky) to analyse
the politics of the Right, although the concept also accorded well with Weber's
critique. Gramsci went back to Weber after the Enabling Act ended the
parliamentary regime in March 1933 (§15.47). The function of political parties in the
parliamentary regime was to train and select the leaders - "educating and testing
out the various personalities" - who would determine the political direction of the
State . The Nazi regime now reverted to a "bureaucratic solution" to the problem of
selecting leaders, but this was far less efficient since "the parties are replaced by
cliques and by confidential personal influences, to say nothing of the restricted
possibilities of choice and the deadening of political sensitivity ».
The concept of restoration. The final twist in the historicist thread is Gramsci's
dialectic of 'revolution-restoration'. As early as 1930 he speculated in terms derived
from English history on whether the present "interregnum" could be followed by a
"restoration" (§3.34). The bankruptcy of the traditional ideologies tended to rule out
this possibility but "not completely". Meanwhile, the appearance of new ideological
"combinations" was anticipated, although he gave no indication of what this might
be in the case of Germany. The new combination was between the old and the
new, the Nationalists and the National Socialists. From the start of the crisis the
two parties entered into a "symbiotic" union to campaign against the republic -
against the Young Plan in 1929-30, for the Prussian plebiscite in 1931, in the
Harzburg Front, in the second ballot of the presidential elections in 1932, and
finally in Hitler's national coalition of 1933. The "molecular" process by which old
and new ideologies combine is studied in notes written at the time of the
presidential elections in early 1932: in the elements of continuity and change in the
"language" used by the old and the new intellectuals (§8.171; his semantic
enquiries into the term 'Reich' in §7.95 and §8.107 are connected with thiS) and in
the "change in the relative weight of the elements" which occurs when new
"utopias" are born out of the old ideological complex (§8.195). The particular
element he had in mind may well have been the element of race, since anti-
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semitism was the subject of Gramsci's fraught correspondence with Tatiana and
Piero at this time on the question of the "two worlds". The element of anti-semitism
was certainly present in traditional natlonaltsmtu , but "what was once secondary
and subordinate, even incidental, is now taken to be primary, becoming the
nucleus of the new ideological and doctrinal complex"
The interregnum ended when the Nationalists and Nazis formed the coalition
government headed by Hitler in January 1933. Gramsci now thought of applying
Edgar Quinet's formula of "the equivalence of revolution-restoration" in Italian
history (§8.25). He introduces it in the notes on Caesarism written in the short
period from Schleicher to Hitler, to break down his first schematic distinction
between 'progressive' and 'reactionary' forms of Caesarism. "The problem is to see
whether in the dialectic 'revolution-restoration' it is the element of revolution or
restoration which predominates, for it is certain that in the movement of history
there is no turning back and no such things as restorations in toto" (§9.133). The
'machiavellian' method of synthesising opposites now led Gramsci to compare the
anti-Jewish Hitlerites who had thwarted the ambitions of Schleicher, who
represented the reactionary military caste, with the pro-Jewish Dreyfusards before
1914 who had defeated the reactionary 'caste' element in the French military
establishment: both were examples of historical-political movements "which are
certainly not revolutions but which are not entirely reactionary either - at least in
the sense that they shatter stifling and ossified State structures in the dominant
camp and introduce into State life and social activity a different and more
numerous personnel" (§14.23). Gramsci continued to explore the problem of
"judging restorations 'dynamically'" in the series of notes on "transform ism" in the
Risorgimento (§15.11 ,§15.15 etc) written immediately after the destruction of the
Left in the Nazi reign of terror in early 1933. The molecular process by which the
'revolutionary' personnel passed over to the dominant camp in the Risorgimento
offered the mirror image of a 'similar' process now starting in Germany with the
introduction of Nazi personnel into State life11, especially as transform ism was
governed by the same law as that followed by all demogogues on achieving power
- "the law of the turncoat" (§15.07). How far would the new personnel be
"absorbed" by the traditional intellectuals, how far would they "transform" their
traditional consciousness?
10 Peter Pulzer (1988).
11 David Shoenbaum (1980); Ian Kershaw (1991). chapter 7.
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Gramsci speculates on whether, "by symbiosis", the Nazis were serving the
interests of their partners the Nationalists, "the historical party" (§14.03). He
predicts that in time the movement would "shed its arbitrary, symbiotic features" and
thus become conscious of its global ('totalitarian') significance (§15.06). The thread
of Gramsci's thinking at this stage (the first quarter of 1933) is hard to follow but in
suggesting that the Nazi Party in power would "shed its arbitrary, symbiotic
features" he did not simply mean ditching the Nationalists (which, of course, Hitler
soon did) but also shedding the 'socialist' element of the new ideological
'combination' .
There is no doubt that some movements, if examined closely, think of themselves as marginal in
character: ie, they presuppose a main movement and graft themselves on to it in order to reform
certain of its presumed or actual imperfections. In a word, certain movements are purely reformist"
(§1S.0S/1933).
Here the dialectic of 'revolution -restoration' is modified to 'reform -restoration': the
constant element is 'restoration', but it is still not a 'restoration in toto '. The Nazis
'reformed' the ideology of traditional nationalism by introducing a 'socialist'
element necessary to win power under the post-war conditions of social and
economic crisis, but this element was unnecessary (,arbitrary') now that they had
won power and "the law of the turncoat" applied. Thus Gramsci looked forward not
only to the shedding of the Nationalists but of the National 'Socialists'. The
"dramatic struggles" of 1934 (§17.51) when those who called for a "second
revolution" were ruthlessly liquidated was a significant episode in the dialectic of
'revolution-restoration' which governed the real process of events. The "blind, one-
sided fanaticism of 'party'" of the Storm Troops impeded the development of the
"State-minded conception of the world" (§17.51) necessary for the ruling function.
(II) Civil Society
The second thread consists of the dialectic of civil society-State (starting in §1.47)
which places particular emphasis on the private initiatives of the dominant class in
organising or reorganising the State. At an early stage in the notes, Gramsci
singled out two forms of private initiative by the dominant bloc which played a key
role in changing the equilibrium of force and consent on which the 'normal'
parliamentary state depended: these were private arm ies and private newspapers.
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The storm troops and 'underground warfare.' The activities of private armies
in the Weimar republic, especially the political warfare conducted by the para-
military associations of the Right (§1.48, §1.133,134) were seen in this context.12
Gramsci interpreted the use of shock troops by the Right as a sign of the relatively
passive and demoralised state of their army, ie, of the deficiency in mass support
for their cause. The crisis of hegemony - a 'slackening of discipline and fighting
spirit on the part of the army as a whole' - demanded a new tactical deployment. "A
weakened State structure is like a flagging army; the shock troops - ie, private
armed organisations - enter the field and have two tasks: to use illegal methods,
whilst the State appears to remain within the framework of legality, to reorganise
the State itself". The distinction between civil society-State was useful, therefore, in
shining a light on the illegal activities of the dominant class which must remain in
the private sphere in order to maintain the appearance of the Rechtsstaat.. From his
Italian experience (notably the Matteotti murder) Gramsci appreciated that the
'appearance' of legality was highly sensitive politically. A note written in 1932 at the
time of Bruning's ban on Hitler's Storm Troops (the "delinquent association" of
§8.81) touches on this question. Since the ban was arguably the main reason for
Bruning's dismissal and since Papen's first act was to lift it, the hypocrisy of the
State in this matter was transparent. Gramsci's notes of 1932-33 on contemporary
Caesarism as more "a police than a military system" (§9. 136) and on political
parties as "police agencies" (§9.133, §14.34), which anticipated the Nazi seizure of
Germany's entire pollee apparatus, were related to this question. So was his
recommendation to marxists to study the constitutions of the major states along the
lines of Marx's analysis of the Spanish constitution of 1812, especially those which
(like the Weimar constitution) provided for a "legal passage" from democracy to
dictatorship.
The concentration of newspapers and the 'ideological front '. In addition to
the private armies, Gramsci took a close interest in the big press groups.13 His note
on the German newspapers (§2.26), which covers the spectrum from the extreme
nationalist to the liberal-democratic dailies, constitutes a detailed description of the
"material structures" which made up the "ideological front" of the dominant class.
The press was "the most dynamic" section of this front which included publishing
12R. Bessel (1985)
13M.Eksteins (1975).
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houses 14, reviews and periodicals of all kinds, and much else - "everything which
directly or indirectly influences public opinion belongs to it". This is what Gramsci
later had in mind by "the superstructures of civil society" (§7.10) which are
particularly dense in advanced capitalist states like Germany. The note on
newspapers may well have been 'occasioned' by the violent campaign of the right-
wing 'Hugenbergpress' against ratification of the Young Plan in 1929-30 which led
the Socialist Interior Minister, Severing, to contemplate tighter legal controls on the
press. The Hugenberg press projected Hitler nationally for months on end and was
a crucial aspect of his "symbiotic" dependence on his partner Hugenburg.
It was Hugenberg's strategy since the war years to build up a 'public opinion
machine' in anticipation of the democratic political order likely to follow the war.15
The alarming extent of his media power by the time of the 1929 crisis was already
described by Ludwig Bernhard in his classic Der 'Hugenberg-Konzern' (Berlin,
1928: untranslated). Its growing hold over the struggling provincial press in the
hard times after 1929 was particularly significant, especially in the light of
Gramsci's observation that "in Germany the number of newspapers published
throughout the country is impressive and the concentration [of papers] in Berlin is
matched by an ample stratification nationwide" (§3.83; the expression un ampia
stratificazione di provincia is substituted in second draft). The spectacular
choreography of the Nazis' "propaganda ooncentratlcns" may have obscured the
"everyday" influence of the local papers in winning over the hearts and minds of
small town Germany to Hitler's cause.
Stragglers along the Sonderweg may well be interested in this 'tranSitional' phase
of the route between 1914-18 in which the dominant bloc planned to use the power
of the press to permeate post-war civil society with traditional national values.
However, Gramsci did not think Germany was entirely peculiar in this respect. His
notes on the concept of public opinion - "the point of contact between civil and
political society" - and on the role of the yellow press and the radio in
manufacturing public opinion 'booms' on the eve of elections (§7.83, §7.103) were
obviously pertinent to Germany, but he wrote them in response to the landslide
victory of the National Government in Britain in Novemeber 1931 in which the
Rothermere and Beaverbrook press, not to mention the supposedly independent
BBC, had much to say.
14Gary D. Stark (1981).
15 John A.Leopold (1977)
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The position of the Catholic Church. The third element of civil society studied by
Gramsci was the network of lay organisations collectively known as Catholic Action
(§5.22, §5.59, §8.129). The depth of the "ideological front" of the dominant class
extended to the Catholic Church: "The position which the Church has kept in
modern society cannot be explained without knowing the persistent and patient
effort it makes to keep developing its own section of this material structure of
ideology" (§3.49). This vision was comprehensible in the Catholic states of the
periphery, especially in view of the 'restoration' of an established Church in Italy in
the Concordat of 1929, but what of the Church's position in protestant Germany?
Was not the position entirely different there where, for example, one element of the
national terrain was a popular-democratic Catholic party, the Centre, which the
Fascists in Italy had stifled in its infancy? Was it not a crude simplication to align
the networks of the Catholic Church in Germany along the same "ideological front"
as the organisations of the extreme Right, albeit far to the rear of these? The
several warnings of the German bishops in 1931 against the Nazis would support
this critiCism, but at the decisive moment in 1933 the Nazis exploited the fact that
the anti-communism of the Catholic hierarchy was far stronger than its anti-fascism.
The intervention of the Vatican in overruling the German bishops was crucial. The
Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Pacelli (the future Pius XII) was ready to
collaborate in the passive dissolution of the Centre Party in order to win the
coveted prize of the Reich Concordat. 16 Gramsci's lively interest in the historical
precedent of Vatican intervention in the vote on Bismarck's seven-year law (§2.20)
seemed to anticipate this possibility; so did his comment on the Concordat with
Prussia in 1929 (§1.03/O5 ) which indicated that "the juridical thought of the Vatican
has evidently changed and it could change again depending on political
expediences" (§16.11).
The Church undertook in the Concordat to withdraw from political society in the
hope of preserving its position in civil society without realising that the very reality
of "civil society" was an affront to the Nazi State. In Hitler's Germany "the whole
society in which the Church moves and can evolve tends to become rigid and
leaves it with few possibilities to adapt.. ..." (§20.04). Moreover, the Concordat was
the means by which the Nazis "coordinated" the Catholic Church from the
16Guenter Lewy (1964). John Cornwall (1999)
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beginning and the Church's subsequent attempts to separate itself from the Nazis'
ideological front - like Vatican's formal condemnation of Rosenberg's book in 1934
(§20.04) - could not change its basic position.
(ill) The Political Parties
The third thread consists of Gramsci's inquiry into the political parties. Not without
'soliciting the texts', he derives the concept of the party from Hegel's doctrine of the
private associations (§1.47) and so treats it as an element of civil society, but his
later distinction between civil society and political society differentiated the parties
from other forms of voluntary association.
The historical party. Synthesising elements of German philosophy and French
politics in imitation of the young Marx (§1.47 & §1.48), Gramsci started by selecting
a concrete element of French political experience - "the richest in political
elements" (§1.44). The right-wing Action Francaise led by Charles Maurras offered
the model of a certain type of political party - "the monarchist party in a republican
regime, like the republican party in a monarchist regime, or the nationalist party in a
regime of national subjection" (§1.18).17 The parties of the Right, whether
monarchist or nationalist or both, could therefore be seen in a certain sense as
'revolutionary' parties Since their ideological aims could only be achieved by
overthrowing the political systems in which they were forced operate. Thus,
analysis of parties of the 'revolutionary' Right could potentially offer useful political
lessons for the revolutionary Left, who must must learn from the weaknesses and
strengths of their enemy. Gramsci compared Maurras' Action Francaise to
Hugenberg's party in Germany (§13.37) which answered to the description both of
a monarchist party in a republican regime and (given the Versailles Treaty
arrangements) a nationalist party in a regime of national subjection. Elsewhere he
calls it "the 'historical' party" (§14.03). Its leader Hugenberg was, like Maurras, "a
demogogue who does not know how to be one" (§1.48). His tactic of absolute
opposition to the republican system was applied in the violent agitation against the
Young Plan in the autumn of 1929, but this resulted in splitting the parliamentary
party in November 1929 as the first of several fractions of the conservative-agrarian
wing (contemptuously referred to by the reactionary rump as English "Tory
17Walter Kaufmann (1954)
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democrats" ) broke away. The splitting of parties was one of the main symptoms of
the crisis of hegemony or "crisis of authority" in the parliamentary arena (§1.48)
although, as we said, Gramsci discovered symptoms of the same crisis in the field
of culture, as his note on German writers indicates (§3.03).
Gramsci started at the end of 1929, therefore, not with the rise of the Nazis but with
the disintegration of the Nationalists.18 As the "historical party" (§14.03) the
Nationalists were the focus of his historicism and the key to understanding the
historical-political dimension of the crisis of authority. It was the party of the
dominant 'agrarian-industrial' bloc but under Hugenberg's leadership the historical
'suture' at the level of the parties was in danger of coming apart. The party
leadership passed from the agrarians, the "traditional intellectuals" whose historical
function was to lead, to an industrialist who demonstrably lacked this capacity.
The charismatic party. Gramsci returned to this thread in the summer of
1930 during the election campaign in Germany. He began a two-part critical
summary of Robert Michels' typology of political parties (§2.75.i & ii). In an article of
1928 Michels added a new party to the typology contained in his pre-war work
Political Parties: this was the charismatic party 'discovered' (so Gramsci correctly
thought) not by Michels but by Weber. The process of his theorising followed the
real course of events in Germany where (according to his periodicals) Hitler's party
was rapidly gaining ground in the election campaign. He now turned his attention
from the historical party to the charismatic party, but Gramsci saw Hitler's
movement as part of the same historicist thread. In Weber's terms, we could say
that Gramsci saw the possible solution to the crisis of authority in Germany as the
transformation of traditional into charismatic authority expressed in the historical
myth of a national "man of destiny" .19 The invention of tradition played a key role in
this myth-making since a version of the nation's history had to be created which
culminated 'providentially' in Hitler. However, Gramsci did not think this type of
solution was peculiar to the Germans. It was Mussolini who exemplified for Michels
the modern charismatic leader, but it was the rise of Hitler in 1929-30 which gave
Gramsci's commentary on Michels its currency.
The theoretical question was this: can one speak of charismatic parties based on
the personality of the leader as a new type of party? Gramsci took note of Michels'
observation that charismatic leaders can be found in parties of the Left as well as
18 Attila Chanady (1967)
191an Kershaw (1989).
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the Right. In the case of Germany, for example, the leadership style of Ferdinand
Lassalle (a proto-'national socialist'?), who seemed to evoke similar popular hero-
worship as Hitler was now doing, supported this. Nevertheless, Gramsci was not
persuaded to accept that a party could be constituted on the basis of personality
instead of the 'permanent' bases of class and ideology which were grounded in the
mode of production. He offered an alternative explanation of the charismatic
phenomenon which harked back to the first phase of the development of Fascism
as a mass movement in Italy:
In the modem world the so-called charisma of which Michels speaks always coincides with a primitive
phase in the development of mass parties in which its doctrine appears nebulous and incoherent in
the eyes of the masses and needs an infallible pope to interpret and adapt it to the circumstances.
The more this happens the more the party originates and takes shape on the basis of incoherent and
muddles ideologies These ideologies are nurtured by feelings and emotions which have still not
reached the point of dissolving because the classes (or the class) which express them, having
reached historically the point of dissolution, still have a certain basis and cling to the glories of the past
in order to shield themselves from the future (§2.7S.i 11930).
This conception approximated closely to the reality of German politics in the
summer of 1930 as Hitler's party began the phase of mass expansion. Gramsci
was aware of the fact, for example, that Otto Strasser had recently been expelled
for daring to open a debate about the party's 'socialism' which questioned de facto
Hitler's position as the infallible pope of its ideology. His suggestion that the party's
nebulous ideology actually enhanced Hitler's charisma ('infallibility') in the eyes of
the masses was an important insight confirmed by later research into this
"deceptively simple" question.20 At this stage he sees Hitlerism as the ideology of
'dying classes' - the shopkeepers and petty-bourgeois of Berlin, the small farmers
and farm managers of the countryside mentioned in another 'German' note (§2.26)
- who are emotionally drawn to Hitler by a mixture of nostalgia and fear.
The breakthrough of Hitler's party in the September elections led Gramsci to pose
the theoretical question of "the value of the ideologies" which, he suggested, could
be studied concretely by analysing "the current phenomenon of the decomposition
of parliamentarism" (ie, in Germany) (§4.22). But if 'Hitlerism' exemplified the
efficacy of the ideologies, Gramsci was no more certain than later historians what in
the eyes of the masses the ideology of Hitlerism actually meant.ai A brief
annotation written shortly after, however, referred significantly to "the change in the
20 Ian Kershaw (1983)
21 ibid.
408
psychology of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalists" since Stresemann's
death in 1929 (§5.118). Meanwhile, the financial panic in Germany in the summer
of 1931 (§6.90) coinciding with Hitler's new plebiscitary campaign in Prussia
(§6.97) led Gramsci to pick up the thread of the charismatic party. The study of
Marx's "concrete historical and political works", especially the Eighteenth Brumaire
but other texts besides (§7.24), now led to a new twist in the thread as the
charismatic leader was seen to be the product of the same situation that produced
a 'Bonaparte'. There were no such things as charismatic parties, only charismatic
leaders. The latter was essentially a "demogogue" whose mass appeal owed much
to modern techniques of political choreography (§6.97), but he emerged out a
similar state of deadlock in the class struggle described by Marx in his accounts of
the class struggles in France 1848-51.
There's no evidence of any parties of this type. At particular moments certain more or less exceptional
personalities represent and express certain interests. At certain moments of 'permanent anarchy'
caused by the static equilibrium of the conflicting forces, one man personifies 'order', ie, the breaking
of the deadlock by exceptional methods, and all the 'frightened ones', all the 'rabid sheep' of the
petty-bourgeoisie flock to his side. Nevertheless, he does have a programme, however vague:
indeed, it is vague precisely because it merely aims to restore the external political casing of a society
in crisis (§2. 75. ii/1931 ).
The expression "rabid sheep" adhered closely to the moment of financial panic in
Germany in the summer of 1931 when a run on the banks was only narrowly
averted, but the possibility presented by the plebiscitary campaign in Prussia that
the charismatic Hitler might choose this moment to restore "order" proved
unfounded. For the time being the state of "static equilibrium" in Germany persisted,
but events in Britain now presented Gramsci with the chance to put the class
struggles in Germany into comparative perspective.
The crisis of parties: the normal and exceptional solutions. The fall of the Labour
Government, the abandonment of the gold standard, and the British general
election now dominated the international news agenda. The spectacle of Ramsey
Macdonald asking the country for a "doctor's mandate" while brandishing a handful
of worthless German banknotes from the 1923 inflation kept the British 'flock'
together at this critical moment. The massive victory of the National Government in
the election of 27 October 1931 demonstrated that the parliamentary equilibrium of
force and consent on which the hegemony of the dominant bloc normally
depended could be extremely "dynamic" in time of acute crisis.
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At a certain point in the historical process classes break away from their traditional parties; in other
words, the traditional parties, given their particular organisational form and the particular men who
personify and lead them, cease to represent their class or fraction of their class. This is the most
delicate and dangerous kind of crisis because it opens the door to providential or charismatic men. A
situation arises in which the representatives and the represented are at odds with each other, and
when something like this occurs in the province of private organisations (parties and trade unions) it
cannot but be reflected in the State where, in consequence, the power of the bureaucracy (in a broad
sense, military and civil) is strengthened to a formidable degree. How then does such a situation arise?
The process differs from one country to another although its content is the same. The crisis is
dangerous when it spreads to all the parties and all the classes, when, in other words, the rank-and-file
of one or more parties does not pass over very speedily to a party which better expresses their
general interests. The latter is an organiC (normal) phenomenon even if the speed with which it
happens is extremely rapid in comparison with normal periods. It signifies the fusion of a class under a
single leadership in order to solve a dominant life-or-death problem. If the crisis is not solved in an
organic way like this but by means of the providential man, it means that a static equilibrium exists. This
is when no class, neither the conservative nor the progressive, is strong enough to win and even the
conservative class needs a master (§4.69/1931).
This note synthesised the key features of Gramsci's crisis of hegemony (§1.48) and
set the agenda for the next phase of the crisis: the disintegration of the traditional
parties and ideologies, the dialectic of civil society and State, and the static
equilibrium which produces the charismatic man. It is interesting to note that the
catalyst which produced this synthesis was the British general election of 1931 as
reported by the Manchester Guardian Weekly (§7.94). When the 'national
government' came to power in Germany in 1933 Gramsci referred back to the
British election in 1931 (§15.02). He was particularly impressed by the
disappearance of the traditional "intermediate" party, the free trade Liberals, whose
rank-and-file passed over in the 1931 election to the protectionist party, the
Conservatives. According to Gramsci's analysis, the class content of this - which
was "essentially the same from one country to another" - was this: these
intermediate or (as he calls them) "industrial" parties represented a nexus of small
classes and big classes which broke up during the crisis when the big class, the
industrialists (supported by the conservative press) switched support to the
agrarian party, the Conservatives, who stood for general protectionism for industry
and agriculture. To this extent the disintegration of the middle parties was not a
peculiarity of the German crisis, but whereas the main beneficiary in Britain was the
Conservatives (disguised as the 'National' party), in Germany it was the Nazis.
According to this perspective, the peculiarity of the Germans would have more to
do with the historic problems of German conservatism not German Iiberalism.22
The fact remains that the coming to power of the 'National' coalition in Germany in
22 David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley (1984)
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January 1933 was seen as a 'similar' class phenomenon as that of the National
Government in Britain in October 1931: the essence of both 'turning-points' was the
fusion of the dominant bloc under a single political leadership.
The bureaucracy of parties. The dialectic civil society-State in Germany at the end
of 1931 now led Gramsci to direct his attention to the State (ie, the civil and military
bureaucracy) whose power was greatly strengthened by the crisis of the "private"
organisms, the political parties and trade unions. This explains the many notes on
the question of bureaucracy (§9.21 etc) in the first half of 1932 when in fact the
ascendancy of the political-military clique around President Hindenburg was most
marked. At the same time, Gramsci attributed the crisis of the German parties
during the new historical phase after 1929 to their tendency to become
"bureaucratised". He applied to the parties of the "other side" a concept which was
first invented by his "own side": this was the concept of "tempismo" invented by
Trotsky in the articles on The New Course in 1923-24 in which he attacked the
bureaucratic tendency of communist parties which caused them to miss
revolutionary opportunities like the German 'October' of 1923.
One of the most important questions about political parties is their 'ability to ride the storm'
(tempestivita) or 'aptitude to change with the times' (tempismo ) or how they react to the spirit of 'habit'
and the tendencies to become anachronistic and mummified. In practice parties arise (as
organisations) after historical events of importance for the social groups they represent. But they are
not always capable of adapting to new epochs or historical phases, they are not always capable of
developing in step with the development of the global relations of force (and hence the relative
relations) in the particular country or in the international field. This line of research must distinguish
between: the social group; the party's mass membership; the party's bureaucracy or general staff.
Force of habit is most dangerous in the last of these: if the party is organised as an autonomous, self-
sufficient establishment, it will end up becoming anachronistic. This is when crises of parties occur,
when all of a sudden they lose their historical social base and end up 'suspended in mid-air': this is
what has happened in Germany as a result of the expansion of Hitlerism (§7.n/1931).
The failure of the traditional party of the German Right, the Nationalists, to adapt to
the new historical phase starting in 1929 (or even 1918) was particularly evident.
The earlier thread of "the monarchist party in a republican regime" (Maurras-
Hugenburg) had emphasised the failure of its ideology. Gramsci's historicist
analysis of the bureaucratic spirit of 'habit' and the tendency to become
'anachronistic' continues the same thread by analysing the weakness of the
party'sorganisation. The same bureaucratic spirit of habit was apparent in the State
which, after all, was personified by an "anachronism", Field Marshall Hindenburg,
who symbolised the fact that the ruling function of the traditional intellectuals was
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nearly 'extinct'. Moreover, the bureaucratic centralism of Papen's 'cabinet of the
nobles' which had no support in parliament, was a mark of its "anachronistic"
character.
Gramsci's 'scientific' use of Trotsky's concept, however, could not hide the fact that
the science of revolution had as much, if not more, to learn from the "other side" (in
the first place, Weber) about the functional role of bureaucracy in the modern State,
especially in view of what Gramsci now called "the whole democratic-bureaucratic
system" (§12.01) of advanced capitalist states like Germany. This system was
never more in evidence than in Germany in the first half of 1932 when the party
'machines' mobilised to fight a continuous series of elections at the presidential,
state, and parliamentary levels. G ramsci seemed to think that these elections
marked the transformation of Hitler's 'movement' into a 'party' insofar as the mass
expansion of a party was considered to be a function of the quantity and quality of
its cadres at different levels (§9.62, §9.69).23 No doubt he implicitly compared the
relative mass expansiveness of the Communists and the Nazis in these elections,
which were taken to reveal the quantity and quality of their cadres at respective
levels. His rough calculations from the voting figures in the Prussian state elections
in April (§9.62 note) of the relative strengths of the parties of the Left and the Right
were connected with this.
The endurance of agarian parties. The mass expansion of Hitler's party reached its
peak in the July elections, but the deadlock could not be broken by electoral means
and the loss of some 2 million votes the following November cast doubt not only on
the permanence of the mass base of Hitler's party but also the capacity of its
cadres. The "static equilibrium" revealed by the election result of November now
led Gramsci to formulate his theory of Caesarism "with catastrophic prospects"
(§9.133/136, §14.23), with its attendant reflections on parties as purely police
agencies (§9.133, §14.34), but the result may also have affected his judgement in
other ways. Firstly, the relative recovery of the Nationalists and decline of the Nazis
in November and their preponderance in the 'National' cabinet formed in January
1933 explains Gramsci's reflections on "the strength of agrarian parties" (§14.53,
§15.02), although the comparison with the National (ie, Conservative) victory in
Britain in 1931 was certainly a factor in these reflections. Secondly, the recovery of
the Nationalists raised the question how much the mass expansion of Hitler's party
23 Dietrich Orlow. 1 (1971)
412
owed to the disintegration of the "intermediate parties" in Germany. This would
explain Gramsci's subsequent conception of Hitler's party as a form of "extremism
of the centre" (§ 14.03) which anticipated an important thesis on Nazism proposed
later.24 Thirdly, the election result in November, and the national cabinet formed in
January, pointed to the fact that the relation between the parties of the German
Right was more accurately described as one of "symbiosis" between the 'old' and
the 'new' than a straightforward process of transformation of one into the other.
Gramsci predicted that now that it had come to power Hitler's movement would in
time "shed its arbitrary, symbiotic features" (§15.06), but judging from the whole
cluster of German notes written in early 1933 he understood this to mean the
development of an ideology in which the element of 'restoration' would
increasingly predominate over that of 'revolution'. Judging by the "dramatic
struggles" inside the Nazi party in 1934 (§17.51), this forecast was not far wrong.
(Iv) Structure-Superstructure and the 'Historical Bloc'
The three guiding threads so far identified were explicitly traced back to Hegel
(§1.47,§6.24,§8.187), confirming the fact that Gramsci's rethinking of Marxism
started with an attempt to read Hegel's Philosophy of Right as Marx must have
done [The text of Marx's Critique of 1843-44 was not extant at the time]. Gramsci
interweaves these three Hegelian threads with a fourth authentically Marxist thread
- the concept of structure-superstructure, the cornerstone of the materialist
conception of history. The Hegelian threads of the theory - intellectuals, civil
SOCiety-State, political parties - all pertain to the superstructures, but Gramsci was
not simply the theorist of the superstructures. This view does not do justice either to
his notes on the structure-superstructure question or, still less, to the application of
his theory to the German crisis after 1929. It should not be forgotten that Gramsci
elaborated his theory in the context of the world capitalist crisis after 1929 - "a
catastrophic eruption of the immediate economic element" - which provided
immediate and concrete evidence with which to 'test' the theory of the structure-
superstructure. Gramsci's notes are particularly interesting, therefore, since
discussions of this question seldom descend (or ascendl) to empirical analysis.
24 Seymour Martin Upset (1983). Ian Kershaw (1991). chapter 2.
413
The critique of economism. Gramsci began theorising on this question
shortly after the Reichstag elections of September (the source cited in §4.38 is
dated 21 October 1930). The dramatic 'superstructural' result marked by the
breakthrough of Hitler's party were seen by Gramsci in the perspective of the
'catastrophic eruption' of the Wall Street Crash a year before (letter to Tatiana, 4
November 1930) but, paradoxically, the results confirmed his vigorously anti-
economistic theory of revolution. In his most sophisticated statement of this theory
(§7.10, §7.16) he argued that the superstructures of civil society in the advanced
capitalist states, like the trench systems of modern warfare, were more resistant to
catastrophic structural crises than economistic theories of revolution assumed.
This did not mean, of course, that the victory of the Hitlerites had nothing to do with
the catastrophic impact on Germany of the 1929 crisis. In the war of position in
politiCS, attack and defence, or rather attack and counter-attack, pertain to both
sides - Gramsci's text is deliberately ambiguous or "objective" on this paint - but
there is no doubt that he interpreted the German election results as a successful
counter-attack. The economistic assumptions on which the policy of the Comintern
in the 'third period' rested were demonstrably falsified by the German results. Nor
could the successful counter-attack of the Hitlerites simply be explained in
economistic terms. This took no account of the depth of the ideological front of the
dominant class (§3.49) with its all too 'material' superstructures of para-military
assoclations, newspaper concentrations, and much else.
The famous passage comparing the superstructures of civil society to the trench
systems of modern warfare (§7.1 0) was, in fact, a critique of the Comintern's
revolutionary thinking. For prudential reasons Gramsci gave it an impeccably
orthodox disguise by composing it in the form of a critique of the revolutionary
theory of Rosa Luxemburg (Germany's theorist) whose 'errors' had been formally
denounced by the Fifth Plenum in 1925 which Gramsci had attended in person.
The "invisible tribunal" in Moscow could not therefore accuse him of heresy.
However, accurate contextual analysis of this celebrated note which he wrote
immediately after the acrimonious disagreement with his comrades in November-
December 1930 over the 'third period' line, reveals the living relation between past
and present he had in mind. The majority of comrades supported the Comintern's
policy and felt that Gramsci had underestimated the likely effects of the world
capitalist crisis in destabilising the Fascist regime. The few who were still on
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speaking terms with him, notably Athos Lisa, invited him to prepare an analysis of
the Italian situation in the context of the world economic crisis. This was impossible
without access to the necessary economic data but Gramsci's project for a study of
the Italian economic structure (§6.96) indicates that he was not insensitive to the
economistic prejudice of his comrades. Whatever the case, Gramsci began in 1931
to study closely the causes and dynamics of the world capitalist crisis both before
and after the new phase starting in 1929. This was obviously a deliberate project
since Tatiana began sending him (which she would not have otherwise done)
special material for the task such as the issue of the review Economia for March
1931 entirely devoted to the causes of the world economic depression.
Gramsci's study of the economic crisis can be followed in notes written at
three different moments: the financial crisis in Europe in the summer of 1931
(§6.90, §6.123, §6.130); the unemployment peak in the summer of 1932 (§9.61);
and the new conjuncture at the start of 1933 marked by the coming to power of
Hitler in Germany, although the creation of the IRI in Italy in January 1933 should
also be included in the conjuncture (§15.01, §15.05, §15.16). His judgement of the
crisis shifted during this time. At the end of 1930, at the time of writing about the
'resistance' of civil society in the advanced states (§7.10, §7.16), Gramsci was
inclined to think that the 1929 Crash was "a catastrophic eruption of the immediate
economic element" similar in its intenSity and duration to the German inflation in
1923. By the start of 1932 he was persuaded by the general scope, depth, and
duration of the new crisis that it was not "conjunctural" like 1923 but "organic"
(§8.216: criticism of Einaudi). His theoretical effort was directed at defining the
difference between these terms - organic and conjunctural - and at understanding
the correlation between short-term and long-term structural movements which they
were meant to describe.
Conjunctural and organic crisis. The relation of structure-superstructure depended
from the start on the accurate definition of structural movement. There were two
kinds to take into account in assessing superstructural phenomena - 'occasional'
and 'permanent' (the terms 'conjunctural' and 'organic' were substituted in 1931)
movement: "The occasional leads to political analysis and is useful in judging
political groups and personalities; the permanent leads to social-historical analysis
and is useful for judging the big social groups" (§4.38). Economics did not
'determine' politics but the movement of the economy must be studied for the
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purposes of political forecasting. From the study of Marx's "concrete historical and
political works" Gramsci extracted a series of principles warning against simplistic
economic determinism. The most important of these was
the difficulty of identifying at any given time, statically (like an instantaneous photographic image), the
structure. In fact, politics at any given time is a reflection of the tendencies of development of the
structure, but this does not necessarily mean that such tendencies will be realised. A structural phase
can only be concretely studied and analysed after the whole process of its development has been
completed, not during the process itself, unless by means of hypotheses and by declaring explicitly
that hypotheses is what they are (§7.24/1931).
The 'parasitic' thesis. Gramsci applied this principle in studying the new structural
phase starting in 1929. In the notes we find a number of "snapshots" of the structure
(for example, §5.68 on the British trade balance;§9.61 on English and German
unemployment) depending on the fortuitous availability of economic data in the
periodicals. Sometimes he described the kind of "image" he wanted without having
the necessary data at his disposal. For example, during the financial panic in
Europe in the summer of 1931 Gramsci argued (against Gino Arias) that the
underlying "crisis of saving" was not due to the Fordist policy of paying the workers
high wages but to the quota of national income consumed by absolutely
unproductive or 'parasitic' social categories. In an earlier note on Americanism he
acknowledged the difficulty of measuring this quota:
The European 'tradition' is characterised precisely by the existence of such classes made up of social
elements like the civil service, the clergy and intellectuals, landed property, commerce. The older a
country's history the more these elements have left behind over the centuries residues of idle people
who live off the 'pension' left by their ancestors. Statistics of these social elements are very difficult to
work out because it is very hard to find the 'heading' which can cover them all (§1.61/1929-30).
His difficulties in working out the appropriate 'heading' can be followed in the
polemic against Arias where he suggests that what is needed is a statistical
'snapshot' of the economically active population: "A relation between 'employed'
workers and the rest of the population would provide the image of the 'parasitic'
weight which rests on the population" (§6.123). Without having the appropriate
statistic to clinch his argument, Gramsci nevertheless concluded:
The category of unproductive parasites, in both the absolute and relative sense, has grown
enormously in the post-war period and this is the category which devours savings. In European
countries it is even greater than in America etc. The causes of the crisis therefore are not moral
(enjoyments etc) or political in nature but socio-economic, ie, of the same character as the crisis itself:
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society creates its own poisons by having to provide a living for masses of the population (not just
unemployed wage-earners) who impede savings and thus break the dynamic equilibrium
(§6.123/1931).
Gramsci's 'parasitic' explanation of the causes of the crisis of saving in Europe
seems more persuasive in relation to the social structure of Italy than of Germany
where by his criteria the proportions of the population were more economically
'rational'. The parasitic social categories he describes certainly existed in Germany
(given their huge mortgage debts and the huge subsidies paid in 'Eastern Aid', the
Junkers themselves were the main "pensioners" of German economic history)25
but a statistic showing the relation of 'employed' workers to the rest of the
population would probably show that the 'parasitic weight' was greater in Italy than
in Germany. When he returned to this question in early 1932, he thought of using a
different statistic ("snapshot") to measure parasitism.
What is the distribution of the population of a given society with respect to 'goods' and ·services'? .... lt
is certain that the more extensive the 'services' sector, the worse the society is organised .....
Parasitism develops especially in this sector to which commerce and distribution in general belong.
'Productive' unemployment causes 'inflation' of services (multiplication of small business)
(§S.10S/1932).
The phenomenal growth of the services sector, in fact, was the single most
important structural change of the post-war economy: in Germany employment in
services grew by 15% compared to 1% in industry in the decade 1920-30, by a
further 21% compared to 13% in industry in the decade 1930-1940.26 But if these
figures tend to substantiate Gramsci's thesis on the growth of relative parasitism,
they also suggest that fascism was not simply the ideology of "dying classes".
The notes on Arias illustrate his attempt to define the relation between the
two kinds of structural movement: the financial panic of 1931 was a conjunctural
crisis - the conjuncture being "the whole complex of immediate and transitory
features of the economic situation" (§6.130). However, the crisis of saving also had
a historical or organic element, ie, the increasing quota of the national income
consumed by the category of unproductive 'parasites' which had "grown
enormously in the post-war period" (§6.123). The study of the conjuncture was
useful in judging political groups and personalities, but it was not possible to
25 See the study by M.Tcherkinsky (1922) ie, before the inflation of 1923.
26 Harold James (1987)
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predict its political outcome (if any). What would be the pobncat result of the
financial crisis of 1931? Gramsci may have reckoned that the financial panic in
mid-July was a vote of no confidence in the policies of Bruning and could result in
his fall (§6.90). He may also have reckoned that it would serve the ambition of the
charismatic Hitler (§6.97) whose plebiscitary campaign in Prussia was due to reach
a climax in early August. Would the "rabid sheep" set in motion by the financial
panic flock to his side? Would the charismatic Hitler choose this moment to restore
"order"? (§2.75.ii) In fact, the financial crisis had neither of these political
outcomes.
The 'snapshot' of 1932. The most successful of Gramsci's snapshots was his
comparison of the English and German unemployment figures in the first half of
1932 (§9.61) which led him to invent the formula of "the coefficient 'organic-cyclical'
crisis" and to form the hypothesis that in the event of a cyclical recovery
unemployment in Germany, although numerically much higher, would be absorbed
more rapidly than in Britain.
The starting point of this analysis can be the phenomenon of unemployment. Do the masses of
unemployed in England and Germany have the same significance? Does the theorem of 'fixed
proportions' as applied in analysing the internal division of labour produce the same picture in both
countries? It can be said that English unemployment, although numerically lower than German
unemployment, indicates that the coefficient 'organic crisis' is higher in England than in Germany
where the coefficient 'cyclical crisis' is more important. Consequently. in the event of a 'cyclical'
recovery unemployment would be absorbed more easily in Germany than in England.
Which element of the structure gives rise to this difference? The answer is that commerce is more
important relative to industrial production in England. In England there exists a larger mass of
'proletarians' employed in the commercial sector whereas in Germany the mass employed in industry is
greater (§9.61/1932).
Gamsci appeared to relate the cyclical movement of German unemployment to the
mass movement towards Hitler in the several elections of the first half of 1932
(§9.61 & §9.62). This is consistent with his later reference to the sudden
"mushrooming" pattern of growth of Hitler's movement. In contrast to the historical
party led by Hugenburg which waited for the masses to 'come back' to it, Hitler's
party actively campaigned during the crisis to win them over.
When the decisive moment comes, we can see that the great mass of energies set in motion by the
crisis, far from flowing into the reservoirs artifically created for them, follow the channels traced out in
the real world by real politics up to that point and are diverted towards the parties which have always
remained active, or even those which have sprouted like mushrooms out of the ground of the crisis
itseff (§13.37/1933.My italics).
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The element of political judgement was to see the mass expansion of Hitlerism as a
"cyclical" phenomenon, but it was impossible to "predict" in the summer of 1932
what would happen in politics when the economic cycle came to an end or entered
a new phase.
Gramsci's study of the cyclical movement of the crisis was reflected in the new
definition of 'conjuncture' in 1933 (§15.16). The change of government (and hence
of economic policy) marked a change in the economic as well as the political
situation in Germany - in other words, a new conjuncture (this being "more closely
linked to immediate politics"). "The conjuncture is studied in order to predict and,
within certain limits, to direct the economic cycle in a way favourable to business".
Whether or not G ramsci appreciated that Hitler had fortuitously come to power at a
favourable point in the 'automatic' economic cycle is hard to say, but this new
definition anticipated that his government would actively direct the cyclical
economic recovery to its own advantage and that of big bUSiness (whose interests
were represented by Hugenburg, the new Minister of Economics).
The historical bloc. The national government formed on 30 January 1933
was the moment of fusion of the "historical bloc" in Germany. Gramsci used Sorel's
notion to convey the force of ideology in binding structure-superstructure together
in a permanent bloc (hence the term has been equated with "ideological bloc" ),
although it also had the advantage of suggesting that for all its permanence the
bloc was continually in movement .27 A concrete reference to the role of ideology
in maintaining the solidity of the historical bloc can be traced in Gramsci's summary
of the German newspapers (based on pre-1929 data):
The Neue Prussische Zeitung. still called the Kreuzzeitung •also with a small circulation (10.000): it is
the classic organ of the Junkers (Prussian latifundists). aristocratic ex-officers. monarchists and
absolutists who have kept their wealth and solidarity based on landed property. On the other hand.
the Deutsche Tageszeitung •organ of the Bund der Landwirte (Farmers Association). has a
circulation of 100.000 copies: it is read by the small farmers and farm managers and helps to keep
public opinion in the countryside loyal to the old regime (§2.26/1930).
The permanence of this bloc depended in the last analysis on preserving the
Junker estates by a variety of "anti-historical policies" protecting them in times of
agricultural depression from the deadly solvent of market forces.28 However, their
27 On the long-term structural decline of the East. Frank Tipton (1976); for a structural explanation of
the breakdown of the political hegemony of the big landowners. Richard Bessel (1978)
28 AGerschenkron (1943); S.R.Tirrell (1951)
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preservation also depended on the residual force of the ruling ideas which made
even raising the question of agrarian reform of the East an affront to sacred
national values. Hindenburg saw the defence of the social order in the East as his
solemn national duty: it was the equivalent in class struggle of a second
'Tannenberg'. Hence the agitation of the Farmers Association in 1933 against
Schleicher's proposals for reforming eastern agriculture ("agrarian Bolshevism")
was decisive in persuading him to dismiss Schleicher and bring in Hitler.29
Gramsci saw the 'national government' formed in 1933 (like the National
Government in Britain in 1931) as a measure of "the strength of agrarian parties"
(§14.53). He observed that at the decisive moment of the crisis the big industrialists
abandoned the "intermediate" parties and turned to the agrarians for political
leadership (§15.02). The new regime was the political expression of the
protectionist bloc of steel and rye on which the historical continuity of the 'Reich'
was founded.30 But the fusion was an affair of small classes as well as big classes.
The agrarian parties owed their strength to
the fact that in rural areas all the elements involved in agricultural production continue to form a bloc
which is often under the leadership of the most reactionary of these elements. On the other hand
there is no such bloc in the cities and in urban-type populations: it dissolved generations ago if in fact
it ever existed (since it could not exist as long as the franchise was not enlarged). It therefore happens
that in preeminently industrial countries the agrarians, now that the intermediate parties have broken
up, have the 'parliamentary' upper hand and impose anti-historical policies. It is necessary to establish
why this happens and to determine whether or not the urban parties, due to their corporatism and
narrow-minded econornism, are to blame (§14.53/1933).
In fact, during the crisis the Nazis were the only urban party to capture a large part
of the rural constituency, penetrating the Farmers League (especially its eastern
branches) which was virtually under Nazi leadership by 1933.31 Indeed, the
demogogic slogan of "agrarian Bolshevism" reflected the new tone of Nazi
leadership of the League. Nazi infiltration of the Farmers League was a crucial
"molecular change" in the historical bloc but their aim was to preserve not to
destroy it. In Gramsci's dialectic it was an element of 'restoration' rather than
'revolution', always remembering that restorations must be understood and judged
'dynamically' (§15.11).
29 M.Broszat (1993), chapter 4.2; Henry A. Turner (1996)
30 Fritz Fischer (1986)
31 Horst Gies (1972); J.E.Farquharson (1976).
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(v) The Force of the Ideologies
The last guiding-thread in Gramsci's analysis of the German crisis and the most
difficult to retrace accurately and continuously relates to the marxist concept of
ideology. This concept accompanied the birth of his political vocation when he left
Turin university in 1915 for a career in revolutionary politics, and was of special
importance to him in understanding the intellectual function he had now chosen for
himself. Just before leaving ( - the interventionist crisis in the summer of 1915 was
decisive -) his linguistics tutor Matteo Bartoli introduced him to Annibale Pastore
who was giving a series of lectures on marxist theory.32 Gramsci wanted to
understand more about Marxism and in particular how ideas can become forces or
"idea-forces". He would discover the answer to this problem not in the lecture halls
of Turin but in the practical example provided by Lenin in Petrograd in 1917 ("The
Revolution against 'Oapltal'"), Meanwhile, even though his commitment to
revolutionary politics meant he had broken with Croce in practice, his thinking still
remained "rather Crocean".33 The task of "settling accounts" with Croce's
philosophy would have to wait until the prison notebooks, but it is interesting to
note that he started precisely from Croce's revision of the concept of ideology.
In his pre-1917 writings Croce accepted Marx's doctrine that the ideologies
were practical constructs, instruments of political rule. In the preface to the 1917
edition of his writings on marxism he thanked Marx for having rendered him
insensible to the seductions of the dominant ideologies. Marx's 'atheism' was a
sane antidote to the passions unleashed on both sides during the war of 1914-18
which was a war of "religions" (ie, nationalist ideologies) as well as a war of
"interests". However, Croce later revised his interpretation. Gramsci observed that
in his post-1917 writings he repeatedly misrepresented Marx's concept by
suggesting that as a materialist he denied the reality of the ideologies, reducing
them to "appearances" and "illusions" concealing the dominant economic interests.
Croce should have known better. His post-1917 interpretation turned a polemical
32 Domenico Zucaro: •Antonio Gramsci all'Universita di Torino 1911-15'. Societa, December 1957.
33 MinFebruary 1917 1 wrote that just as Hegelianism had been the premiss of the philosophy of
praxis in the nineteenth century, at the origins of modem-day civilisation. so Croce's philosophy could
be the premiss for the renewal of the philosophy of praxis in our times and for our generations. The
question was barely touched upon and was dealt with certainly in a primitive and most certainly an
inadequate way since the concept of the unity of theory and practice, philosophy and politics, was far
from clear to me at the time and I tended to be rather Crocean. But now it seems to me that, even
though the maturity and capacity needed for such a task may be lacking, it is worth reexamining this
thesis and elaborating it critically in more developed terms" (§10.1.11, aCII p.1233).
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language ("appearance" and "illusion") used by marxist critics to unmask the
dominant ideologies and to destroy their hold on the masses, into a gnosiological
principle which denied the objective reality of the ideologies altogether - which
denied, in other words, their efficacy as instruments of political rule. As Gramsci put
it: "Marx explicitly affirms that men become conscious of their tasks on the terrain of
ideology, of the superstructures, which is no small affirmation of 'reality'" (§4.1S).
Gramsci first formulated his argument in a series of notes headed Croce and
Marx (§4.15, §4.20, §4.22) written at the time of the election campaign in Germany
in the summer of 1930. He suggested that the question should be studied
empirically with particular reference to the current phenomenon of the
decomposition of parliamentarism (§4.22). The context indicates that he meant the
current "crisis of authority" in Germany where the breakdown of the parliamentary
regime had now led to the sudden explosion of a new 'ruling idea' - 'Hitlerism'.
There was a lot to be said for the marxist criticism that Hitlerism was an "illusion"
but it was plainly wrong to infer from this that it was not an "objective and
effectual reality". Its success in the German elections of September 1930 was "no
small affirmation of reality"
Again, Gramsci's rethinking of marxism from its Hegelian origins was deployed in
support of his argument for "the validity of the ideologies". From memory he
recalled the affirmation in the Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of
Right (1844) that "theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the
masses" (§7.21). This affirmation was potentially valid for "both sides", the Left and
the Right. In the latest German elections the theory that had gripped the masses
with seemingly lightning speed and with the energy of a material force, was not
communism but Hitlerism. It was the beginning of what he would later call "an
explosive synthesis of the collective will" (§8.195) although Gramsci doubted the
"solidity" of the popular belief in Hitler in view of the inherently instable nature of
"charismatic" leadership.
*
There are four strands in Gramsci's notes on the 'German ideology'. Firstly, in using
the term 'Hitlerism' in the notes (rather than 'fascism' or 'national socialism'),
Gramsci was conscious of its charismatic origin. The charismatic leader himself
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was a form of ideology34 which marxist theory had not come to terms with before
Gramsci. Secondly, the success of the charismatic or providential man partly
depended on what marxist historians have called "the invention of tradition".
Gramsci's observations on the way in which the new intellectual group around
Hitler sought to connect itself in the sphere of ideology with the traditional
intellectuals are relevant here. The historical myth of the 'Third Reich' was a clear
example of this. Thirdly, Gramsci regarded Hitlerism as a movement of 'restoration'
disguised by the language of 'revolution'.35 Its language was more redolent of
Nietzsche than of Marx but, either way, it was still a matter of "appearances". Whilst
unmasking its revolutionary pretensions, Gramsci recognised that "appearances"
were important in view of the fact that the ruling ideology in its traditional form had
lost its hold, especially on the younger generation. Before 1933 the revolutionary
language of Hitlerism not only expressed the "will to power" but also fostered the
"will to believe", which was vitally important in the context of the despair and fear
engendered by the 1929 crisis. After 1933 Gramsci developed a "functionalist"
analysis of Hitlerism according to which the practice of governing the State would
step by step clarify the nature of the movement's ideology. His forecast that the
movement would shed its "arbitrary, symbiotic features" was verified by the
massacre of 30 June 1934 when its inchoate 'revolutionary' element was ruthlessly
liquidated. In the dialectic 'revolution-restoration', the element of restoration now
predominated.
Lastly, the mass expansion of Hitlerism in the election of September 1930 raised
the question of the 'racial' consciousness of the Germans.36 Gramsci recognised
the element of race as the nucleus of the new ideological and doctrinal complex -
Hitler's utopia - and the first laws of the 'racial' State in 1933-34 confirmed this.37
However, he found it hard to explain what seemed to be the mass appeal of this
element. The problem was partly that the question of race did not interest him
unless "the germ of racist romanticism ....was well and truly sterilised" (letter to
Tatiana, 21 March 1932), but this was arguably the secret of its appeal. Meanwhile,
he observed that the intermixing of the elements of racial struggle and class
34lan Kershaw (1983)
35Jeremy Noakes (1983)
36 The best empirical research on the electoral appeal of Nazi anti-semitism before 1933 is Sarah
Gordon (1984), chapter 2.
37Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wipperman (1991)
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struggle could sometimes playa significant part in setting "the nationalistic tone of
movements of the subaltern classes" (§7.51). The economic crisis of 1929 created
the conditions in which the ideology of racial struggle could find a 'meaningful'
response, although Gramsci also took into account external conditions: the struggle
of national 'liberation' from the regime of subjection imposed by the French at
Versailles was interwoven with the intensification of the class struggle following the
catastrophe of 1929.
Gramsci's observations on German ideology start from the "crisis of authority"
(§1.48, §3.03, §1.127, §3.34, §4.22). In the post-war period the traditional
ideologies or ruling ideas had largely lost their hold on the masses, especially on
the younger generation (§3.03, §1.127). How would this crisis of authority be
resolved? The breakdown of the ruling ideas potentially created the conditions for
an unprecedented expansion of marxism (§3.34), but in the meantime (the
"interregnum") a new "combination" appeared - national socialism or 'Hitlerism'.
The "catastrophic irruption of the immediate economic element" in 1929 (§7.1 0)
was followed in September 1930 by a catastrophic irruption of the ideological
element.
The charismatic leader as an ideological form. The "nebulous" character of
Hitlerism was intimately connected with its charismatic origins. These included the
suppression of all collective debate about the movement's ideology38 as
demonstrated by the instant expulsion of Otto Strasser for daring the debate the
question of the movement's 'socialism' in 1930. For
in the modem world the so-called charisma of which Michels speaks always coincides with a primitive
phase in the development of mass parties in which its doctrine appears nebulous and incoherent in
the eyes of the masses and needs an infallible pope to interpret and adapt it to the Circumstances
......These ideologies are nurtured by feelings and emotions which have still not reached the point of
dissolving because the classes (or the class) which express them, having arrived histOrically at the
point of dissolving, still have a certain basis and cling to the glories of the past in order to shield
themselves from the future (§2.75i/1930).
This interpretation of Hitler as the saviour of "dying classes" who cling to the glories
of the past was consistent with his conception of it as a movement of restoration,
especially as these dying classes included a "big class" (the landowning nobility)
as well as "small classes". The theme of restoration underpinned by fear of the
future was more pronounced when Gramsci returned to the question of charisma at
38 J.Nyomarkay (1967)
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the time of the financial panic in 1931.
At certain moments of 'permanent anarchy' caused by the static equilibrium of the conflicting forces,
one man personifies 'order', ie, the breaking of the deadlock by exceptional methods, and all the
frightened ones, all the 'rabid sheep' of the petty bourgeoisie flock to his side. Nevertheless, he does
have a programme, however vague: indeed, it is vague precisely because it aims merely to restore the
external political casing of a society in crisis (§2.75ii/1931).
Gramsci maintained that in the modern world the collective will was formed on the
permanent basis of the mode of production which standardised the modes of
thinking and acting of the masses. By contrast, the collective will formed "through
the impulse and immediate suggestion of a 'hero'", was inherently unstable and
was "continually forming and disintegrating" (§7.1211930). It was largely a thing of
the past. In modern times it was the form of leadership characteristic of conditions
of exceptional crisis39 but it could not have a permanent, long-term character.
In the modem world, only those historical-political actions which are immediate and imminent,
characterised by the necessity for lightning speed, can be incarnated mythically by a concrete
individual. Such speed can only be made necessary by a great and imminent danger, a great danger
which precisely fans passions and fanaticism suddenly to white heat, and annihilates the critical sense
and corrosive irony which are able to destroy the 'charismatic' character of the condottiere (as
happened in the Boulanger adventure). But an improvised action of such a kind cannot, by its very
nature, have a long-term and organiC character. It will in almost aUcases be appropriate to restoration
and reorganisation, but not to the founding of new States or new national and social structures .....
(§13.01/1932).
The invention of tradition. The power of mass suggestion exercised by the
providential man (§4.69) or mythical hero (§13.01), crucially depended on how the
masses perceived his relation to the nation's "tradition". The failure of the traditional
ideologies made it necessary to reinvent them. The ideology of Hitlerism was (as
historians have often observed)40 more a case of reinventing the old than of
creating anything new. This aspect was brought sharply into focus in the
presidential contest between Hindenburg and Hitler in early 1932. At the time
Gramsci made inquiries into the meaning of the term 'Reich' (§7.95, §8.107) as in
the contradictory title 'President of the Reich' (ie, not 'President of the Republic')
which expressed the idea of continuity with the 'Second' Reich as though the
defeat and revolution of 1918 and, more importantly, the territorial reorganisation of
1919, had not happened. Just as Hindenburg was the last representative of the
39 Jeremy Noakes (1983)
40 Ian Kershaw (1983)
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Second Reich, Hitler presented himself as the first representative of the 'Third
Reich', thus perpetuating the myth of the historical continuity of the 'Reich'. Gramsci
thought that Hitler's use of the traditional "conceptual nomenclature" was
significant, observing that "if the new intellectuals put themselves forward as the
direct continuation of the ideas of the preceding intellectuals, they are not 'new' at
all: ie, they are not linked to the new social group which represents the new
historical situation but are left-overs from the old social group and the old ideas of
their intellectuals" (§8.171). Again this analysiS was consistent with the concept of
Hitlerism as restoration but his concept was not unqualified. He acknowledged that
although the nomenclature formally remained the same, "the content of the
language has changed even if it is difficult to be aware immediately of the preCise
change" (§8.171). The precise meaning of the 'Third Reich' was clearer after it was
established in 1933:
A study of keywords like 'Third Reich' used by movements of the German Right. Historical myths like
these are essentially a concrete and effective way of presenting the 'histOrical mission' of a people.
The point to study is precisely this: why is this form 'concrete and effective', or just more effective than
another? In Germany the uninterrupted continuity (ie, not interrupted by permanent foreign invasions)
between the medieval period of the Holy Roman Empire (the first Reich) and the modem period (from
Frederick the Great to 1914) makes the concept of the 'Third Reich' immediately comprehensible
(§15.48/1933).
Gramsci traced the 'messianic' element in German nationalism back to the
Wilhelmine period but it did not become "concrete and effective" in the eyes of the
masses until after 1919. For the historical continuity of the Reich had, of course,
been interrupted by the Versailles Treaty which not only redrew the territorial
frontiers of the Reich but also imposed an element of foreign invasion and
occupation. This was a potent weapon in the hands of the German monarchists.
After 1919 they invented a similar doctrine to that of the French monarchists who,
as ever, served as Gramsci's 'model'.
The monarchists have constructed the historical-political doctrine (which they seek to popularise)
according to which the Empire and the Republic have up to now meant invasion of French national
territory. Two invasions connected with the policies of Napoleon I (in 1814 and in 1815), one with the
politics of Napoleon III (1870-71) and one with the polities of the Third Republic (1914) provide the
material for agitation .....This way of presenting the question to the popular masses by all the various
nationalist tendencies is far from being inefffective. But is it historically accurate? How many times has
Germany been invaded by the French? (It would be necessary to count the occupation of the Ruhr in
1923 as a French invasion) ... (§9.39/1932).
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The tendency to synthesise French and German experience in terms of a common
element of politics - the anti-republican doctrine of the monarchists - was typical of
Gramsci's dialectical turn of mind. The mission of "all the various nationalist
tendencies" in Germany was to free the Reich from "the regime of national
subjection" (§1.18) imposed by the French at Versailles. Before 1929 not all
nationalists agreed with the right-wing monarchists that this mission could only be
achieved by getting rid of the republic. But after the death of Stresemann in 1929
the various nationalist tendencies fused together in the mission of the providential
man, Hitler. In a brief note on Stresemann in early 1931 Gramsci noted "the change
in psychology of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois nationalists" in Germany since
his death (§5.118) - a change which was registered by the unexpected success of
Hitlerism in the election of the previous September. The formation of a collective
will, Gramsci observed, was usually a long process of development and rarely a
matter of "sudden, explosive syntheses" (§8.195). "Such 'explosions' do occur but
on close examination it can be seen that they are more destructive than
reconstructive; they remove external and mechanical obstacles in the way of an
indigenous, spontaneous development". The collective meaning of Hitler's
"mission" was to rid Germany of "the external and mechanical obstacles" of
Versailles.
The ideology of restorations. In early 1932 Gramsci began thinking about "the
formula of the equivalence of revolution-restoration" as a way of interpreting
national history from the Risorgimento to Fascism (§8.25). With the tenth
anniversary of the March on Rome in 1932 Fascism celebrated its claim to be a
'revolution' even though it had since revealed itself, especially in the Concordat of
1929, to be a 'restoration'. The currency of the formula, the putative link between
history and politics, included a comparative element. For this perspective on the
nature of Fascism could be applied to Germany at this time where the presidential
contest between Hitler-Hindenburg appeared to present the voters with a choice
between revolution and restoration. Gramsci's point was that the choice was more
"apparent" than real since the two terms were not opposites but equivalents. Was
not Hitlerism another movement of restoration disguised in the language of
revolution? Thus we find him 'unmasking' the general pretensions of fascist
movements to be 'revolutions'.
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Do we have to accept as 'revolutionary' all those movements which try to dignify and justify themselves
by calling themselves 'revolutions'? There is an inflation of concepts and revolutionary phraseology
here, as though the hat makes the head or the habit makes the monk. De Sanctis already observed
and ridiculed this attitude in The Jew of Verona. It is also necessary to see whether the phraseology
of 'revolution' is purposely used to create 'the will to believe', this being well-supported by solid
'collateral' arguments (in the shape of tribunals, police etc). The fact that so many Nietzscheans
masquerading as rebels against existing reality and social conventions, etc, have ended up
stomaching them and have thus emptied certain attitudes of any serious content, is perfectly true, but
this is no reason to let one's judgement be guided by charlatans of this sort (§8.21 0/1932).
Gramsci returned to the formula 'revolution-restoration' in the notes on Caesarism
at the turn of 1932-33 as the "catastrophic" phase of the German crisis approached
(§9.133/136, §14.23). These were interwoven with another series on "the popular
(popolaresche ) origins of the 'superman' (§4.04, §4.27, §4.30) in which he
resumed the critical task of deflating the pretensions of these would-be
Nietzscheans. The Caesarist and the superman notes were putatively linked. Their
currency was provided by Hitler's new year message to the Brown Shirts
comparing himself to Mussolini. Hitler evoked the imminent catastrophe facing
Germany in order to emphasise that only a 'superman' could prevent it. Just as Italy
had been saved by Mussolini, "one of those exceptional men in the history of the
world", so providence had now given Germany its own world-historical hero.
Gramsci suggested that the romantic hero-worship on which the credibility of this
vision of history depended was not grounded (at least in the case of Italy's Black
Shirts) in high culture at all, in spite of Nietzsche's predeliction for heroes.
Every time we come upon some admirer of Nietzsche, it is worth trying to find out if his 'superman'
ideas, against conventional morality, etc, etc, are of genuine Nietzschean origin. In other words, are
they the result of a process of thought located in the sphere of 'high culture' or do they have much
more modest origins? Are they connected, for example, to serial literature? (But was Nietzsche
himself entirely uninfluenced by French serial novels? It should be remembered that this literature,
now relegated to the caretakers and servants quarters, was very popular among the intellectuals at
one time, at least until 1870 ,just as the 'thriller' is today) (§14.04/1933).
The romanticism of Germany's Brown Shirts had different roots, though. These
spoke not of individual supermen (Caesar, Napoleon, etc) but of a race of
supermen: Hence:
For the Nietzschean 'superman', apart from the romantic influence of Stendhal (and the cult of
Napoleon I generally), it is necessary to examine the racist tendencies which culminated in Gobineau
and thence in Chamberlain and in Pan-Germanism (Treitschke and the theories of power)
(§14.27/1933).41
41 Steven E.Ascheim (1994)
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The putative link between racism and 'restoration' was established in 1934 when a
new biography of Gobineau provided Gramsci with the occasion to trace the roots
of racism back via Gobineau to the great French historians of the Restoration
before 1848 (see below). The link is interesting in view of attempts by later
historians to trace the origins of a so-called "revolutionary" racism from this period
which is supposed to be a peculiarity of the Germans. At the very least Gramsci's
analysis points to the semantic problem of calling this tendency as
"revolutionary" .
Meanwhile, the "static equilibrium with catastrophic prospects" (on which the
Caesarist thesis depended) was broken by exceptional methods when Hitler let
loose the Brown Shirts on the parties of the German Left. The 'morality' of the
would-be 'Nietzscheans' was amply demonstrated in the cellars of Berlin's Brown
Houses. The sudden and complete liquidation of 'Marxism' was not the 'revolution'
it claimed to be, however, but the start of a modern 'restoration' characterised by a
regime of universal repression. The charismatic man, it will be recalled, appeared
at moments of great and imminent danger, "a great danger which fans passions
and fanaticism suddenly to white heat and annihilates the critical sense and
corrosive irony which are able to destroy the 'charismatic' character of the
condottiere" (§13.01). The imminent danger of a communist revolution was now
past but the 'restoration' dep~nded on keeping the memory of it alive. Gramsci
makes this point in a penetrating comment on the cultural spirit of restorations in
§23.36. This was written in the summer of 1934 at the time of the 'Night of the Long
Knives', the murderous suppression of the alleged "plor by Rohm and the Storm
Troops. It was a redraft of a note written earlier but Gramsci made a few later
additions which bore the imprint of recent German events.
Whatever they choose to call themselves, restorations, especially the restorations which take place in
the present epoch, are universally repressive: 'Father Bresciani', or Bresciani-type literature,
predominates. The psychology which precedes an intellectual phenomenon of this sort is created by
panic, by a cosmic fear of demonic forces which are beyond understanding and so cannot be
controlled except by constructing something universally repressive. The memory of this panic (of its
acute phase) is long-lasting and decisively shapes the will and the feelings: creative freedom and
spontaneity disappear and what remains is the rancour, the spirit of vengeance, the stupid blindness -
all hidden by a mellifluous and jesuitical disguise. Everything is reduced to the practical (in the worst
sense), everything is propaganda, polemic, implicit negation, expressed in a mean, narrow, often vile
and repulsive form as in The Jew of Verona. (§23.36/1934: italics indicate additions to the second
draft).
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The main clue to these "demonic forces" lies in Gramsci's reference to the The Jew
of Verona , the anti-semitic novel about the 1848 revolution in Italy by Father
Bresciani which had originally appeared in serial form in the Jesuit review Civilta
Cattolica. Gramsci had mentioned De Sanctis' critical essay on this novel in early
1932 (§8.210) at the time of his exhange of letters with Tatiana and Piero on the
question of whether there was any anti-semitism in Italy. In the letters Gramsci was
far from convinced of this, but his reference in the notes to The Jew of Verona
indicates that he was more open-minded than the letters would suggest.
Bresciani's characterisation of the 1848 revolution in Italy as a conspiracy of secret
societies under the influence of the 'Jew of Verona' had a striking contemporary
resonance. Gramsci's insight lay in his attempt to "translate" the anti-semitism of the
Nazi movement into Italian cultural terms. The system of universal repression which
he held to be characteristic of modern restorations was now exemplified by the
Nazi repression of Jews and Marxists, who were both regarded as part of the same
"world conspiracy". The bloody repression of the Rohm "plot" added a further
element to the "demonic forces" allegedly at work in Germany. In the official
account of the plot given by Goring and reported in Corriere della Sera, Rohm was
described as "a courageous ex-combatant who had allowed himself to be drawn by
his abnormal tendencies into company which would prove fatal to him". Again,
Hitler's intervention had averted a great and imminent danger since "the SA
command began to hatch plans for a revolt aimed at supplanting the present
regime with a State which would be headed by these sick elements". Thus, the
system of repression became ever more universal as homosexuals were added to
marxists and Jews among the myriad "demonic forces" plotting against the State.
"Dynamic" though Hitler's murderous intervention was, it was perfectly attuned to
the spirit of restoration. His action in murdering his captains was worthy of Cesare
Borgia but the attempt to legitimise it relied entirely on "conventional morality".
The German consciousness of race. The crucial change of meaning
between the second and the third 'Reich' (although "it is difficult to be aware
immediately of the precise change" (1932) ) was the element of race. This was the
real inspiration behind Hitler's "mission" which aimed, albeit "vaguely", to create a
Reich far beyond anything imagined by Gramsci or anyone else in 1933.42
Gramsci first enquired into this element after the electoral breakthrough of Hitlerism
42 Ebehard Jackel (1981).
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in September 1930 which he took - probably wrongly43 - to be a demonstration of
the German consciousness of race. The question was framed in comparative terms
and his answer said more about Italy than Germany.
Does any sort of 'racism' exist in Italy? There have been many attempts but they are all purely literary
and abstract in character. Italy differs from Germany in this respect although there are some
interesting, if extrinsic, similarities between the two countries: 1) the tradition of localism and
consequently the belated achievement of national and state unity. (An extrinsic Similarity since the
origins of Italy's regionalism differ from Germany's. Two main elements contributed to it in Italy: (a) the
remergence of local races after the fall of the Roman Empire (b) the barbarian invasions first, the
foreign conquerors later. International relations had an influence in Germany but not in the form of
direct occupation by foreigners). 2) Medieval universalism was more influential in Italy than in Germany
where, during the Reformation, the Empire and the lay outlook triumphed much earlier than in Italy. 3)
The domination into modern times of the propertied classes of the countryside, but the [social]
relations are very different. The German is more conscious of race than the Italian .. (§6.35/1930-31).
In fact, this last affirmation begged a question which historians have since found
hard to answer.44 The suggestion that the German consciousness of race could be
explained in historicist terms, ie, in terms of the relative continuity of German history
uninterrupted by foreign conquest and occupation, was not followed up, unless it
was in Gramsci's observation on the success of the myth of the 'Third Reich' as an
expression of the "historical mission" of the German people. Nor was the promising
idea that the alleged racial consciousness of the Germans could be explained by
the domination of the aristocracy into modern times, even though this idea
converged with the first notes on the 'traditional intellectuals' written at this time
(§4.49). The 'missing link' in his chain of thought can perhaps be found in his
observations on utopias written at the time of the Hitler-Hindenburg contest in early
1932. Gramsci had previously discussed the continuity and change in the
language used by the 'old' and the 'new' intellectuals (§8.171), with reference to
the term 'Reich'.
The importance of utopias and of confused and rationalistic ideologies in the initial phase of the
historical processes whereby collective wills are formed. Utopias, or abstract rationalism, are no less
important than the old conceptions of the world elaborated through the accumUlation of successive
historical experiences. What matters is the critique of this ideological complex by the first
representatives of the new historical phase. This critique involves a process of differentiation and
change in the relative weight which the elements of the old ideologies possessed: what was once
secondary and subordinate, or even incidental, is now taken to be primary, becoming the nucleus of
the new ideological and doctrinal complex. The old collective will dissolves into its contradictory
elements since the subordinate elements among them are developing socially etc (§S.171/1932)
43 Sarah Gordon (1984)
44lan Kershaw (1983)
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Was the 'utopia' Gramsci had in mind in this note Hitler's 'Third Reich'? Was the
secondary element of the old ideology, which had now become "the nucleus of the
new ideological and doctrinal complex", the element of race and, more particularly,
of anti-semitism? Was it due to the subordinate elements of the old collective will
"who are developing socially", that anti-semitism had now become the nucleus of
the new ideology? These general observations on utopias 'adhere' closely to
German reality in 1932 dominated increasingly by the ascent of Hitlerism.
Moreover, this interpretation is corroborated 'externally' by the fact that Gramsci
had only just concluded (March-April 1932) the long correspondence with Tatiana
and Piero precisely on the Jewish question. Between the notes and the letters,
however, there is an interesting discrepancy. The utopia of the notes is an abstract,
'rationalistic' construct whereas the 'Third Reich' was an essentially 'romantic'
myth. In the letters, however, Gramsci dialectically compared the biblical language
about the 'chosen people' and the 'mission' of the Jews to the sort of language
used by the Kaiser before the war. This 'messianic' element in German nationalism
was what Gramsci meant in the letters by "the germ of racist romanticism". This
element must be well and truly sterilised, he said, before the question of race could
be discussed rationally. Gramsci was in two minds about this element, not knowing
whether to regard as absurd or abhorrent. However, "the germ of racist
romanticism" was the nearest glimpse he had of the potential of Hitler's utopia.
A further strand in Gramsci's thinking linked racism to 'restoration'. For the
origins of racist ideas Gramsci went back to "the controversy of the two races"
among the great French historians of the Restoration (Mignet, Thierry, Guizot). This
seems an obscure place to find the origin of modern racism45 but Gramsci was
approaching the question from a particular contemporary angle, ie, the
interference between class struggle and racial struggle. In a brief note on "the
history of the subaltern classes" written at the time of the Prussian plebiscite in
1931, Gramsci noted that "the element of racial struggle grafted on to the class
struggle in France by Thierry has had some importance. How important was it in
France in setting the nationalist tone of the movements of the subaltern classes?"
(§7.S1). As always Gramsci started from an element of French politics but the link
between past and present was provided by the current political experience of
Germany. In fact "the element of racial struggle grafted on to the class struggle"
45 See. however. Poliakov (1974). chapter 2.
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was a timely one to investigate at a time when the communists had joined forces
with the nationalists in Germany in the campaign for the Prussian plebiscite (the
"red referendum"). Gramsci did not pursue this question further until 1934 when the
development of the German situation itself had removed any confusion between
the two ideologies of 'struggle'.
It is worth noting that this discussion (ie, the "two races") gave rise (at least partially) to two tendencies:
that of the philosophy of praxis which began to study the two strata of the French population not from
the standpoint of their different national origins but for their economic and social functions: 2} that of
racism and the superiority of the Germanic race which, from being a polemical element used by the
French aristocracy to justify a more radical Restoration, an integral return to the conditions of the pre-
revolutionary regime, became through Gobineau and Chamberlain an element of German culture
(imported from France) which has had new and unanticipated developments Proof that this
question is not merely abstract and bookish but can become a militant and effectual political ideology
is demonstrated by the German events· (§17.43/1934).
Thus, Gramsci clearly associated racism with the tendency to restoration not
revolution, although he admitted that in Germany it "has had new and
unanticipated developments".
The early legislation of the racial State, notably the compulsory sterilisation law46
which provoked fierce criticism in Italy when it came into force at the start
of 1934, persuaded Gramsci to look elseware for "origins". He now associated
racism with the rise of scientific positivism at the end of the nineteenth century. The
revolt against positivism led by Croce47 had failed to stop the irresistable rise of
'Lorianism' in Italy, the term used by Gramsci to describe a contagion of pseudo-
scientific habits of thought whose cumulative effect is the degradation of a country's
intellectual culture. At the same time, the positivist revision of marxism played a key
role in the glittering academic prizes awarded to the Lorias of this world "with the
support of interested forces", but the national culture paid a heavy price for this
blunting of the marxist 'critique'. This was a general phenomenon, not confined to
Italy for
it should be noted that every period has its Lorianism in a more or less rounded and perfected state,
just as every country has: Hitlerism has shown that in Germany under the rule of an apparently serious
intellectual group, a monstrous Lorianism was hatching out which has broken the official mould and
has been propagated as a new 'official' conception and scientific method .
Only now (1935), after the brutality and unprecedented ignominy manifested by German 'culture'
dominated by Hitlerism, have a few intellectuals begun to notice just how fragile modern civilisation
was in all its contradictory, but necessarily contradictory, expressions (§28.01/1935).
46 Jeremy Noakes (1984), Robert N.Proctor (1988).
47 H.Stuart Hughes (1967)
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Gramsci's admission that the success of racism in Germany was an "unanticipated
developmenf' is confirmed by the obvious sense of shock in this note at the
"monstrous" character of Hitlerism as it implemented policies of eugenic
sterilisation of the disabled and racial exclusion of the Jews. This was his last word
on Hitlerism. It is uncharacteristically apocalyptic in vision and tone as he looks
back on the history of civilisation since the first millennium which, as he saw it, had
culminated in Marx's great synthesis. Gramsci suggests that the poliCies of
Hitlerism were prepared intellectually by the revision of Marxism at the end of the
nineteenth century which had removed the 'critical barriers' to the rise of scientific
positivism. The complete repression of marxism by Hitler had eradicated from
German culture the dialectical spirit of 'contradiction', but for Gramsci this was the
spirit of 'civilisation' itself.
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Appendix 1
The Dates of Panlcular Notes
Chapter 1. 1929-30
§2.75(i) and (ii). R. Michels etc
[Critique of Michels' concept of 'charismatic parties']
This long note was written in two instalments at different times. (i) The first part was
written according to Professor Gerratana's parameters, in the second half of 1930.
The following §2.76 cites the issue of Critica Fascista for 1 August. This indicates
that §2.75 was more likely to have been written in August than in September 1930,
ie, before rather than after the breakthrough of the 'charismatic party' in the
German elections on 14 September, the results of which were not known to
Gramsci before he received the issue of the Rassegna settimanale of 23
September.
(ii). The second part, written in different ink and handwriting, starts from the
paragraph: "The charismatic leader could belong to any kind of party, whether
authoritarian or anti-authoritarian"etc. This was written a year later in the second
half of 1931, ie, after the Prussian plebiscitary campaign ending on 9 August. Proof
of the date is as follows: in the last paragraph Gramsci refers in parenthesis to a
note that he had previously written: "This very equivocal motive in Michels recurs (I
think I have made a note elsewhere of his position at the outbreak of the war)". This
must be a reference to §7.64 which discusses the Italian translation of Michels'
book published in 1914, L'imperialismo italiano. This is one of a block of notes,
§7.49-§7.108, which according to the sources used was started in August and
finished in December 1931.
Chapter 2. 1930·31 (Past and Present)
§3.33.Some Causes of Error
My contention is that this note was written shortly after the visit of Gramsci's brother
Gennaro on 16 June 1930 to inform him of the change in the tactical policy of the
Comintern and the PCI. According to Gennaro's testimony, Gramsci told him that
the change of policy was a mistake. His general reflections on this mistake are set
out in §3.33. Moreover, Gramsci's disagreement with the Comintern's new line put
him in an impossible position vis-a-vis the "invisible tribunal" in Moscow: this
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explains the significance of the preceding §3.32 in which Gramsci reflects on
different modes of assassination, including the method of "making life impossible".
This tends to confirm Gennaro's testimony that he covered up for his brother and
concealed his disagreement from the party leadership which might otherwise have
been forced to expel him.
External proof of the date is that the preceding notes §3.21-§3.27 cite issues of
Nuova Antologia for 1927 which were included in the list of material sent to
Tatiana on 15 June 1930, the day before Gennaro's visit .. Eugenio D'Ors' book on
Goya cited in the preceding §3.32 was included in the list of material sent to Carlo
on 2 October 1930. This indicates that §3.33 was written after 15 June but not later
than 2 October 1930.
§7.10. Structure and Superstructure
[Critique of Luxemburg]
My interpretation of the "double meaning" of this note depends on its temporal and
contextual connection with the "political conversations" held in November 1930
when Gramsci's disagreement with the new party line became obvious to his
comrades in prison. Gramsci had just broken off the conversations when Bruno
Tosin arrived at Turi "at the start of December". This must have been when GramSCi
wrote §7.1O. Proof of the date is as follows. At the start of December Gramsci heard
that his petition to Mussolini sent in October to be allowed to read a list of books
withheld by the prison censorship had been successful and the forbidden books
were immediately handed over. The list included the novel by the cossack general
Krasnov, From the Imperial Eagle to the Red Flag, cited by Gramsci in §7.1 O.
Assuming that Gramsci read the novel straight away, which is quite likely, this
places §7.10 in December 1930.
§7.16. War of Position and War of Manoeuvre or Frontal Attack
[Critique of Trotsky]
Gramsci also asked permission in the petition to read Trotsky's Autobiography
recently published in Italian by Mondadori, but Tatiana had to order this from the
bookshop and Gramsci did not receive it until29 December. Gramsci cites
Trotsky's book in §7. 16 which, assuming he read it straight away, was probably
written sometime in January 1931. It is possible that he wrote this note a little later
I
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after reading Stalin's latest speech published in the issue of Labour Monthly for
February 1931. However, this conjecture depends on internal inference and
assumes that the issue of Labour Monthly containing Stalin's speech (a work of
"political agitation") was not intercepted by the prison censor.
§2.75ii. See above.
§4.69. On the Parties
This important note is extremely difficult to pin down. Professor Gerratana's
parameters are very broad. It is one of a block of notes, §4.49-§4.77, started in
November 1930 and completed sometime in the second half of 1931. To add to the
difficulty, the preceding §4.68 cites E.Scarfoglio's book IIlibro di don Chisciotte
which was included in the list of material sent to Tatiana on 15 June 1930 - a date
completely outside these parameters I This suggests that the notes in this block
were not written in sequence but were entered randomly, at different times.
In the second draft, it is integrated with another note, §7.77, written in December
1931. My conjecture is that the two notes are "twins" written at the same time in
different notebooks and later brought together and redrafted as § 13.23.
Observations on the Structure of Political Parties in periods of Organic Crisis. This
is supported by the internal evidence of §4.69 which closely "approximates" to what
happened to the parties in the British general election on 27 October 1931.
Chapter 4. 1933
§14.03. Machiavelli. Centre
[Hitler and the symbiosis of the right-wing parties]
The date of this note is problematical. Professor Gerratana establishes that it was
one of three notes, §14.01-03, squeezed into the front of the notebook when most
of it had been filled. The handwriting differs markedly from that of the succeeding
notes but is very similar to that of the notes written towards the end of the notebook.
The thematic continuity between §14.02 and §14.65 on 'rationalism' in architecture
compared to the other arts tends to support this.
However, the notes at the end of the notebook were not written sequentially and
some of them may have been written at a much later date. According to Professor
Gerratana's conjecture. §14.74 may have been based on a source as late as
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March 1935! Whatever the date of §14.74, however, It is unlikely that §14.03
was written as late as this: the 'symbiotic' relation between the parties of Hitler and
Hugenburg-Papen ended when Hugenburg was dismissed and his party was
dissolved in June 1933. My conjecture is that §14.03 was written in the spring
(March-May) of 1933. The difference in handwriting could have been due to the
crisis of Gramsci's health on 7 March which affected his hands and (according to
the doctor who visited him on 21 March) meant that "he was unable to write as he
used to". A comparison of the handwriting of §14.03 and the letters he wrote in
April and May 1933 (for which we have precise dates) might be helpful in
establishing this.
§14.68. Machiavelli
[The question of Stalin's 'nationalism1
My interpretation of this note depends on its temporal and contextual connection
with the destruction of the German Communist Party in the Nazi reign of terror in
late February-early March 1933 (to which Gramsci refers in §15.07. Machiavelli.
Elections, where he compares the relative advantages of 'voting' and 'shooting').
This is why Gramsci chose this moment to analyse the question of Stalin's
internationalism. In the following §14.70. Machiavelli. When it can be said that a
party is established and cannot be destroyed by normal means, he examines what
a party must do to prepare for defeat rather than victory. Again, it was the defeat of
the German Communist party which put this question on Gramsci's agenda. It is
therefore probable that §14.68 was written sometime between March-May 1933.
§13.37. Notes on French National Ufe
[The defeat of Hugenburg]
The notes in Notebook 13 were written in sequence.Since in the preceding §13.25
Gramsci cites the issue of the quarterly La Cultura for October-December 1933,
§13.37 could not have been written before October. This is interesting because
Gramsci writes: "The defeat of Maurras (like that of Hugenburg in Germany) is
certain". If Gramsci meant by this that Hugenburg's defeat was a forecast rather
than an accomplished fact, it would suggest that he temporarily lost the plot of
German politics in the second half of 1933 since Hugenburg's defeat was in June
when he left the coalition and the Nationalists were forcibly dissolved.
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Appendix 2
Description of the Periodicals
Articles and reports on the German crisis In perlodlcsls and newspapers
received by Gramsci on subscrlptlon,1929-34
Of the 20-25 periodicals to which Gramsci subscribed, the following (together
withCorriere della Sera) were the most important as far as political news and
analysis were concerned. Abbreviations used are indicated.
Gerarchla (GER)
Crltlca Fasclsta (CF)
Educazlone Fasclsta (EF)
Polltlca (POL)
Nuova Antologla (NA)
ClvUta Cattollca (CC)
Rassegna settlmanale della stampa estera (RSE)
Manchester Guardian Weekly (MGW)
Labour Monthly (lM)
Corrlere della Sera (CdS)
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Gerarchia
A Political Review. Director Benito Mussolini
The monthly Gerarchia was the leading political review of Fascism. Although it
appeared under Mussolini's name it was edited by his Jewish mistress, Margherita
Sarfatti, who later fell foul of the racial laws in 1938. It reflected the standpoint of
the State rather than the party and its editorial views could be taken as official. Its
general orientation was anti-parliamentary and anti-French. It played a significant
part in the increasingly pro-German orientation of Fascist Italy, especially once
German 'fascism' developed into a mass movement after 1929. Until then it
regarded the Nationalists not the Nazis as the German 'fascists' (compare the
articles by Spaini and von Schwochau in the August and December issues of
1929). It was not blessed with capable writers on German affairs. Werner von
Schulenberg was a conservative nationalist who, judging by his famous Junker
name, was well connected to the old ruling class of which he claimed special
knowledge in his very superficial articles. Giuseppe Renzetti was closer to Nazi
circles and was a key intermediary in promoting closer relations with the Nazis:
except on the issue of race, his critical distance from them was virtually nil.
1929 August
November
December
1930 May
June
July
September
November
1931 April
June
June
June
June
August
August
September
October
December
1932 January
March
Alberto Spaini: IIlabirinto tedesco
[Speculum.Cronache del Mese. Virginia Gayda: Variazioni su una tema
francese. II Parlamento contro 10Stato]
Geert von Schwochau: La Germania e Hitler
Werner von der Schulenberg: Un notevole libro tedesco
Ernst Buhla: II Cancelliere Bruning
Alessandro Lessona: I nuovi interrogatividella politica tedesca
Giuseppe Bevione: " trionfo di Hitler
Werner von der Schulenberg: Esiste un'influenza dell'idea fascista sui
risultato delle ultime elezioni politiche tedesche?
Giuseppe Bevione: II Progetto di Unione Doganale fra Germania e Austria
Giuseppe Renzetti: Hitleriani Dissidenti
Gino Arias: II significato storico dellacrisi economica
Minimus: La Germania a Ginevra e a Chequers.L'accordo Austro-GermaniCO
Virginio Gayda: L'Unione Austro-Germanico a Ginevra
IICancelli ere della ricostruzione tedesca
Gino Arias: Problemi economici mondiali
[Giacomo Redentini: La Crisi inglese]
[Camillo Pellizzi: Consideraziani sulla Crisi Britannica]
Paolo Thaon di Revel: La crisi economica presente
Werner von der Schulenberg: Bruning, Hitler, Hugenberg
Giuseppe Renzetti: Hindenberg e Hitler
April
June
August
August
August
November
December
1933 March
April
April
April
April
May
August
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Giuseppe Renzetti: Aspetti Politici Attuali della Germania
Giuseppe Renzetti: Le Fasi della rivoluzione tedesca
Giuseppe Renzetti: Aspetti della situazione politica tedesca
A.G: Le Associazioni giovanili germaniche
Speculum.Cronache del Mese [German election results of 31 July]
Werner von der Schulenberg: Le Elezioni in Germania
Werner von der Schulenberg: E Schleicher?
Werner von der Schulenberg: Socialismo e Comunismo in Germania
Vittorio Profumi: II Terzo Regno
Giuseppe Renzetti:La rivoluzione nazionale in Germania
Werner von der Schulenberg: La rivoluzione tedesca
[Sergio Panunzio: La Fine del Parlamentarismo e I'Accentramento delle
Responsibilital
Giuseppe Renzetti: Problemi germanici
Raffaele lacuzio: II Concordato fra la Santa Sede ad iI Reich Germani
Crltlca Fasclsta
A Fortnighly Review of Fascism.
The fortnighly Critica Fascista was directed by Giuseppe Bottai, the Minister of
Corporations and chief ideologist of corporativism. It was an organ of 'militant'
Fascism reflecting the standpoint of the party rather than the State and projecting
Fascism's image as a 'youthful' movement. It was keen to promote the 'battle of
ideas' even though all its serious opponents had been silenced by other means. It
seldom reported political facts, preferring to be an organ of discussion of ideas and
opinions. It took the ideology of National Socialism completely seriously. A series
of articles in 1932 by its main commentator on German affairs, Mario da Silva,
sought to explain the elements of National Socialist 'doctrine' to Italian fascists. The
articles were typical of Critica Fascista infilling the intellectual atmosphere with
what Gramsci called "asphyxiating gasesn•
1930 1 October
1931 1 February
15 February
1 March
1 April
1May
15May
15July
15 September
15 November
Umberto Nani: LaGermaniaad unasvolta?
Mario da Silva: Amarezze della economia tedesca
Giovanni O'Alo:La Costituzione di Weimar e I'unita della stato germanico
Mario da Silva: Nomenclatura e realta nella Germania attuale
Mario da Silva: La Germania e Ie riparazioni
Mario da Silva: L'unione doganale austro-tedesca
Umberto Nani: La Piccola Intesa e I'accordo doganale austro-tadecso
Luciano Ingianni: La vacanza nei pagamenti e iImaturare di una situazione
Rodolfo Foa: L'origine della crisi britannica
Rodolfo Foa: Dopo le elezioni generali inglesi
1932 1 April
15May
1 June
15 June
1 August
15 August
15 September
1933 1May
1 July
1 July
1 September
15 September
lOctober
1 December
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Mario da Silva: Le elezioni presidenziali tedesche
Mario da Silva: Hitler e iI Nazionalsocialismo
Mario da Silva:Basi dello Stato nazional-socialista
Mario da Silva: Nazional-socialismo e democrazia
Mario da Silva: Nazionalsocialismo e economia liberale
Mario da Silva: Sipario su Weimar
Valentino Piccoli: Problemi della nuova Germania
Alberto Luchini: Posizioni e interpretazioni dell'intelligenza nazionalsocialista
Mario da Silva: Lettera dalla Germania. Lunghezza d'onda: Roma
Mario da Silva: Lettera dalla Germania: IIRogo di Piazza dell'Opera
Gustav Glaesser: La nuova generazione rivoluzionaria tedesca
Francesco Monotti: Goebbels 0 della Hingabe
Gustav Glaesser: Attualita di Sorel [review of Michael Freund: 'Georges Sorel.
Der revolutionare Konservativismus', Frankfurt am Main, 1932]
Lettera della Germania. Dopo Norimberga
Novus: IICristianesimo nella rivoluzione tedesca
Educazlone Faaclata
The monthly, later bimonthly Educazione Fascista was the organ of the
philosopher Giovanni Gentile, the first Fascist Minister of Education (1922-24) and
President of the Institute of Fascist Culture. The review promoted his idea of
Fascism as an 'integral' culture which would supersede the influence of
Catholicism in the civil and moral life of Italians. Gentile was marginalised after the
Concordat of 1929 but he continued to pursue his idea through the Institute of
Fascist Culture. Gramsci began subscribing to the review at the start of 1932 to
keep track of the currents of ideas among the different groups of fascist
intellectuals. It included a regular rubric [L'ltalia e II Mondo, later Politica Estera] on
foreign affairs carefully written by Umberto Nani which reported the main
developments belatedly but accurately and dispassionately.
Rubrics: 1M= L'ltalia e IIMondo. PE = Political Estera
1932 January-
February
March
May
July
September-
October
December
1M.Hitler contro Bruning
1M.Le elezioni presidenziali in Gerrnania
1M.Le elezioni Germaniche [Results of the presidential ballots of13 March
and 10 April and Prussian and state elections of 24 April]
1M.Crisi tedesca [Von Papen's nomination and programme]
1M.La vittoria di Hitler [Results of Reichstag elections of 31 July.
Hindenburg-Hitler meeting (13 Aug). Hitler rejects offer of vice-
chancellorship]
1M.La crisi tedesca [Dissolution of Reichstag,12 Sept]
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1933 February
March
June
July
August-Sept
PE. La crisi tedesca [Schleicher's nomination (3 Dec) and programme]
Umberto Nani: Hitler e La Cattiva Coscienza della Francia
PE. II discorso Hitler [Hitler's speech on disarmament]
PE. La siglatura del Patto a Quattro
PE. La firma del Patto a Quattro. IIConcordato fra il Reich e la Santa Sede
Politic.
Quarterly Review founded by F.Coppola and A.Rocco
Edited by F.Coppola
The quarterly Politica was started in 1919 by two Southern intellectuals Francesco
Coppola and Alfredo Rocco who were among the founders of the Italian Nationalist
Association before the war. The merger of the Nationalists with the Fascists in 1923
was crucial in 'delivering' the conservative elites in the bureaucracy, the army, and
the academic world to whom Politica was mainly addressed. The launch of the
review coincided (as Croce noted) with the Italian translation of Treitschke's Politics
by Laterza in 1919. This signalled the general orientation of its nationalism, which
asserted the 'German' principle of authority and hierarchy in the State and the
reality of power politics in international relations. The review specialised in foreign
affairs, including events in the Soviet Union after 1929 in which it took a close
interest. It was a leading mouthpiece of post-war Italian 'revisionism', its cause
being boosted by the rise of a militant German revisionism after 1929. Its main
contributor on German affairs Giuseppe Piazza (who also wrote for Nuova
Antologia ) favoured Nazi leadership of the national "revolution" in Germany but the
editor Coppola was more cautious and felt that a national "restoration" (as he
preferred to call it) led by the traditional elite around Hindenburg would be in safer
hands (see Coppola's postscript to Piazza's article in the issue of June-August
1932, published the following November - ie, just before the downfall of
Hindenburg's chancellor Papenl).
Gramsci's relation to Politica is something of a mystery. Although he listed it
among the reviews he was receiving in the petition to Mussolini in October 1931,
Professor Gerratana could find only one reference in the prison notes to issues of
Politica after 1929 (in §6.85 where he refers to an article by Coppola in the issue
for February-April 1929: aClv p.2720). A peculiar feature of the review was that
every issue was published several months in arrears of its appointed date: whether
this was deliberate policy or editorial indiscipline is hard to say, but the timing
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meant that its articles on German politics had been overtaken by events by the time
they appeared. Its detailed narrative of German politics (carefully compiled by Grilli
under the rubric 'Rassegna Politica') was many months behind the events it
described. It did not adhere very closely to the movement of political events,
therefore, but provided Gramsci with 'background' information and a 'retrospective'
view.
RP = Rassegna Politica, written by Giocondo Grilli
1930 October-December [published March 1931]
RP. La Grave Crisi Germanica, le Leggi Finanziarie, e Le Elezioni Generali
La Renania dopa 10Sgombero Militare
1931 February-April [published June 1931]
RP. Polemiche Revisioniste, Secessione Parlamentare di Destra, Intransigenze Cattoliche e
Sospensione delle Liberta Costituzionali in Germania
June-August [published September 19311
RP. Protocollo austro-tedesco del19 marza 1931 (Zollunion)
October-December [no publication date given]
Giuseppe Piazza: La crisi tedesca ad iI fronte di Weimar
RP. I Vasti Sviluppi della Crisi Mondiali. Including the following headings:
II convegno anglo-tedesco ai Chequers (5-7 June 1931)
La profonda crisi del Reich
La soppraggiunta nuova crisi finanziaria della Germania
La 'Emergency Conference' di Londra (20-23 July 1931)
I Ministri inglesi a Bertino
I Ministri tedeschi aRoma
1932 February-April [published June 1932]
Giuseppe Piazza: La lotta politica in Germania .Le elezioni presidenziali.
RP. II parere consultative della Corte Permanente di Giustizia Internazionale sui Progetto di
Unione doganale austro-germanico.
LaCrisi Economica e Ie Vaste Ripercussioni Politiche Mondiali. Including the following:
Referendum ad unitarismi prussiani
Ministri francesi a Bertino (27-28 September1931)
II Secondo Ministero Bruning (9 October 1931)
lI'fronte unico delle opposizioni nazionali' costituito a Bad Harzburg (11 October 1931)
L'insolvenza della Germania
L'accordo sui crediti tedeschi per iI 1932
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June-August [published November 1932}
J.Evola: II nuovo mito germanico del'Terzo Reich'
Giuseppe Piazza and Francesco Coppola: La latta politica in Germania. Hindenburg, von
Papen e Hitler
RP. Le grandi consultazioni elettorali Europee della primavera 1932. Includes the following:
Le elezioni presidenziali tedeche (13 March-10 April 1932), il rinnovo della Dieta Prussiana
(24 April 1932), e iI duello fra nazionalsocialisti e socialdemocrazia in Prussia
II dissidio Hindenburg-von Groner: la caduta del Ministero Bruning
II conflitto fra il Reich e gli Stati confederati meridionali
Le elezioni generali politiche tedesche (31 July 1932)
October-December [Published February 1933]
No Articles on Germany
No Rassegna Politica
1933 February-April [Published August 1933)
Giuseppe Piazza: Elementi del nuovo ordine tedesco
RP. La Rivoluzione Nazionale Tedesca: la lotta politica dalla liquidazione della 'Coalizione di
Weimar' all' awento delle Destre Nazionali. Includes the following:
la lotta di Hitler contra I'Herrenklub'
L'entrata dello 'Stahlhelm' nella latta politica
I progetti di von Papan per una rifonna costituzionale del Reich
la fase acuta del duello Hitler-von Papan: Ie dimissioni del Gabinetto von Papen (17 Nov '32)
la crisi insolubile. II Gabinetto von Schleicher (3 December 1932)
L'episodio Strasser: Ie dimissioni del Gabinetto von Schleicher (28 January 1933)
la ricostituzione del 'fronte di Bad Harzburg'. L'awento delle Destre aI potere: iIGabinetto
Hitler di concentrazione nazionale (30 January 1933)
IIdualismo tra la Prussia ed iI Reich: iIGoverno commissariale in Prussia dalluglio 1932 al5
marzo 1933
la politica federale dei Governi dei landers meridionali (April 1932- 4 March 1933)
Le elezioni del 5 marzo 1933 per I'ottavo Reichstag
la nuova Germania
la 'Magna Charta' della Rivoluzione nazionale (23 March 1933)
Le decisioni della Conferenza episcopale di Fulda (28 March 1933)
Nuova Antologla
A Review of Literature,Science and Art
The fortnighly Nuova Antologia is the review most frequenty cited in Gramsci's
notes. It was directed by Tommaso Tittoni, President of the Senate (1921-29) and
then President of the newly created Academy of Italy. Tittoni was a career politician
of conservative-clerical persuasion. His special interest was in foreign affairs
having served as foreign minister under Giolitti and latterly influencing the early
stages of Mussolini's foreign policy. The review regularly featured researched
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articles on the history, politics, and culture of other countries especially Britain and
Germany, like Tommasini's article on Stresemann which Gramsci commended. It
featured a regular 'Political Review' (later 'Political Chronicle') which was a useful
source of political facts: for example, the results of the German elections of
September 1930 were reported under this rubric. Its leading analyst on German
affairs was Giuseppe Piazza, who also contributed to the review Politica : his
periodic articles on the German crisis were probably the most interesting by a
fascist commentator.
Rubrics: RP = Rassegna Politica ; CP =Cronaca Politica
1929 16 July
16 October
16 November
1930 1January
16January
16May
1 June
1 September
10ctober
16 October
16 October
1 November
16 November
1931 1 March
1 April
1May
1 June
16 June
16 August
1 September
1 September
16 September
16 October
1 November
16 November
16 November
[Augur: La politica della Gran Bretagna]
[Luigi Villari: iI governo laburista britannico]
Francesco Tommasini: II pensiero e I'operadi Gustavo Stresemann
J.Evola: Aspetti del movimento culturale della Germania contemporanea
[Augur: Britannia, quo vadis?]
Alberto Giaccardi: II pangermanesimo coloniale fra Ie cause del conflitto
mondiale
[Lorenzo Gigli: Gli amici italiani di Gobineau]
[Luigi Villari: L'agricoltura in Inghilterra]
Augur: L'anima della Germania
RP .Results of German elections,14 September.
Manfredi Gravina: Le memorie del Principe di Bulow
Saverio Nasalli Rocca: La politica tedesca dell'impotenza nella guerra
mondiale (I)
Saverio Nasalli Rocca: La politica tedesca dell'impotenza nella guerra
mondiale (II)
[Luigi Villari: La posizionedella monarchia nella Gran Betagna]
Manfredi Gravina: II terzo volume delle Memorie di Bulow
L.Chiovenda: Vita studentesca in Germania
[Luigi Villari: Giornalismo britannico di ieri e di oggi]
CP. After Stresemann.Austro-German Customs Union
CP. Talks at Chequers on Austro-German Customs Union
CP. Bruning's visit to Rome.[ The English financial situation]
Principessa Maria Radziwill: Giuglielmo II e II Principe di Bulow (da un carteggio
inedito)
CP .After Bruning's visit to Rome. Result of Prussian plebiscite,
9 August
[CP .The English criSis]
CP . The German crisis and the English elections
[Giuseppe Bevione: La dramma di sterlina]
[Luigi Villari: La crisis politica inglese (Result of British general election, 27
October]
CP: German debts
1 December
1 December
1932 1 January
16January
1 February
16 February
1 March
1April
16 April
1May
1 May
1 June
16 June
1 July
16 July
16 July
16 August
1 September
16 September
10ctober
16 October
1 November
16 November
1 December
1 December
16 December
1933 1January
16January
16 February
16March
1 April
1 May
16May
1 June
16 June
1July
1August
1 September
16 September
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Giuseppe Piazza: La crisi tedesca e il fronte di Bad Harzburg
CP. The fortunes of the Young Plan
Note economiche. German reparations
CP. The Geneva conference on reparations
Note economiche. Reparation payments. Bruning's speech
CP. The reparations question
CP. Hitler's candidature in the presidential elections
CP. Hitler and Hindenburg: results of the first round, 13 March
CP. Re-election of Hindenburg, 10 April
Giuseppe Piazza: Le elezioni in Germania
CP. The Diet elections in Germany
CP. The German [financial] crisis
CP. New governments in France and Germany
CP. Lausanne conference on disarmament, reparations etc
[Pietro Chimienti: La Camera dei 'Lords' e il 'Parliament Aet']
CP. Lausanne conference on reparations
Bruno Biagi: Aspetti e Problemi della Disoccupazione (British and German
unemployment figures)
CP. Results of German elections, 31 July
CP. The German situation after the latest elections
CP. Germany and armaments
CP. The struggle for the government in Germany
Giuseppe Piazza: La Germania tra una rivoluzione e una restaurazione
CP. German parity and disarmament
CP. The elections in Germany, 6 November
CP. The crisis of government in Germany (the problem of Article
48 of the constitution)
[Giuseppe Bevione: La prova di Inghilterraj
CP. Schleicher nominated Chancellor
CP. The question German parity
CP. German parity and security
CP. Hitler in power
CP. The New Germany (The German elections, 5 March)
Giuseppe Piazza: Primo tempo nazionalsocialista in Germania
CP. Visit of German and Austrian ministers to Rome
CP. The Mussolini Pact with Britain, France, Germany
CP. Hitler's speech. 17 May. The Mussolini Pact
CP. The Mussolini Pact
CP. The Mussolini Pact
CP. The Mussolini Pact
CP. The Austro-German question. Mussolini's intervention
Giuseppe Piazza: Nazionalsocialismo - Razzismo
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Civilta cattolica
Review of the Jesuits directed by Padre Enrico Rosa
The fortnighly Civilta Cattolica was the intellectual review of the Jesuits. Its views
on religious, political, and social questions were close to those of Pius XI, the 'Pope
of the Jesuits', and Padre Rosa's reputation as a great intellectual authority
probably owed as much to this than anything else. Its independence of the Fascist
regime was guaranteed by the Concordat but it was only asserted when absolutely
necessary: during the controversy over Catholic Action in 1931, for example, it
carried the text of Pius Xl's encyclical condemning the Fascist attacks on Catholic
Action. Ordinarily, the review played a key role in signalling the various
adjustments of position which the Church found it necessary to make in its relations
with the State in this or that country, depending on the particular national
circumstances and terrain. For example, the increasingly tense position of the
Catholic Church in Nazi Germany after the Reich Concordat of 1933 was well
documented, including a number of interesting articles responding to the early
racial legislation of the Nazi regime. Every issue featured a rubric 'Oose Straniere'
CForeign Affairs') which was a reliable and accurate source of international pOlitical
news, the bare facts of which were chronicled with a studied, enervating neutrality.
Rubric: CS = Cose Straniere
1929 6July
20 July
5 October
19 October
2 November
16 November
7 December
21 December
1930 4January
1 February
5 April
19 April
3May
17May
5July
CS.[ Inghiiterra.Ministero laburista]
CS. Germania. II Piano Young
CS. Germania. Concordato della Prussia con la Santa Sede
CS. Germania. Morte del ministero Stresemann
CS. Germania Lotta fra Govemo e tedesco-nazionali (campaign for the anti-
Young Plan plebiscite)
CS. Germania. Morte del Principe di Bulow
CS. Germania. Esito del referendum per iI plebiscito. II nuovo Ministero degli
esteri
CS. Germania. Le peripezie del Piano Young. Giubilo per 10sgombero della
seconda zona renana
CS. Germania. Omaggi dell' Azione Cattolica di Bertino aI Nunzio Pacelli
CS. Germania. Disoccupazione e conflitti sanguinosi
CS. Germania. Dimissioni del Presiclente della Reichsbank. Merte
di von Tirpitz
CS. Germania.Caduta del Muller e Ministero Bruning
CS. Germania.Approvazione dei prowedimenti fiscali e agrari
CS. Germania. II Nuovo Nunzio Apostolico. Esposizione finanziaria aI
Reichstag
CS. Germania. Morte di Adolfo von Harnack
19July
2 August
16 August
6 September
4 October
1 November
20 December
1931 3January
7March
18 April
2May
16May
4July
18 July
1932 1 January
19March
2April
16 April
7May
4June
2July
6 August
20 August
3 September
10ctober
19 November
17 December
1933 7January
18 February
18March
1 April
6May
3June
15 July
5 August
19 August
16 September
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cs. Germania. Lo sgombero della Renania
CS. Germania. Scioglimento del Reichstag
CS. Germania. Feste renane per la liberazione. Leggi finanziarie
CS. Germania. Discorso di Ministero Treviranus
CS. Germania. Esito delle elezioni per iI Reichstag
CS. Germania. Opening of the new Reichstag (13 Oct). Bruning announces
his programme (16 Oct)
CS. Germania. Bruning's financial measures approved by Hindenburg (1 Dec)
CS. Germania. Bruning's financial measures approved by the Reichstag (6
Dec) despite opposition of the extreme parties
CS. Germania. Resumption of the Reichstag (3 Feb). Bruning survives vote
of no confidence with Communists and Nazis jointly attacking the
government. Nazi Party walks out of the Reichstag (10 Feb)
CS. Germania. Reichstag recesses (26 March) until October. Decree
announces new restrictions on political meetings
CS. Germania. Stennes revolt against Hitler and 'legality'
[unsigned article]: II Nazionalsocialisrno in Germany
CS. The Chequers meeting: economic crisis in Germany and suspension of
reparations
II Comunismo sovietico e la Rivoluzione spagnuola [review of the German
edition ofTrotsky's book 'The Spanish Revolution']
CS. Germania. Economic and financial measures (8 Dec)
CS. Germania. Prime awisaglie della lotta presidenziale
CS. Germania. Esito delle elezioni presidenziali (results)
CS. Germania. Lotta per Ie elezioni della dieta prussiana. I candidati alia
presidenza del Reich
CS. Germania. Esito delle elezioni presidenziali e della dieta prussiana
CS. Germania. Cad uta di Bruning. Von Papen nuovo Cancelliere
CS. Germania. Le 'Truppe d'Assalto' nuovamente perm esse
CS. Germania. Torbida vigilia ellettorale
CS. Germania. Esito delle elezioni per il Reichstag (results)
CS. Germania. Prowedimenti di rigore. Hitler alia conquista del potere
CS. Germania. La radunata degli 'Bmi d'Acciaio' a Bertino. Lo scioglimento
del parlamento tedesco. II retiro della Germania dalla Conferenza
del Disarmo
CS. Germania. Conflitto rostituzionale fra iI Reich e la Prussia.
Esito delle elezioni pelitiche
CS. Germania Vicende e soluzioni della crisi
CS. Germania. Programma del Cancelliere Schleicher.
Concordato del Baden con la Santa Sede
CS. Germania. Caduta del ministero Schleicher. Hitler nominato
Cancelliere: formazione del ministero.; primi atti del govemo
CS. Germania. Incendio nel palazzo del Reichstag. Elezioni pelitiche (results)
CS. Germania. Tutto iI petere ai nazionalisti. Inaugurazione del Reichstag
CS. Germania. 'Unitary' Law of 7 April abolishing federal structure of theState
CS. Germania. Hitler's speech of 17 May
CS. Germania. Totalitarismo in atto
CS. Germania. Concordato con la Germania (8 July)
CS. Germania. Dalla 'rivoluzione' alia 'evoluzione'. Contro i nemici della Stato
CS. Germania. Congress of National Socialists at Nuremberg
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18 November E.Rosa, SJ: II Concordato dela Santa Sede con la Germania
2 December CS. Germania. Votazione plebiscitaria
1934 1January
3 February
7 April
19May
20 October
CS. Germania. Ordinanza sulla 'sterilizzazione' (9 Dec)
M. Barbera, SJ: Mito Razzista Anticristiano (Rosenberg's book)
CS. Germania. Episodi ostili ai cattolici
A.Messineo, SJ: La Concezione dello Stato nel Terzo Reich
E.Rosa,SJ: 'LaQuestione Giudaica' e l'Antisemitismo Nazionalsocialista
Rassegna settlmanele deUa stampa eatera
(Weekly Review of the Foreign Press)
The Weekly Review of the Foreign Press was produced by the press office of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was an impressive publication consisting of excerpts in
translation from foreign, mostly European, newspapers and reviews on weekly
political events country by country. Under the rubric 'Germany' for example, it
reported the reactions of the German and foreign press to the main developments
in German politics each week. These excerpts were pieced together by editorial
additions putting the events and issues in context. These often included useful
summaries bringing the reader up to date with the latest political facts.
It was not primarily an organ of "ideological struggle". The fascism in its editorial
approach appeared particularly in its presentation of excerpts from socialist and
communist newspapers, including the Soviet press, and in its perspective on
'General Political Problems' like lithe decadence of democracy as a system of
governmenr (20 May 1930). As with all the fascist publications he received,
Gramsci applied his formidable skills in 'philological criticism' in order to ascertain
the facts and to get an objective view. For example, the Weekly Review follOwed
the expansion of the Nazi movement with close interest and gave regular coverage
to the Nazi and nationalist press, but it also reported the reactions of the French
and Polish press where the progress of the Nazi movement was followed with
growing concern and was greeted with sceptical or hostile comment. Gramsci
could therefore get a rounded view of events.
It was Gramsci's most important source of continuous news about national and
international politics between 1929-33, including of course German politics. When
other sources gave an incomplete picture or were withdrawn altogether, he could
continue to follow the thread of events in the Weekly Review. He does not cite it
very often in the notes, but he seems to have followed it closely during two critical
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phases of the German crisis: around the time of the elections in September 1930
and at the time of Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in January 1933. A complete
list of the contents of the rubric 'Germania' would be too detailed to give here, but
the following samples are representative of the continuity and extent of its
coverage.
Rubrics: G = Giomali; R = Riviste
Sample: October1929-December1930
(from the death of Stresemann to the Nazi electoral 'breakthrough' and reactions to it)
1929
October
1 G. Relazioni con la Francia - Rivelazioni su approcci per un'alleanza franco-tedesca - Una
lettera di POincare e la risposta di Rechberg
8 G.La situazione interna - Vivace lottadi partiti sui risultati dell'Aja - La preparazione d'un
'referendum' contro it Piano Young - Gli attentati dinamitardi - Aspri dissidi per la riforma della
legge sui sussidio al disoccupati - II compleanno del Presidente Hindenburg
La morte di Stresemann e la politica estera tedesca da Locarno all'Aja
15 G. Ancora commenti sulla morte del dottor Stresemann e sulla politica estera del Reich -
L'assunzione da parte del dottor Curtius dell'interim del Ministero degli affari esteri - Lo
scioglimentodelle organizzazioni degli Elmetti d'acciaio e della commissione nazionale per iI
referendum contro iI piano Young
Relazioni con la Grecia
Le aspirazioni coloniali tedesche e una pro posta di Lord Rothermere
R. La morte di Gustavo Stresemann - La sua opera di uomo di Stato
22 [No report on Germany]
29 G. Ancora sulla lotta tra nazionalisti e Governo circa i1'referendum' contro il piano Young - Una
lettera ed un giudizio del Presidente Hindenburg - L'iniZio dellesottoscrizioni per la valid ita del
plebiscito - Nuovi commenti sullo scioglimento degli 'Elmi d'acciaio' - Le e1ezioni amministrative
a Bertino e 10 scandala Sklarek nell'amministrazione comunale - II problema del regresso
demografico tedesco
Relazioni con la Francia: la proroga delle trattative per la soluzione anticipata della questlone
deilaSarre
Relazioni con I'URRS: IIquarto anniversario del Tarattato di Rapailo
R. Ancora commenti sulla morte di Gustavo Stresemann e sulla politica estera del Reich -
L'interim degli affari esteri aI sig.Curtius
November
5 G. Ancora sui referendum per iI p1ebiscito contro it piano Young - La lotta fra i partiti ed un
nuovo intervento del Presidente Hindenburg
La morte del Principe B.von Bulow - La sua opera politica
R. Ancora commenti sulla morte di Gustavo Stresemann e sulla sua politica
12 G. L'esito del referendum per it plebiscito contro iI piano Young - La politica estera: Relazioni
con I'ltalia e con la Francia
R. La morte del Principe di Bulow - La sua opera polltica
Relazioni con la Francia - II problema della Sarre e Ie trattative per la sua anticipata soluzione
[R. Stati Uniti. La crisi borsistica - Le ripercussioni in Europa]
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19 G. La nomina del sig.Curtius a Ministero degli esteri e del sig. Moldenhauer a Ministero
dell'economia
Relazioni con la Francia: un passo dell' Ambasciatore von Hoesch circa la data dello sgombero
della Renania
26 G. L'esito delle elezioni municipali a Berlino - L'assemblea generale dei tedesco-nazionali e le
dichiarazioni di Hugenburg
Relazioni con la Francia e I'Inghilterra - Un discorso di Mons. Kaas sui rapporti con la Francia -
Un nuovo dell'Ambasciatore germanico circa la convocazione della seconda Conferenza
dell'Aja - Una lettera del Ministero Snowden a proposito della restituzione delle eccedenze
sulle liquidazioni delle proprieta tedesche - L'inizio delle trattative franco-tedesche per la
soluzione anticipata della questione della Sarre
December
3 G. Ancora sui Congresso dei tedesco-nazionali - Dichiarazioni di Hugenburg e le tre mozioni
votate - L'esito ufficiale del referendum per chiedere iI plebiscito contro iI piano Young ed iI
progetto di legge relativo - II govemo del Reich contrario aI plebiscito
Relazioni con la Francia - Le trattative per la soluzione anticipata del problema della Sarre
1 0 G. Relazioni con la Francia - Ancora sulle trattative per la Sarre - La sgombero della seconda
zona renana - Relazioni con iI Belgio: La campagna di a1cuni giomali tedeschi per iI terntono
Eupen-Malmedy
17 G.La legge per la difesa della Repubblica e per la pacificazione della vita politica - Un discorso
del Ministero degli esteri Curtius contro iI progetto di legge nazionalista per iI referendum sui
piano Young -II progetto respinto dal Reichstag - La scissione nel partito tedsecso-nazionale-
II memoriale del presidente del Reichsbank sui piano Young e la risposta del Govemo -
Dichiarazionl del Cancelli ere sulla riforma finanziaria - La riunione della Confederazione
dell 'industria
L'SOth anniversario del generale Mackensen
24-31 G. La situazione del bilancio -la ripresa delle discussioni sulla riforma finanziaria - II voto di
fiducia - L'atteggiamento del dottor Schacht e i prestiti esteri - II rifiuto dei banchieri americani -
II prestito interno - Disordini del dlsoccupati - II progetto di 'allargamento' della riforma
finanziaria - Le dirnissioni del Ministero e del Sottosegretario aile Finanze
Relazioni con la Francia: Ancora sulla futura Conferenza dell'Aja e sui problema della Sarre - II
plano Young e iI diritto di rioccupazione francese della zone evacuate - La Conferenza degli
ambasciatori e Ie ferrovie della provincia renana - Un'intervista del Generale Groener sugli
armamenti tedeschi in risposta aile asserzioni fatte alia Camera francese
Relazioni con la Citta del Vaticano - La partenza di S.E. iI Nunzio Pacelli
L'espansione economica della Germania in Turchia e in Persia
[A. Stati Uniti. Ancora sulla crisi borsistica di New York - L'atteggiamento del Governo federale)
1830
January
7 [No report on Germany)
14 G. Ancora sulla situazione del bilancio e sulle dimissioni di HiHerding - II passaggio del
Ministero dell'Economia Moldenhauer aile Finanze e la nuova nomina a Ministro dell'Econornia
del dott.Roberto Schmidt - L'esito del referendum contro iI Piano Young - La tesi del Govemo
e quella dei nazionalisti
Relazioni con la Francia: piano Young, Conferenza dell'Aja e gil impegni tedeschi - La
sgombero anticipato della Renania ed un rnemoriale del Maresciallo Foch - II dott.Schacht e la
delegazione tedesca a1I'Aja
[Problemi Politic! Generali. La seconda Conferenza dell'Aja]
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21 [No report on Germany]
[G.Problemi Politici Generali. La Conferenza dell'Aja - Per I'applicazione del piano Young etc]
[A. Problemi Politici Generali. II problema delle riparazioni all'Aja etc]
28 [No report on Germany]
[G.Problemi Politici Generali. La fine della seconda Conferenza dell'Aja - La soluzione del
problema delle sanzioni nei riguardi della Germania - L'accordo su tutte Ie clausole del piano
Young per Ie riparazioni tedesche etc]
February
4 [No report on Germany]
[G.Problemi Politici Generali. Dop la seconda Conferenza dell'Aja - Commenti ai risultati
ottenuti dalla Germania etc]
11 [No report on Germany]
18 [No report on Germany]
[G. Problemi Politici Generali. Oop la seconda Conferenza dell'Aja - I risultati ottenuti dalla
Francia e dalla Germania etc]
25 G. Problemi politici all'interno e all'estero - La situazione dei partiti - Relazioni con la Francia -
Problemi economici: la situazione delle industrie - Problemi sociali: i moti comunisti
March
4 [No report on Germany]
[A.Problemi Politici Generali. La crisi dello Stato mademo]
11 G. Le agitazioni comuniste - La disoccupazione - Le discussioni sui piano Young e la riforma
finanziaria - II deficit - Le richieste dei popolari - Le dimissioni del dottor Schacht da presidente
della Reichsbank - II mutamento del Ministero dell'intemo in Prussia
18 G. Ancora sui problema finanziario e sull'approvazione del piano Young - L'atteggiamento dei
partiti ad un intervento del Presidente Hindenburg - La definitiva approvazione del piano
Young - La nomina di Luther a successore di Schacht nella presidenza della Reichsbank
Lamorte dell'ammiraglio von Tirpitz
Le aspirazioni coloniali tadesche - Un voto della Camera olandese e un reclamo degli abitanti
di Samoa - Discussioni sui sistema dei mandati - II problema della nazionalita dei tedeschi
residenti nelle ex-colonie germaniche - La contrarieta per i progetti inglesi riguardanti I'unione
doganale fra Kenia, Uganda e Tanganika
25 G. Dopo I'approvazione del piano Young e la firma apposta del Capo dello Stato - Un
manifesto del presidente Hindenburg al popolo tedesco e I'atteggiamento dei partiti di destra
- Propaganda nazional-socialista in sene alia Reichswehr e attentati terroristici -
L'approvazione della legge sulla protezione della Repubblica - II Capo dello Stato firma anche
iI trattato di liquidazione con la Polonia
A. Dope la ratifies del piano Young - I partiti politici al Reichstag - La situazione finanziaria - Le
dimissioni di Schacht e la nomina di Luther alia Presidenza della Reichsbank
April
1 G.Dissidio fra iIGovemo del Reich e quello di Thuringia - La sitUazione economics - La crisi
ministeriale - Le dimissioni del Gabinetto Muller e il nuovo Governo
Sulla polities estera in generale - Relazioni con I'URSS - Polemiche sui trattato di RapaJlo
R. La ratifies degli accordi per Ie riparazioni e 10sgombero della Renania
8 G.Ancora sulla crisi economica e sulla crisi ministeriale - II nuovo Gabinetto Bruning - Le
dichiarazioni ministeriali
15 G.Ancora sui nuovo Ministero Bruning - Un questionario del tedesco-nazionali - La
discussione sulle dichiarazioni govemative e iI voto di fiducia - II distacco dei social-nazionalisti
dai tedesco-nazionali - I compiti finanziari del nuovo Governo
Relazioni con la Francia e con I'ltalia
A. Dopo la ratifica del piano Young - II nuovo Ministero - Le prospettive economico-industriali
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22 [No report on Germany]
29 G.Ancora sulta situazione del partito tedesco-nazionaie e sui suoi rapporti con quelto social-
nazionale -ilavori parlamentari e it voto di fiducia - L'approvazione dei prowedimenti agrari e
dei prowedimenti fiscati per la copertura del bilancio - La situazione economica - La questione
dell'incrociatore B
Relazioni con la Francia - II problema dello sgombero della Renania - Le nuove prospettive per
la politica estera tedesca
May
6 G. L'assemblea del partito tedesco nazionate: la scissione evitata - I principali problemi di
politica interna: bitancio, agricoltura, partiti - In occasione del quinquennio della presidenza di
Hindenburg - Commenti al yolo dello 'Zeppelin' su Londra e Parigi e relazioni con I'lnghilterra e
laFrancia
A. Dopo la ratifica del piano Young - " Gabinetto Bruning - La situazione parlamentare e it
movimento dei partiti - L'atteggiamento dei tedesco-nazionali - I prowedimenti agrari e fiscali -
II Governo del Reich e quello deUa Prussia - La penetrazione straniera nelle industrie
13 G. La situazione dei tedesco-nazionali e l'atteggiamento degli altri partiti verso it Gabinetto
Bruning - II bilancio finanziario al Reichstag - Dichiarazioni del Ministero Moldenhauer
20 [No report on Germany]
[Problemi Politici Generali. La decadenza deUa democrazia come sistema di governo]
27 A. Aspetti della democrazia e del parlamentarismo - Misure a favore dell'agricoltura - Rinascita
economica e previsioni per l'awenire dell'industria e del commercio
June
3 G. La situazione dei partiti - II problema agrario - II bilancio della Reichswehr - Dichiarazioni del
Ministero Groener
Relazioni con la Francia - L'ordine di sgombro della terza zona renana - Dopo i oolloqui di
Ginevra Briand-Curtius: II problema delta Sarre
10 G. La situazione economica e it disavanzo del bilancio - Disoccupazione, sussidi e inasprimenti
fiscali
Relazioni con la Francia: Ancora sullo sgombro della Renania - La visita a Parigi e Ie
dichiarazioni del capo dell'Associazione giovanile tedesca 'lungdo' - Relazioni con I'URSS
A. La tendenza anti-demografica e la preponderanza prussiana
Relazioni con la Francia - L'evacuazione della Renania - La situazione nella Sarre
17 [No report on Germany]
24 G. Le lotte dei partiti in Bavaria - La situazione interna del partito social-nazionalista - Un
decreto del Governo bavarese contro I'uso delle uniformi dei partiti - Un altro del Govemo di
Prussia - L'industria e la stampa tedesca - Congresso della stampa tedesca a Monaco -
L'eoonomia rurale discussa alia Dieta bavarese - La 'comunanza dellavoro' -1 prowedimenti
progettati dal Reich per far fronte aI deficit finanziario - Dichiarazioni del Ministero del Lavoro -
Relazioni con la Francia: anoora su110sgombero deUa Renania
July
1 G.La proibizione d'un comizio e d'una adunanza dei sociat-nazionalisti - Ancora suI divieto
delle uniformi di partito - I suocessi e1ettorali degli hitleriani in Sassonia -11programma del
Ministero Moldenhauer per far fronte aI disavanzo - II rapporto dell'agente generate delle
riparazioni - Le dimissioni di Moldenhauer
Relazioni con l'URSS - La creazione d'un comitato tedesco-sovietico per comporre le
divergenze tra i due Paesi
A. La situazione economica dopo la ratifica del piano Young
8 G. Ancora sulla vittoria elettorale degli hitleriani in Sassonia - Le organizzazioni operaie
cattoliche - II 4th anniversario della 'Confessio Augustana' e it concordato -La concentrazione
454
industriale - Dopo Ie dimissioni del Ministero delle finanze Moldenhauer - II bilancio degli Esteri
e undiscorso del Ministero Curtius: Renania, Sarre, relazioni con I'ltalia, con I'URSS e con la
Polonia - La nomina di Dietrich a nuovo Ministero delle finanze - Dichiarazioni di Curtius sulle
aspirazioni coloniali - Dichiarazioni del Ministero di lavoro - Le proposte del Govemo per la
coperturadel bilancio
La cessazione del regime d'occupazione in Renania - Festeggiamenti e manifesti - Incidenti
contro i separatisti -La questione della Sarre
Relazioni con I'URSS - Ancora sulla Commissione germano-sovietica
15 G. Ancora sulla cessazione del regime d'occupazione in Renania - Relazioni con la Francia -
Colloquio del sig. Briand con l'Ambasciatore germanico sugli incidenti contro i separatisti -
Un passo francese a Bertino
R. Lo sgombro della Renania - II problema della Sarre - Reiazioni con la Francia - L'opera del
Gabinetto Bruning e la recente vittoria nazional-socialista
22 G. La scissione del partito sociat-nazionalista - Un discorso di Adolfo Hitler sugli scopi del
partito - Nuove proibizioni di uniformi di partito - Ancora sui progetti finanziari per coprire it
deficit del bilancio - Lo scioglimento del Reichstag - Una lettera del Presidente Hindenburg
per la revoca dello scioglimento degli 'Elmetti d'acciaio' - La composizione della vertenza e la
partenza del Presidente per la Renania
R. Relazioni con la Francia - L'evacuazione della Renania e it problema della Sarre
29 G. Ancora sullo scioglimento del Reichstag e sull'intervento del Presidente Hindenburg nella
politica interna
Relazioni con la Francia - Dopo la sospensione dei negoziati per la Sarre
R. Relazioni con la Francia - La sospensione dei negoziati per la Sarre
[La crisi economica mondiale]
AugU8t
5 G. L'inizio della lotta elettorale - La formazione di nuovi partiti: dei contadini, del popolare
conservatore, del partito di Stato - Un decreto-Iegge in applicazione dell'art.48 che sanziona
la tassa di sacrificio
Relazioni con la Francia - I festeggiamenti in Renania: it trionfale viaggio del Presidente
Hindenburg - IIlutto a Coblenza per la cad uta di un ponte
R. La dissoluzione del Reichstag - Previsioni sull'esito delle future elezioni politiche
12 R. La lotta elettorale e la situazione politica - II nuovo partito di Stato
[La crisi economica mondiale]
19
26 G. Ancora sui discorso del Ministro Treviranus - Commenti e polemiche
Relazioni con la Francia - Ancora sui festeggiamenti in Renania - I negoziati per la Sarre -
Dichiarazioni del Capo della delegazione tedesca
R. II movimento nazionat-socialista - II generale von Seeckt entra nella politica attiva - IIdiscorso
del Ministro Treviranus - Provvedimenti economici del Governo
September
2 G. Ancora sui discorso Treviranus: it problema delle revisioni dei trattati - La situazione
elettorale - Conflitti e manifesti - La crisi bavarese
[R. Depressione economica e disoccupazione]
9 G. Dopo it discorso di Treviranus: relazioni con la Francia e la Polonia - II revisionismo - La
campagna elettorale - Un discorso del dott. Held - Un discorso del Cancelliere Bruning sulla
politica estera e interna della Germania - II generale von Seeckt e Ie forze armate tedesche
Relazioni con I'URSS - La morte dell'ex-tenente Amlinger - Un comunicato della Reichswehr
R. Dopo it discorso del Ministro Treviranus - II revisionismo - Relazioni con la Francia, it Belgio e
la Polonia - Lacampagna elettorate
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16 R. La situazione economica e la disoccupazione - Ii revisionismo - Ancora sui discorso di
Treviranus -I rapporti franco-tedeschi, la politicadi Locarno e le elezioni
23 G. I risultati delle elezioni generali pelitiche - La posizione del gabinetto Bruning -
L'impressione in Francia e in Inghilterra
30 R. Le elezioni tedesche - Le posizioni reciproche dei partiti al Reichstag - La ripercussione
delle elezioni in Austria
October
7 G.Ancora sui risultati delle elezioni generali politiche - Ripercussioni SUlia politica interna e
sulla politica estera - Dichiarazioni di Wirth, di Hitler e del Cancelliere Bruning - II nuovo
programma del Gabinetto Bruning
R. Ancora commenti ai risultati delle elezioni tedesche - Le cause della vittoria nazional-
socialista - L'atteggiamento dei partiti aI Reichstag -La politica dei nazional-socialisti nei
riguardi della Francia
14 R. Ancora sui risultato delle elezioni - Le cause economiche e sociali della vittoria degli
hitleriani - I commenti francesi prospettano la necessita di un aumento di forze militari in
Francia
21 G. Ancora commenti aI risultato delle elezioni - Un articolo di Lord Rothermere e la polemica
suscitata nella stampa tedesca - Le intenzioni dei social-nazionalisti - La campagna contro iI
Piano Young - II raduno degli 'Elmi d'acciaio' a Coblenza - II programma finanziario del Governo
- La inaugurazione del nuovo Reichstag e I'atteggiamento dei partiti
R. Dopo le elezioni - La situazione politica e finanziaria - La situazione estera e le relazioni con
a Francia
28 G. L'elezione del sig.Loebe a Presidente del Reichstag - Le dichiarazioni ministeriali -II voto di
fiducia - Un discorso di Braun alia Dieta prussiana - Lo sciopero dei metallurgici - La campagna
per la revisione dei trattati e i commenti aile proposte di Herve - Relazioni con la Francia
R. Le relazioni con la Francia e la possibilita d'un accordo dopo i risultati delle elezioni
November
4 G. Commenti al voto di fiducia per iI Ministero Bruning e alia elezione di Loebe a Presidente
del Reichstag - La nomina di Severing a Ministro dell' interno di Prussia - Nuovi commenti aile
proposte di Herve per un'intesa franco-tedesca - La risposta di Hitler
R. II partito di Stato - La situazione economica - La sciopero dei matallurgici
11 G. Dopa la riapertura del Reichstag e iI voto di fiducia aI Govemo Bruning - II programma
finanziario - Ancora sulla campagna revisionista e sulle propaste di Herve - Dichiarazioni del
Cancelliere Bruning sui rapporti fra la Germania e la Francia
R. II movimento hitleriano e i suoi scopi - L'attuale situazione al nuovo Reichstag e Ie difficolta
politiche ed economiche del Gabinetto Bruning - La campagna revisionista
18 R. La situazione del Gabinetto Bruning - L'azione odierna e futura dei nazional-socialisti - La
campagna contro iI piano Young
25 G. Conseguenze della crisi economica - 111000 della vertenza metallurgica - L'azione per il
ribasso delle mercedi e del costo della vita - Le richieste della Lega agraria - Le discussioni
sulle riparazioni
II revisionismo - Seguito della polemica tra Herve e Hitler - Relazioni con la Francia
R. La crisi economica e le sue ripercussioni palitiche - Relazioni con la Francia - Possibilita di
una revisione dei trattati - Conseguenze eventuali della revisione
December
2 G. II discorso del Ministro Curtius suUa politica estera - Relazioni con la Francia - II problema del
disarmo - II revisionismo
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9 G. La politica finanziaria ed economica del Governo - Le dimissioni del Ministro delle finanze - I
progetti finanziari discussi al Reichstag - Dichiarazioni del Ministro delle finanze
II Congresso del partito popolare bavarese
A. Le riforme finanziarie e la situazione psicologica del popolo tedesco
[A. Inghilterra. II sistema del governo e quello elettorale (Ramsey Muir's critique)]
[A. Problemi Politici Generali. Democrazia, monarchia, e dittatura in Europa]
16 G. L'approvazione al Reichstag delle leggi emanate con decreti Ministeriali in materia
finanziaria
Relazioni con la Polonia - Una nota del Governo di Bertino alia Societa delle Nazioni
23 R. L'azione per iI ribasso dei prezzi - Gli atteggiamenti dei gruppi politici e la crisi della
democrazia
30 R. La crisi economica - Propaganda bolscevica e Ie relazioni con I'URSS - I'aspirazione a
riavere iI 'corricloio' polacco - La necessita di crediti - Relazioni con la Francia
* * *
Sample: January-August 1933
(from the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor to the abolition of other political parties and the
announcement of the Reich Concordat)
January
3-10 G. Ancora sui programme del Cancelliere - Nuovi commenti sulla situazione interna del
socialnazionalismo - L'ordinanza presidenziale per la pace nel Paese - L'assistenza ai
disoccupati
17 G. Ancora sull'amnistia e sulle altre misure del Governo - Messaggi e dichiarazioni di
capodanno del Presidente, del Cancelliere e di Hitler - II colloquio Hitler-von Papan - Politica
nazional-socialista - it movimento revisionista
Accordi commerciali con la Francia
24 G.La situazione generale politica e i nazional-socialisti -Le elezioni a Lippa - II conflitto fra la
Lega agraria e iIGoverno - Indici di miglioramento nella situazione economica - II bilancio - Sui
Govemo della Bavaria - 1162ndanniversario dell'lmpero germanico
31 G. Conflitti fra i partiti - Ancora sulla riforma della Costituzione bavarese - Un disocrso del
Presiclente della Reichsbank - Le dimissioni del Gabinetto von Schleicher e la formazione del
nuovo Governo: Adolfo Hitler Cancelliere del Reich
II revisionismo e la politica estera - Relazioni con la Francia e con la Polonia - L'atteggiamento
della Germania nel problema del disarmo
February
7 G. Ancora sull'ascesa di Adolfo Hitler al Cancellierato e sulle fasi che I'hanno preceduta - I
manifesti del Cancelliere al partito sociatnazionatista e at popola germanico - L'atteggiamento
del Centro - La scioglimento del Reichstag - Dichiarazioni di Hitler sulle relazioni italo-
germanioo - Anoora sui Governo della Bavaria - Relazioni con I'Austria
La politica del Ministero degli Esteri - L'atteggiamento della Germania nel problema del
disarmo
14 G.L'inizio della campagna elettorale per Ie elezioni al Reichstag - Lo scioglimento della Dieta
prussiana - Ancora oommenti sui Nuovo Governo e sulla mutata situazione politica
R. Oop la nomina di Hitler a Cancelliere - II programma del nuovo Governo - L'inizio della
campagna elettorale
457
21 G. L'ordinanza presidenziale sui diritto di riunione e di stampa - Dichiarazioni del Cancelliere
sulla missione del giornalismo - Inizio della campagna ellettorale: disocrsi di Hitler, Hugenburg,
Von Papen
28 [No report on Germany]
March
7 G. La travolgente vittoria dei social-nazionalisti nelle elezioni e le fasi che I'hanno preceduta -
La campagna elettorale; I'atteggiamento del centro e della social-democrazia - I problemi
federali e la nuova situazione in Prussia; rapporti tra Reich e Lander - Incendio del Palazzo del
Reichstag; prowedimenti contro il comunismo -I risultati elettorali
La situazione economica - Prowedimenti per le aziende agrarie dissestate - La politica
doganale e le esportazioni
14 G. Ancora sui successo elettorale dei socialnazionalisti e del Governo - Le misure contro i
comunisti dopo I'incendio del Reichstag - A proposito del movimento monarchico in Bavaria
21 G. Ripercussioni a11'internoe a1I'estero dei risultati elettorali
28 G. La nomina del generale von Epp a commissario della Bavaria - Le e1ezioni amministrative in
Prussia; nuovo successo dei partiti di Govemo - II mutamento della bandiera del Reich - II
nuovo Ministero della propaganda nazionale - La protesta francese per I'impiego della polizia
ausiliaria in Renania
R. Le elezioni politiche - II trionfo del partito hitleriano
April
4 G. Italia. L'atteggiamento della Germania verso iI Piano Mussolini e le dichiarazioni del
Cancelliere al Reichstag
R. Problerni Politici Generali. La decadenza dello Stato democratico e I'awento di nuove
dottrine politiche - sviluppi internazionali della dottrina fascista
11 G. Italia. L'atteggiamento della Germania [towards Mussolini's 'Four Power' Plan]
G. Germania. L'inaugurazione del Reichstag e della Dieta Prussiana - IIdiscorso
programmatico del Cancelliere e la votazione dei pieni poteri
R. Italia. Consensi stranieri aile dottrine fasciste e critiche ai govemi parlamentari
R.Germania. L'opera riformatrice del Governo hitleriano nel campo costituzionale e in quello
sindacale
18 G. Italia L'atteggiamento della Germania - Commenti aile dichiarazioni del Gran Consiglio
Fascista sui Piano Mussolini
G.ltalia. II Duce a I'opera del Regime - La forma di Governo destinata a succedere alia
democrazia - L'universalita dell'idea fascista
R. Italia. La decadenza della democrazia
25 G. II consolidamento del Governo - Ancora sulla legge dei pieni poteri; I'atteggiamento del
Centro - Polemiche sulla politica estera socialnazionalista - Contro Ie campagne calunniose di
stampa - La questione dell'antisemitismo - L'abolizione delle pregiudiziali cattoliche contro iI
nazionalsocialismo
Le misure contro le infiltrazioni di oppositori tra gli Elmetti d'acciaio, e la progressiva
dissoluzione dei partiti d'opposizione - La nomina dei Luogotenenti per i Lander - II
riassestamento economico - La missione della stampa - Caratteristiche della nuova Germania
Relazioni con I'ltalia, la Francia e I'lnghilterra
R. L'opera del Gancelliere Hitler per la rinscita della Germania
May
2 [No report on Germany]
9 G. L'opera di Hitler per I'unita del Reich - La situazione in Bavaria dopo la riforma: iI nuovo
Gabinetto; la collaborazione dei 'popolari bavaresi'; I'inaugurazione della Dieta - Un discorso
del Cancelliere a Monaco
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R. L'opera del Governo nazionalsocialista per iI rinnovamento della Germania
16 G.Politica estera - Relazioni con Inghilterra - Un'intervista del vice Cancelliere - Relazioni con la
Francia - Relazioni con la Polonia: un colloquio del Cancelliere con il Ministero polacco a
Berlino - La proroga del Trattato di amicizia con I'URSS
23 G. Le riforme sociali del Govemo - La politica interna e la nuova struttura corporativa dello
Stato in due discorsi di Hitler - L'azione contro i sindacati liberi
Le dichiarazioni del Cancelliere sulla politica estera: revisione in base ai trattati; disarmo; parita
di diritti e pace - Accenni al Piano Mussolini e aI messaggio Roosevelt
30 G. Dopo il discorso del Cancelli ere
Risposte di von Papen ad accuse contro la Germania - La politica socialnazionalista
R. Le dichiarazioni del Cancelli ere sulla politica estera
June
6 [No report on Germany]
G.ltalia. Opinioni tedesche (on Mussolini's 'Four-Power Pact')
13 G. L'atteggiamento del Governo del Reich di fronte al problema del disarmo e agli altri problemi
internazionali
La concentrazione delle forze nazionali - Dichiarazioni di Goring alia Dieta prussiana - Una
riforma nella legislazione agraria - La legge per combattere la disoccupazione
20 [No report on Germany]
27 G. La moratoria dei trasferimenti - Discorsi di Hitler e Goebbels sui compiti del
socialnazionalismo - II servizio obbligatorio dellavoro - II'Fronte tedesco dellavoro' -Lo
scioglimento dei reparti di combattimento tedesco-nazionali - L'inquadramento degli 'Elmi
d'acciaio' nel nazionalsocialismo
July
4 [No report on Germany]
11 [No report on Germany]
18 G. La formazione dello Stato totalitario - Lo scioglimento del Partito socialdemocratico e di
quello del Centro - L'inquadamento del fronte tedesco-nazionali nel socialnazionalismo e Ie
dimissioni di Hugenburg
25 [No report on Germany]
August
1 G. Campagna per la parita aerea a propositodi una incursione su Berlino - L'anniversario di
Versailles - La Vertenza della Chiese evangeliche - Elezioni comunali nella Sarre
8 [No report on Germany]
24 G. L'organizzazione unitaria delle Chiese protestante - La firma del Concordato con la Citta del
Vaticano -II nuovo Consiglio di Stato - Lo Stato totalitario: dalla rivoluzione all'evoluzione
Relazioni con I'ltalia, la Francia e I'lnghiiterra: un passo francese e inglese a Ber1ino - L'azione
moderatrice del Governo italiano
R. Gli obiettivi del nazionalsocialismo
29 G. Relazioni con I'Austria: Ancora sull'opera di mediazione svolta dal Governo d'italia -
Polemiche e nuovi incidenti
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Manchester Guardian Weekly
The subscription to the Manchester Guardian Weekly was taken out at the start of
1931. At first Gramsci did not think his command of English was up to it but by the
summer he reported that he found English easier to read than German and that he
was reading it without difficulty. The subscription had to be cancelled at the end of
the year due to the fact that under the new penal code introduced that year by
Alfredo Rocco, the Minister of Justice, Gramsci was no longer allowed to receive
foreign-language publications. Given that most of his sources of political news
were fascist or 'fascistised', it was the best anti-fascist source of political facts and
analysis Gramsci had at any time during his imprisonment.
The paper was edited by Edward Taylor Scott, son of the proprietor C.P.Scott, and
spoke for the tradition of British Radicalism. Politically it was aligned with the
Radical or 'left' wing of the Liberal Party still led by Lloyd George until he resigned
in 1931. It was a bad year for Liberals everywhere but the objective quality of the
paper's reports was probably all the better for having to report so much bad news.
Of the major events of 1931, there were detailed reports of the financial crisis in
Germany in July and the general election in Britain in October, when the Liberal
Party disappeared from British politics.
January
2 Germany's Coal Dispute
9 The Ruhr Coal Strike
Supplement. The Berlin Year [review of Berlin's cultural life in 1930]
German Foreign Policy
16 Six Per Cent Wage Cut in the Ruhr
Supplement. Minorities in Poland [on alleged ill-treatment of the German minority in Poland]
23 Minorities in Poland: German statement to League Council
30 Minorities Treaties Violated: Decision against Poland
Germany's 'Forced' Exports: Goods sold at less than Cost
February
6 Editorial. Germany's Western Frontier
The Nazis in Despair: Germany's New Hope in the League [on political violence in Germany]
13 'German FascistsRetreat'. Nazis retire from Parliament
Stahlhelm plans a Referendeum. Attempt to dissolve Prussian Diet
Editorial.Germany's Uphill Fight
20 Supplement. Anti-Fascists in Germany: Ranks Closing [on the anti-Fascist movement in
Bremen and Hamburg]
27 Communists shot by Police: Unemployment Protest
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March
6 Supplement. Socialist Losses in Brunswick. Communist Victory
13 Supplement. Germany, France, and Russia. Berlin Reflections on the Moscow Trial
French Arm's Increased Power: German demand
20 Violence in Germany. A Nazi Murder
Fighting in Hamburg Parliament
Editorial. The Hamburg Murder
27 Austro-German Customs Union. A Political Storm in Europe
Editorial. Austria and Germany
Supplement. Germany's Pocket Battleships. Estimates allowed to pass
A Nazi Conversion [the Scheringer case]
April
3 The Austro-German Customs Plan. Open to Discussion by the League
[An interview with Trotsky on the Five Year Plan]
1° German ministers invited to London
Editorial. The German Visit
Heavy Nazi Defeat. Domination Ended in Thuringia [collapse of Nazi-Nationalist coalition in
Thuringia]
Against Hitler. Berlin Revolt Suppressed [the revolt of Stennes and the Berlin Storm
Troops]
17 The German visit to England. Vain Fantasies in the French press
Editorial. Conditions in Germany
The Weimar Experiment. A Rather Inglorious Failure [an analysis of the experiment in Nazi
government in Thuringia and of the methods of Frick, Nazi Minister of Interior]
Cartoon from the Munich 'Jugend' showing "King Adolf I" and the proclamation of the "Third
Empire" at Weimar
24 Germany's status at Geneva.
Dyeworks Espionage. German Communist Statement
Referendum in Prussia. Response to Petition
May
1 Crisis in German Fascism. Cartoons from the Moscow 'Isvestia' and the Amsterdam
'Notenkraker' on the recent split in Nazi ranks
Austro-German Customs Plan
8 Labour Day Abroad [reports from Berlin, Madrid, Paris, Moscow on Labour Day celebrations]
Letters. Two letters supporting the report on 'German Political Brutality'
15 German Relations with France. Austro-German Plan the Supreme Test
The Austrian Credit Bank [collapse of the Kreditanstalt]
22 Austro-German Union. Reference to International Court
Fascist Gains in Germany [election results in the state of Oldenburg]
The Pocket Battleship
29 The German Visit to England. Frank Exchange of Views
Patriotism in Germany. New Note of Mockery [memorial for those who died in occupation of
the Ruhr 1923]
German Attacks on Dr.Curtius. The Austro-German Union Plan
June
5 German Minister's Visit. Discussions at Chequers
The Stahlhelm Parade. 150,000 march past the ex-Crown Prince
Financial Experts in Vienna. Stable Currency Guaranteed [remedial measures following the
collapse of the Kreditanstalt]
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Supplement. Poverty and Luxury in Berlin. A Menacing Outlook
12 The Anglo-German Conversations at Chequers. Interpretations of a vague comminque
Return to Berlin. The Chancellor's hostile reception
Emergency Tax inGermany. Salaries and Incomes Cut
19 German Cabinet's Escape. Emergency Decree to be modified
German Reparation Policy. Revision within Young Plan
26 Germany Saved. American Offer a Sudden Relief [the Hoover moratorium and the financial
crisis in Germany]
July
3 Uproar at Berlin University. Attack by Nazi Students
Communists Active in Berlin. A Victory in Brunswick
10 German Views. Saving the Five-Year Plan [German reactions to Stalin's latest speech]
17 Grave FinancialCrisis in Germany. Emergency Measures in Force
An Eventful Week in Germany. The Situation Day by Day
[Recommendations of Macmillan Report on Finance and Industry]
Comment and Criticism. Editorial comment on the economic crisis in Germany
Photograph showing the 'Danat' bank guarded by mounted police after it had closed down
24 Little Relief for Germany. Decision of the london Conference
Dangers in Germany. Political passions rising to fever heat [on the Communist threat to vote
with the National Opposition in the Prussian Referendum]
Comment and Criticism. A Temporary Solution. Editorial on how to restore confidence in
Germany
31 British Ministers in Berlin
Renewed Crisis in Germany [German fears of inflation and the run on the savings banks]
August
7 Confidence Returning in Germany.The Referendum in Prussia
The Prussian Referendum. Aims of the National Opposition
Democracy in Europe. Mr.Gooch and the Outlook in Germany
14 The Referendum in Prussia. Failure of the Dissolution Campaign
France and Germany. Effect of the Prussian Referendum
21 World Bankersand Germany
France and Germany. A Change of Tone in the Paris Press
Bankers Report on Germany
28 [A National Government in Office in Britain]
September
4 Disarming Berlin
11 Decision of the Hague Court against the Austro-German Customs Union
Land settlement scheme for the unemployed in Germany
Hamburg and the Elbe
German Youth Hostels
18 Or.Curtius speaks out at Geneva
Anti-Semitic Riot in Berlin
25 [Britain suspends Gold Standard]
The Pound in Berlin and Paris. German Fears of Inflation
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October
2 Editorial. A Warning from Germany [Nazi and Communist gains in the Hamburg elections]
French Minister's Visit to Berlin. Goodwill but Meagre Results
Germany's Political Crisis. Nazi Victory in Hamburg
9 Rule by Decree in Germany. Tighter censorship and income limits [Bruning's new cabinet]
Editorial. Whither Germany?
Socialist Split in Germany [creation of German Socialist Labour Party]
16 German Chancellor hits out. Socialist support for Cabinet assured
Report of the Harzburg Front rally
23 The Position in Germany. Bruning Cabinet's Majority
30 [Results of British General Election]
Foreign Views on the Election [German reaction to British election result]
November
6 [The New Parliament Assembles in Britain]
Political Extremism in Germany [Nazi gains in the Mecklenburg elections]
13 Propaganda in the German Army. Ministry's statement
Nazi Leaders sent to Gaol [Storm Troops leader gaoled for organising the anti-Semitic riot of
12 September]
Increases in Germany: Devalued Pound's Effect [German unemployment reaches 4,622,000]
20 Germany and Young Plan: Paris negotiations
Political Murder In Germany. Frequency Alarming General Public
More gains for Hitler [Nazi and Communist gains in the Hesse elections]
27 Germany and the Young Plan. Agreement with France. 'CUts' All Round
Germany's Debts to Bankers
Political Crime in Germany
Germany's Financial Plight: Action under Young Plan
Germany's Appeal [German government announces it cannot pay reparations]
December
4 The Nazi Plot in Hesse: Inquiry Ordered
Editorial. The Condition of the German People
Letters. Wage Reductions in Germany
Germany's Private Debts: Chances of Long-Term Credit
Two More German Banks Close
11 A Challenge to Hitler [Bruning's radio broadcast explaining the latest economies and
threatening martial law if Hitler's party continued to incite civil war]
More German Unemployed [German unemployment reaches 5,057,000]
Herr Hitler's Announcement [Hitler promises to repudiate reparations]
18 Germany reaches the limit: No further economies possible
Nazi Reply to Dr.Bruning: To Share Power or Risk Defeat
German Socialists to fight Hitlerism
25 Germany's Ability to Pay: Conference in January at Lausanne?
A German Realist [Review of Alfred Doblin's novel Alexanderplatz]
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Labour Monthly
A Magazine of International Labour
Edited by R.Palme Dutt, Labour Monthly was an organ of the British Communist
Party. By calling itself 'A Magazine of International Labour', it tried to avoid the
impression of being a party organ and to reach a wider audience than the party
faithful. Nevertheless, its contributors included the familiar names of British
communism in the 1930s - Harry Pollitt, Allen Hutt, Maurice Dobb, R.Page Arnot
etc - and many issues carried Stalin's writings and speeches. Its political-
ideological line was never less than completely orthodox. It was critical of the trade
union leadership and the Labour Government of 1929-31 which it began to
characterise as 'social-facist' . Nevertheless, it stood up for the class interests of
labour during the economic crisis as the MacDonald-Snowden partnership
prepared cuts in unemployment benefit.
It was on Sraffa's advice that Gramsci agreed to subscribe to it at the start of 1931.
In July he wrote to Tatiana: "I hope Nino is getting Labour Monthly regularly: the
articles are very uneven in quality but the editor's Notes of the Month are always
excellent. In the July issue there is an article on historical materialism by Prince
Mirsky which has a certain curiosity value since the author who lives as an emigre
in London and was once an officer in Wrangel's army, has only begun to take an
interest in these problems in the last couple of years". Sraffa's high opinion of
Palme Dutt's notes now seems surprising since the editor's undoubted literary flair
no longer disguises as it once did the rigidly orthodox standpOint which
underpinned his monthly analyses of the national and international situation in
1931. Whether or not Sraffa agreed with Palme Dutt's poSition, however, the
attempt to provide a consistent analysis of the current Situation and to place it in a
broad international perspective was intellectually worthwhile and respectable.
We do not know if Gramsci received Labour Monthly regularly. Since it was
a magazine of communist "political agitation" (although in a foreign language), it is
very surprising that he received it at all. However, the success of Gramsci's recent
petition to Mussolini, whose decision effectively overrode Rocco's Ministry of
Justice and the prison governor, may have opened a loophole in the prison
censorship by creating uncertainty or confusion. It was no coincidence that the
loophole was soon closed by Rocco's new penal code published on 27 June 1931
which introduced an official list of permissable reviews excluding foreign-language
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publications. (see the letters of Sraffa to Tatiana, 11 July 1931. and Gramsci to
Tatiana, 27 July 1931. seeking the text of the new regulation).The question is
important not because of the few articles on Germany in the magazine (on the
financial crisis), but because of the serialisation of Stalin's Marxism and the
National Question.
We know for certain that Gramsci received the issues for July and October
containing O.S. Mirsky's two articles (however. see Valentino Gerratana's
discussion of these articles in Gramsci. Problemi di metodo p.147-153), but we can
see that these were the only two issues for the second half of 1931 which did not
include instalments of Stalin's work and it can plausibly be inferred from this that
the issues containing these were intercepted by the prison censor. However, there
is more doubt about the issue for March 1931 containing the text of Stalin's famous
speech in February in which he articulated his vision of Russian history. This may
have got through the loophole before it was closed in June. Gramsci's critical
judgement of Stalin in private conversation with Riboldi at that time, ie, that he had
"the nationalist mentality which is expressed in the cult of the 'Great Russians' ",
may have been formed on the basis of having read this latest speech. This remains
a possibility rather than a probability, but the dates coincide quite closely (see
thesis pp's143-144)
1931
January
February
NM = Notes of the Month. by the editor.
NM. 1931 and War
Garfield Williams: South Wales and the Miners' Strike
Harry Pollitt: The Communist Party and the Whitechapel By-Election
William Rust: The Mosley Manifesto
Hugo Rathbone: Parasitic Decay of British Imperialism
N.Lenin: The Meaning of Militant Materialism
The World of Labour. Spain
NM. Either - Or
Shapurji Saklatvala: The Indian Round Table Conference
Tom Mann: Impressions of South Wales
R.Bridgeman: The Fight against Imperialism
William Joss: Crisis - Conflict - Counter-Offensive
George Padmore: British Finance-Capital in West Africa
L.Sharkey: Strike Struggles in Australia
The World of Labour. International Miners. Germany
Book Review [of G.T.Grinko: The Five- Year Plan of the Soviet Union]
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March NM. The International Situation
J.Stalln: We must become Masters of Technique
William Rust: The Workers' Counter Offensive
H.Lee: The Cotton Weavers' Struggle and Victory
J.Tanner: Engineering Workers, Be Prepared!
Ben Francis: Lessons of the Strike in South Wales
V.I.Lenin.ln Memory of the Paris Commune
Book Reviews.
April NM. Left Socialism and Communism
Harry Pollitt: On the Eve of the Charter Convention
Fred Douglas: Organising 'Slave Labour' in Britain
Allen Hutt: Social Democracy and War on the Soviet Union
G.Padmore: Forced Labour in Africa
VIC Farrant: British Workers and the Wortd 'Spartakiade'
Book Reviews.
May NM.lndia
Hugo Rathbone. The ILP and 'Moscow' Methods
John A. Mahon: The Workers' Charter Convention
'Railworker': Revolt on the Railways
Allen Hutt: 'Disarmament' and the Coming War
Lieutenant D.Scheringer: From Fascism to Communism
V.Chattopadhyaya: The Indian National Congress
G.Padmore: Labour Imperialism and East Africa
Book Reviews.
June NM. War Manoeuvres
William Rust: Which Way out of the Crisis?
Bernard Houghton: Indian Mill-Owners Cry Haiti
Dan Richards: Recent Events in Australia
Edmund Frow: The Attack on the Engineers
G.Padmore: Labour Imperialism and East Africa
J.Stalin: Marxism and the National Problem
World of Labour. Burma
Book Review.
July Frontispiece. The Labour Monthly in the May Day Demonstration, 1931
An Appeal
NM. 1921 - 1931
Messages of Greeting
A. Lozovsky: The Struggle for the Masses in Britain
E.Varga: British Economy and the Task of the Labour Monthly
R.Page Arnot: Ten Years
W.Rust: A Decade of British Workers' Struggle
Hugo Rathbone: Ten Years of Economic Crisis
W.Gallagher: The Royal Commission on Unemployment
Joseph Southall: Socialism versus the Labour Government
Marx on Kautsky (with facsimile of Marx's letter)
D.S.Mlrsky: Bourgeois History and Historical Materialism
Book Reviews.
Cartoons
August
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NM. World Crisis and War
Harry Pollitt: August 1st, 1931
Maurice Dobb: The Crisis in Germany
Friedrich Engels: World War and Proletarian Revolution
Ben Francis: The Mining Situation Today
George Pennington: British Railways and Workers Struggle
J.Stalin. Marxism and the National Problem
Books Reviews
September NM. Towards National Coalition
JL: The Bankruptcy of German Capitalism
P.Glading: The Metal Workers Face Fresh Struggles
Left Wing Socialism and Communism
- Thomas Murray: The ILP and the Labour Party
- 'S': Where does the ILP stand?
Allen Hutt: The Congress of Vienna
A.Lunacharsky: Bernard Shaw
J.Stalin: Marxism and the National Problem
Book Reviews
October NM. The Great Turning-Point
Harry Pollitt: The Charter Fight against all Cuts
Karl Radek: British and American Finance Capital
H.Rathbone: British Imperialism at Bay
Shapurji Saklatvala: The Second Round-Table Conference
Tom Lincoln: Aerial Supremacy
D.S.Mlrsky: The Philosophical Discussion In the CPSU In 1930-31
November NM. The Mass Struggle after the Election
J.Shields: The Struggle and the Factories
H.Rathbone: Left Wing Socialism and Communism
- Money and the ILP
E.Kolman: Marx and Darwin
J.Stalln: Marxism and the National Problem
The World of Labour. Britain - Germany - France -Italy
December Our Conference
NM. New Problems
George Hardy: British Workers and the War in Manchuria
Lett Wing Socialism and Communism
- William Rust: The Opposition in the ILP
- B.J.Boothroyd: The ILP Waits to See
E.Woolley: Organising the Fight against the Means Test
A.Macgregor: Tariffs and the Working Oass
K.S.Shat: The Workers' Welfare League of India
J.StaUn: Marxism and the National Problem
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Corriere della Sera
Under the new penal code of 1931, prisoners were allowed to read a daily
newspaper which had been denied Gramsci since starting his sentence at Turi. He
took out a subscription to Corriere della Sera for the last quarter of 1931, which
was then renewed until June 1932 when he abruptly and unaccountably cancelled
it, probably at the order of the prison governor. It was not restored until Gramsci
was transferred from Turi to Formia in 1934.
The Corriere was edited by Ugo Ojetti who was appointed after Luigi Albertini was
removed in 1925 for his handling of the revelations implicating Mussolini in the
murder of Matteotti. Gramsci often mentions Ojetti in the notes where he is included
satirically in the pantheon of third-rate writers known as "the grandchildren of
Father Brescianin• His dim view of the technical standards of the Corriere under
Ojetti's editorship is recorded in the letters where he complains about the lack of
continuity in its reporting of the creation of the Istituto Mobiliare Italiano in
November 1931.
The continuity of its news reports from Germany in the first half of 1932 could not be
faulted, however. There was seldom a day when it did not carry news of the latest
developments either on the front page or the back page under the rubric
'Recentissime'. This phase of the German crisis was densely packed with events,
including the two rounds of presidential elections (March-April), the ban on the
Storm Troops (April), the elections in Prussia and other states (April), the dismissal
of Bruning (May) and the appointment of Papan (June). During the presidential
elections the Corriere collaborated in reshaping Hitler's image from the party
agitator to the national statesman. The reports from its Berlin correspondents were
flavoured with empathy for their fellow German fascists. The stories carried details
of the intense 'behind the scenes' machinations of the leading actors, giving the
impression that the reporters had privileged access to the ruling circle. Gramsci
frequently cites the feature articles in notes written in 1932 but completely avoids
the political reports preferring, for example, to use factual data on the German
elections taken from the periodicals.
At Formia, Gramsci was reading the Corriere at the time of the dramatic events of
the summer of 1934 - the murderous suppression of the so-called Rohm plot on 30
June, the death of Hindenburg on 2 August and Hitler's assumption of the
presidential power.
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Rubric: R = Recentissime [back page]
1931
October
2 Scioperi di minatori in Germania
3 Gli 84 anni di Maresciallo Hindenburg
4 Battaglia contra Curtius
7 Oggi iI Governo tedesco si dimmettera
8 Un Regime d'eccezione instaurato in Germania
9 Difficile soluzione della crisi tedesca.Bruning avrebbe perduto iI favore di Hindenburg
10 la formazione del nuovo Gabinetto tedesco
11 I capi socialnazionali ricevuti da Hindenburg [comments of Berliner Tageblatt on Hindenburg's
"serious error" in receiving Hitler on the same day as the Harzburg rally of the Right
OPPosition]
13 Bruning si presenta oggi al Reichstag. Vivace polemiche intorno al discorso di Schacht
14 II discorso-programma di Bruning aI Reichstag
15 Le Destre contra iI Gabinetto Bruning
16 La sorte del Govemo Bruning sara deeisa oggi. Hitler replica al discorso del Cancelliere
17 II Gabinetto Bruning salvo per 25 voti. la mozione di sfiducia respinta. II Reichstag aggiomata
20 Grandi si reea a Berlino. L'attesa in Berlino
[Further reports on Grandi's visit to Berlin 21,22.24.27,28]
28 [First results in British general election, 27 Oct]
29 Hitler e i giovani [reports parade of Hitler Youth at Brunswick and reflects on Hitler's appeal to
youth]
November
3 Un Piano tedesco per la sistemazione dei debiti
4 Prima contatto franco-tedesco per la revisione del Piano Young
5 R. I 'punti fermi' francesi per discutere la revisione del Piano Young con la Germania.Bruning
tratta a Bertino con I'ambasciatore di Francia
6 Dichiarazioni di Bruning al centro cattolieo
7 Difficolta di un accordo
8 R. Studenti social-nazionali contra insegnanti ebrei
11 R. L'inchiesta finanziaria in Germania. Le divergenze sui lavori della Commissione,
non ancora risolte fra Briand e von Heesch
13 R. la politica economica del Duce desta unanimi consensi in Germania
14 Un discorso di Bruning: 'la Germania a una svolta decisiva'
17 R. I risultati delle elezioni in Assia [results of election in Hesse]
18 Le trattative franco-tedesche concluse. Draconiane misure in Germania contro la 'fuga' delle
divise estere
19 R. la Solvibilita del Reich. Von Heesch sottopone a lavalla formula tedesca per
I'inchiesta
20 Corriere berlinese
R. la Germania chiede la nuova inchiesta sulla capacita finanziaria del Reich
21 R.Gli scandali finanziari in Germania
24 Modesto bilancio dell'attivita del Comitato economico tedesco
26 Dope le parole, I'azione
R. la latta dei partiti in Germania. Severing contra gli hitleriani
27 R. Un comunicato dei social-nazionali sui piano degli hitleriani d'Assia
28 Coro intemazionaie di proteste per iI pugno sui tavola di laval
R. Gli hitleriani di Assia, difficilmente saranno perseguibile
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December
1 Corriere berlinese
R. Icomunisti offrono un'alleanza ai socialisti e ai Reichsbanner [success of Nazis in election
at Birkenfeld. Communist appeal to Socialists for a bloc against the Right]
2 La Germania e iI protezionismo inglese. Dichiarazioni di Luther
4 R. La crisi economica e finanziaria internazionale
5 R. Una 'pace natalizia' in Germania. Bruning e la social-democrazia
[reports of Rosenberg's visit to London and Hitler's press conference to British and American
press giving his views on German relations with France]
6 R. Rosenberg. Bruning replichera a Hitler [Bruning's radio broadcast in reply to Hitler's recent
press conference]. Due deputati hitleriani in !talia
8 La situazione finanziaria della Germania
R. Ifermenti dei socialisti tedeschi per i prowedimenti di Bruning [results of communal
elections in Wurtemberg. Bruning announces cut in salaries of all public employees]
9 Nuove misure tedesche contro la crisi [Bruning's radio broadcast explaining the latest
economies. Threatens to declare a 'state of seige' against whoever attacks the State. German
unemployment reaches 5,057,000 in November]
10 Corriere berlinese
R. Le ordinanze tedesche osteggiate dai gruppi radicali
11 R. Dichiarazioni di Dietrich alia Commissione parlamentare
12 La crisi economica e Ie ripercussioni politiche. II dissidio Bruning-Hitler
13 R. Un messaggio di Hitler aI popolo americano
15 Tre interviste in Germania.
II Fermento nel Reich. Cruenti conflitti in parrecchi centri
16 IIComitato economico franco-tedesco inizia i lavori a Berlino
R. La tesi tedesca riaffermata dal Ministero della Reichswehr
17 Hitler replica a Bruning, dichiarandosi pronto ad assumere it Governo [text of Hitler's reply to
Bruning's radio broadcast of 8 December]
Corriere berlinese
24 Natale in Germania
R. Le conclusioni del Comitato consultivo del Piano Young. L'accordo tra delegati nel
giudicare la situazione tedesca.
29 La Destra tedesca ha fretta
1932
January
1
2
L'appello del vecchio Presidente
La solidarieta fra gli Stati auspicata dal Maresciallo Hindenburg [Hindenburg's new year
speech]
La condizionata adesione della Francia alia Conferenza di Losanna Critiche varie della stampa
parigiana al discorso di Hindenburg
Momento di attesa in Germania
Gli aiuti alia Germania. Polemiche intorno alia proroga della moratoria Hoover. Speranze in
Germania
Le trattative finanziarie di Berlino. II 'congelamento' dei crediti privati tedeschi prolungato di un
anno - I banchieri inglesi per una soluzione prowisoria
Intensa attivita in Germania
R. A Berlino si discute nuovamente un'intesa Bruning-Hitler
Probabilita di un accordo per i debiti privati tedeschi. Fervore di discussioni suna necessita di
risolvere definitivemente iI problema riparazioni
La grave crisi della marina tedesca. Le triste condizioni del porto di Amburgo
Bruning chiede I'appoggio di Hitler per iI prolungamento dei poteri di Hindenburg
3
5
6
7
8
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9 L'attesa risposta di Hitler
10 Bruningdiehiaraehe la Germania non paghera Ie riparazioni. Viva impressione a Londra e a
Parigi. Pronta replica di Flandin
12 Hitler e Hugenburg contro la proposta Bruning. La rielezione di Hindenburg
13 Preoccupazioni a Bertino per it maneat rinnovo dei erecliti
14 II dilemma degli hitleriani. Hindenburg si, rna Bruning no
15 Senso di sollievo in Germania
R. Inquietudini teclesche
17 Attesa in Germania [hopes for Lausanne Conference]
19 Icavilli della Francia.Quanto ha pagato laGermania
20 L'intransigenza della Francia riaffermato da Laval. Penosa impressione a Bertino
21 LaGermania rifiuta una semptieeproroga della moratoria
22 Vive deplorazioni pel rinvio della Conferenza di Losanna. La Germania ribadisce ehe non
paghera
23 Tentativi per una soluzione prowisoria delle Riparazioni. Attivita diplomatica in Germania
24 Vanae travagliata ricerca di un compromesso per le Riparazioni
26 Unamoratoria totale di un anno sarebbe proposta dalla Francia
27 Persiste it disaccordo anglo-francese. 'Da Versailles alia erisi di '21' [start of series of articles on
the history of German reparations in immediate post-war period]
28 Ladifficotta di un accordo tra Parigi e Londra. 'L'occupazione della Ruhr'
29 IIlavorio in Germania per la rielezionedi Hindenburg
30 La Francia e i pagamenti tedeschi. Nuove manifestazioni d'intransigenza ufficiale. 'II Piano
Dawes'
31 Unacandidatura Hitler alia presidenza del Reich?
February
1 [Opening of Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Further reports on 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12]
3 Storia delle Riparazioni: 'II Piano Young'
4 Scettieismo a Berlino [towards the Disarmanent Conference]
6 Fraelezioni e riparazioni: Una catalisi a rovescio
La eandidatura di Hindenburg verrebbe appoggiata anche dalle Destre
10 La Germania chiede che tutti si mettono al suo Iivello. Le destre tedesche insoddisfatte
11 [Italianproposal of renunciation of all 'aggressive' weapons of war welcomed in Berlin]
R. Gli Elemetti d'acciaio ricevuti da Hindenburg
13 II gioco delle Destre tedesche per tentare di rovesciare Bruning [the Right Opposition offers
to support Hindenburg on condition that he drops Bruning]
14 [Reparations conference fixed for June]
R.Critiche della stampa pangermanista alia decisione per Ie riparazioni
16 Hindenburg si ripresenta contro i deliberati dei gruppi nazionali
19 Un Principe Hohenzollem contro Hindenburg?
23 Hitler candidato contro Hindenburg
24 Dusterberg per gli 'Elmetti d'acciaio'
26 Bruning difende al Reichstag
27 Una maggioranza di 25 voti per Bruning
March
3 I 5 Candidati alia presidenza del Reich
10 Hindenburg 0 Hitler?
11 II discorso di Hindenburg ai Tedeschi
12 L'appello di Bruning per Hindenburg
13 Lagiomata storicadella Germania
15 Hitler decide a continuare la lotta
16 Come Hitler si prepara alia battaglia per le elezioni della Dieta prussiana
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17 IIlavorio dei Partiti tedeschi in vista delle prossime battaglie
18 Le sede dei nazional-socialisti perquisite dalla polizia in Prussia
19 Le perquisizioni aile sedi dei social-nazionali
22 I socialisti contro Groener. Nessun fronte delle destre per la Dieta
27 Un accordo Severing-Hitler per i documenti sequestrati
30 Hitler si prepara ai nuovi cimenti. Un appello di Hugenburg ai partiti borghesi
April
1 Hindenburg, Hitler e Thalmann si contenderanno la Presidenza del Reich
3 L'ex-Kronprinz interviene in favore di Hitler
5 L polizia contro i social-nazionali. La instancabile attivita di Hitler
6 La persecuzione di Severing contro gli~itleriani
8 Uno dei figli dell'ex-Kaiser candidato hitleriano alia Dieta prussiana
9 L'accanita lotta elettorale tedesca
12 I manifesti di Hindenburg e di Hitler al popolo tedesco. Viva impressione per la forte votazione
ottenuta dai social-nazionali [result of second round of presidential election]
13 Un colpo di forza di Braun atl'agonizzante Dieta di Prussia
14 Lo scioglimento dei reparti social-nazionali ordinato con decreto di Hindenburg
15 Dignitosa e ferma protesta di Hitler
16 L scioglimento dei Reichsbanner chiesto dai social-nazionali
17 Hindenburg invita Groener a proporgli misure contro Ieformazioni militari di tutti i partiti
19 Gli attacchi delle destre a Groener. Nessuna decisione per i Reichsbanner
21 II prossimo voto per le Diete tedesche. Le indagini sui "fronte rosso"
23 Le elezioni aile Diete tedesche. L'importanza del voto in Prussia
24 La Prussia elegge oggo la nuova Dieta. Gli hitleriani alia conquista della maggioranza
26 Le consequenze della grande vittoria di Hitler. La gravita della disfatta socialdemocratica e iI
disordine dei partiti di maggioranza.Gli estremi tentativi per ritardare I'arrivo degli hitleriani aI
potere [results of Prussian and state elections]
27 Dopo la vittoria di Hitler. I social-nazionali chiedono a Hindenburg 10 scioglimento anticipate del
Reichstag
28 Collaborazione Bruning-Hitler?
29 Imminente inizio a Bertinodelle trattattive fra Centro e hitleriani
30 Difficile situazione del Gabinetto Bruning
May
1 R. La situazione in Germania. Bruning da Hindenburg un prestito interno per lavori publici?
3 R. In Germania. Nervosismodei circoli militari per Ietergiversazioni del Centro
R.L'ex Kaiser si dinteressa degli awenimenti politici tecJeschi
4 Bismarck e Mussolini. Due epoche, due condottieri di popoli
R. II Gabinetto Buning in crisi. Le dimissioni del Ministro dell'Economia Warmbold.
I generali della Reichswehr contro Groener? Imminente scioglimento di tutte Ie organizzazioni
a caratteremilitare
5 R.Misure di rigore inGermania contro Ieorganizzazioni paramilitari
6 R. Une querela di Hitler contro iI ministro Treviranus
7 R. II Ministro tedesco dell'Economia sostituito col segretario Trendelenberg
8 R. II Reichstag si riapre domani. Nessun approccio tra Hitler e Centro
10 R. Bertino non crede a mutamenti della politica francese
11 R. Movimentata seduta at Reichstag. II programma hitleriano di ricostruzione esposta da
Strasser. Accuse a Groener per 10 scioglimento dei "reparti d'attacco·
13 Una giomata di drammatici eventi a Bertino. La sessione rinviata "sine die", in seguito ad una
clamorosa incidente fra hitleriani e socialisti. Hindenburg congeda Groener. I generali della
Reichswehr per gli hitleriani. Difficilissima situazione di Bruning
14 La crescente pressionedegli hitleriani portera a una prossimo scioglimento del Reichstag
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15 Estremi tentativi di Bruning per rinviare la crisi. Vivi alarmi in Francia per la cad uta di Groener
17 Ammirazione in Germania per la sagace politica finanziaria italiana
18 L'attesa per Ie decisioni di Hindenburg. Varii sforzi di Bruning per salvare il Gabinetto
19 Bruning rinuncia al tentativo di risolvere parzialmente la crisi
20 R. Dichiarazione di battaglia di Hitler al Centro.
"I social-nazionali non vincoleranno la politica della nuova Germania ad un qualsiasi coalizione"
[reports of stories in the Nazi Der Angriff and the nationalist Borsen Zeitung]
[Hitler's speech to the Prussian deputies on the eve of the reconvening of the Prussian Diet]
21 R. La lotta fra hitleriani e Centro si delinea lunga e aspra.
22 R. Nuovo monito degli hitleriani perche Bruning lasci it Governo [reports story in Der Angriff]
25 Le complicazioni della crisi politica tedsca. II ricorso aile decisioni di Hindenburg
26 R. [Opening of Prussian Diet]. Un hitleriano Presidente della Dieta prussiana.
Mischia furibonda nell'aula tra comunisti e social-nazionali. Numerosi feriti e contusi. La seduta
sospesa
27 La situazione tedesca. II dilemma di Hindenburg
Ammirazione in Germania per it genio politico di Mussolini
28 R. Hindenburg sosterrebbe Bruning fin dopo la Conferenza di Lossnna
R. Una proroga della moratoria Hoover considerata impossibile in Germania
29 R. I disordini comunisti in Germania. Vrttime in Renania e ad Amburgo.
31 Under the heading 'L'ondata social-nazionalista in Germania': II Gabinetto Bruning costretto a
dimettersi. Hindenburg ha un lungo colloquio con Hitler
June
1 Nuova Germania [editorial]
Hindenburg incarica von Papen di formare it Governo. Espediente prowisorio. L'attegiamento
di attess di Hitler
2 II nuovo Gabinetto tedesco. Von Papen alia Cancelleria. L'opposizione dei cattolici e it veto
dei tedsco-nazionali. Probabite scioglimento del Reichstag
3 II Gabinetto von Papen completato
4 R. II Reichstag viene sciolto oggi. Le elezioni a luglio. I punti fermi di Hitler
5 Hindenburg ha sciolto ieri it Reichstag. La dichiarazione ministeriale di van Papen
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Gramsci "settles accounts" with Croce in Notebook 10 (now translated by David
Boothman in FSPN pp's 326-475). Croce's philosophical idealism is fundamental
to understanding Gramsci's epistemology. The following works are particularly
important, although his critique is more comprehensive in scope. All are published
by Laterza, Bari. The dates of the first editions are followed by the dates of the
editions used here.
Materialismo Storieo ed Economia Marxista (1900, 10th ed.,1961)
Suggio sullo Hegel (1906, 5th ed., 1967)
Filosofia dell Spirito III. Filosofia della Pratica. Economia ed Etica (1908, 9th ed.,
1973)
Cultura e Vita Morale (1913, 3rd ed., 1955)
Conversazione Critiche. Prima serie (1915, 4th ed.,1950)
Filosofia dello Spirito IV.Teoria e Storia della Storiografia (1917, 9th ed., 1966)
Conversazioni Critiche. Seconda serie (1918, 1950)
L'ltalia dal1914 a11918. Pagine sul/a Guerra (1919, 4th ed., 1965)
Frammenti di Etica (1922)
Elementi di Politiea (1924)
Etica e Politica (1931), combining Frammenti di Etica and Elementi di Politica,
(4th ed., 1956)
Storia d'/ta/ia da/ 1915 a/1915 (1928).
Translated asHistory of Italy 1871-1915, by Cecilia M. Ady (Oxford, 1929)
Storia d'Europa nel secolo decimonono (1932).
Translated asHistory of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, by Henry Furst (Unwin,
1965)
Selected Historical and Critical Work.
The complete bibliography of writings on Gramsci is Bibliografia gramsciana 1922-
1988 , a cura di John M.Cammett, prefazione di Nicola Badaloni (Editori Riuniti,
Roma 1991). There is an online searchable version on the website of the
International Gramsci Society: www.soc.qc.edu/gramsci/.There have since been
two supplements: Bibliografia gramseiana. Supplement updated to 1993, edited
by John M.Cammett and Maria Luisa Righi (Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Roma,
1995); and the Second Supplement compiled by John M.Cammett and updated to
October 1997. The bibliography currently lists some 12,000 publications in 33
languages.
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Michele Abbate: La filosofia di Benedetto Croce a la crisi della societa italiana
(Einaudi, 1966)
Perry Anderson: 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', New Left Review, 100,
November 1976-January 1977.
Considerations on Western Marxism (Verso, 1979)
Nicola Badaloni: /I marxismo di Gramsci (Einaudi, Turin 1975)
Giancarlo Bergami: /I giovane Gramsci e il marxismo, 1911-1918
(Feltrinelli, 1977)
Norberto Bobbio: Saggi su Gramsci (Feltrinelli, Milano 1990)
A.J.B. Bosworth: The Italian Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives in the
Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism (Arnold, 1998)
Christine Buci-Glucksmann: Gramsci and the State.
(Lawrence and Wishart, 1980)
Aaffaele Colapietra: Benedetto Croce e la Politica ltaliana, 2 vols (Edizioni del
Centro Librario, BariJSanto Spirito, 1969-70)
Critica Marxista: Prassi rivoluzionaria e storicismo in Gramsci
Quaderni di Critica Marxista, 3, 1967
Renzo De Felice: Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo
(Einaudi, nuova edizione ampliata, 1993)
Geoff Eley: 'Reading Gramsci in English: Observations on the Reception of Antonio
Gramsci in the English-speaking World 1957-1982'
European History Quarterly, Vol. 14, 1984.
Joseph V.Femia: 'An Historicist Critique of 'Revisionist' Methods for Studying the
the History of Ideas', History and Theory, XX, 1981 [A critique
from the standpoint of Gramsci's "absolute historicism" of
Quentin Skinner's 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of
Ideas',History and Theory, VIII, 1969].
Giuseppe Fiori: Gramsci, Toglistti, Stalin (Editori Laterza, Bari, 1991)
Antonio Gramsci. Ufe of a Revolutionary.
Translated by Tom Nairn (New Left Books, 1970)
Gianni Francioni: L'officina gramsciana. lpotesi sulfa struttura dei 'Quaderni del
carcere' (Bibliopolis, Napoli 1984)
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Eugenio Garin: Con Gramsci (Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1997)
Cronache di filosofia italiana (1900-1943) (Editori Laterza, 1959)
Valentino Gerratana: Gramsci. Problemi di metodo (Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1997)
Paul Ginsborg: 'Gramsci and the Era of Bourgeois Revolution in Italy',
in John A.Davis (ed.): Gramsci and Italy's Passive Revolution
(London, 1979)
Piero Gobetti: 'Storia dei comunisti torinesi scritta da un liberale', in
Scritti politici , a cura di Paolo Spriano (Einaudi, Torino, 1960)
Eric J.Hobsbawm: Gramsci in Europa e in America, a cura di Antonio A. Santucci
(Editori Laterza, Bari, 1995)
H.Stuart Hughes:Consciousness and Society. The Reorientation of European
Social Thought 1890-1930
(Macgibbon & Kee, London and New York, 1967)
James Jolt: Gramsci (Fontana Modern Masters, 19n)
Alfonso Leonetti: Note su Gramsci (Argalia Editore Urbino, 1970)
Guido Liguori: Gramsci conteso. Storia di un dibattito, 1922-1996
(Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1996)
Adrian Lyttelton: The Seizure of Power. Fascism in Italy 1919-1929
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson, second edition, 1987)
Luisa Mangoni: 'II problema del fascismo nei Quademi del carcere '
in Politics e Storia cit.
Chantal Mouffe (ad.): Gramsci and Marxist Theory
(Routledge & Kegan Paul,1979)
Leonardo Paggi: Gramsci e il Principe modemo (Editori Riuniti, 1970)
La teoria generale del marxismo in Gramsci', in
Storia del marxismo contemporanea. Annali Feltrinelli 1973
(Feltrinelli, Milano, 1974)
Le strategie del potere in Gramsci. Tra fascismo e socialismo
in un paese solo 1923-1926 (Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1984)
Hugo Portelli: Gramsci e il blocco storico (Laterza, 1976)
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Salvatore Francesco Romano: Gramsci (UTET, Torino, 1965)
Massimo L. Salvadori: Gramsci e iI problema storieo della demoerazia
(Giulio Einaudi, Turin, 1973)
Anne Showstack Sassoon (ed.): Approaches to Gramsei
(Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative Society, 1982)
Giovanni Somai:Gramsci a Vienna. Rieerehe e documenti 192211924
(Argalia Editore Urbino, 1979)
Paolo Spriano: Storia del Partito comunista italiano ,5 Vols
(Einaudi, Turin, 1967-1975)
I. Da Bordiga a Gramsci
II. Gli anni di elandestinita
III. , fronti popalari, Stalin, la guerra
Gramsei e l'Ordine Nuovo (Editori Riuniti, 1965)
'L'Ordine Nuovo' e i Consigli di fabbrica (Einaudi, 1971)
Gramsei e Gobetti (Einaudi, Turin, 1977)
Antonio Gramsei and the Party. The Prison Years.
Translated by John Fraser (Lawrence and Wishart, 1979)
Palmiro Togliatti:Gramsei , a cura di Ernesto Ragionieri (Editori Riuniti, 1967)
La Formazione del Gruppo Dirigente del Partito Comunista
Italiano ne11923-24 (Editori Riuniti, 1969)
Enzo Traverso: 'Gramsci and the Jewish Question', in
The Marxists and the Jewish Question. The History of a Debate
1843-1943 . (Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1994)
Giuseppe Vacca: 'L'Urss staliniana nell'analisi dei 'Quaderni del carcere' in
Critica marxista, 1988, n.3-4.
Gramsei e Togliatti (Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1991)
Domenico Zucaro: Vita del Careere di Antonio Gramsei
(Edizioni Avantil, Milan-Rome, 1954)
• 'GramsCi all'Universita di Torino 1911-1915',
Societa , December 1957
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Proceedings of International Conferences on Gramsci
Studi gramsciani.
Atti del convegno tenuto aRoma, 1958 (Editori Riuniti, second edition 1969)
Gramsci e la cultura contemporanea.
Atti del convegno internazionale di studi gramsciani tenuto a Cagliari, 1967,
a cura di Pietro Rossi, 2 vols. (Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1969 & 1970)
Politics e storia.
Atti del convegno internazionale di studi gramsciani, Firenze, 1977,
a cura di Franco Ferri, 2 vots (Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1977)
Gramsci nel mondo.
Atti del convegno internazionale di studi gramsciani, Formia, 1989,
a cura di Maria Luisa Righi (Fondazione tstituto Gramsci, Roma, 1995)
Selected Works on German Hlatory
Gramsci's notes on the intellectuals in Notebook 12 were intended to set an
agenda for further research. The following secondary works in English are selected
on the basis of his historicist perspective on Germany's past (ie, the history of the
traditional intellectuals) and its application to the present (ie, the post-war crisis of
hegemony).
Ps.t and Present: on the history of the 'Traditional Intellectuals'
Robert M. Berdahl: The Politics of the Prussian Nobility. The Development of a
Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848 (Princeton, 1988)
David Blackbourn: Populists and Patricians. Essays in Modern German History
(1987)
David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley: The Peculiarities of German History
(Oxford University Press, 1984/1991)
F.L.Carsten: A History of the Prussian Junkers (Scolar, 1989)
Lamar Cecil:The German Diplomatic Service, 1871-1914 (Princeton, 1976)
Gordon A.Craig: The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945
(Oxford University Press, 1978)
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Karl Demeter: The German Officer Corps in Society and State 1650-1945
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965)
Geoff Eley: Reshaping the German Right. Radical Nationalism and Political
Change after Bismarck (Ann Arbor, 1991)
G.Field: Evangelist of Race: The Germanic Vision of Houston Stewart
Chamberlain (New York, 1981)
Fritz Fischer: From Kaiserreich to Third Reich. Elements of Continuity in German
History 1871-1945 (Unwin, 1986)
A.Gerschenkron: Bread and Democracy in Germany, with a new forward by
Charles Maier (Cornell University Press, 1989)
John R.Gillis: The Prussian Bureaucracy in Crisis, 1840-1860
(Stanford University Press, 1971)
Eckart Kehr: Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy. Essays on German
History, edited and introduced by Gordon A.Craig
(University of California, 1977)
Martin Kitchen: The German Officer Corps, 1890-1914 (Oxford, 1968)
Wolfgang J.Mommsen: Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1920
(University of Chicago, 1984)
Lysbeth Muncy: The Junker in the Prussian Administration under William II, 1888-
1914 (Brown, New York, 1944 & 1970)
Peter Pulzer: The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria
(Peter Halban, revised edition, 1988)
Hans Rosenberg: Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy. The Prussian
Experience 1660-1815 (Beacon Press, Harvard, 1966)
M.Tcherkinsky: The Landschaften and their Mortgage-Credit Operations in
Germany 1770-1920
(International Institute of Agriculture, Rome, 1922)
Frank B. Tipton: 'The Rise of Berlin and the Decline of the East 1882-1907' in
Regional Variations in the Economic Development of Germany in
the Nineteenth Century
(Middletown, Conn., Weslyan University Press, 1976)
S.R.Tirrell: German Agrarian Politics after Bismarck's Fall. The Formation of the
Farmers League (Columbia, 1951)
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Max Weber: Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order,
in Political Writings, edited by Peter Lassman and Ronald Spiers
(Cambridge, 1994)
The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation. Edited with an
introduction by Talcott Parsons (Collier-MacMillan, 1969)
Hans-Ulrich Wehler: The German Empire, 1871-1918 (Berg, 1993)
Paul Weindling: Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification
and Nazism, 1870-1945 (Cambridge, 1993
Past and Present: on the 'Crisis of Hegemony' 1929-34
Steven E.Aschheim: The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990
(University of California, 1994)
Pierre Aycoberry: The Nazi Question. An Essay on the Interpretations of National
Socialism (1922-1975) (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981)
David Beetham: Marxists in Face of Fascism. Writings by Marxists on Fascism from
the Inter-War Period (Manchester University Press, 1983)
Richard Bessel: 'Eastern Germany as a structural problem in the Weimar Republic'
Social History, Vol. 3, No.2, May 1978.
- Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism. The Storm Troopers
in Eastern Germany 1925-1934 (New Haven, 1985)
- (ed.) Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: comparisons and contrasts
(Cambridge, 1996)
Martin Blinkhorn (eeJ.):Fascists and conservatives: the Radical Right and the
establishment in twentieth century Europe
(Unwin Hyman, London, 1999)
Karl Dietrich Bracher: The German Dictatorship (Penguin, 1973)
R.Brady: The Rationalisation Movement in German Industry (Berkeley, 1933)
Martin Broszat: Hitler and the Collapse of Weimar Germany (Berg,1993)
Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wipperman: The Racial State. Germany 1933-
1945 (Cambridge, 1991)
Michael Burleigh: The Third Reich. A New History (Macmillan, 2000)
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F.L.Carsten: The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918-1933 (Oxford, 1966)
Robert Cecil: The Myth of the Master Race. Alfred Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology
(Batsford, 1972)
L.Ceplair: Under the shadow of war: Fascism, Anti-Fascism, and Marxists, 1918-
1939 (New York, 1987)
Attila Chanady: 'The Disintegration of the German National People's Party 1924-
1930', Journal of Modern History, March 1967.
T.Childers: The Nazi Voter (Chapel Hill, 1984)
John Cornwall: Hitler's Pope. The Secret History of Pius XII (Viking, 1999)
Jane Degras (ad.): The Communist International. Documents, 3 vols.
(Frank Cass, 1971)
Modris Eksteins: The Umits of Reason: the German Democratic Press and the
Collapse of Weimar Democracy (Oxford, 1975)
J.E.Farquharson: The Plough and the Swastika. The NSDAP and Agriculture in
Germany 1928-45 (London, 1976)
Peter Gay: Weimar Culture (Penguin, 1974)
Horst Gies: 'The NSDAP and Agrarian Organisations in the Final Phase of the
Weimar Republic' in Henry A. Turner (1972) cit.
Sarah Gordon: Hitler, Germans, and The 'Jewish Question' (Princeton, 1984)
Ebehard Jackel: Hitler's World View. (Harvard, 1981)
Harold James: The German Slump. Politics and Economics, 1924-1936
(Oxford, 1987)
Larry Jones: German Uberalism and the Dissolution of the Weimar Party System,
1918-1933 (Chapel Hill, 1988)
Michael Kater: The Nazi Party. A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919-
1945 (Blackwell, 1985)
Walter Kaufman: Monarchism in the Weimar Republic (New York, 1954)
Ian Kershaw: The Hitler Myth. Image and Reality in the Third Reich
(Oxford University Press, 1989)
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- The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation.
(Edward Arnold, second edition, 1991)
- 'Ideology, Propaganda, and the Rise of the Nazi Party'
in P.D.Stachura (ed.): The Nazi Machtergreifung , cit.
- Hitler. 1889-1936. Hubris (Allen Lane, 1998)
Walter Lacqueur:Weimar: A Cultural History, 1918-1933 (Putnam, 1974)
- (ed.) Fascism: A Reader's Guide (Penguin, 1979)
J.A.Leopold: Alfred Hugenburg (New Haven, 1977)
Guenther Lewy: The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964)
Seymour Martin Upset: 'Fascism: Left, Right, and Centre' in Political Man. The
Social Bases of Politics (Heineman, second edition, 1983)
P.H.Merkl: Political Violence under the Swastika (Princeton, 1975)
Robert Michels: 'Charismatic Leadership' (1927)
'The Sociological Character of Political Parties' (1928)
in First Lectures in Political Sociology. Translated with an
introduction by Alfred de Grazia (Harper, 1965)
Jeremy Noakes: 'Nazism and Revolution', in Noel O'Sullivan (ed.): Revolutionary
Theory and Political Reality (London, 1983)
'Nazism and Eugenics: the background to the Nazi Sterilisation
Law of 14July 1933', in R.J. Bullen, H.pogge von Strandmann,
and A.B.Polonsky (eds.):/deas into Politics (LondonlSydney,
1984)
J.Nyomarkay: Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party (Minneapolis, 1967)
Dietrich Orlow: The History of the Nazi Party. 2 vols. (David and Charles, 1973)
Detlev K. Peukert: The Weimar Republic. The Crisis of Classical Modernity
(Penguin, 1991)
Leon Poliakov: The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas
in Europe (1974)
Nicos Poulantzas: Fascism and Dictatorship. The Third International and the
Problem of Fascism (New Left Books, 1974)
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Robert N. Proctor: Racial Hygiene (Harvard, 1988)
David Schoenbaum: Hitler's Social Revolution. Class and Status in Nazi Germany
1933-1939 (Norton, New York & London, 1980)
P.D.Stachura: Nazi Youth in the Weimar Republic (Santa Barbara, 1975)
The Nazi Machtergreifung (London, 1983)
Gary D.Stark: Entrepreneurs of Ideology. Neoconservative Publishers in Germany.
1890-1933 (University of North Carolina, 1981)
Fritz Stern: The Politics of Cultural Despair. A Study in the Rise of the Germanic
Ideology (Anchor, 1965)
J.P.Stern: The Fuhrer and the People (Fontana, revised edition 1990)
Leon Trotsky: The Lessons of October (1924) (Young Socialist Publications, 1974)
The Struggle against Fascism in Germany (Penguin, 1975)
Henry A.Turner (ed.): Nazism and the Third Reich (New York, 1972)
- Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933
(Bloomsbury,1996)
Eugene Weber: Action Francaise. Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth Century
France (Stanford, 1962)
Robert Wohl: The Generation of 1914 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980)
G.Zinoviev: 'Lessons of the German Events and United Front Tactics' , in
The Communist International (Monthly Organ of the ECCI), 2,
February 1924
